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CHAPTER I 
I NTRODUCTION 
A. Berdyaev. 1. Life. Concerning the general study, 
one aspect of which is to be specifically deline'at_ed i n this 
disserta tion, Dean Inge ha s remarked: 
We are dealing with ~ ph ilosophy which is not only 
persona list but in an unusual degree personal, and the 
career of the writer is relevant to an _estimate of his 
opinions to an extent which does not apply to such 
professional teachers as Kant and Lotze.l 
Nicolas Alexa ndrovich Berdyaev, wa s born at Kiev, 
Russia, in 1874 of "gentlefolk society" the social traditi ons, 
prejudices, and interests of wh ich he informs us in a mos t 
illuminating sp i r itual autobiography2 "I ha v,e never seen any 
diff iculty in sacrificing."3 Contrary to the Platonic ad-
monition a ga inst . tasting " the dear• delight too ee.rly,"4 
Berdyaev. read phi losophical books while still a boy. His 
first love was Schopenhauer though Kant likew ise exerted an 
early influence. From t he standpo int of pure phi losophy he 
admits heavy indebt edness to t hes e two champions of t he will. 
I feel a specia l aff i n ity with the dualism of Kant, 
with his distinction betw een the realm of fre ed om and 
t he r ea lm of nature, with his doctrine of fre ed om a s 
of a charac t er wh ich is apprehended by the mind , with 
1. Art.(l946), 195. Symbols in footnotes are ex-
plained in the Bibliography, infra. 
2. SF, 7-19. 
3. SF, 11. 
4. Republic, 539B. Cf. DM, 320, for a personal 
reminiscence indicating an early and marked sensitiveness. 
the Kantian doctrine of the will, with .his view of 
the world of phenomena a s distinct from the real world 
which he not very happily called 'the world of things 
in themselves.' I find myself close also to Schopen-
hauer's distinction of will and 'representation, • to 
his doctrine of the objectivization of the will in t he 
natural world, which creates ~n unreal world, and to 
Schopenhauer 1 s irrationalism.~ 
For the philosophers between Kant and Schopenhauer_ 
Berdyaevvhas little kindred feeling . 
What ~ is entirely alien to me is the monism, the evo-
lutionism and optimism of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, 
their .. ·understanding of the objectivization of the 
spirit, of the universal ego, of reason in the world 
and the historical process, _and especially Hegel's 
doctrine of the self-revelation .of the spirit and its 
development towards fgeedom in the world process, of 
the emergence of God. · 
His social ideas were first _.molded by the influence 
of Tolstoi to whom he says he owed "my .quite early con-
viction .that falsehood and injustice lie at the very roots 
of civilization, that there is orig inal sin in history. 11 7 
As a student he came under the influence of ~~rxism though 
without accepting its metaphysical materialism. 
I maintained the existence of truth and goodness as 
idealist values which are independent of the class 
struggle, of social conditions and the rest; and I did 
not acquiesce in the final subjection of philosophy and 
ethics: to the revolutionary class .strugg;Le. I believed 
in the existence of' truth and justice as determining~ my 
revolutionary attitude to social reality, , and not as 
determined by it.8 
In 1898 Berdyaev suffered exile from. Kiev. to Vologda 
because of his connection with the social democrat party. 
5. SF, 12. 
6. SF, 12. 
7. SF, 12. 
8. SF, 13. 
2 
Following his return he launched his literary career- with . 
the publication in 1901 of Subjectiv,ism .and Individualism 
in Social Philosophy in which he endeavored to describe the 
idealistic· tendemcies in Marx.ism. This work reflected a 
definite struggle which was going on in Russian rev.olution-
ary circles. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century Russian 
Marxism split up; the more cultured Russian Marxists 
went through a spiritual crisis and became the 
founders - of an idealist: .. and religious movement, while 
the majority began to prepare for the advent .of 
Communism.9 
Berdyaev threw his influence and talents in with the 
former movement. He mentions Ibsen's "sharp opposition of 
personality to the community;;" Dostoyevsky's sense of "the 
depth of the problem of personality, and of personal 
destiny;" and Nietzs:che's "transvaluation .of values" and 
"revulsion from rationalism and moralism" as particularly 
influentiaL.during these years •10 
The years leading up to. the Revolution found 
Berdyaev actively engaged- in discuss.ing the momentous: 
political and spiritual issues of the times. 11 I was nev.er 
a philosopher . of the academic type and it .. has never. heen 
my wish that .philosophy should be abstract . and remote from 
life ."11 He wrote ma.!:ly artic·les -:- and published' sev.er.al 
9. EO, 132. 
10. SF, 14. 
11. SF, 7. · Cf. Lampert, Art.(l947), 32lf. " Philo-
sophical works are of two kinds: some lead us through_ in-
tricate systems, like hitherto unknown lands; others bring 
volumes on moral and social philosophy. Reacting against . 
authoritarianism both from the right and · the left b..e says-: 
"The problem of man, the problem of freedom, the problem of 
creativeness cam~ to he the fundamental problems of my 
philosophy." 12 Berdyaev ·. dates the expression . of his own-_ 
independent ,philosophic. outlook from the appearance in 1916 
of The Meaning of the Creative Act. From this -general 
period also we find the first mention _of the German mystic, 
Jacob: Boehme, of whom ·Berdyaev says:, "Something .of him was :· 
grafted into me."13 
Berdyaev also edited a magazine, founded t he "Re-
ligious Philosophical Society 11 in St. Petersburg, establisb..ed 
and presided over the "Free Academy of Spiritual Culture" in 
Moscow. "Owing to the ~ctivity. and combativeness of my 
character, I took my part from time to time in a g ood deal 
of what was going on. 11 14 As a frank critic. of existing in-
stitutions he came into frequent conflict .,with the Czarist . 
reg ime and just before the fall of the imperial g!)vernment ~ 
was threatened once more with exile because of his condem-
nation of the Erastianism of the governing Synod of the 
Orthodox Church. 
us into direct personal contact with the philosopher him~ 
self. The books of Nicolas Berdyaev hav,e always been of the 
second kind." 
12. SF, 16. 
13. SF, 16. 
14. SF, 16. 
Following the Revolution which Berdyaev, considered 
"inevitable and just" but which caused him "stormy inward 
reaction" since its "spiritual aspect was uncongenial • 
• • 
from the beg inning"l5 he became Professor of Philosophy at 
the University of Moscow. A series of lectures deliv..ered 
in I•.1oscow at the "Free Academy of Spiritual Culture" in 
1919-20 formed the basis of one of his most important books, 
The Meaning of History. In this study he frankly rejected 
many Marxian doctrines ·• He was· arrested by_ the Tcheka but 
was. soon _released. 
The historical backdrop ·before VThich .these events : 
were performed has been described by Fedor Stepun: 
In .a very short time great spiritual and cultural in-
tensity had ' developed·. In the years 1919 to 1921 the 
entire cultural life of anti-Bolshevist Russia was: 
concentrated in the free philosophical society and the 
'house of authors' in Petrograd~, and in the religio-
philosophical academy in Moscow. When _one thinks 
back, in the peace and -comfort even .of the agitated 
l!;urope of today, to Soviet Russia in the first .. years, , 
it seems hard to believe that .. half.;.starving men could 
assemble in great numbers several time.s a week in . 
badly lighted and unheated rooms, to debate philo-
sophical problems ' for three or four houra and listen_ 
to poems. And yet .. there can be no doubt that .the 
Spirit, in its highest forms, . was. never . so much man's 
daily bread as. in .the winter of 1920-21, when 
Berdyaev directed the lectures at the ~elig_io­
philosophical academy he had founded.lb 
In 1922 Berdyaev was arrested again and this time 
exiled from his native land on purely ideological grounds. 
15. SF, 16. 
16. RSR, 150f. Of. Lampert, Art.(l947), 311-321, 
for a more extended description of this renascence and its 
limitations. 
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"I was banished from Soviet Russia simply and solely be-
cause of my reaction in defence of freedom of the s pirit."l7 
The paradox of a man exiled both by Czarist and Communist 
regimes is suggested in the following passage: 
The fundamental contradiction in my thinking ahout 
social life is bound up with the juxtaposition in me 
of two elements--an aristocratic interpretation of 
personality, freedom and creativeness, , and a social-
istic demand for the assertion of the dignity of 
every man, of even the most insignificant of men, and 
for a guarantee of his rights in life •••• When a 
levelling tyranny offends a gainst my understanding of 
the dignity of personality, my love of freedom and 
creativeness, I rebel against it .and I am ready to 
express my revolt in the extremest .. ,form. But when the 
defenders of social inequality_ shamelessly defend 
their own priviieges, when capitalism oppresses the 
labouring masf.§s, and turns a man into a thing, then 
also I rebel. 
Following a brief sojourn in Berlin from 1922 to 
1924 where he founded a "Religious PhilosophicaL.Academ:v" 
which brought together all out standing Christian intel-
lectual leaders abroad, Berdyaev moved in 1924 to Paris 
from which center he carried on his activities to the end 
of his life. 
His treatment at · __ the hands of the Communists did not 
make him reactionary save a gainst the Russian emigres and 
bourgeois capitalist society. Both of these latter groups. 
he saw as · equally antagonistic as communism against free-
dom. Politically Berdyaev described his point . of view as 
that of a "personalist socialism." In his multifarious 
17. SF, 16. 
18. SF, 9. 
6 
activities as the recognized philosophical leader of a . 
large colony of Russian ~mi_gres, head of the "Religious 
Ph ilosophica l Academy," editor of a periodical of Russian 
relig ious thought entitled Th~ Way, lecturer at the Russian 
Theological Institute, and author of a dozen or more books 
dealing with various aspects of the spiritual crisis of our 
day Berdyaev . had become at his death an outstanding champion . 
of man and human personality which he defended against 
every type of slavery. 
During the war, Berdyaev, despite failing health a nd 
lack of adequate food, continued to write books and to give 
lectures. Before and during the war his office was v.isited 
by scores of American and Europea.n clergy. Follow:tng the 
war he made lecture tours in Switzerland ~nd England, and 
in 1947. was awarded an honorary doctorate of theology by 
Oxford UDJ.vArs ity. On March 23, 1948, ,at the age of seventy-
five, Berdyaev died. 
A former student has described his character: 
Berdyaev seemed to have an almost irresistible person-
al charm; it was somehow quite impossible not to be 
delighted to meet him--a f act I observed in many 
people, even amongst those whose vie·ws were strongly 
opposed to his. This was due to the exceptional 
warmth of his heart, his great kindness and generosity, 
although personally he often seemed reserved and 
reticent. One never felt in him any sign of ambition 
and rivalry, which is s uch a rare quality in the 
literary world. Yet he never failed to advocate h is 
own spiritual convictions strongl:v and even passion-
ately. It was strange to think that beneath the outer 
. I II 
calm and harmony there lay hidden a 'wandering soul, 
for ever agitated by moral and intellectual problems, 
7 
by struggle and disquietude s .l9 
2. Writing~. Berdyaev's literary career embraced 
nearly a half-century. It was· inaugurated at the turn of 
the century with Subjectivism and Individualism in Social 
Philosoph!• During the next few years he published 
articles in collections of essays. In addition he was the 
author of a number of important works on moral and social 
philosophy--the most outstanding being The Philosophy of 
Freedom, 1911, and The Meaning of the Creative Act, 1916. 
Following . the Russian Revolution and his ex-ile 
Berdya ev .was · a prolific publisher. He wrote on a variety 
of themes, albeit all reflected his central concern with 
the social and religious problems·of the modern age. The 
pr incipal post-war publications were The Meaning of History, 
1923, the fullest exposition of his philosophy of history; 
Dostoyevsky, 1923, literary critic ism.; The New Middle .Ages, 
1924, a supplement. to the earlier philosophy of history; 
Leontiev, 1926, spiritual biography; Freedom .and the Spirit, 
1927, theology and philosophy of religion; The Bourgeois 
Mind and Other ·Essays, 1928, critique of modern civilization; 
Marxism and Religion, 1929, and Christianity and the Class 
War, 1931, analyses of the role of Christianity - in current 
economic and polt tical struggles; The Destiny of :f.!Jan, . 1931, 
ethics; The Russian Revolution, 1931, critique of communism; 
19. Lampert, Art. ( 1947), 312f. 
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The Fate of 1\lfan in the Modern World; 1934, interpretation 
of the significance of present political and cultural mov . e-
ments; Solitude and Society, 1934, and Spirit and Reality, 
1937, spiritual psycholo~y; Slavery and Freedom, 1939, 
philosophical personalism. 
In addition to a veritable barrage of volumes, not all 
of which are noted above, Berdyaev :wrote a consta nt stream 
of reviews and articles for his magazine Put'. In the 
sixty-one volumes examined, dating from 1925 to 1940, some 
eighty-two signed articles and reviews hav-e been noted. 
3. Influence. We are too close to this recently de-
ceased philosopher and theolog ian to be able acc-urately to 
estimate his abiding influence. He undoubtedly did much to 
acquaint the Western world with a knowledge and a ppreciation 
of Russian religious thought. In days when a divided 
Christendom has shown itself inadequate to meet the 
challenge of a paganBnd secular world anything that can 
aid in restoring the essential unity of the Church is of 
value. ~.L. Munzer, writing in The Commonweal, considers 
Berdyaev the most . eminent s piritual link between East and 
West.20 
The interest of the Roman Catholic Church in Berdyaev, 
is evidenced by the fact that all of his earliest English 
translations were published by Sheed and Ward and were 
20. Art.(l944), 198. 
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cordially received by the Catholic press. However, though 
the Catholic Church applauded Berdyaev~s anti-Marxism which 
was· conspicuous in his earliest translated works, a fuller 
presentation of his views· in the volumes from Freedom and 
the Spirit on revealed him as one who could hardly bB 
fitted into the Catholictheological and ecclesiastical 
system. Hence the appearance of much less favorable re-
views · and art'Lcles typified by Vernon J. Bourke's remark: 
"It is obvious · that the general philosophical position of 
Berdyaev is not consonant ~with Catholic Scholasticism. 1121 
How widespread an influence Berdyaev .. has: had upon 
Orthodoxy -itself is difficult .to calculate. , He regards 
himself as · a member . of the Russian Orthodox Church though 
his allegiance is inward rather than outward. Donald Atte-
water ;·in an introduction to Berdyaev' s contribution to 
Essays · in Order states that "many Russian traditionalists 
regard him as a heretic· and a dangerous modernist." 22 
'Nal ter Marshall Horton, after pointing out that ... Berdyaev! s 
more recent work is a . type of free religious speculation ~ 
in line with a mystic tradition in lboth .F.as·tern .and western 
Christianity, adds this note: 
It should of course be understood that this tradition 
has never had official church sanction, .and has always 
been _under some degree of suspicion, . even when it . took 
pains to distinguish itself from heretical Gnosticism 
and non-Christian Theosophy • . Berdyaev endeavors to 
21. Art.(l936), 421. 
22. EO, 87. 
10 
distinguish his · position carefully from such spurious 
brands of speculation; but many of his warmest ad-
mirers, like Father .. Florovs~y, refuse to follow him in 
this aspect of his thought. ) 
However, as one of the leading figures at the Russian 
Theological Institute Berdyaev has had· a part in the edu-
cation of a steady stream of "parish priests of high in-
tellectual and spiritual order, going as missionaries to 
build up new parishes, ,wherever sixty or a hundred Rus s ian 
refug.ee families are to be found." 24 We may conclude that _ 
the fac-t that a great .portion of contemporary Orthodoxy is 
not unaware of the failings r of the Ea stern Church; tha t . the 
need for the development of i ts ethical, social side is 
being realized; a nd that the Orthodox:·. Church is becoming _ 
increasingly oriented to the churches of the West is due in 
no small part . to the literary a nd professor~al activities 
of Berdya ev • 
Berdyaev's influence upon Protestantism can perhaps 
best be indicated through the medium of some of its s pokes-
men. Walter Marshall Horton finds in ... Berdyaev . a theology 
' 
11 distl.nctly liberal 1.n tone" which is neither pessimistic: 
nor -·d1s1llusioned and which 11 presents to disillusioned 
American idealists the possibility,,- of deepening and cor-
recting their faith without denying it."25 In evaluating~ 
contemporary continental theology Horton holds that what it 
23. COT, , 23. 
24. COT, 5. 
25. COT, 39f. 
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"lacks in balance it makes up in depth ." 26 Berdyaev has 
definitely had an influence in the general 11 deepening" that 
has characterized most .. Protestant theology in recent years. 
John A. I\18-ckay holds that "no one has shown such insight 
into the contemporary situation as has NicholascBerdyaev • 
• • • His works entitle him to be regarded as the greatest 
Christian philosopher of our time ." 27 Paul Tillich regards 
him as "one of the outstanding and most representativ.e 
thinkers in present Europe," 28 finds ·him .. 11 1n .full agreement 
with many tendencies of modern and even humanist Protes-
tantism and in full contrast .. to Barth ian Biblicism, "29 and 
concludes that his ideas ·"may further prove the necessity 
that a coming ecumenical theology conside~ the possible 
contributions of the Eastern Church more seriously than 
before.u30 Edwin E. Aubrey writes: 
His comblnation of social radicalism with a profound 
religious philosophy that borders on mystic.ism makes 
him highly significant as a thinker in an era such asc 
we . now enter, where these two tendencies are both 
- powerful and at present ~ stand in opposition to each 
other.31 
Douglas Clyde M:acintosh holds ·· that though in Berdyaev . 
"there is much that is original, profound and fruitfully 
suggestive" that "as against the rational and rationally 
26. CCT, 217. 
27. PCT, 21. 
28. Art.(l938), 407. 
29. Art.{l938), 411. 
30. Art.{l938), 415. 
31. Art.(l948), 533. 
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ethical emphasis in modern theology he has reacted funda-
mentally and far toward the opposite extreme."32 The 
divergent attitudes that Berdyaev awakens in Protestantism 
are suggested by Lynn Harold Hough' s .· remark that 
when you mention the name of Berdyaev and refer to his 
caustic and effective analysis of a decadent civili-
zation, some men will turn toward you as men turn from 
darkness to the light. Others will turn away in 
bewilderment and distaste.33 
In an article that has appeared since the end of the 
war Egbert .L. Munzer takes a rather pessimistic view of 
Berdyaev '·s continuing influence. After pointing. out that . 
his fame in Anglo-Saxon countries has been in eclipse for 
a number of years, that the vogue of his earlier writings 
has~ subsided, that the spiritual kinship for Catholicism, 
which characterized former publications· has now been re-
placed by a growing estrangement, that the non-catholic_. 
churches which formerly hailed him as one of their own have 
ceased to be much concerned about him, Munzer concludes 
that Berdyaev "seems doomed to oblivion in .. his own time."34 
This ~ seems an unduly negative conclusion. It is 
perhaps true as· regards the Roman communion though Berdyaev's 
intimate friendship with Maritain .and the latter's obvious 
indebtedness to his Orthodox colleague would seem to belie . it. 
The close relationship between Berdyaev and the Anglo-
32. PRK, 352. 
33· MHE, 198. 
34. Art.(l944), 198. 
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Catholic sociological group of Maurice Reckit and Canon 
Widdr1ngton and the high esteem in which he and his books 
are held by the Church of England points to a continuing 
influence in the Anglican communion. 
The greatest influence of Berdyaev . may be foundin 
the events of the summer of 1948-- the Lambeth Conference 
and the first General Assembly of the World Council of 
Churches. Berdyaev ~was an active supporter of the ecu-
menical movement, was frequently visited by leaders of the 
World Council of Churches, and was one of the first lectur-
ers at the Ecumenical Institute opened a few years ago by 
t he World Council at Bossey, Switzerland. 
B. Literature. 1. Primary. Berdyaev! s work was 
done originally in Russian. A bibliography of Russian 
titles shows thirty-four list i ngs though some of these are 
of composite authorship. The only source of periodical 
literature has been the files of Put' which have yielded 
some eighty-two reviews and articles. While undoubtedly 
not an exhaustive bibliography t his compilation does repre-
sent the fullest listings discoverable. The author of t his 
dissertation does not have a knowledge of Russian but, was 
granted the privilege of working on Berdyaev, without a 
knowledge of the language. Hence, the disserta tion is 
based on translations, principally English, to t he con-
sideration of which we now proceed. 
Berdyaev has been widely translated into some sixteen 
languag es--which fact is indicative of the broad interest 
in his writings. Of the twelve Russian works written before 
the first World War only one has been translated and that 
into German. However, since the war, , revolution, and his~ 
exile, Berdyaev·; has- been made acc~essible in all the major 
languages of Western Europe. Twenty-three French, fifteen 
Eng.lish, thirteen German, five Sp~nish, one Dutch, and one 
Italian translation hav·e been listed. Since one of the 
characteristics of Berdyaev·.· is a constant tend-ency to 
repetition, it is doubtful that any of his earlier ideas of 
import have not been stated many times over in his later 
works. 
Twenty-five translated _articles have been listed. 
A number of these upon investigation proved to have been 
essays taken from earlier or subsequently printed volumes. 
This might be the best place to incorporate a brief 
note from Donald Attwater, the translator of the first 
work to appear iri English: 
In conclusion, I must say wha t every translator of 
Berdyaev is forced to say: his Russian is very diffi-
cult to put into English. Apart from the obstacles: 
inherent in the great difference between the two 
languages, his style itself is a peculiar one. It is, 
so to speak, a "tautological" style: he hammers out 
his thought . ~by constant repetition·_ of the same words 
and phraa·es, by a vast accumulation of abstract nouns 
and complicated adjectives, which are easily strung 
together in Russian but are a burden to any English 
phrase.35 
35. EO, 104. 
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This stylistic problem ha& impressed other writers as well. 
Julius Seelye Bixler states: "His style is poetic rather 
than sc ient1fic or argumentative. What he says makes good 
reading, but it is hard to summarize.u36 A less generous' 
description .is accorded by Paul v. Kennedy in the only 
doctora l dissertation thus far devoted to Berdyaev: 
He writes diffusely, with maddening repetitiousness, 
and. has a habit of starting to say something, branch-
ing off on another theme, and returning later to begin 
as it were anew. Many of his chapters have all the 
desultoriness and digressiveness of casual conver-
sation. They are an example of that easy writing 
which proverbially makes hard reading; they display a 
want of good editing.37 
2. Secondary. In addition to the primary sources 
noted above and a host of reviews and shorter notices 
there have been a number of longer expository and critical 
articles on various aspects or volumes of Berdyaev•a· 
philosophy. To some of these we shall return later in more 
detail. Several Catholic thinkers have centered their 
contributions upon Berdyaev!s gnosticism. Karl Pfleger has 
treated it sympathetically, while Vernon J. Bourke and 
Paul v. Kennedy have expressed strong antipath.y.38 . .l:ie.nry 
Nelson Wiem~nand Douglas Clyde Macintosh have directed 
criticisms against his irrationalism. N.F. Langford has-
criticized particularly Berdyaev's doctrine of spirit. 
36. Rev. 1, 76. 
37. MGNB, 24. 
38. The sources for these and the other authors cited 
in this section may be found in the Bibliography, infra. 
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Matthew Spinka has related the Russian thinker to Origen • 
. Paul Till1ch, Edwin C. Aubrey, a nd W. R. Inge hav\e written 
brief sympathetic expositions of his philosophy as. a whole. 
,. ,. . 
The best over-all resumes of Berdyaev's thought are found 
in Walter Marshall Horton's and W.J. Phythian-Adam's ex-
cellent studies, in the keenly analytical article of Jacques 
Delesalle, and in the recently published extended survey by 
Bvgeny Lampert. Egbert L. Munzer, Oliver Fielding Clarke, 
the editors of Twentieth Century Authors, and · Donald By-
water's introduction to Berdyaev,' s contribution to Essays· 
in Order are the best secondary sources for the Russian's 
life. 
Berdyaev's philosophy of history has been treated 
most fully in Eberhard Dennert's article which is largely 
an exposition of The Meaning of History. Dennert believes:. 
that the Occidental reply to Berdyaev's Eastern apocalyptic 
conception of history will be one of misunderstanding and 
rejection despite the fact that the West has failed in _a l l 
its efforts to solve the problems of mankind. Dennert 
points · out that Berdyaev!,s conception is not new ·but is . 
essentially Christian and that the West has already in 
large rejected that. He concludes· that ~ the West and its 
world conception will perish unless it b$comes united with 
the higher Eastern apocalyptic idea which turns toward the 
supernatura~ and eternal.39 
39. Art.(l928), 418f. 
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The most rewarding criticisms of Berdyaev}s histori-
cal views are found in the citations from .Morris. Zucker's · 
volume and an essay of R.J.S. Hoffmann. 
Zucker bases his brief criticism of Berdyaev, upon a 
single writing. He directs his diatribe from a positivist-
ic standpoint at Berdyaev's failure to prove "in the scien-
tific meaning of that term" any of .his basic. assumptions. 
Specifically he reacts ag~inst Berdyaev's · clain that . histo-
ry has its own distinctive epistemology; Berdyaev's endow-
ment of ideas with "supernatural, metaphysicaL and . other-
worldly properties;" his general idealistic bias·; ·and his 
genera lities and lack of specific solutions.40 
Hoffmann. ~. s essay was , oc:cas.ioned by the translation 
of The Meaning of History and following a resume of the 
same he brought three general criticisms: one, its general 
mystical character; two, its deep pessimism; three, . 1 ts 
acceptance of the Spenglerian notion of culturesc as org~n­
isms · subject to decay.41 
In the only doctoral dissertation .discoverable on 
Berdyaev Paul v. Kennedy devotes . a portion of one chapter 
to an exposition of the philosophy of history as found in_ 
The End of Our Time and The Fate of Man ,1n· the Modern 
World. Kennedy draws two main conclusions: one, that 
40. PAH, 228ff. 
41. Art.(l936), 158ff. 
Berdyaev is a Gnostic; two, that Berdyaev is a modernist. 
He concludes with a final .appra isal which indica tea his 
treatment of the matter at hand: 
Berdyaev has made a capable analysis of modern history; 
he has put his finger on the root of man's present dis-
orders, and has aptly pointed out that hope lies only 
in a return of mankind to God •••• In his proposal of 
a cure of society's ills through ?; reconstruc.tion of 
the social order along occupational lines he is again 
at one with the most advanced Christian thought; but , 
here too one cannot overlook the tone of pessimism he 
adopts in regard to the machine, nor the note of 
aristocratism carried over from his religious philoso-
phy which causes him .. to speak with contempt and dis-
trust of the ordinary people •••• But his philo-
sophical and religious opinions cannot .. -be squared with 
reason or faith, and the nature of his appeal to 
Christians is insidious and filled with that calli-
dissi m artificium which Pope Pius X attributed to Af 
the J odernists.42 /t 
Nowhere ·does one find in the secondary literature a 
systematic exposition of Berdyaev's philosophy of history 
that is based onall of his writings, nor a full correlation 
of his historical views with his philosophic and religious~ 
ideas, nor an evaluation of the contributions and de-
ficiencies of his historical method and conclusions. 
C. Problem and Method. The problem., of this diss·er-
tation ,is to present a critical exposition of Berdyaev's 
philosophy of history. The method to be used wil·l he an 
examination of Berdyaev~s post-war writings. Specific 
attention .will be directed to The Meaning of History, The 
New Middle Ages, and The Fate of Man in the Modern World, 
42. MGNB, 224f. 
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since these set forth in fullest detail his , historical 
views. However, the cosmic setting of history will ne-
cessitate frequent reference to his other volumes dealing 
with basic me_taphysical and theological notions. An 
attempt will also be made to correlate certain_key ideas 
with other classical metaphysicians and philosophers of 
history. 
D. Plan of Dissertation. Following this brief in-
troductory chapter the dissertation _will proceed with two 
chap·t.ers dealing with Berdyaev! s epistemology and meta-
physics. Three chapters will then be dev0ted to an ex-
position of his interpretation of past, modern, and con~ 
temporary and future history. Another chapter . on meta-
physics dealing with the end of history brings the expo-
sition to a close. The dissertation will _conclude with a 
criticism of Berdyaev' s philosophy of history and an 
attempt to indicate the permanent elements in his views• 
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CHAPTER II 
EPISTEMOLOGY--THE PROBLEM OF HISTORICAL KNO'ffLEIDE 
In the investigation of tb.e historical proc_ess and 
its meaning, a basic problem .is that of knowledge. How do 
we ·gain insight into the inner significance of history; t h.e 
philosophy of h.istory? Despite Berdyaev!s own warning th.at 
"th.inkers who devote themselves to epistemology seldom . 
arrive at ontology," 1 and Maritain's depreciating remark 
upon being questioned as to Berdyaev's e'pistemology, "But 
has b.e a theory of knowledge?" 2 we m~st, like the Russian 
t hinker himself, spend some time with this issue. We shall 
fol l ow Berdyaev' s treatment as· outlined in his The Meaning 
of History but shall have fr equent occasion_to refer to 
idea~ developed in his later v olumes. 
A. Organic Participat ion. Berdyaev.1 discusses three 
attitudes that may be t a ken toward history. In t he first 
place there is ::- that .of . "direct int.eg;ral and organic experi-
ence i n some settled historical order."3 Bat -in such a 
static; , crystallized, matured, and settled era there is no 
awarene.ss' of history nor concern with its meaning since 
these presuppose a sense of dynamism ._ and movement oc-
cas1oned by a rupture or break in the established order. 
Hence, while such an epoch may be of great .interest to 
1. DM, 1. 
2. Cited by Kennedy, MGNB, 66. 
3. lvlli, 3· 
historical research, it is in itself non-historical.4 
B. Enlightened Rat-ionalization. In the second p_lace 
"there is the period of fateful and menacing schism andi dis-
ruption,. when the .foundations,· of an estahlished order are 
tottering."5 The former harmony thatLexisted between the 
subject and the life in which he pa rticipated is destr.oyed 
so that an antithesis is • now set up between them. Hi .stor.i-
cal science may develop during such a time but not . a 
phil osophy that _is capa~le of penetrating into the depths, 
6 mysteries, and -meanings of history. 
4: MH, 2f. Hegel .likewise discusses three historical 
methods• The first is that of "original history" which 
bears ,:: a resemblance to Berdyaev' s first ~ category o It is the 
writing of those who are "limited to deeds, events, and 
states of society, ,which they had before their . eyes, and 
whose spirit they shared."(PH, 1) Their material is "what .. 
is present and living in their environment." Of the his-
torian of this era he concludes: "Reflections are none of 
his business, . for he lives in the spirit of his subject; he 
has not attained an elevation above it."(PH, 2) In Hegelian 
language it is the Sein phase of reality. 
Cfo Spengler, DW, II, 48-51, where he distinguishes 
between "zoological happenings" and "history o 11 "'Historical' 
man • • o • is the man of a culture that is in full march 
towards self-fulfilment. Before this, after this, outside 
this, man is historyless o" ( DW, II, 48) 
5. IviH, -3• 
6. MH, 3f. Cf. Hegel's treatment of "reflective 
history 11 (PH, 4-8) which is described as "history whose mode 
of representation is not really .confined by the limits of 
the time to which it relates, but ~hose spirit transcends c 
the present." (PH, 4) This history may take a variety of 
forms :-: it may be devoted to a full view of a people, 
country, or the world; to pragmatical or didactical re-
flections; to a criticism of historical narrativ.es and an 
investigation of their truth and credulity; : or to the 
history of special departments of thought and life. In 
logical terms this is the Wesen stage. 
Spengler and Berdyaev hav·e much in common here. The 
former holds that man may picture the world under two 
22 
1. Its Failure. This second at titude arises in an 
age of enlightenment and tends to attack and discredit the 
sacred, the organic, and the traditi onal in history. It 
affirms the all-sufficiency of human reason and denies any 
mystery to the historical process. By this self-confident 
attitude it in reality severs itself from what Berdyaev·, 
terms "the reason of universal history, 11 "the organic 
reason. of history," the "higher reason," 11 the primal wisdom 
of mankind," and so fails, despite its name, to be truly 
enlightening • 7 It may succ·_eed in "relating, collecting , , 
amassing and partially apprehending very much, 11 8 but it 
fails ' to gain insight into the historical itself. The 
inner communion between the subject and the culture and 
possible views. One is that of Na ture; the other is that of 
History. That which is known through the senses is Nature. 
It is symbolized by mathematical number, is mechanically 
defined, and is brought under the rule of law. On the other 
hand is History which is known only through vision and con~ 
templation. History is unique and incapable of being re-
peated. Hence it cannot be put under law. Nature is time-
less. History is characterized by irreversibility. History 
is pure hecoming and as such cannot be subjected to the 
domain of cause and effect, law and measure. "The wish t o 
write history scientifically involves a contradiction. 
True sciencs reaches just as far as the notions of truth 
and falsity have validity: this applies - to mathematics and 
it applies also to the science of historical spade-work, 
viz., the collection, ordering and sifting of material. 
But real historical vision (which only begins at this 
point) belongs to the domain of significances, in which the 
crucial words are not 'correct' and 'erroneous,' but 'deep' 
and 'shallow.' The true physicist is not deep, but keen: 
it is only when he leaves the domain .of working hypothesis 
and brushes against the final things that he can be deep, 
but at .this stage is already a metaphysician."(DW, I, 96) 
7. MH, 5-7. 
8. MH, 7 . 
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history which he is trying to understand is lost; its 
essentials g one, , he is content with the husks.9 
A prime example of this extreme rationalization of 
the mysteries and traditions of history is found in Marx's 
economic materialism. The historical process is completely 
despiritualized, and the only realities are economic and 
m~terial. 10 Marxism is of value, however, in that it 
poses the dilemma eithe.r of adapting oneself to this 
mystery of non-existence and of plunging into its 
abyss, or of communing once aga in with the imponderable 
mystery of the inner destiny, of the inner traditions 
and mysteries.ll 
But before moving on to the third attitude suggested 
in the second alternative in the above dilemma, it will be 
well to pause and consider at some length the territory 
tl1us far covered. It may not s eem strange to some that t he 
first attitude mentioned, that of organic participation, 
s hould not yield great results for an understanding of 
history;l2 but that the attitude of enlightened and 
9. 1lli, 8f. Cf. infra, Cha p . V, for a treatment of 
the historic Enlightenment. 
10. IviH, 9f. As Marx put it in describing his relation 
to Hegel: "To Hegel, the life-process of the human _brain, 
i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of 
"the Idea," he even transforms into an independent subject, , 
is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is 
only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea." With me, , 
on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material 
world reflected br, the human mind, and translated into 
forms of thought. '(CAP, I, 25) 
11. I'ilH , 12 • 
12. Merely living through an historical epoch does not 
in any sense gua~ntee that the participant will have any 
awareness as to what it is all about. Plants, animals, 
and many primitives may have this purely zoological, as 
contrasted to an historical, existence. 
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critical rationalism should likewise fall short of the g oal 
may appe.ar strange. And it is just here that Berdyaev has 
been vigorously censored by some of his critics for his 
alleged "irra tionalism" 13 and "anti- intellectualism. 1114 
Just what is Berdyaev's point of view on this score? 
It is true that Berdyaev .. manifests a fundamental dis-
trust of any form of intellectual knowledge. The opening 
sentences of two of his most profound works sound a leit-
motif that recurs through .all that he has written. "I 
' ' . 
intend to begin •••• with an accusation ag~inst episte-
mology."15 "We have lost all confidence in ••• an ab-
stract metaphysics ." 16 Why this antipathy toward reason . 
which he is willing to regard as a necessary stage in the 
development of philosophy,l7 and what does he propose to 
offer us in its stead as a guiding principle? 
The basic difficulty with the intellect, mind, , or 
reason as a means of attaining adequate knowledge is that 
1t hypostatizes the phenomena of man's psychic life, the 
material world, or the world of ideas~ and under the guise 
of the resulting systems of metaphysical · spiritualis-m, 
materialism, and idealism tends to regard these ab-
stractions as the essence and fullness of reality. All 
13. r~cintosh, PRK, 35lff. 
14. Kennedy, MGNB, 66ff. 
15. DM, 3. 
16. FS, 1. 
17. FS, 4f. 
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realities--even life', being, God, and spirit--are conceived 
as· substances, things, objects. 18 
"But concrete living realities· have always eluded 
these metaphysical doctrines." 19 To treat all reality on 
the analogy of :.: material objects is to miss its inner_ mean~ 
ing. 
Naturalist metaphysics with its _ substances and rigid 
objects reflects, relatively, it is true, certain 
aspects of being seen from a particular orientation 
and structure of consciousness. It gives us our 
direction but cannot claim to give ex-oression to the 
final and absolute truth about being.20 
Rationalism implies that in ._ the knowing process ther.e 
is a dualism--kn.owledge and reality. . The former is a re-
flection of the latter. But this 
opposition between knowledge and existence, _regarded 
as an object standing over against the knowing subject, 
is not primary but secondary, and is a result of 
reflection. The primary fact is that knowledge itself 
is a rea lity and t a kes place in rea lity.21 _ 
The severance of knowledge and rea lity denies that the act 
of knowing is an existential act ,and reduces knowledge to 
an account about something rather than being something 
itself. 22 It __ results in the point . of view of naturalism. 
Opposed to it is the conception of what Berdyaev -has in-
creasingly,r in his later books called "personalism. 1123 This 
18. FS, 1. 
19. FS, 1. 
20. FS, 5. 
21. DM, 4. 
22. DM, 5. 
23~ Cf. ss , SF, passim. 
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latter idea, which results in a definite theory of 
knowledge to be examined below, affirms : that the knower is: 
primary--that he forms part of reality~-thi~ his knowing is 
a living, existential act.24 It asserts that 11 persnnality 
is the absolute existential cent.re," and that "nothing in 
the object world is an authentic existential c~ntre. 1125 
2. Philosophy, Religion, and Science. This degraded 
position of philosophical knowledge inevitably results 
when ph1losophy fails to realize that it is unique and 
incapable of being reduced to either science or relig ion. 
Philos.ophy has always been threatened by one or the other 
of these two neighbors- -or rather by their naturalistic 
interpretations. Not that philosophy can be completely 
independent, since "both religion and science may enrich 
philosophical knowledge from within, but they must not 
dominate it from without. 112 6 
Particularly violent has been the conflict between 
philosophy and religion due to the fact that "religion_ 
claims to possess in theology a cognitive expression, a 
field of knowledge," 27 the problems of which are also those 
of philosophy. The conflict, however, , between the reve-
lation . of relig ion and the knowledge of philosophy comes 
about only as the former is given a theological .. 
24. DM, 5. 
25. SF, 26f. 
26. DM, 6. 
27. ss' 4. 
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interpretation which reflects the existing scientific, 
philosophical, and social prejudices of the group. Thus, 
for example, Aquinas strictly subordinated the Christian 
revelation to Aristotelian .philosophy and impeded philo-
sophical speculation and the development of science.28 
Opposi tion. .has also arisen where philosophy has made 
religious claims such as regarding itself as a means of 
salvation and has sought to regenerate the soul through 
knowledge. This attitude of philosophy is explicable since 
"the true philosopher is not _. only satisfied to apprehend the 
world; he also desires to modify, to improve, and to re-
generate it."29 But he cannot .detach himself from religion 
since his "immersion in the depths of existence, his Being, 
precedes, and also comprehends, his cognitive activity,n30 
and it is with this that religion deals• Hence, the 
dilemma of the ph.ilosopher: 
On the one hand, he is incapable of supporting, must, 
indeed, refuse to suffer, the authority of religion; 
on the other, he tends to lose all notion of Being, 
and the strength it imparts, as soon as he becomes 
detached from religiou~ experience.31 
This dilemma has been to a certain extent resolved by 
the movement of modern philosophy which shifted attention~ 
from .the object to the subject which it freed increasingly 
from the shackles of religious dogma, theology, and 
28. ss, 6. 
29. ss, 8. 
30. SS, 9. 
31. SS, 9. Cf. DM, 6. 
28 
ecclesiastical authority and granted the right of free 
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speculation. 
Of the relationship between religion .and philosophy 
Berdyaev concludes that 
trutn is on the side of relig ion when philosophy 
claims to replace it in the sph.ere of salvation·~ and 
eternal life ••• on the side of philosophy when it 
claims to attain _a higher degree of knowledge than 
that attained by the eleme~ts of naive knowledge 
incorporated in religion.35 . 
Therefore, the philosopher may readily accept revelation 
and -faith as primary phenomena, but he will avoid endorsing 
their naturalistic interpretations which are secondary and 
purely social phenomena.34 
A not dissimilar movement took place between philos-
ophy and science. No sooner had philosophy escaped fro~ ­
religi on than it fell captive to its erstwhile child, sci-
ence . "Science has not only progressively reduced t he 
competenc·e of philosophy, but it ha s also at.tempted to 
suppress it altogether a nd to replace it by its own claim to 
.. 
32. SS, lOf. 
33. SS, 20. 
34. Berdyaev ~ s attitude on the relation between re-
ligion and philosophy is essentially a mediating one. He 
does not take the extreme position. of Kierkeg?lard or Barth 
who regard religion as exclusive and independent .of all 
other areas of life. Nor does he go to the other extr..eme 
of the various external critics of religion who would dis-
credit it by giving essentially non-religious explanations 
of the experiences commonly regarded as religious. Subse-
quent .study may reveal Brightman to have been closer to a 
correct evaluation _of Berdyaev than Macintosh. Wh ile the 
latter regaTds Berdyaev as an irrationalist of the Kierke-
gaardian or Barthian stripe, the former describes him as ''a 
practical truth- seeker, an empirical rationalist . .. Art. 
(1944), 520. 
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universality."35 But philosophy and science are incom~ 
. mensurable ·despite the efforts of Husserl and others of his 
school who seek to make philosophy a pure science. "Sci-
ences are concerned with .. abstract partial realities, they do 
not see the world as, a whole or grasp its meaning. u36 
However, 
the chief characteristic which distinguishes philosophy 
from .scientific knowledge is that philosophy knows -
being in and through man, while science knows being_ as 
it were apart from man and outside him. Therefore for 
philoso~hy being is spirit and for science being is 
nature.57 
Science studies man as an object, as. part of the kingdom of 
nature, whereas philosophy studies him in .. and through him-
self as belonging to the kingdom .of spirit. To free 
knowledge, as science wishes to do, from the human. element 
would be to destroy it •. But more of this as we come to the 
proper task and method of philosophy itself. 
3. Summary and Transition. We may summarize this 
portion of our study and orient ourselves to the next with 
the following citation: 
Knowledge is based upon the action . of three principles: 
the human, the divine and the natural. It is the out-
come of the reciprocal action of human _culture, Divine 
Grace, and natural necessity. , The philosopher's 
tragedy has its origin _in the attempt to restrict his 
pursuit of knowledge by the invocation of Divine Grace 
or by an appeal to the universal chara cter of natural 
necessity. If God and nature are the objects of 
philosophical investigation, then its antagonism to 
35. SS, 12; cf. DM, 7ff. 
36. DM, 8. 
37. DJ.II , 9. Cf. Brightman, , NV, passim. 
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both dogmatic relig ion and s cience is inevitable.. But 
its ·true sphere is the investigation of human existence, 
human destiny a nd human purpose. Ma n is the ·real 
subject of the philosopher's knowledge; thr-Dugh man . he 
ca n apprehend both God and na ture; but he cannot pursue 
his investigations with out stumbling against .. objecti-
fied forms of knowledge which claim to expound the 
ultimate truth concerning God and nature., The philos o-
pher is ready to accept Divine Rev,elation and f a ith, 
but he must a void endorsing their na tura list .. inter pre-
tation, just as he must Fefuse to a ccept the univsrsal-
ist, claims put forwar d by natura l science.3(j 
Since "being is revealed only in and through man," 
any ph ilosophy which "seeks knowledge outside man instead of 
in and through him" "becomes abstract and loses touch with 
the sources of life.u39 
Meaning is to be found not in the object which enters 
the mind a nd not in the subject who construes a mental 
world, but in. the s p iritual world which is neither · 
objective nor subjective but is pure activity and 
s p iritual dynamics.40 
Realism and idealism are not :. then the only alterna-
tives in theory of knowledge, for "there is a t hird position 
which I personally consider to be the only va lid one."4l 
We are therefore not really confronted with the dilemma 
of either postula ting the authentic reality of a n 
object .absorbed by the ·knowing subject or denying ex-
ternal reality altogether by brea king it up into a 
series of sensations and concepts formed by the subject~ 
The subject himself is being •••• he is, existential 
• • • he can achieve an a uthentic knowledge of 
reality. 42 
In fact, the e pistemological distinction of subject and 
328. ss, ' 19f. 
39. DM , 11. 
40. DM, 13. 
41. SR, 7. 
42. SR, 8. 
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ohject is regarded- a s b:eing artificial and as· guilty of 
los ing existence, life, a nd heing. 11 To obJectify is to 
destroy meaning; in order to understand meaning, one must 
enter into it, and this communion is not obj~ctificat:l.on."43 
We may conclude this particula r section by noti ng 
that f or Berdyaev . there ar.e two types of knowledge. First., 
there is rationa l a nd objective knowledg e which is "conf i n ed 
within the frontiers of reason .and apprehends only t he 
44 general." Secondly, there is the knowledge 
immanent in . Being a nd in_ existence throug h whic h r ea son 
is enabled to apprehend the irrational a nd the indi-
vidual after transcending the general; this knowledge 
is synonymous with community and participation. 45 
43. DM, 14. 
44. SS, 67. Cf. MH , 13ff. 
45. SS, 67. Thus while a · rational approach to ex-
istence may give knowledge, it is•. knowledge of an inferior 
grade. Such knowledge has to be expressed in terms of the 
general, , the objective, the universal--that . is, irr. terma of 
that which is open to all men . But, since existence is 
individual and irra tional, it can be known via this r oute 
only by subjecting it .. to a certain amount of abstraction 
with a resultant . loss of concrete reality. Hence, while 
partial truth into existence ca n be gained by objectiv-e, 
r a tional processes, an essentially irrational .. process is 
necessary to ga in full insi ght a nd knowledge of any concrete, . 
individual t hing. . Thus, while the ob jecti v.e and rationa l 
s ci ences of physics, chemist r y, biology, psychology, and 
sociology can g ive me much inf ormation about an_ individual , 
there remains · an inner mystery which must be penetrated, if 
at _all, by another mode of knowing. ( Cf. SS, 67; DlVI , 13) 
Berdyaev's distinction here is =comparable to that~ in 
Willia m James ·, PP, I, 221 between knowledge of acquaintance 
and knowl$dge about. Thus James -writes: "I am acquainted 
with many / people and t l1ine;s, which I know ve ry little a bout • 
• • • I l{now the color blua:: when I see it, a nd the flavor 
of a pea r I when I t a ste it; I know a n inch ·when I move my 
fi nger t hrough it; a second of time when I feel it . pe. ss'; an 
effort of Jattention when I ma ke it; a difference between 
t wo t hings wb.en I n otice it; but about the inner. nature of 
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Kn 1wledge may be considered from the sta ndpoint of 
Soc 4ety -· .. 1 ere it 1·~ ... , "J "' chara cter ized by communication. between. 
men by mec. ns of the objective and the general. . But, while 
these facts or wha t makes them ·what they are, I can say 
nothing at a ll. I cannot impart .. acquaintance with them to 
e.ny one who has not already made it himself .. I cannot de -
scribe thr1 m, ma. ke a blind man . gue ss what .blue is like,de-
fine to a child a syllogism, or tell a phi losopher in. just 
what resp ct dista nce is just what it is, and differs from 
other for~s of relation. At most, I ca n say to my friends, 
Go to cerpa in pl a ces · and act . in certain ways, , and these 
objects w~ ll probably come." 
Prrtt~, commenting on James's distinction, writes : 
111 Knowled~ e of acquaintance' is, . then, the immediate and 
direct experience itself, . standing for itself and not'_ t aken 
e.s pointipg to or representing something else. It . is our 
sensation!, or better still our feelings, that are typical of 
it. 'Knoyvledge about, .' on the other hand, is seen in_ ideas 
and abstrrct thought. It is conceptual, . descriptive, repre-
sentative !~ communicable. All genera l propositions, de -
scription,s of t h ing s which ma ke them communicable to other 
minds, a11 'universals,' scientific formulas, and .tbe like, 
come undelr this heading."( RC , . 400) · 
· Inl contrast to the emphas is noted by James and 
Berdyaev , / t he following excerpt from Royce is suggestiv.e. 
"In fact, then, our presented experience is indeed our only 
g uide; bJt it only g uides us by pointing beyond itself to 
that wit~ out which it becomes self-contrad ictory. . e know 
of no me~empirical truth except by means of presentations. 
But our ~resentations, in_ our .·present form of consciousness , 
get thei~ whole sense from their reference to what for us~ 
remains · ~etempirical truth. . No fact gets: 'accredited' un~ 
less our experience g ives it credit~ . But -experience, when 
ra tional~y interpreted, in the lig ht of our indirect demon-
strations, , never gives credit to any facts except >to those 
whi ch, i1 some aspect, transcend our presentations."(WI, 
II, 23) 
1 H~gel has expressed the same idea in a single 
sentence~ "What .is 'familiarly known' is not properly 
known, just for the reason . tha t it is , familiar.'"(PM, 92) 
Ne ither .. ·Heg·el nor Royce would regard the individual 
and his experience as irrational, , but rather . as abstract . 
and partial, and as · pointing beyond 1 tself to a lai'ger. 
whole in which its true meaning lies ·. Complete rationality 
will be found only in terms of that ultimate whole which. 
Royce certainly, and Hegel probably, interpreted in terms' 
of Selfhood and Personality. 
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t l1 is type of knowledge may reve2.l someth ing of true reality, 
it . is f a r inferior to that marlred by "existential c ommu.ni on_ 
and • • • penetration .. into the heart of the individual • 11 46 
C. Spiritual Communication. We pass to Berdyaev's 
own positive epistemolog ical position_as vve come to the 
t h ird attitude that _may be t a ken tovvard the historical • . 
This · approach is able 
to appose and oppose these two movements--that of direct 
participation in an historical order and that- of d ivorce 
from it--in order to arrive at a t h ird s p iritua l sta te 
which induces a part i cu.larly; acute c onsc i ou.sness~, a 
pal1 ticular aptitude for s peculation . a nd a correspond ing 
aspiration tovmrds the mysteries of the 'historica l.' 
Such a state is especial ly favorable to the conside~­
ation . of the problems f of the philosophy of history.47 
1 • . lm Anthropological . pproach. An adequate ph ilosophy 
of history will not be reached by attention to objective, 
abstract, .a nd general concep tions · whi ch but lead to 
46. SS, 67. Cf. James, VRE, 492: "Individua lity is 
found ed in feeling ; and the recesses of feeling, , the da r ker, 
blinder strata of character, a re t h e only places in. the 
wor ld in wpich we catch rea l f a ct in the making, ; a nd d ire ctly 
pe r c e ive how events t}a ppen, . a nd h ow work is a ctua lly d one. 
Compared v1 i th this world of living indi vidu.alized feeli ngs , 
t he ·w orld of generalized objects vvh ich the intellect con-
tem-plates is vvi tl1ou.t solidity or life." 
- 47. MH, 4f. Hote the essentially. dialectical ap-
proach in. which the two earlier methods are su.bla ted under_ 
a third which includes and transcends t hem. 
Heg el adopts as his method the approach. of "ph.ilo-
sophical history" wl1ich is defined as "the thoug htful con':"' 
sideration" of history.; (PH, , 8f.) It is: an assertion. "that 
Reason is the Sovereign. of the World; that the history of 
the world ••• presents · u.s with a r a tional process."(PH, 9) 
Cf. Kierkegaard's comment on the German _philosopher.: 
"Hegel undertook to explain existence, history. • . • •. How 
the g ods must ha ve laughed! J:\. miserable don like that, who 
ha d seen t hrough the necessity of everything a n d g ot. the 
wh ole thing off by hea rt. 1.1 ( Quoted in, Macintos h, PRK, 328) 
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intellectual superstructures devoid of substa ntial ex-
istence, but only by concentration upon_the subjective, t he 
concrete, and the pa rticular which is of the very substance 
f h . t 48 o 1s ory •. The concrete and pa rticular reality that . the 
philosophy of history will study is ma n--"man in. the c on-
cre te fulness of l1. is sp iritual b e i ng •••• man in rela tion 
to t he world of forces which act up on him."49 
This stress up on the huma n element, a s v;e ha ve a lrea dy 
seen, is cha racteristic of the ph ilosophic attitude. Hefer-
ences to it ab ou.nd: "The fundamental problem of philosophy 
50 is t hat of human l{nowledg e. 11 "The subj ective approa ch is 
t he only one likely to elicit a revelation of the orig i na l 
t r ut h conta ined in 1 rimi ti ve Be ing . uSl 11 an is insepara ble 
from philosophy •••• He apprehe nds Being because he is 
48. Illi , 13. Cf. Heg el wh o i n his a ctual presenta tion_ 
comb ines the universa l a n d the c oncrete. "What I hav.e s a id 
.•• is ••• to be regar ded ••• a s a sumnary view of t he 
wh ol e ; the result of the investigation we are about to p ur-
sue; a r e sult wh ich happens to b e known to me, beca u s e I 
ha v,e tra ve rsed t h e entire field. It is onlya n . inference 
f rom the history of the ' vorld, tha t its development ha s been 
a rational process; tha t t he h i s t ory in question ha s consti-
tut e d the r a tional necessary c ourse of the W orld-Spirit~­
t ha t Spirit wh ose na ture is a l wa ys one and the s ame, but 
which unfolds this ' its one nature in the phenomena of t h e 
7/orld's existence. _ This must, a s before sta t e d, present 
itself as the ultimate result of History. But we ha ve to 
take the latter as it is. '.l e must proceed historically--
empirically.:' ( PH, 11) 
49. I:iH , 14f. Cf. Heg el: "But in._ t he history of the 
~rorld, t he Individua·ls we have to do with a re ~eoplee; 
Totalities that are States." (PH, 14) It is thls essentially 
impersonal approach that Berdyaev rejects. Cf. SF, refer-
ences to Hegel. 
50. ss, 26. 
51. ss, 28. 
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himself a part' of Being. 1152 "Phi. los ophy must_ ther efore be 
anthropolog ical. ,53 
But .the time has now come to rediscover and rehabilitate 
man, no longer envisaged as a fra gment of nature and 
the objectiv.e world, but as a being in his ovm right, 
situated- in the extra- ob _ect i ve and extr.a-na tura 1 
world, in the very core of hi s own existence. 
2. The Historical Memory--Myth. This anthropological 
approach is definitely applicable -to the philosophy of 
history • . Here we may best .gain insight into the mystery of 
the historical--since between man and history tb.ere exists 
"a deep, mysterious, _ primordial and coherent relationship"55 
--by sensing history "as something that is deeply mine, t ha t 
is deeply !!!l_ history, that is deeply !!1Y, destiny. u56 H:i..st ory. 
then must be rega rded not in the mood of destructive criti-
cism as something alien and hostile, but as something inti-
mately related to me. History ."is not .a given empir:i..ca~l 
fact or a naked factual material, 11 but _a "spiritual reality" 
revelatory of "essential being." 57 As such it is to be 
52. ss, 29. 
53. ss, 30. 
54. ss, 43. Italics in original. This is essentially 
a pers on ... a list point of view. Cf. B:r'ightman, _, NV, 125: "In 
view of the vast~ ranges of exper ience) the mirid must choose 
its orientation. It must choose between debasing God to the 
level of the sensuous or the unconscious . and elevating na tur.e 
to the level of spirit. Thepersona list chooses to elevate 
nature to spirit, and thereby he gains · insight , into hoth. 
The naturalist, by his choice to restrict spirit to nature, 
limits his understanding of both and renders the highest 
reaches of personal experience all but incomprehensible. 11 
Cf. also Berdyaev, FS, Chap. I, "Spirit . and Nature." 
55. MH , 15. 
56. MI-1 , 16. 
57. :MH , 17. 
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approached not through the rationalizations - of the objectiv,e 
historian but through a certain s piritual acti v,i ty,, the 
"historical memory."58 
History , like everything el se , has two aspects: on t he 
one hand, it is an objective process in so far as it 
investigates the past ~s an object and is, consequently, 
relegated like nature to the objective world; on the 
other hand:, it is a sp iritual event in . the inner S-Phere 
of existence. As a spiritual event, history can_ only 
be apprehended by means of the ontologica l memory and 
a ctive communion with the past. To achieve this result, 
man must apprehend the pa st as a part of his own ex-
istence, of his own pre-hist orlca.l spiri tua.l existence. 
The past thus : becomes a n integral constituent of his 
present, and man is enabled to overcome temporal dis-
integration.59 
This historical memory is part . of the historical tradition. 
By means of it man is able to commune "with another ev.er-
lastingly broader and richer reality than that in, which he 
is empirically immersed." 60 Hence the peculiar gnosi ology ,...-· . 
essential to the philosophy of history whereby knowledge of 
its inner significance can be gained is in "the acceptance 
of historica l tradition and of communion with history." 61 
58. lvlH ' 17. 
59 • . ss ' 142. 
60. MH, 19. Cf .. Bergson,, CE, 7f. After stating that 
the past in its entirety follows us at _every instant but is 
largely driven back into the unconscious by the cerebral 
mechani sm, he writes: " t th.e most,. a fevf superfluous 
recollections may succeed in smuggling t hemselves through the 
half-open door. These memories, messeng ers from the un-
conscious, remind us of what we are dragg i ng behind us un~ 
awares. But, even though we may have no distinct idea of it, 
we feel va guely th.at our past remains present to us. Wha t 
are we , in fact, ·what is our character, if not the con-
densation of the history tha t we havs lived from our birth--
nay, even before our birth, s ince we bring with us prenata l 
dispositions." 
61. MH, 12. 
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.Again, . "history is not an objective empirical datum; 
it l. s · a myth . " 62 A t 1• • d t my ~1, nowever, oes no represent. a 
fiction, but a reality-- 11 a reality immeasurably greater than 
conc·ept ." 63 11 1VIyth is the story preserv.ed in popular memory 
of a past event and transcends the limits of the external 
obj e ctive world, revealing an idea l world, a subJect-object 
world of facts. 1164 
~!yth is the concrete recital .of events and orig inal 
phenomena of the s piritual life symbolized in the 
natural world, which has engrav:.ed itself on the 
language, memory, and ,crea tive energy of the people • 
• • • Myth presents ~ to us . the s uper-natur•a l in t b.e 
na tura l, . the supra-sens.ible in the sensible, t he 
spiritual life in the life of the651esh; it brings two worlds together symbolically. 
For only if the re is some inner tie between the subject of 
b.istory and the object of l1istory can tb.ere be any histori-
cal comprehension • . This conviction. leads Berdyaev. to affirm 
62. IJH, 21 . 
63. FS, 70. Cf. Inge's championing of the place of 
myth in philosophy • . " My thesis is that when the mind 
communes with the world of values its natura l and inevitable 
lang uag e is the l a rJ.guage of poetry , . symbol, and myth.. And, 
furtper that . phi losophy has to deal with a number of ir-
re ducible surds vvh ich cannot be rationalized. • . • . • We are 
driven to mythologize, . confessoing that we hav.e l eft the 
rea lm of scient\l..f:i.c fact. We give re:i.n . to the imag ination 
••• hoping that: the creative imag ination. may rev.eal to us 
s ome of t he real meaning of · questions· which we cannot 
answer• 11 Art .(l936), 131. 
Cf. also Reinhold Niebuhr , "The Truth in ] yths·," in 
which he contends that there are. "aspects· of reality which. 
can be stated only in mythi cal terms.~' Art.(l937,), 119 • . 
Particularly noted are those of value and depth . " Nei the.r. 
the vital thrust .. of life, . nor its organic unities nDr ita 
disharmonies ~ nor its hig hest posaibilitie~ can bs expressed 
in terms of log ic and rationaLconsistency •. u Ar.t~(l937), 125 •. 
64. MH, 21. 
65. FS, 70. 
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t bat . "historical science oug ht to a dapt to its needs ••• 
th e Platonic doctrine of knowledge as a n act of r emembra.nce ."66 
This Berdyaev proceeds to do when he states t hat . 
each man is - a microcosm through wh ich the macrocosm. of 
world history may be apprehende d . Assuming an external 
stimulus for ev.ery profound act _.of remembra nce it should he 
p ossible for ma n to apprehend histor .y within himself. Th is 
external .stimulus is the historical myth which "contains 
the story that .is preser.v . ed in popular memory_ and tha t he l p s 
to bring to life some deep stra tum buried in the depths of 
the human spirit.!' 67 In a c onsiderably l a ter_ work, in 
wh ich Berdyaev relate s , himsel f to the existential philosop hy, 
t h is parallel passage occurs: "The participat.ion of the 
knowing subject . in existence is anterior to his- knowle dge. 
My existential experienc e is a nterior to my knowledge. For 
that .rea son, kno·w ledg e is remembrance. 1168 
The historical tradition wh ich criticism would r e ject 
as of little value proves on .t h is bas·is· to be of inestimable 
worth. - Its va lue is not found in . the area of objective fact 
--h.ere criticism has giv.en us - the final word--but_ it. is· 
revelatory of the inner_ significance of history •. For while 
"the externaL. facts of history ha v-e · a tremendous· imp ortance, 11 
it is "the inner current of mysterious life" that is of 
66. IviH , 22. The Platonic doctrine of Reminiscenc.e 
or Recollection is dealt .with most fully in the Phaedo (73-
76) and the Meno (Slff.). 
67. MH, 23f. 
68. SS , 60. Cf • . Sartre's "Existence precedes essence." 
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greatest .importance in constructing _ a philosophy of 
history-. 69 "History is to be apprehended only from within 
and ••• this : apprehension depends more and more on the 
inner state of our consciousne ss , on its breadth and 
11 70 depth ... , 
Historical criticism and science rest upon. a very 
narrow ·and superficial state of c onsci ousnes·s and self-
knowledge. They represent, however, but a trans-ient stage 
in _ the development . of man's knowle dge, . a prelude to an en~ 
tirely different era where "this inner tradition., this· inner 
myth of history, , which has been discredited in the period of 
critic ism (will) transform . and define itself anev;."7l 
What is the source of this myth, this tradition, 
whereby through the agenc-y of the historical memory we may 
gain insight into the meaning of history? It is to be found 
in relig ion • . 
The most arid rational theology and m.etaphys.ics· derive 
their sustenanc·e from the myths of relig ion. . A meta-
physic which is pure, abstract, and entirely free from 
all mythology means the end of any living knowledge and 
a complete detachment from existence.72 
The Promethean and Dionysian myths symbolize certain_ events· 
in the spiritual life of man, but it is· in the myth of the 
fall of Adam a nd Eve that ~we have the expression of the 
greatest of all realities - of the spiritual world. 
69 • Ivlli , 2 5 • . 
70. M3:-I, 25. 
71. :rviH, 25. 
72. FS, 70. 
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11 Christianity is entirely mytholog ica l, as indeed all 
relig ion is:, and Christian myt hs express the deepest a nd 
most central realities of the world.!173 
This takes us back to a problem which we noted 
earli er--the r e lationship between relig ion and philosophy--
wherein .we noted that philosophy cannot detach itself from 
relig ion without being disastrously impaired.74 
Philosophy is a part . of life; spiritual experience lies 
at ,the basis of philos-ophica l knowledge; a philosopher_ 
must be in touch with the primary source of life a nd 
derive his cognitive experi ence from it.75 
Or a gain: 
v1an has his · roots · in life-- in 'first life' --a nd is 
g iven rev.elations concerning its· mysteries •. It is 
only at these deptt1s tha t . ph ilosophy comes into con-
t a ct witg religion, _but it d oes so freely and from 
within.7 
But, though philosophy is inseparably connected with 
relig ion, it is, as we have already noted, not to be re-
gard.ed as 1 ts mere hand-maiden. Hence, while philosophy, a s 
73. FS, 71. Cf. Niebuhr, Art •. (l937L passim. 
74. Cf. Inge, Art .. (l936), 144-f. 11 The question which 
we really have to consider is whether. philosophy ought to 
include within its s6ope the higher religion . and mysticism, 
a lthough these ca n only expres s their aspirations· and intu-
itions· in ima ·inativ_e and symbolical language. I mainta-in 
that if philosophy treats this: part of human nature a-s he-
yond its scope, it will necessarily be ensla ved to natural 
science, or ·to psychology, which is a na tural science if it 
is a science at . all • . Now that natura l science, abati ng its-
former pretensions, claims only to be a hypothetical study,, 
a matter of pointer_ r eadings and mathematical symbols, we 
have to choose between returning to Plato and admittin~ 
that philosophy it self is out of contact with reality. 
75. DM, 7. 
76. D!vi , llf. 
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its greatest exponents from Plato on have realized, deriv.es 
its sustenance and life from the myths of religion, these 
are not to be treat ed in a naive ly realistic fashion, for 
"it is essent.ial to grasp the inner meaning of t he myth a nd 
symbol in a spiritual manner __ • "77 Thus, for example, 
Berdyaev rejects the naive Biblical science and scholastic 
theology based upon it .which would regard "all the events 
of the spiritual world as taking place upon this earth, that 
is, within space a nd time, 11 so that the world is conceived 
a s crea ted by God in time as a fact of t he natural order 
with Pa radise definitely located bet·ween the Tigris: a nd 
~uphrates rivers. 78 
Berdyaev rejects the na tura listic int erpretation of 
myth and tradition which has been characteris tic of the 
most of Christian history. He obj ects to the fact t hat our 
conventiona.l sys tems of knowle dg e have been a dapted to tt1e 
interests of t he a v-erage. man a nd of the collective 79 with 
t he result that .t he spiritual a ristocrats of history hav.e 
b een either i gn ored, condemne d , or forced to submit.BO 
77. FS, 71. 
78. FS, 21. Berdyaev and Barth alike are to be dis-
ting uished from the fundamentalist position since both ac-
cept ~ the result~ of historical and literary criticism. Cf. 
Niebuhr, Art~ ( 1937), 128: "Whenever · orthodoxy insists upon 
the literal truth of such myths it makes a bad historical 
science out .of true religious< insights• . It fails to dis-
tinguish between what is primitive and what is permanent, 
what -is · pre-scientific and what is supra-scientific in great 
mytbs. 11 
79. FS, xi. 
80. FS, x ii ff. 
And yet it is P?ssible f or a higher Christian knowl edge 
of spiri~ual thlng s to ex ist which is a t once mor e 
pen~trat1ng , less ex ot eric, , and less moul ded to the 
nee a s of th e collectiv-e t han tha t of the dominant 
systems of official theology.81 
Berdyaev rega rds himself as such a spiritual aristocrat . 
when he cla i ms to write prophet ic or free philosop~y wh ich 
passes beyond t he "limits of philosophica l, theolog ica l, a nd 
mystica l knowledg e so dear to the Western mind," and claims 
f or hims elf the distinction .. of being a "Christian theoso-
phis t ." 82 
81. FS, xvi i. 
82. FS, xix . - The la s t word here needs clarificat ion 
since, as Berdyaev put s it: "Words · often prov-oke a false ' 
ass ociat ion of i deas which do not correspond to t heir on-
tological meaning. 'Theosophy ' is a word of t hi s kind." 
(FS, 270) To such an . attempt ed clarificatio~ Be rdyaev _ devotes 
a full cha pter.(FS, 270-302, Chap . VIII, . "The.osophy and 
Gnosis") He distinguishes between_ b.istorical Cb.ri s tian 
theosophy in which tradition he names Paul, _ Clement of Alex-
andria, Orig en, the Areopag ite, tb.e medieval mystics, Nicho-
l as ·- of Cusa, Eckhart, Boehme, , Baader, and Solovyov.; (FS , xix, 
270f.) and contemporary theosophy represented by Blavatsky, 
Besant , a nd Steiner. These latt er Berdyaev subjects to a -_ 
severe criticism concluding t hat 11 this: type of thought 
recogni zes : neither God, man, nor _ pers.onality but only the 
cosmic ~ impersonal wh.ich is identical with the divine im-
persona l.'.' ( FS, 280) But, wl1ile rejecting both this cont empo-
rary brand of theosophy and ancient Gnosticism, _ Berdyaev, 
affirms: - "We should be wrong in concluding that Chr.istiani ty 
has no place for gnosis and permits no kind of knowledge of 
cosmic mysteries. 11 (FS, 292 f .) Berdyaev rejects the claims 
of human natura l '. theology holding rather . that .11 if a 
Christian gnosis is p ossible it can only be a s ~)iritual and 
mystical form of kno·wle dge and not a natural _or rational 
one."(FS, 294) He criticizes the limiting of gnosis by any 
official pronouncement. "To forbid gnosis means to put a 
premium on a false gnosis and to encourage theosophy i n 
wh ich a number of scattered truths a re g iven . a highly arti-
ficial synthesis·• False tLJ.eosophy then ·must be countered 
by a genuine Chri s tian form of t heos·ophy ."(FS, 298) This 
. lcnowledg e . will relate God, , man, a n d nature in_ a new syntl1e-
sis. It has b e en most closely realized in Boehme who "more 
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Karl Pfleger has given us g ood insight just _here 
when he writes of Berdyaev: 
H ~s thought •••. is philosophy , theology, and mysti-
Clsm ~n one, a. ph llosophy wh ose s p~culation is fed by 
the llving rellg ious sources ·, of be1ng, and which is -
the creative revelation of the soul enlightened.83 
Wb.ile presupposing the unconditional a cceptance of the 
faith, Berdyaev. "proceeds to subject the content of faith 
to a process of speculation in. order . to derive f r om it 
furtber _ truths," since "it cannot .be rna inta ined that the 
whole truth about' man and the universe has been revea led 
in t he Gospel or by the subsequent .development of Christi-
84 
ani ty." 
3. Experience and Intuition. What .. descriptive 
epistemological t e rms .can be applied to Berdyaev's t be ory 
of knowledge ? In the first place, we may describe it as 
following_ t he pathway of experience a nd intuition. . Ber dya ev 
sounds a note of "ra dical empir icism" when he affirms: 
It is an error to think tha t , emotion can only be sub-
jective, whereas thought ., is objective; that the knowing 
t ha n all the other Gnostics, knew how to unite in hi mself 
the mystical, occult, a nd r e lig iOL1S moments·."(FS, 30lf.) 
Berdyaev!s use of the t e rm corresponds closely to the 
literal meaning of "wise . in_ the t hings of God" and to a 
more formal definition which states clearly its differentia. 
"Theosophy differs from philosophy in tha t it .. starts from_ a 
trans cendenta l apprehension of the universe, and does not e 
generalize from phenomena to the being a nd attributes of 
God; -and from relig ious mysticism in that .. it . does not con~ 
tent itself with t h e rela tions of the soul to God, but 
speculates on t he constitution and COLlrse of nature." 
(Funk and VV'a gnall' s New Standard Dicti onary) 
83. Pfleger, WC, 278. 
84. Pflege r, WC, 279f. 
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subject can on ly apprehend Being intellectually Wt'1ere -
as. ernotio~ confines him. to t .he sub jective world: ••• 
Phllosophlcal apprehension is a spiritua l act whic h in-
volves not only lntellection, but also the conc entration 
of the totality of man 1 s spir itual forces, of both h is 
voluntary a nd sentient .being .85 
There is then an affective mode of apprehension, a n _ 
irrationa l pa th to knowledg e. 86 This is ' especially true of 
85. ss , 14f. 
86. Cf. Berdyaev: "It is a prejudice to believe that 
knowledge is a lways rational, that th ere is · no such t hing as 
irrational knowle dg e."( SS, 15) The word "irrationa l" seems 
too strong here since it has the connotation of oositive re-
jecti on of a nd antagonism to the reasoni 1~ proces s. Berdya e v 
r a t her is suggesting the incompleteness of rea s on a s a way 
of knowing • . The knov1ledg e wh ic h comes f r om the affect i ve 
s i de of b e ing may not deny r eas on in the sense of bei ng c on-
tra r y to it, but .. it .may nega t e it in the sense of beiYlb 
r ea ch e d in other t han by the r a tional pathway. 
This judgment .is susta i ned by an. exa minatton of the 
d i st i nction between 11 irrationa l" and "non-ra tional." J~c­
cord ing to Warren, Dictionary of Psyctlology: 11 irra ti ona l = 
contrary to reason or to t he principles of log i~. (Syn. 
illog ical. Someti mes , but i mproperly, us ed as syn. fo r !!.£!!-:-
r a tional, i.e. b eyond the s phere of log ic.)" "non-ra-tional:. 
outsi de the province of reBson; i.e. not characteriz e d by 
reas on. ( E . g . non-rationa.l be ha vior; distg. fr. i rrat ional 
lying ins ide the province of r eason but violating its 
ca n ons. ) 11 
Berdyaev, on .this · basis Bnd on h is own admission , is 
b ett e r classified as a "non-ra ti ona list" than as an 11 ir-
ra ti ona list.11 In emphasizing the aff ective a s "irrationa l" 
or "non-rati ona l" h e is suggesting its persone.l, uni q_ue, 
peculiar nature whic h re-nders it _inca pable of being put 
i n to g eneral terms or concepts without chang ing its very 
na. ture. ·~ e will return to an evaluation of t h is p oint of 
view in the concluding chapter. 
Cf. for a survey of comparable points of view, 
Macintosh, PRK, Cha p . XVII-XIX. · Thus in the first -noted 
c ba pter, "Critical Rationalism, 11 in discussing Rudolp h 
Otto lv!acintosh .p oints out that in seeking for the source 
and orig in of relig ion, a nd failing to find it in t he 
rational or intellectual a spect of man, Otto ratsed the 
question: 11 Vihat, then, in .the non-ra tional or irrational 
constit ution of man accounts for bis b e ing religious •••• 
The quest for ·the rational apriori of relig ion ha ving 
the appreciative aspec t of knowledge where "the heart_ is 
the centre of the entire man."87 But . "to admit an aff.e c.tive 
mo de of apprehension, a sensible appreciation, of value , is 
not to deny rea s on," but to discover its contradictions · and 
limitations~ 88 The appropriate ph ilosophical mode of 
cognition then is found in: the heart and conscience. This 
is not only a profound Christian-. trLtth, but .ha s been 
witnessed to by many exponents of the existential philosop hy.89 
proved somewhat disapp ointing, having yi e lded a result not 
really adequate to account for historical religion, Otto 
takes up the quest _for the irrational:apriori of _religion." 
( PRK, 301) This · he found, like Schleiermacher, , in. t he 
feeling-side of re ligious experience which yielded an. 
"intuitively felt religious reality; and presence , t h e holy, 
the divine" for _which he coined the t erm "numinous." 
In the fol lowing two chapters, " Religious Pragmatism" 
and "Reactionary Irrati ona lism," Macintosh giv.es a brief 
resum'S of the thoug ht of a number _ of . other thinker_s who 
stress the "non-rational" or . "irrational" as a way of arriving 
at .. religious knowledge. 
87. ss' 15. 
88. ss , 16. 
89. This may be the best place to write a brief h is-
torical note on Existentialism •. This phil osophy_ has hecome 
widespread in recent years--in the sense that many talk 
about it--through the literary efforts of J ean-Paul Sartre . 
But, as Bixler sugg_ests: " Existenz is not a school but a 
name of certain similarities in the thought of otherwise 
diverse philosophers •••• It is phi los ophy~ yet~ it . is more 
interested in doing justice to personal feeling t han. in 
following a rigorous logical procedure. It . is :poetry , .· yet 
it br ings a moral challenge • . It is religion, yet ••• it .. 
is scornful of the narrowness and exclusiveness· of all 
theologies. The word which most .. nearly expresses its 
special qualities is · the ••• word 'personal.' Existenz 
is ·an attempt to put .. into words the essentially inde-
scribable experience whi ch we ca ll personal life, with 
spec ia 1 reference to its sensitive, suffering, c.nd dec.is.i on-
making moments.u ·.Art.(l940), 36. This is essentially the 
empha.sis pla ce d by Berdyaev: "Existential philosophy is a . 
Personalist ph ilosophy,; the human . persohali ty _. is the rea·l 
sub j .~ct . of knowledge . ' { SS, 70) 
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Ho cking describes its central idea br.iefly: "Tbe 
I? ost concrete ?e ing is: not physical, _but the physical-held-
ln-mind; and tne mind ls most concrete not when it insuects 
as an observer, but when it passionately cares about. what 
is before it. If we seek reality we sha·ll find it .in ex-
perience, deeply and anxiously felt."(TP, 269f.) Again a. 
citation from Berdyaev: " .i~xistence excludes the idea of 
mediation : to exis~ . is ~o be an entity. The particular is 
more deeply rooted 1n Be111g than the general . 'rhe world of 
eternal Ideas is not the image of existence, as the Pl atonic 
tradition would have us believe; this image is more truly 
_reflected in human . nostalgia, despair, unrest and dissat:l..s -
faction." (.ss, 54) 
Socrate s is l:l..sted among the first hist orical an-
cestors of existentialism by reason of tbe subjective ap-
proach of his dictum, "Know thyself. 11 ( Cf. Russell, . HWP, 
73, who traces the seeds of decay in Greek philosophy back 
to Prota·g oras and Socrates with their . "undue emphasis on man 
as compare d with . the universe.") 
Whi le Berdyaev would come close to listing all within 
the existentialist fold when he pr oclaims that "every true 
ph ilosophy bears the stamp of its author's personality, 11 
( SS , 26) and that "ultimately, the most objective and i mper-
sonal of them all .apprehend t tu'ough feeling," ( SS, 27) most 
historians list Pascal as the first name in modern thought 
whose famous remark: ''The heart . has its reasons, of wh ic h 
reason is · ignorant," clearly places h i m in t his category. 
However, the chief fountain-head of modern existen-
tialism is Kierkegaard who, in reacting vi olently against 
the a bstL"action and systematization of Hegel, proclaimed 
that trutt1 is in subjec.tivity and that there is: no system 
that can explain existence. Kierkegaard saw · man as · living 
simultaneous ly in . the realms of time and eternity--in the 
former he exists as an irre leva nt ,member of t he species; in 
t h e latter . as a solitary individual. · The disparity between 
t hese two planes produces a state of tensi on marked by fear, 
trembling, despair., and tragedy. The solution is fo und in_ 
fait h in .God where alone the paradoxes of existence can. be 
reconciled~ (Cf. Berdyaev, SS , 26, 50f., et passim for 
references to Kierkegaard.) Kierkegaard was first redis-
covered in . our own day by the ·work of Una.muno, the Spanish 
Catholic. 
It was in the work of the p ost - war German ptlilosophers, 
neide5ger ·and J aspers, that ex i s tentialism first rec e ived 
its recent impetus. They both acknowledge their endebtedness 
to Kierkegaard, stres s i1~ particularly h is tragic sense of 
life, his awareness of anothe r d imension of reality, and his 
conviction that this realm, while inaccessib.le to t h e in-
t e llect, is open to s ome othe r more per.s onal and vital 
faculty of man. (On .the relation of Jasper.s and Heid~gger 
to Kierkegaa r d of. Brock, CGP, II, III. For Berdyaev s 
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Berdyaev .. openly avers that the unique mode of knowing 
in phi losophy is that of intuition. 
Intuition is the sine qua ~o~ of :phil?s?phy •. Every 
t;r~.e phi.l?soph~r ha ~. an or1g 1nal 1ntu1t1on of his own. 
P~;-losopn l:a~ l~tuiw~on canno~ be deduced from any-
tnlng else, 1t ls prlmary, and secretes in . itself the 
light .which wi ll illuminate every act of knowledge .. 
Ne ither religious nor scientific truths are adeauate 
substitutes for intuition. Philosophical knowledg e 
depends on the range of experience, and it also 
supp oses an es sentially tragic experience of all the 
contr~dicti ons of human. exis~ence. Philosophy is 
therefore base d upon the max1mum experience of human _ 
existence.90 
react ion to these thinkers cf .. SS , 4lf., 52f., et passim.) 
From Germany existentialism spread to Franc.e where 
Sart~e is perhaps its most consp icuous present-day fig ure. 
He is an agnostic who took over Kierkegaard 's conception_ of 
tensi on but threw out God. 11 ~Nbether God exists or. not is 
of no importance in our philosophy • . There is no communi - . 
cation between him and us." Since then God is at .. best ir-
relevant,. man is responsible sole ly to himself. 11 YoLL. ar•e 
your life and nothing else. 11 (Cited in Time, 47(J·an .. 28-,-
1946)' 29) 
Sartre shares with other French existentialists, in-
cluding, we may note, Berdyaev, two basic ideas: first, the 
repudiation of the esprit seri eux, i.e. the tendency to 
identify oneself with the arbitrary function which. society 
has bestowed upon him; secondly, the insistence upon the 
basic homelessness of man .in the world • . (Cf. Arendt, Art . 
1946) Sartre 1 s stripe of exi stentialism shares wit h comrnu- ' 
nism its atheistic denial of God, but breaks with it in . 
reJecting its disdain of philosophy, deification ~ of sci.ence, 
and optimistiQ fait~ in progress • . His existentialism sharss 
with Christianity a preoccupation with individual liberty, 
and ' its account of the misery of man is in ess ential harmony 
with the views of many Christian thinkers. (Cf. Brnwn·., Art. 
194-6) 
Contemporary existentialism should not, . however., be 
limited to the atheism of Heidegger and Sa~tre. Among the 
Christian existentialists may be listed Jasper_s, Scheler.,. 
Jackers, Barth, Jl; arcel, and Berdyaev, wh o, ·while differing 
widely among themselves are in essential. agreement in re-
maining true to the funda mentally religious basis of the 
thought of Kierkegaard. 
90. SS, 17. Reference to intuition as a way of 
knowing suggests: Bergson. His view ·Of intuition is b.est 
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Not,. a ll men hav.e such exper1· ence ~ Berd h 
. yaev, owev:.er , 
claims to be such a one when he describes his Christian 
faith as ba sed neither on habit nor tradition but "won 
t hrough an experience of the i lLner life of a most painful 
C 'na ra.cter ." 91 Thl' " it 1 d d s v a an ynamic experience" led to 
the attainment of a Christianity compara ble in no way to 
d ogmatic formulas or abstract ._ theolog,~es, but to a Chr isti-
anity "much more spiritual. ,92 
This experience is not one of the soul but of the 
spirit. In fact "philosophy is just . spirit b~e coming con-
s ci ous of itself •••• Philosophy is determined by life, 
because spirit is life, a nd because the knowledge which 
stated in an article, 11 Introduction to Metaphysics, 11 l a t_er 
repr inted in The Creative Mind. Here two brief citations 
shall havs to suffice for purposes of illustration~ A dis-
tinction is made between " two vmys of knowing a t h i ng . 11 The 
first implies g oing all around it, t he second entering into 
it. The first depends on the viewpoint chosen and the 
symb ols employed, , while the second is taken . from no v iew-
point and rests on no symbol. . Of the first . kind of 
knowledge we shall say that it stops at . the rela ti v.e; of the 
sec ond that, wherever poss ·ible, it . attains the a bsolute ." 
(CM, 187) 11 It follows that an absolute can only be g iv.en 
in an intuition, while all t he res t ,.ha s to do with ana lysis. 
We ca ll intuition here the sympathy by which one is trans-
p ort:ed· into the interior of an object in order t .o coincide 
wi t h what there is unique a n d conse quently inexpressible in 
it • . Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which re-
duces the obJect .to elements already known, that is, com on_ 
to that obJect and to others. Analyzing t hen cons ist.s in 
expressing a t h i ng in t erms of wha t is not it." ( CM, 190) 
Summar.izing Bergson's criticism of the intellect we note 
that: its · knowledge is analytical, external, relative, 
abstract and partial, a nd represents its objects as static 
and dead. Intuition is the counterpart of intellect in. all 
of these respects.(Cf. Hocking, , TP,-Chap . XIII) 
91. FS, x. 
92. FS, X. 
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spirit has of itself is the knowledge that life has of it-
self. 1193 
Spirit is life, experience, destiny •••• In the 
knovTledge of spirit subject. and object are not opposed 
to one another •••• The llfe of the spirit is not 
set over against knowledge a s an ohjectiv.e t h i ng , such 
as nature. £v.erytl1ing that .. transpires in the life of 
t he spirit a nd in its own knowledg e of itself lie s 
w ,it~in, the unfath?mable de.pths:· of spirit. Everyth ing_ 
t na ~ takes- place 1n the splritual world takes pla ce 
in me.94 
Such experience is· self-evident ... in_ that . its mere ex-
istenc e is· the cri t .erion of its truth. . "Truth in t he spiri-
tual life is the life itself." 9S I t is impossible to prove 
and justify the exist ence of spir itual experience to those 
who ha ve not ha d it. Such exper iences· are a utonomous, 
existing in their own rig ht, incapable of proof .96 
We return to a note a lready sounded when Berdyaev. 
a ffirms t ha t "the ma terials of a philosophyof a spiritual 
life a re contribut e d by the spiritual life of huma nity it-
self a s it h.as dev e loped in history. "97 But one is capable 
93. FS, 4. 
94. FS, 9. 
95. FS, 25. 
96. FS , 13f. Berdyaev :rejects· the usual criteria of 
verification or proof. Thus "there is nothing 'corresp onding ' 
to my spiritual . life, for it .. exists in its own right .•. 11 (FS , 
11) "Reflection .... seeks- laboriously for the crit eria of 
truth outs ide the truth ·which it fails to possess.. • • • But 
outside this truth a nd on a lower plane it .. is imposs ible to 
find such crit eria. The truth itself is its own cri t .er.i on." 
(FS 26) The closest Berdyaev approaches to a criter ion o~ 
trut h is · when after admitting that t here is. " a false mysti-
cism .and a purely fictitious - s p iritual knowledge 11 (FS , 30) 
he declares "it is necessary to try the spirits, for we 
cannot giv e credence to every spirit ..... Spiritual life 
is victory over sin. 11 (FS, 31) 
97. FS , 19. 
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of acquiring this knowledge only to the extent that r1e 
joins "himself to all t h ose wh o have participated in the 
development . of the knowledge of spir it in hist ory ."98 That 
is, "a philosophy of . the spirit ••• presupposes· fellow-
ship with tradition .. "99 
In this connection_ the following is· an interesting 
personal note that .. bears up on the issue at t. hand. Berdyaev. 
writes : 
I am myself limited as rega rds the extent of my 
knowledge; my experience is restricted and cannot_pre-
tend to cov.er the diversity of existence in all its 
fulness; I have not . myself known _ a great. number. of 
spiritual contacts of a dete rmining_ character •••• 
But I can "get . outside myself, and I can_, metaphysically 
speaking, P?-SS beyond my own limitati ons and have con-
tact with experience of a supra-personal kind. In t h e 
religious experience of the Church, e nd in his contact 
with Christ, man is not a lone and confined within_ his 
own limitations ·, for he is· dravrn near_ to all other..s 
v; ho have known this experienc:e, , to the whole Christian 
world, to apostles, saints, and to a ll who are in , 
Christ whether . living or departed.lOO 
4. T ysticism. Another term which can very readily he 
applied to Berdyaev's epistemology is "mysticism." Mysticism 
is not to be identified with the s p iritual life, which is 
its-elf "an infinitely broader tl'1ing ," but only with ttthe 
depths and heights of the spiritual life."lOl Spiritual ex-
per~ence in general is described as 
a liberating experience whi ch opens the door into the 
spiritual _and suprapersonal world, . revealing those 
98. FS, 19. 
99. FS, 19. 
100. FS, 329f. 
101. FS, 241. 
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hidden links v;h icll. bind the mic rocosm to the macrocosm. 
It corresponds a l vrays to a breach in the stl'ucture of 
the psycho-corporeal monad, to a leav~ng behind of 
self through i~mers ion . in t he deepest. levels of self-
h ood; it . is the mark of vict ory, over al l that, divides 
and is extrinsic.l02 
Mysticism proper would seem to be t his type of experi-
ence carr ied to an extr.eme-- its essence being defined a s 
"the overcoming of crea tureliness." 103 The mystical experi-
ence i s characterized by the disappearance of 11 any insur-
mountable dualism betwe enthe supernatural and the natura l, 
the divine and the created·, . for in. it t he natural. becomes 
supernatural and the creature is de ifi ed." 104 
The gnosiolog ical E•dv.anta ges of mysticism are clearly / 
sugges t ed : 
.Admittedly rational .theology Et'nd metaphystcs are right 
in insisting on tbe transcend~nt~ gulf between the Cre- · 
a tor a nd creati on, , the superna tural and the natural 
wor ld • . But supra-rationa l mysticism_ is not le ss tr.ue 
when it envisage s t he possibility of bridging this gulf. 
One truth does not contradic t the other. They b ot h 
express different moment s and states of experience. 
Mysticism does not m.ean_ the end of dogma, but it d oes 
penetrate to a dee£55 level than . tll.at _reac hed by 
dogmat ic formulas• 
Mysticism, however, is not of a sing le kind . 
There is a mysticism wr1ich is the perfec tion of tl1e 
soul, a spiritual ascent leading to God, , and there is· 
a nother kind of mysticism which is a knovrledg_e of the 
mysteries of be ing and of the divine.l06 
102. FS , 15. 
103. FS, 243. 
104. FS, 243. 
105. FS, 247. 
106. FS , 252~ 
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The former type, which has had the off icial approval of the 
Church, stresses morality, , asc eti cism, renunciation, , and a 
contemplation of a nd union with God. It ~ is · sacramenta l 
and conservative in its nat ure. Tbe latter type is pr..o-
phetic, reformist, creativ.e, a poca lyptic, a nd es chatolo ical 
' ' 
and by reason of t hese cha r acterist ics· has fr equently been 
suspected by the Churcl1. Th is form of m..yst icism, whi c h is 
of a "Gnostic type," has been eminently illustrated in 
German myst icism, t he deliverances of wh ich will conc ern us 
particularly in our next chapter . In t his mysticism. "we 
find a form of s piritual knowledge and a percept ion of 
divine mysteries whi ch rise above the di stinctions created 
by metaphysics and theology."l07 
5. Revelation and Faith. In any discus·sLon~ of 
Berdyaev's epistemology the terms "revelation" and "faith" 
recur many times, 108 so t ha t we must briefly discuss t he i r 
- significance • . Any distinction between rev.ealed and na tural 
r elig ion is rejected, since "every re lic i on in which we can 
see a measure of divine illumination . is a revea l ed religion ."l09 
107. FS , 252. 
108. FS, Chap. III, "Revela tion and Faith ." 
109. FS, 88. At this point t here is still wag ing one 
of t he chie f conflicts of- modern missions. ( Cf . Va n Dusen, 
Art. 1944) Dr. Hendr i k Kr a emer holds t ha t only Chris ti -
ani ty, Judaism, and lv ol1ammedanism are revela ti onal, while 
a ll others are na tura lis t ic or r at i onal istic. Between tl1e 
former a nd the l at t er there are no va lid points of common 
reference; but only a re l ationship of r ad ica l opposition 
and incompa tib~lity • . Ber dyaev stands much closer t o t e 
po i n t of view of Hoc king wh o rejects as unsound and un-
chr i s tian Kraemer's vi ew , and pr oposes i n vvhat he calls 
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Revelation, wh ich "is p oles apart from r a tional t 10ug ht 11 
and " doe s not i mply t ha t God is capable of be i ng e; r asped 
by r eason a nd conceptua l t h inking , 11 d O'es not pr .oc eed from 
object to know i ng subject in an obj ectivist, tra ns cendent, 
or rea list inter pr et a tion, but i s " something v1h ic h t ran -
spires vv i t h in us , a light springing up in our inwost deDtbs· 
.. ' 
a fa ct of the spiri tual 11fe."110 In fact . "there ca n be 
revea led to us only t ha t whi cb is reveE.l ed in us , for onl y 
t hat vrh ich ha ppens within ca n hav·e any meaning for_ us. "111 
Indeed "history cannot be unders tood except through s p iritua l 
experi ence of it, a nd when it i s regarded entirely as a 
r efl ection of certain spiritua l manifestat i ons. 11112 
· )eve lati on is a re l ease of the spirit t ha t has been 
i mpr is oned in the consci ousness a nd mat erial nature. 113 It 
11 is a catastroph ic trans format ion of consciousness" in 
wh ich "the barr.i ers of consciousness dissolve ," and " the 
c onscious is rais ed to the leve l of the supra-consci ous and 
i s wi dened a nd deepened to an unlimited extent ." 114 
'
1 The Wa y of H.econc eption" a s olution which conc e ives t he . 
pos sibility of fresh truth being d iscovered. 
110. FS, 9 0 .. 
111. FS, 93. 
112. FS, 94 . 
113. FS, 95. 
114. FS, 961' . Berdyaev's trea t ment hears a re-
semblance to t hat of Ja mes in the concluding chapter of h is 
VRE . There Jame s i dent ified the "more " with which the 
relig ious · believer comes · in contact· with "the subconscious 
self " ho l di ng that "wha tever it may b e on its far.ther 
side : the 1 more 1 with which in r elig ious experience we feel 
ours e lves connected is on. its hit her side the subconscious 
continuation. of our consci ous life.n(VRE, , 502) In his 
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Consciousness is not static and limit ed , but r a ther t her_e 
are "unlimited poss-ibiliti e s of spiritual ex perience a nd of 
r a ising consciousne s s to a h i gher leve l."ll5 But "only 
mystical emp iricism admits• the p ossibility of a full a nd 
unlimit ed experi ence a nd br-i ngs u.s ba ck to basic and orig_i-
na l life itself." 116 
· Consciousness-, Berdyaev _ holds r, may be activ.ely 
directed toward one pha se or• another of rea lity. Its 
st r ucture "always i mplies a sele cti on • . •• is determined 
by the reality to wh ic h it aspires • . •• obtains wha t it 
VT is hes , while remaining blind· a nd deaf to the t h ings from 
wh ich it turns away ." 11T "The fu llnes s of being , 11 "the 
infinite life of the spirit.," can be known_ only by a 
c onsciousness d irected towa r d it that has suitable powers of 
conception of wha t it may be on the farther side J ames in-
d ulges in wha t .. he calls a n . " over - belief." This " over- beli e f 11 
is that "the further limits of our b e i ng p lunge ••• into 
an a ltog ether other dimension of existence frnm t he sensib le 
and mere 1 understandable 1 world." This "ot her . dimension of 
ex i s t ence" James is ·wi lling to ca ll the "mysti ca l" or 11 super-
na tura 1 11 region and holds that t 0 it "we belong • • • in a 
more intimate sense tha n tha t in wh ich we belong to the 
visible world, for we belon~ in t he most intimate sense 
wherever our -ideals· belong. (VRE , 506) "This hig her. part _ of 
t he universe" Ja me s calls God.(VRE, 507) 
115. :F'S, 98. 
116. FS, 100. I n a footnote (FS , 100) Berdya e~ cites 
with approval the empiricism of J ames which, . as contr.a.sted 
with 11 the prev.a iling form of empiricism, 11 d oes· "support 
relig ious experience . ~ ' J ames is the only American philoso-
ph.er mentioned by Berdyaev .. . The reason . for such a-p. affi~ity 
has b-een well p ointed out by Bixler (Art., 1940) wno , wh1.le 
not s pecifically mentioning Berdyaev, shovvs clearly tl1e 
common elements betwe en J ames- and the proponents' of t.he 
Exi s tenz-Philosophie. 
17. FS, 101. 
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receptivity. If we are willing to submit our_ consci ousness 
to a catastrophic cha ng e , purify it in the fire of_ spirit , 
these other worlds may be revealed to us. I n other words, 
11 the phenomenon of revelationrequires the phenomenon of 
fa ith. 11118 Ea c h_ requires a nd needs the other. 
Real and ob ject ive faith presuppos es revelation, the 
movement which orig inates in the divine s phere , but 
revelation cannot itself penetrate into this world 
save in so far as it . is receiy,ed by faith and i s a 
fact of man's s p iritual life.ll9 
The unseen, -myst erious world cann_ot force i t self upon 
our attention, but thr ough faith, '!a voluntary re-direction 
of our power of ch oice," 120 we may once more a ddr ess our-
selves to the divine and sp iritual world. This experience 
wh ich "necessitates the sacrifice of the lower rea son" 121 
opens fres h possibilities of s p i ritual and divine knowledge. 
Since revelation is adapted to the structure of consciousness 
and proportioned to the degree of development it has rea c hed, 
t here will be degrees of r eve l ation in . a ll relig ions, a nd 
t here i s possible even in Christianity a new revelation. 122 
118. FS, 103. 
119. FS, 103. Cf . James: "' fho knows· whether the 
f a ithfulness of individua ls · here below to t he ir own poor 
over-beliefs· may not act ually help God in turn to be more 
eff ectively f aithful to his own grea ter t asks." ( VRE, 5~09) 
120. FS, 107. Cf. James's "The ·Ifill to Believe. 11 
121. FS, 106. Cf. Locke, ,t;HU, Bls:. IV, Chap . XI X, 14: 
"He therefore that will not e; ive himself up to all the ex-
tra vagancies of delusion and error, must bring t h is gui de 
of his liGht .within to the trial. God, when he makes the 
prophet, does not unmake the man. He leave~ a~l his 
faculti e s in the natural sta te, to enable h ~m GO jud e of 
his inspirationsi whether . th ey be of d ivine orig ina l or no ." 
122 • FS, 11 ff . 
56 
CHAPTER III 
METAPHYSICS- - CELESTIAL HISTORY 
A. Introduction. The problem of Berdyaev's meta-
physics might be promptly dealt with if we were to follow 
the view of one critic who concluded, "It would be more 
correct to say tha t he has no metaphysics."l However, such 
a summary way out is not here possible, and we must plunge 
into what another unfriendly critic has descr1bed as "some 
of t he most unintelligible pages of critical obfuscation 
that have ever found their way into print." 2 
Berdyaev's metaphysics and epistemology are so in-
separably intertwined that the material of the preceding 
chapter must be kept constantly in mind. We there noted 
his appreciation of tradition and myth. Tradition is 
historical recollection; history is myth. Myth is seen not 
as a term descriptive of something unreal but as a reality, 
albeit not of the objective-empirical type so often re-
ga rded by positivistic science as the only reality. 1zyt h 
is the remainder of former events as preserved in the 
people's memory. As such it is subjective-objective. I yth 
and tradition must be critically viewed, yet they contain 
reality in that they reveal a secret inner connection of 
man with an historical object. I~n is a microcosm and 
1. Bourke, Art.(l936), 422. 
2. Troy, Art.(l934), 682. 
hence historical events .are paralleled by inner events in 
man. The people's memory, as it is expressed in tradition 
and myth, is a symbol of its historical experience.3 
"The real goal of the philosophy of history," 
Berdyaev writes, ."is to establish a bond between man and 
history, between man's destiny ·and the metaphysics of 
history. " 4 Or again, "The destiny of man 1 s life on earth 
is the theme of history. rr5 But man 1 s destiny is fulfilled 
not only objectively in the macrocosm of world history but 
also subjectively in the microcosm of t.he knowing self. 
There is a connection between these two which implies a 
special relationship between the historical and the meta-
physical. 
Rejecting any religious, scientific, or phil'osophic 
view which would oppose the metaphysical and the historical 
on the assumption that the former cannot manifest itself in 
the latter, Berdyaev. proposes instead that "the meta-
physical may be transposed and made manifest in terms of 
the historical." 6 This conception which, as we shall see 
later,7 was only realized at long laEt in the Christian 
philosophy of history holds that "the eternal can. have a 
temporal fulfilment." 8 This means the rejection of the 
3. Cf. supra, Chap. II; MH , 15-25. 
4. MH , 17. 
5. 1IIH, 26. 
6. w,- -26 
7. Infra, Chap. IV. 
8. MH , 35· 
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view that history is simply "an inert mass of material 
devoid of inner life and meaning, u9 and instead the ac-
cep~ance of it as a 
union of the temporal and the eternal, of the histori-
cal and the metaphysical, of that which is present in 
the physical facts of history and that whic h has been 
revealed in the inmost depths! of spiritual reality .10 
The ultimate ground or source of the historica l 
process is found not upon the temporal or human plane but 
upon that of the eternal and divine. It is with this 
eternal and divine plane, which Berdyaevv calls "celestial 
history," or the "divine prologue," and which is the "true 
metaphysical foundation of history," that we are concerned 
in this chapter. 
This celestial realm is not inaccessible but is "a 
part of the inmost depths of our spiritual life."ll By 
entering into this inner spiritual reality we come into 
contact with the divine life and with the source of history. 
Here "in the inmost depths : of the Ab'solute, that is, in 
t hose depths of being with which spiritual life and ulti-
mate spiritual experience at their deepest ,come into com-
munion," is the beginning and fulfilment ,of history. 12 
B. God. How are we to think of the Divine Being who 
is thus the source of the historical process? Log~cal and 
9. MH, 38. 
10. :rvlH , 39. 
11. MH, 44. 
12. MH, 45. 
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abstract monism do so under the categories of fixity and 
immutability regarding the world as plural, contradictory,, 
and ~obile. But such monism in all its for~s--Indian, 
Parmenidean, Platonic, Nee-Platonic, or absolutistic- -fails . 
to explain the origin of the world in terms of God."13 
Creation of the world cannot be deduced from the 
Absolute which is perfectly self-sufficient. Creation 
of the world implies movement in God, it is a dramatic 
event in .the Divine life.14 
The above noted systems either regard the mobile plural 
world as unreal or draw .such sharp distinctions between 
God and the world that they eventuate in unresolvable 
dua 1 isms •15 
1. Static Monism Denied. The only way out is to 
deny such a monism. This, Berdyaev recogniz·es, is to run 
contrary "to the dogma of the Church and its prevailing 
philosophy," but he regards such dogma as not only "purely 
exoteric and superficial," but as contradictory to "the 
Christian mysteries of the Divine Trinity, of Christ as the 
center of divine life and of Golgotha," all of which suggest 
movement and dramatic history in God. 16 
13. It is doubtful whether Berdyaev . does Plato full 
justice here, though many authorities from Aristotle on 
have so interpreted him. The interpretation of Plato as 
given by Demos in POP, drawing, heavily upon the Timaeus and 
Philebus, would put Plato in an historical tradition much 
closer to Berdyaev. Brightman's reading of Plato in POR, 
286-289, is also in agreement with this point of view. 
14. DM, 38. Cf. ~lli, 46. Cf. Brightman's citation 
of comparable notions by Swens.on and Cassirer in Art.(l947), 
258. 
15. MH , 45f. 
16. Ivlli , 46-49. Cf. DM, 37f • 
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The trouble with traditional theology is that in-
stead of penetrating to the mystical, esoteric meaning of 
its dogmas it has proceeded to rationalize them in an 
exoteric, naturalistic sense. It fails to see them as 
symbols or reflections of spiritual reality but "" takes t hem . 
as realities in themselves.l7 The most disastrous result 
of this exotericism of traditional affirmative theology, 
bears on the point under discussion--namely,, the static 
conception of God as actus purus, immobile perfection.l8 
But for Berdyaev: 
The static conception of God as actus purus having no 
potentiality and completely self-sufficient is a 
philosophical, Ar~totelian, and not a Biblical con-
ception. The Go~~he Bible, the God of the revelation, 
is by no means an actus purus: He has affectiv.e and 
emotional states, dramatic developments in His inner 
life, inward movement.l9 
17. Cf. Tillich's distinction between the ontic and 
the ontological concept of God. .4ccording to t .he first: 
"God is a reality exceeding the ordinary reality with . 
respect to power and value, to which man has personal re-
lationships according to the character of his God." The 
ontological definition makes God "the Unconditioned of 
being and what ought to be, the foundation and the 'beyond' 
of all that is conditioned." (Cited by Harkness, .Art.(l938), 
512) A summary statement by Miss Harkness concerning 
Tillich applies to Berdyaev as well • . Rew.rdirlfi "man! s 
phenomenological knowledge of God as symbolic, Miss H~rk­
ness holds that Tillich believes "such symbolism is not 
false, but it is inadequate. It becomes false when symbol 
is taken .as literal truth. The one element in our knowl-
edge of God which is literal fact, and not symbol, is God's 
character as~ the Unconditioned." Art.(l938), 512. 
18. For a brief sketch of theistic absolutism with 
citations from its chief historical exponents see Brightman, 
POR, 283ff. Cf. also, Brightman, Art.(l932) and Art.(l947). 
19. DM, 37. Cf. SF, 51, 84. 
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In fact the very qualities which Christianity con-
demns in man as -sinful are calmly ascribed by the tra-
ditional theologians to God. 
It is utterly unthinkable to ascribe to God the 
Creator self-sufficiency, self-satisfaction and 
despotism as· characteristic of His inner life. It 
is more worthy of God to ascribe to Him a longing 
for the loved one, a need for sacrificial self-
surrender. People are afraid to ascribe movement to 
God, because movement indicates the lack of something, 
or the need for something which is not .. there. But 
it may equally well be said that immobility is an 
imperfection, for it implies a lack of the dynamic 
quality of life. _ Tragic conflict in the life of the 
Deity is a sign of the perfection, and not of the 
imperfection, of the divine life • . The Christian 
revelation . shows us God in_ the aspect of sacrificial 
love, but sacrificial love, far from suggesting self-
auf iciency, implies the need for passing_ into its 
"other." It is impossible to deny that the Christian 
God is, first and foremost, the God of sacrificial 
love, and sacrifice always indicates tragedy. Dra-
matic movement and trag_edy are born of the fullness, 
and not of the poverty of life • . To deny tragedy in 
the Divine life is only possible at the cost of 
denying Christ, His cross and crucifixion, the 
sacrifice of the Son of God.20 
A summary statement of Berdyaev's conception of God 
which may serve as a transition to the next section occurs 
in one of his more recently translated volumes: "God is 
not an abstract idea, nor abstract ex.istence, , elaborated by 
the categories of abstract thought. God is a Being, a 
Persona 11 ty. "21 
2. Dynamic Dualism Aff.irmed. Berdyaev! s thought, ; 
especially when concerned with the mysteries of traditional 
20. DM, 38. 
21. SF, 51. 
Of. MH, 47-51. 
Of. FS, 195. 
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Christianity, is characterized by a freedom and boldness 
that in the eyes of many would appear ,. to verge on heresy. 
However, a~ we have already noted, 22 he does not lose ·him-
self in a private chaos of speculative anarchy, but is 
guided in the gnosis which he propounds by the spirituaL. 
experiences of the great saints and· mystics. 23 Thus he 
finds backing within the Christian faith itself for the 
doctrines which he advanc .es. 
All the great .Christian mystics, whatever confession _ 
they belonged to, have taught that in eternity, in 
the depths of the spiritual world, a divine process 
takes place in which is revealed the relationship 
between God and man, and the birth of God in_man and 
of man in God, where lover and beloved meet. These 
are truths of spiritual experience, living truths, 
not metaphy~ical categories nor ontological 
substances. 4 
Hence, as we have already noted in our epistemologi-
cal study, spiritual reality and the divine life cannot be 
known through "abstract philosophical thought based upon 
the principles of formalist ~. or rationalistic logic" which, 
since it denies movement to God, fails to realize th.e 
connection between the divine life and the tragic destiny 
of man, but only through a concrete myth.25 
22. Supra, Chap. II. 
23. A similar process is followed by Tillich as - is 
indicated by Miss Harkness: "All attempts to prove God's 
existence by argument fall down, from the fact that they 
proceed from ontic premises •••• The alternative is, with 
the mystic, , to grasp by intuitive awareness the uncon-
ditioned Reality of God, .and then ••• attempt to state 
in philosophical language that which in its ultimate 
nature is ineffable." Art.(l938), 512f. 
24. FS, 195. 
25. :tvlli, 5lf. Cf. supra, Chap. II • . 
Only a mythology which conceives the divine celestial 
life as celestial history and as a drama of lov.e and 
freedom unfolding itself between God and His· other 
self, which He loves and for whose reciprocal love He 
thirsts, and only an admission of God's longing for 
His other self, can provide a solution of celestial 
history and, through it, .. of the destinies of both man _ 
and the world. Only such a freedom of both God and 
man, only such a divine and human lovB in the fulness 
of the tragic relationship, would appear to be the 
way to d~gcover the sources of every historical 
destiny. 
To illustrate further his view that "the origins of 
history lie in the inmost depths of the Absolute and in the 
tragic potential of the divine life itself," Berdyaev re-
fers to the "profound and original doctrine of German_ 
myst i cism," particularly as this is represented in Eckhart . 
and Boehme.27 These thinkers : hold that there is "in the 
nature of God, deeper than Him ••• a sort of primal dark 
abyss, and in its inmost depths occurs a theogonic process 
or that of divine genesis." 28 According to this negativ.e 
or mystical theology, the primal _reality is · the Gottheit 
or Ungrund. 29 
What is its nature? This is difficult to a scerta i n, 
s i nce to it "neither human words nor the categories of g ood 
a nd evil nor those of being or non- being are applicable."30 
But, though "irrational and incommensurable with any of our 
26. MH, 52f. Cf. FS, 195. 
27. MH, 54. 
28. MH , 55. 
29. Chief references for this important conception 
are: MH, 54f., 85; SR, 140-146; FS, 135, 160, 165f., 194, 
314; ~ DM , 33ff., 39, 52· 
30.. 1ill ' 55. 
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categories,"31 Berdyaev uses a host of terms to elucidate 
its meaning. It is "deeper than anything else;" "the 
primal source of what, according to Boehme and Schelling, 
constitutes the Dark Nature of God;" "primal source and 
fount of being;" "a profound source of ••• tragic con-
fl1ct, movement and passion in the depths of the divine 
life itself."32 Again, it is described as "the primary 
bas-is of existence;" ''super-existence, super-personality, 
the ineffable depths and genesis of God;" "not creative;" 
"not being , but a more primeval and deeper stratum of_ 
being ;" 11 nothingness as distinct from something in th.e 
II ) )/ ' ;,~ 
categ ory of being;" notOV)t O'I , butp"lovbut not in. the 
Greek sense;" "deeper than God;" "the primal pre-
existential freedom for fr eedom precedes being (and) free-
dom is · not created; 11 33 "the da rk void;" "the undetermined , 
the groundless, tl1e bottomless ••• situated beyond t he 
world of causality. "34 From a still later volume we read: 
There is in the very origin of the world an irrational 
freedom which is grounded in _the void, in that abyss 
from which the dark stream of life is sues tgrth and in 
which every sort of possibility is latent.3 
The same volume holds that it is "pure possibility;" "not 
evil;" "the source of every kind of life and every 
31. MH, 55. 
32. MH, 57. 
33. Of this citation Berdyaewsa1,s: "That is the 
definition I personally should propose.' (SR, 145_) 
34. SR, 140-146. 
35. FS, 160. 
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actualization of being."36 
The primal source of all else t hen is the Divine 
Nothing, the Absolute, the Gottheit, the Ungrund. Second-
ary as compared with the primal groundlessness and inex-
pressible abyss occurs the theogonic process or divine 
genesis noted above. Thus there is the distinction drawn 
by Eckhart between Gottheit (Godhead) and Gott _. (God). The 
former is a revelation of apophatic (negative) knowledge; 
t he latter a revelation of cataphic (affirmative) knowledg e. 
While the latter may be made known through conceptua l a nd 
ex oteric language, the former must be communicated only 
through symbols and myths.37 
Tne conclusions of German mysticism are that neither 
the Divine Nothing nor the Absolute ca n be t he 
Creator. The Gottheit is not creative; it .escapes all 
worldly analogies, affini ties, . dynamism. The notion_ 
of a correlativ-e Creator and creature is a category 
deriving from cataphic theology • . I should state this 
as follows: God is not Abs olute, for the notion of 
God-the-Creator~ God-the-Per s on, God in relation to 
the world and man .lacks that complete abstraction 
wh ich is necessary for a definitive concept of the 
Absolute. The concrete, revealed God is correlative 
to the world a nd man. He is the biblica l God, the 
revealed God. But the Absolute is a definitive 
mystery. In consequence t wo acts are affirmed: 
Firstly, from the Divine Nothing, . from the Gottheit, 
from the Ungrund, a God is realized in eternity, a 
triune God; and secondly, God, the triune God, , ·is the 
36. FS, 165f. Cf. Tillich (also influenced by 
Boehme) and his use of the term "abyss" (IH, 77ff.) defined 
by Miss Harkness as "the inexhaustible baa:is of all b.eing, 
whether good or evil •••• The term abyss applies to both 
good and evil to connote the bottomless base from which all 
that exists comes into being . 11 Art.(l938), 513. 
37. SR, 140; FS, 194. Cf. Tillich's distinction _ 
already noted between ontic and ontologi ca l knowledge. 
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Author of the world. It appears, therefore, that_ t here 
is i n eternity a theog onic process, . a Divine genesis. 
And tha t . is the inner, esoteric life of the Deity. 
The act t, of Creation, the relationship between God a nd 
man, is the revelation of the Divine drama, of which 
time and history are a n inner content.38 
What explanation does Berdya ev offer to account. for 
the theog onic process, the Divine genesis? Certain insight 
is g iven when he sta tes that the Ungrund or Gottheit is a 
"wilfui principle,"39 and that it is best defined as "the 
prima l pre- existential freedom." 40 This "nothingnesS' long s 
to be something." 41 This freedom or will longing to mani-
fes t it self would se e·rri to be t he basic. explanation of t he 
inner . movement within the Absolute. 42 
Tha t - is meant by creation? It is· "a g_rowth , an 
addition, the making of something new that ha d not existed 
before •••• bringing fort h out of nothing." It is a 
process in which "nothing bec omes something, non- b:eing be-
comes being,_. n43 Creation differs from emanat i on, which 
holds that "particles of matter radiate from a centre and 
are separated off," and from evolution, in which "nothing 
new is~ made, but the old is redistributed."44 Creation is a 
38. SR, 141. Cf. DM, 33f. and FS, 194. 
39. MH, 56. 
40. SR, 145. 
41. SR , 145. 
42. Berdyaev's thought here relates him definitely to 
the voluntaristic emphasis in modern philosophy, especially 
to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Bergson • . Cf. Tillich's 
description of the abyss as "an active inexhaustibility," 
"a : productive inner infinity of existence." (IH, 84) 
43. DM, 162. 
44. DM, 163. 
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mystery, but .its inner meaning is revealed to us: in the 
biblical myth which in Berdyaev's interpretation teaches--
that "God created the world out of nothing, i.e. fr.eely and 
out of freedom." 45 With this statement as- to the nature of 
creativeness before us Berdyaev's summary account . of the 
process may be noted. 
"Out of the abyss :, out of the Divine Nothing is born 
the Trinitary God and He is confronted with meonic freedom •. 
He creates out of nothing the world and- man." 46 Ag?- in: 
"Freedom is not determined by God; it .. is : part:. of the nothing 
out of which God created the world •••• Both God and free-
dom are manifested out _of the Ungrund. 1147 Th.e task of 
creation is seen as that of God "conquering non-being."48 
Thus, for Berdyaev 
the primal foundations of . bei:ng rest .u;g>on a certain 
irrational and· wilful principle, and ••• the whole 
significance and essence of the world process consist 
in an illumination of this dark irrational principle.49 
A long~r citation expands this essential idea and shows the 
genius of Berdyaev . in combining religious rev-elation, 
philosophical .. speculation, and mysticaL. intui tion. 
In the b-eginning was the Logos; the Word, the Meaning, 
and · the Light. But _. this eternaL truth of religious 
revelation only means· that _tne kingdom of light and 
meaning has heen realized · initially in. being and that,_ 
the Logos triumphed from the beginning over darkness 
of ev.ery kind. Divine life isa tragedy. Even at the 
45. DM, 163. 
46. DM, 34. 
47. DM, 33f. 
48. DM, 34. 
49. MH, , 56. 
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beginning, before the formation of the world, there 
was the irrational void of freedom which had to be 
illuminated by the Logos. This freedom is not a form 
of being which existed side by side with the Div.ine 
Being, the Logos, or Mind. It is rather that principle 
without which being could have no meaning for God, and 
which alone justifies the divine plan of the world. 
God created the world out . of nothing, but it would be 
equally true to say that He created it out of freedom. 
Creation must b!e grounded upon that limitless freedom. 
wl1ich existed in the vnid before the world appeared. 
Vf.i thout freedom creation has no value for God. In the 
beginning was the Word, but in the beginning also there 
was freedom. Thi.s · latter is not opposed to the Word, . 
for without it the Meaning of the world does not exist. 
Without darkness there is mo light. Good is rev.ealed 
and triumphs through the ordeal of
5
evil. Freedom 
makes both good and evil possible. 0 
C~ ~· . 1. His Creation. The most essential 
portion of creation is man. What L, does Berdyaew have to say 
of his nature? "Man is the creation of God, rr5l though . 
since "the Creator is manifested at the same time as cre-
ation, God and man appear simultaneously."52 Berdyaev, 
cites from the mystic literature at ,length in pointing out 
the correlation between God and man. The following from 
Vogel is typical: 
But God ••• is either for Himself, absolutely, apart 
from. all creatures, in the mystery of His = unity, or 
else respectu creaturarum, present and acti~e in His 
manifestation to His creature. God, abBolute, alone 
f'or Himself', apart f'rom all creature, is · and remains 
impepsonal, , timeless,, placeless, inactiv.e, will-less, 
dispassionate, ' nor is He Father or Son or Holy Ghost, 
but He is in eternity beyond time, in every plac.e 
poised in the dwelling of Himself, working nott1ing, 
50. FS, 165f. This section on creation is of great 
importance for Berdyaev!s treatment of the problem of evil 
which will be discussed below. 
51. FS, 224. 
52. FS, 194. 
willing nothing, desiring nothing • . But in respect of 
the creature, i.e. with. and through th.e creature, He is 
personal, active, willlng, desiring and suffering •• 
• • Then also He becomes the Father and He b:ecomes t he 
Son and is Himself the Son, and He becomes the Holy 
Ghost and is Himself the Holy Ghost, .willing, mov.ing, 
creating all things.53 
What is the nature of man? Following a surv.ey of 
antnropological tbeories,54 Berdyaev, concludes that .while 
11 all these theories contain elements of truth 11 that .. "none 
of them expresses the essence of human nature as a whole."55 
The only adequate anthropology is that :.found in the Bible--
that . man is the image and likeness of God the Creator. 
This means that . "man is a creator too and is callee to 
creative cooperation in the work of God.u56 But .. man can be 
a creator only if he has freedom. Hence, there is revealed 
a certain duality in the origin and nature of man. 
There is in him the element of primeval, utt.erly un-
determined potential freedom springing from the abyssc 
of non-being, and the element .. determined by the fact 
that .man is the image and likeness of God, a Di~ine 
idea which his freedom may realize or destroy •••• 
1~n has sprung from God and from the dust, from God's 
creation and· non-being, from God's idea and freedom.. 
53 • .Quoted in SR, 143. Cf. supra, 62 and 66, where 
Berdyaev . denies the conception of God as Absolute and af-
:firms God as · Personality.; This conception is related to 
Hegel's notion that .. the Absolute is not to he viewed as an 
abstract unity or identity but as a process of development .• . 
Cf. Hegel, PM, 77ff., for his criticism of Schelling. 
54. DM, 59-69. 
55. DM, 69. 
56~ DM, 69. Berdyaev's anthropology is to be con-
tras,ted with most of that .. of historical Christianity whether 
in the Roman Catholic tradition or in that L. of Protestant 
orthodoxy. He is likewise vigorously opposed. to the be-
l:ittl1ng of man found in the revtval of neo-orthodox.y. 
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• • • I~n is an enigmatic_ being because he is not the 
product of natural processes but is God's child and 
creation, ,and also because he is the child of freedom 
and ,aprings from the abys~ of non-being.57 
Man has then an initial freedom--a freedom "which is, 
in some kind of way, the mysterious: source of life, the 
basic and original experience, the abyss which is deeper 
than being itself and by which being is determined.n58 
This original freedom is the source of_tragedy both for man 
and God. God desires tha t the being created in his image 
enter into the fullness of the divine nature and participate 
in the crea tive work of conquering non-being--of joining_ 
Him in the task of creation defined as ''tra nsitl.on !£..2.!!!-
non-being to being through ~ free act."59 As we shall note 
shortly, man at first joined wl.th God and then rebelLed. 
Before passing on to the rebellion of man it is 
basic to note that Berdyaev's theodicy is involved in the 
interplay of the factors already discusaed. 60 The issue as 
it confronts the religious man is stated briefly: 
It seems difficult to reconcile the existence of God, 
as an All-merciful and All-powerful Disposer with that 
of evil which is such a formidable and powerful ele-
ment in our world.61 _ 
The rational solutions of monism or pantheism, which denies 
that evil is evil, and dua lism, which regards it as ha ving 
57. DM, 70. Cf. SF, 45. 
58. FS, 126. 
59. DM, 44. 
60. Chief discussions of this central religious : 
issue are found in FS, Chap. V, and DM, Chap~ II. 
61. FS, 158. 
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an independent, positive, and ontological source, are both 
rejected as failing to take into acc.ount the factor of 
freedom ... 
Either evil finally disappears or it .,appears as a 
force completely ,outside and apart from the human 
spirit. But if evil cannot .~be regarded as hav.ing 
its source in.: God, and if outside God there _ is· no 
other source of be5~g, how can the phenomenon of 
evil be explained? 
The solution of much traditional theology which explained 
evil as "due to the abuse of freedom with which God endowed 
His creatures" is re jec.ted as "purely superficial." It has 
regarded "freedom itself (as) created by God and penetrable 
to Him down to its very depths," but in so doing it , 11 in .no 
wise saves the Creator_ from the responsibility for pain and 
evil" and may, in fact, be "the profound moral source of 
atheism."63 
Berdyaev-.· states his own solution briefly in his two 
chief the ologica 1 writings. "God is All-power.ful in 
relation to being but not in relation to nothingness and to 
freedom; a nd that .. -is why evil exists.n64 Or . again; "God 
the Creator is all- powerful over being, ,·over the created 
world, but .He has no power over non-being, over the uncre-
ated freedom which is impenetrable to Him. 1165 A summary 
statement by Berdyaev ties together the essential elements 
62. DM, 32. Cf. DM, 45. 
0'3. DM, 31. 
64. FS, 160. 
65. DM, 34. 
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that we :ha ve noted: 
The source of evil is ·-· not in .God, nor in a being ex-
isting positively side by side with Him, but in the 
unfathomable irrationality of freedom, in pure possi-
bility, in the forces concealed within that dark void 
which precedes all positive determination . of being .• 
Thus evil has no basis in anything; it is determined 
by no possible being and has no ontological origin. 
The possibility of evil is l a tent in tha t mysterious, 
principle of being in which every sort .of possibility 
lies concealed • . The void (the Ung rund of Boehme) is 
not ~ evil, it is the source of every kind of life and 
every actualization of being. It conceals within it-
self the possibility both of evil and of g ood.66 
66. FS, 165. Cf. Brightman, PG, FG, PR, a nd POR for 
a t heodicy suggestive of Berdyaev's views at _many points. 
Both thinkers see the problem of evil as a central issue fo~ 
relig ion and disparage tra ditional solutions of it. Both 
break emphatically with traditional absolutism, which holds 
t hat the power of the divine will is unlimited, and instead 
conceive of God as facing conditions which his will did not 
crea te. Berdyaev calls this reca lcitrant element which is 
· inca pable of fina l rationalization ."meonic freedom;" Bright-
man refers to it as "The Given." Both ultimately locate 
these factors within t he divine and reject dualism-- Berdya ev. 
swallows : t hem up in the Ungrund or Gottheit, Brightman r e -
gards The Given as an a spect of the personality of God . 
For both these factors are eternal• In neither case is it 
evil per ~~ but in each case it is potential obstacl e a nd 
evil, or potential instrument and g ood. Both see the 
creative task of conquering The Given as continuing and 
stress the cooperative endeavors of God and man in furt her-
i ng control of it towa.rd the emerg ence of value. 
Cf. also Tillich's essay on "The Demonic" (IH, 77-
122) for a parallel conception. The chief categ ories of 
the divine, the satanic, and t he demonic have been well-
summarized by M1 ss Harkness: 11 Th.e demonic • • • • denotes 
the antithesis of the divine, but also--contrary to popula~ 
usage--the antithesis of the satanic •••• The divine is 
the positive creative ground of existence which imparts 
meaning to life; the satanic is the negative, destructive 
urinciple inimical to all meaning. The demonic: is . the 
~ternal tension between the form-creating a nd form-
destroying elements of existence. Its metaphysical roots· 
are in the divine, since God is the unconditioned g_round 
of all being. Yet the demonic elements in life. are t h ose 
which move toward the disintegration . of meaning rather than 
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2. His Rebellion. With this background in theodicy 
before us we turn to the event with which evil is most 
closely linked--the rebellion of man. God, confronted with 
toward its creation •••• The rooting of the demonLc in 
the divine means, phenomenologically, that there is nev.er 
a clear cleavage to be drawn between them, and metaphysi-
cally, tha t God must b.ave a . 'dark nature' within him, an 
aspect of the divine being wb.ich the Hebrew prophet,s 
grasped when they spoke of a God of wrath." Art. ( 1938), 
513f. 
The key-passage from Tillich for a possible theodicy 
follows: "Form of being and inexhaustibility of b.eing be-
long together. Their unity in the depth of essential 
nature is the divine, their separation in existence, the 
relatively independent eruption of the 'abyss' in things, 
is the demonic. An absolutely independent eruption of the 
'abyss,' a mere devouring of every form, would be the 
Satanic, which 1' or that .. very reason cannot take form or. 
come to existence. In the demonic, on the other hand, the 
divine, the unity of bottom and abyss, of form and con-
sumption of form, is still contained; therefore the demonic 
can come to existence only in the tension of both elements. 
The tension is really in everything which. is produced by 
the creative power. The impulse for formation inherent in , 
everything and filling it and the horror of decay of form 
is founded on the form-quality of existence. To come into 
being means to come to form. To lose form means to lose 
existence. At _-the same time, howev.er, there dwells in_ 
everything the inner inexhaustibility of being_, the will to 
realize in itself as an individual the active infinity of 
being, the impulse toward breaking through its own, limited 
form, the longing to realize the abyss in . itself. The 
living form with the fullness and limits of its existence 
results from the conjoined effect of both tendencies. From 
the isolation and formless eruption of the abyss - results 
demonic distortion. Demonry is the form-destroying 
eruption of the creative basis of things." (IH, 84f.) 
Tillich, Berdyaev, and Brightman are at one in seeing 
the presence of evil in the world as a fact which must be 
faced, in their rejection of dualism, and in their discover-
ing the source of evil in God. Tillich and Berdyaev. seem 
more concerned about the evil of _sin, whereas : Brightman 
seems to focus his attention on na tural evil. Tillich and-
Berdyaev both reflect the influence of Boehme and Schelling 
in their doctnines of the Unconditioned or Ungrund and tend 
toward an ultimate impersonalism as over against the per-
sonal World-Ground of Brightman. 
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meonic _ freedom, creates the world and man and calls for man 
to join with him in the creative work of conquering non-
being. 
At .. first the answer_was consent .to creation, then it~ 
was rebellion and hostility towards God, a return to 
original non"'!being. All rebellion ag?-inst God is a 
return to non-being which assumes the form of .fals-e 
ill:usory being, and is a victory of non-b:eing over the 
divine light • . And it is - only then that .. the nothing 
which is not evil becomes ev11.67 
The rebellion of man against God has . been giv.en 
mythological form in the Biblical acQount of the Fall and 
of the Garden of Eden which tells of "the powerlessness of 
the creator to avert .the evil resulting:_ from fre'edom which 
He has not __ created. 11 68 This myth expresses in symbols -
events in the spiritual world, epitomizing _ "what _.must . have 
happened in the history of being prior to the origin of the 
world process. n 69 In this myth Paradise stands for "the 
state of being in which there is no valuation or distinction, 11 
as -"the blissful life in which the cosmos was . in man 1 and 
man wa s in God."7° But, though an age of bliss and inno-
cence, it .was~- one conditione.d by ignorance. It was the 
realm of the unconscious in which man lived a merely 
vegetative existence. " M:a.n's freedom was-- not as yet 
67. DM, 34f. Cf. Tillich., IH, 84f. for a comparable 
point . of view. The vital element .revolts against the formal 
element in a desire for greater self-rea lization but 
realizes only demonic distortion verg~ng on the satanic:• 
68. DM, 34. 
69. MH, 77. 
70. DM, 47. 
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unfolded; it had not expressed itself or taken part in 
creatl· on."7l G d k 1 o was nown mere y as a sustaining pnwer, 
·a creative ·force. 
I~ man had remained in the pa ssive state of par~disai­
cal innocence and unconsciousness, i.e. if he had. 
remained at .the stage of the divinely natural life, he 
would not have known Christ or attained deification.72 
But the meonic freedom though temporarily hidden at 
the creation of the world "remained = in the subsoil of the 
paradisaical life and was bound to. manifest . itself • 11 73 
" IvJan rejected the bliss and wholeness of Eden and chos e the 
pain and tragedy of cosmic life in order to explore his 
destiny to its inmost depths."74 Man's . cr.eative efforts 
took the form of self-affirmati on and led him into the path 
of isolation, division, and ha tred . 75 T.he dividedness that _ 
man experienced when he rejected paradise a.nd God wa s the 
occasion for the birth of consciousness. In place of the 
harmony and unity a nd wholeness symbolized by the tree of 
life from which man departed, there comes conflict and 
division and loss of whole~ess symbolized by man's tast i ng. 
of the tree of knowledge. From this resulted distinctions: 
and valuations, the knowledge of g ood and evil, and the 
experience of pain and suffering. But, though . under the 
sway of the chaotic elements in his nature, the memories of 
71. Divi, 48. 
72. DM, 49. 
73. DM, 48 • 
74. DM, 48. 
75. FS, 162. 
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Paradise still linger with man, and he seeks through his 
experience of dividedness, pain, and suffering to ascend 
to regeneration and wholeness in God.76 
3. His . Enslav.ement. Berdyaev 's tr.ea tment of the 
natural world can best be noted briefly at this point. It 
is marked by a non-realistic temper77 and an .appreciation 
of the contributions of German idealism.78 Thus, the 
76. DM, 51. Cf. Hegel's interpretation of the Fall 
which contains -· comparab:le ideas • . The primitive. state of 
man was one of innocence and harmony, , but it ."was likewise 
the condition of the brute. "Paradise is a park, where only 
brutes, .not men, can remain. For the brute is one with God 
only implicitly. Only 1/Ian' a Spi.ri t has a self-cognizant 
existence. This existence for self, this consciousness, is 
at the same time separation from .. the Universal and Div-ine 
Spirit. If I hold to my abstract Freedom, in contra-
position to the Good, I adopt the standpoint of Evil. The 
Fall is therefore the eternal Mythus of Man~-in fact, the 
very transition by which he becomes man • . Persistence in 
this · standpoint is, howev·er, Evil."(ffi, 333) And so "this 
position of severed life has in its turn ;. to be suppressed, 
and the spirit has· by its own a ct .to win its way to con-
cord again."(LOG, 54) 
Nels Ferre in ECF, Chap. V and VI, on 11 Ev11 and 
Freedom" and "Evil and Sin," suggests two .ideas in ke eping 
with the present theme. One, which harmonizes with 
Berdyaev, is that 11 0ur freedom is the key to the world ' s 
evil. To become really ·free we must act in rebellion 
against others •••• . ws must assume God'fr place •••• 
Spiritual and ethical autonomy is · a necessary stage to true 
selfhood •••• God want.s sons, not automata:. God wants 
free sons who willingly love Him and who serve Him because 
they have come to themselves•"(ECF, 33) But a second idea 
is at odds with BerdyaevJs basic notion. Ferr~ goes on in 
the tradition of absolutism to affirm of God that "He not . 
only allowed us a neutral freedom., but gave US ' purposefully_ 
a freedom weighted toward the self, toward estrangement, 
toward maturing self-judgment, toward an independence that 
would make our freedom authentic."(ECF, 49) For Berdyaev's 
reply to this reasoning cf. supra, 72, and DM, 3lff. 
77. FS, 16f. 
78. FS, lf. 
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"natural world is itself but the reflection of the spiritual 
world, an event in spiritual life."79 "Space and time, 
within which is the givenness of the natural world, are 
created by spirit and merely denote a particular condition 
of the spiritual world." 80 This condition . is the separation 
from God occasioned by the Fall, which event resulted in a 
loss of integration,. completeness, and absolute unity. Hence, 
space, time, and matter "are simply the result of the Fall 
and of separation from God" and are thus : "symbolic images of 
the inner divisions of spirit."Sl 
Everything without is but the symbol of that which is 
within. :Matter itself is only the" symbolization" of 
the inner states of the spiritual world, that is, of 
its hatred and its g~visibility, , and is not a substance 
existing by itself. . 
Evil, we have seen,83 has its cause in 
a · fa:lse and illusory self-affirmation_ and in . spiritual 
pride which places the source of life not in .God but 
in self, to the annihilation .of human personality in so 
far as it bears the divine image; it .constitutes a 
79. FS, 22. 
80. FS, 13. 
81. FS, 17. Cf. Schopenhauer, 1fiWI, for whom space and 
time are the principles of individuation. Reality is seen 
as one and indivisible, and apparent multiplicity is simply 
due to the subjective forms of human thought--space and time 
--which come between us and the truth. 
82. FS, 18. The preceding two sentences are worthy of 
note as well. "The spiritual life is a historical life, for 
the latter_is concrete in character. But the exterior 
reality of history is only the image of spiritual life under 
the conditions of time and·· divisibility•" 
Berdyaev's approach here is comparable to that of 
Hegel in PM. Hegel might have written: "An abstract meta-
physics cannot exist, but a philosophy or a phenomenology 
of the spiritual life is possible."(FS, 6) 
83. Supra, 74f. 
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return to the void from which the world came into be-
ing. Pride and egoism lead to the abyss, to non-
being, and to death. By isolating himself in himself, . 
and by taking as the centre of his life not being but 
his own self, man is not only separated from God and 
from the sphere of the divine~ but is also deprived or 
all true riches of his being.o4 
Thus evil has its origins in a freedom which proves il-
lusory in that it but ends in realizing tyranny. 
Recalling the earlier statements c.oncerning the 
duality in the orig in and nature of man,85 we, see that in 
rebelling against God man does not become a God-like 
creature but instead 
becomes the slave of his lower. nature, , and, at the 
same time, by losing his higher.·nature becomes subject 
to natural necessity and ceases to be spiritually de-
termined from within. He is deprived of his freedom. 
Thus evil involves that displacement .. of the true centre 
of being and that complete revolution of the hierarchy 
of the universe which involves, not only the spirit's 
being possesaed in .its pride by the material principle, 
but the actual substitution of the material for the 
spiritual. The hard and resistant appearance of t he 
material world is simply the result of its having lost 
its true centre in the spiritual world. The spirit, , 
in ,. all. its pride and egoism, is dl"'iven forth into that 
material sph.ere which is itself nothing but the result 
of the disintegration8gf the world by the forces of hatred and animosity~ . 
This dilemma of man has been brought to us afresh hy 
the discoveries of modern .psychopathology which "are wholly 
in keeping with the Christian doctrine of original sin."87 
84. FS, 167f. Cf. Tillich's concept of the demonic• 
In indiv-iduals it is a power which at the same time gives 
great insight and destroys. It is "creativity which by a 
tragic law becomes self-destructive."(Classnotes) 
85. Supra, 70f. 
86. FS, 169. 
87. DM, 88. 
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Credit must be given to it for its aware~ess that man is a 
sick a nd disintegrated being, but it fails in claiming to 
be a metaphysic of life since the ultimate truths escape 
it.88 
The problem that we face is how man's freedom can be 
maintained and how he can be preserved from the evil which 
seems to follow in its train. .Man is free, but . his self-
centered assertion of this freedom subjects him to the en-
slav-ement of necessity. How can he be freed from t hi s 
thralldom and restored to his orieinal wholeness? This is 
the problem of redemption, of the further relationships 
between God and man. 
D. God-Man. We have thus far noted the natures of 
God and of man. Each involves the other and longs for that 
other without which its own being is incomplete. As 
Berdyaev puts it: 11 The primal drama • • • taking place in 
the inmost depths of being • • • • is that of the mutual 
relations between God and man • • • • the genesis of God in 
ma n and of man in God. u89 
If there is such a thing as a human longing for God 
and a response to it, then there must also be a divine 
longing for man a nd the genesis of God in man; a long-
ing for the loved and the freely-loving and0 in. response to it, . the genesis of man in God.9 
$8. DM: , 95. Cf. Hocl{:ing, Science and the Idea of 
God Chap. II, 11 Psychology and the Cure of Souls," for an exc~llent statement of the needed supplements t 0 psyc'l1ia try. 
89. MH, 56. 
90. MH , 57. 
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Berdyaev . elsewhere describes this conception of there-
lations hip of God and man as "theandric anthropomorphismrr91 
which idea allows for both the independent existence and 
distinctive contribution of God and man • . The movement from 
God to man ~nd from man to God 'received its perfec.t -ful-
fillment -in .Christ, the God-Man, in whose person "the in-
finite divine love met the answering love of man."92 
1. Reveals God and Man. Christ perfectly rev.eals 
God who in this second act of his relation to man and the 
world 
appears not in the aspect of Creator_but of ~edeemer 
and Saviour, in the aspect of the suffering God who 
takes upon Himself the sins of the world. God in the 
aspect of God-the-Son descends into the abyss, into 
the Ungrund, into the depths ·of freedom out of which 
springs evil as well as every kind of g ood •••• He 
manifests Himself 'not in power but -.. in sacrifice. The 
Divine sacrifice, _the Divine self-crucifix-ion must 
conquer evil meonic freedom by enlightening_ it from 
within without -- forcing it,.,_ without depriving the 
created world of freedom.~3 
Christ also reveals man. 
In Christ, as Man, in the ab'solute sense, summing up 
in Himself the whole of spiritual humanity, , man makes 
a heroic effort Jto overcome by sacrifice and suffering_ 
both sin and death, which is the consequence of sin. 
And this he does in '- order to respond to the love of 
God. In Christ human nature co-operates- with the work 
of Redemption. Sacrifice is the law of spiritual as-
cent and with the birth of Christ a new era in the 
life ·of creation b:egins. Adam underwent . the t-rial of 
his freedom and failed to respond to the divine call 
by an .expression of free and creative - love. Christ, 
91. FS, 209. 
92. FS, 177• 
93. DM, 34f: 
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the New Adam, makes this response to the love of God 
and ther.eby points out th~ way to this response to all 
who are spiritually His~94 
A third citation may be noted as tying together the 
two sides of the process~ 
Through Christ, the God-1~n, the Redeemer and Saviour 
of the world, the two movements proceeding from God 
and from man, from grace and from freedom, are united. 
God through the power of grace aids man in the conquest 
of sin, and so re-establishes· the shattered forces of 
man's freedom. Man out . of the depths of this freedom 
then makes his response to God, b:eg-ins to open up to 
Him, and thus continues the work of creation. Man ia 
not a slave, still less· a mere nothing, and he co-
operates with the divine task of achieving a cr.eative 
victory over~ · nothingness. Man is· necessary to God, 
and God suffers when man fails to be conscious- of . h is 
own u~efulness. God helps man, but man must .also help 
God.9:> 
94. FS, 177. 
95. FS, 209f. Berdyaev . in his views -as to the re-
lationship between God and man is vigorously opposed to 
orthodoxy in either its classical or revived form. Both 
Calvinism and Barthianism he views as varieties of mono-
physitism in that ~ they see God as· ev . er~thing and man as 
nothing. This notion he summarizes: 'Only God is a free 
agent; His power is manifest everywhere. Human agency is 
sinful and worthless, since man is lacking in freedom and 
creative power."(SR, 147) Mentioning both of these 
(in)famous theologies Berdyaevgoes on: "In the most un-
compromising forms of Western asceticism, in those which 
regard man and the world as entirely sinful, in Calvinism, , 
for example, with its sentiment of Divine power. and glory 
at _. the expense of man's humiliation, in Barthianism, even, 
with its belief_ that God is everything and man nothing, in 
all these we can observe ., an almost imper.ceptirrle transition 
from dualism (the transc:endental gulf b:etween God and man) 
to a form .of ·monism or pantheism, involving not the deifi-
cation but the humiliation of the world and man." (SR, _ 148) 
As contrasted with this low estimate put on man by 
Barth and Calvin may be noted Berdyaev.,' s description of his 
status '. "The spiritual nature of man is corrupted and con-
taminated, but though much shattered it . is still preserved 
and is not completely destroyed. In human nature the 
divine idea a nd image have been obscured in the primal void 
of initial non-being, from which God called man to life by 
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2. Offers Redemption Through Freedom •. Because 
history is not only the plan of divine revelation but also 
of human revelation, it is subject to tragedy. If history 
were only the revelation of God a nd its gradual apprehension 
by man, there would be no world process but "a static and 
preeminently perfect Kingdom of God as an essential and 
predetermined harmony."96 But history also involves man 
who is endowed with freedom and from wh om God desires a 
freely given love. And because of . this - irrational factor of 
freedom .a solution of the tragedy of world history. is 
offered. "It is the source and origin of movement, of 
process, of inner conflict and of inwardly experienced con-
tradictions. tt97 
Freedom, then, is t he· metaphysical bas is of history. 
"God's · desire for man implies that He desires his freely-
given love. And this const itute£ both the foundation and 
theme of world history and destiny."98 History is· possible 
only if there be freedom--either ·natu:Pal necessity or div-ine 
constraint would put it to an end since the destiny of man 
the act of creation. But human nature remains capable of 
enlightenment and there remains within it an ardent long i ng 
for the divine which makes both revelation and salvation 
possible. Evil has not finally possessed man's nature for 
it is a dual nature belonging to two worlds, and even after 
the Fall man did not break completely with God, Wh o con-
tinues to have dealings with him and to impart .. to him His 
regenerative powers."(FS, 170) 
96. MH, 58. 
97. MH, 58. 
98. MH, 59. 
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is fulfilled only through "freely-given love." History is 
replete with tendencies "to create harmony, to overcome t he 
dark premiss, to subdue the turbulence of freedom and super-
sede it .by compelled and necessary good," but these are 
temptations to be resisted, since the reconciliation be-
tween freedom and necessity can be overcome only transcen~ 
denta lly through the principle of Divine Grace.99 Grace, 
as,- we have a lready noted, comes through God as Redeemer and 
Savior, through Christ the God-Man who perfectly revealed 
and united God and man, tying together celestial and 
terrestrial histDry, God and the world, the absolute and 
the human. 
E. History. "History is made up ·_, of the _complex 
interaction of the three principles of necessity, freedom, 
and transfiguring Grace, 11 the interrela tion of which as "the 
motivating metaphysical · forces . in history ••• determines 
the whole complexity of man's historical destiny." 100 Or, 
a~ Berdyaev describes elsewhere these theogonic, cosmogonic, 
and anthropogonic~ processes: 
Three principles are active -in the world: . Providence, ; 
i.e. the super-cosmic .God;. freedom, i.e. the human 
spirit; and fate or destiny, i.e. nature, the solidi-
fied, hardened outcome of the dark .meonic freedom.lOl 
1. Rooted in Eternity. What is the significance _ of 
history? Since history is a process within time its 
99. MH , 60f. 
100. MH , 61. 
101. DM, 42. 
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significance depends on what status is accorded to time. 
Berdyaev, who views 11 the'historical'as something essential 
to the inmost depths of being,• sees· time as having onto• 
logical significance, i.e. he holds to the doctrine that 
"time exists for the very essence of being."l02 Time is 
not a denial of eternity, but "time is itself rooted in 
eternity and forms part of it.nl03 
What does Berdyaev . mean by time and eternity?l04 
He nowhere gives a formal, philosophic definition of 
eternity, but some insight may be gained from the following 
citations. It is "celestial and divine time."l05 It is 
described as "a certain time-process" which occurs in "the 
102. MH, 63. Berdyaev . here is assuming "a temporal-
1st view of God." Cf. Brightman, Art.{l932), for a classic 
statement of the case for and the arguments against the 
conception. The evidence ·noted by Brightman from history 
is - in thorough agreement with the notion of Berdyaev. "If 
the ongoing of history reveals God, it rev.eals one for whom 
events happen and to whom the order of events is of real 
importance •••• A Christian philosophy of history is 
essentially temporalistic; there is a divine drama which 
actually progresses and in which there is real action." 
Art.(l932), 547. Cf. Berdyaev's remarks relative to the 
traditional theology "which tended to favour the view that _. 
the nature of time did not affect the depth~ of divine 
life •••• I believe that .to assert that ~ time do es not 
exist in tbe divine life is to approach the question exo-
terically w1 thout r .eaching the ultimate depths of gnosis ." 
(MH , 66) Cf. supra, 59ff. for the closely related criticism 
of a static, immobile, absolute God. In both Brightman and 
Berdyaev . the conceptions of temporality and finitude in God 
are linked together. 
103. MH, 63f. 
104. This is a difficult question and one that will 
be returned to in Chap. VII in the discussion of escha -
tology. The chief references are MH, Chap. IV, X; FS, Chap_-. 
IX; DM, Part .. III; SS, Fourth I'v1editat_ion; SF, Part IV-2. 
105. IVIH, 64f. 
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very foundations of being. 11 106 It is"qualitative infini-
ty" and is "situated in the extra-natural world, away from 
the world of quantitative infinity and mathematica lly 
divisible time." 107 The end of history wilL liberate man 
from 11 the perspective of quantitative, mathema tica l infini-
ty" and open up ·"the perspective of qualitative infinity, 
i.e. eternity." 108 "Eternity is not a cessation of move-
ment and creative life; it is creative life of a different 
order, it is movement which is not spatial and temporal but 
inward. " 109 Again, . eternity is used as an equivalent term 
for "the divine r eality."llO 
In his discussion of time Berdyaev . dis-tinguishes< 
between t wo kinds of time--a good and true, and a bad and 
false. 111 The latter is tha t which treats the temporal 
world process as self-contained- -the former tha t which sees 
it as a "sort of interior period, a sort of interior epoch 
in eternity itself." 112 
107. SS, 155. 
108. SF, , 265. 
109. DM, 366. 
110. 1v1H , 67. 
111. MH, , 64. 
112. MH, 64. By eternity Berdyaev.· means the unbegun _ 
and unending process a nd movement . that takes· place within 
the·.· nature of God. It . is what he calls 11 celestial history" 
or "divine history." Berdyaev . does not ~accept , as adequa te 
the conception of a totality of the real postulated as com-
plete and final in eternity. He does · not .. see everything as 
given once for all. Th.e Parmenidean conception. of eter.na:L 
being is rejected, and the Heraclitean . conception of. an 
eternal becoming accepted. Thus the eternal perpetually 
expresses i tself in time but also str.ugg~es to transcend 
the temporal. The process going on .eternally within. God 
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In accepting the view of time as a parte of eternity 
Berdyaev criticizes the false distinction drawn by many 
schools of philosophy between time and eternity. Thus he 
rejects the phenomenalism of both Kantian criticism and 
English empiricism with their temporal phenomenal_world on 
one hand, and a deep and true reality not subject to the 
laws of time on the other. Neither Platonic nor Indian 
phil osophy made any connection between time and the inner 
reality which was regarded as an immobile eternity. The 
same point of view was largely shared by Christianity which 
felt it necessary "to shut off our world temp:orarily from 
the supernatural world." ll3 Pos:i tivism and matel''ialism, , in 
denying the existence of any other world, restricted at-
tention to the temporal process which was regarded as the 
wh ole of reality. 114 
has assumed more dramatic form in the terrestrial history 
of our aeon which is but a symbolic representation of what 
takes place everlastingly. The events which take place in 
our historical time are meaningful for and make a differ-
ence to God. The failure of men t© relate their lives and 
conduct to God, to hi s Kingdom, and to respond to his love, 
and their regard of this world as self-sufficient results 
both in what Berdyaev calls "bad time" and what may be 
facetiously called "a bad time." To relate this· terrestrial 
life to God and to see it in terms of his everlasting_ 
struggle is ' to know eternity within time. This concept of 
"eternal life" is closely rela.ted to that of the Fourth 
Gospel where it is visualized not simply_ in quantitative 
t erms but as a "qualitative infinity." (Cf. E.F. Scott,, The 
Fourth Gos el: Its Pur ose and Theolo , and Benjamin W. 
Robinson, The Gospel of John. 
113. wlli, 67. Cf • . the recrudescence of that~ thought 
whic h holds to "an endless yawning qualitative difference 11 
between time and eternity. 
114. MH, 65ff. Cf. SS, 131. 
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As contrasted with this view Berdyaev offers what 
must ,he regarded as "the fundamental hypothesis" of "the 
metaphysics of his-tory"--namely, that 
the 'historical' is part of, and has its roots in, 
eternity. History is neither merely the scum of the 
world process nor the loss of all association with 
t he roots of being; it forms a necessary part . of 
eternity and of the drama that is fulfilled in it. 
History is the resu~t of a deep interaction batween 
eternity and time; it is the incessant _eruption of 
eternity into time.ll5 
The victory that Chris.tiani ty envisages eternity 
gaining over time and the historical process is not to be 
interpreted in terms of a departure from, denial of, or 
detachment from time, but .as a victory over it within t he 
arena of history itself • . History, then, is not to be denied 
but to be seen in its proper setting--namely, in relation 
to God and eternity. 
The significance of the history taking place in t h is 
terrestrial aeon lies in its participating in the ful-
nes s of eternity, . in that this aeon, emerging. from its 
imperfect and defective state, should partici~te in 
the fulness of being peculiar to eternal life.ll6 
The close connection of historical reality to time 
poses a special problem as to the relation of past, present, 
and future. Divided as it is into sections, and with each 
section warring against the other, the time of our world 
reality and aeon is a false and divided time revealing an 
ev-il, deadly,, and destructive principle in which an 
115. MH, 67. 
116. MH, 69. 
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all-devouring future precipitates everything into the past 
of non-being. 117 Over against the vlew which regards the 
future as reality and the past as less real, Berdyae~ 
apposes that of the duration of history which denies that 
any historical reality disappears or perishes but holds 
that the past is · an enduring, eternal reality. OVer against:. 
the conception of a false, diseased, and divided time, it~ 
self the result of our own disintegrated and . limited 
personalities, the historiqal memory battles. The histori-
cal memory is 
the greatest .,manifestation of the eternal spirit in our 
temporal reality. It upholds the historical connection 
of the times. It is ; the very foundation of history. 
Without it . history would not exist; for even i~ histo-
ry did fulfil itself, the cleavag~ · between the past, 
the present and the future would be so hopeless as to 
render all apprehension of history impossible. All 
historical knowledge is but a remembrance, one or 
another form of the triumph of memory over the s p irit 
of corruption.ll8 
As such, the historical memory is the manifestation of the 
conservative principle tying the historical present to t he 
eternal past.. Thus, human destiny can be seen in terms of 
the celestial, the historical in terms of the metaphysical, ~ 
and meaning and integrity can be reached in a philosophy of 
history. 119 
117. 1lli, 69ff. 
118. MH, 73. 
119. For a view containing comparable elements cf. 
Charles Hartshorne, articles "eternity" and "time" in ER. 
From the first comes this definition of eternity: "the 
summation of all actual or elapsed events· in an ever-growing 
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2. Subject to Decadence or Development. Berdyaev's 
final postulate in his metaphysics of history is the free-
dom of evil • . Without the acceptance of this principle 
history cannot be understood • . The evolutionary point of 
view which regards man as a product of world forces, who 
has ascended to higher states, has largely superseded the 
older view according to which "man 1 s Fall and certain acta 
of sin and divorce from the sources of divine life and 
higher truth preceded the evolutionary, secondary and 
partial processes in man 1 s destiny ."120 But, unless this-
relig ious-metaphysical view be accepted, destiny in any real 
sense cannot be ascribed to man 1_s terrestrial history. Only 
present, to whose increase there is no beginning or_ end." 
From the second come these "' concluding remarks ·: "The vast 
scope of human forgetting, by a natural anthropomorphism, 
tends to make us feel tha t the values of the present, . as 
apparently not containing those of the past, plus the values 
of the near future, make up almost the sum of values to be 
t a ken into account. This anxious absorption in the present 
and near future may be --the real 'defect' of 'temporal' ex~ 
istence of which Berdyaev and so ma ny have complained, but 
it is a defect of human temporality n ot _, of temporality as 
such. To dismiss time as of merely creaturely concern with-
out exploring the possibility of a super-creaturely form of 
time is as illegitimate as to deny personality to God mere-
ly because creaturely personality, .like creaturely anything, 
is imperfect. If all experience is indestructible, then, 
as is often said, we are immortal not just .in the future 
but in our present being •. Our present self-realization . 
contributes to the rea l not some deposit or mere effect, it 
contributes itself. If there be a divine form of temporali-
ty, such that God is able to receive new -content, then our 
'service' to him is to become, and help our fellows to be-
come, as precious additions to the divine being as possible. 
A purely timeless God could receive no additionsr and could 
not in any way be served or advantaged. 11 
120. MH, 76. 
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as man had a pre-world existence in which his destiny, 
originated does history have meaning.l21 Destiny "can_ 
exist only if man is the child of God and not of the 
world. 11122 
:Wian is the child bf God and suffers a tragic destiny 
in a world that is subject to decadence as well as 
development. At the foundations of this destiny lies, 
the original freedom with which God's child has. been _ 
endowed and which is the true reflection and image of 
the Creator. This · freedom has become the source of 
man's tragic destiny, . and that of history with all its 
conflicts and horrors ••• . • The world and historical 
pr.ocesses are based upon the freedom of good and evil, 
that .. of renouncing as well as of communing with the 
source of higher divine life. The freedom of evil, 
indeed, forms the real foundation of history ••• . • 
Only then can the history of mankind be understood as 
a free trial of human spiritual forces and as the ex~ 
piation of man's Or1ginal .Sin and Fall . which were 
brought about t~rough the agency of thE? fr.eedom, in-
herent:. in him.l 3 
121. Tnis· is not to be interpreted as: reincarnation 
or transmigration which Berdyaev . censors as "the occultist 
and theosophical nightmare."(FS, 325) Berdyaev, refuses to 
consider the traditional theological doctrine that _tbe soul 
was created by God at the moment of physical concept:ion, , 
but finds instead "an .eternal element of truth in the Orphic 
doctrine of the soul put forward by Plato. The pre-
existence of the human soul in the spiritual world is an 
indispensable truth, for the soul is not the child of time 
but of eternity • . But .the doctrine of reincarnation on the 
earth is incompat:tble with Christienity. It .. :tnvolv.es the 
splitting up of personality and introduces~ a naturalistic 
conception into the spiritual life."(FS, 326) Rather, the 
soul :ts eternal both in the future and in the past. It is 
"created by God in eternity:, Ln the spiritual w or lei. 11 ( DM, 
79; cf. DM, 328) For an historic statement of the v.-iew of 
pre-existence and for criticisms of it cf. Knudson, DR, 
lOOff. Cf. also Bowne, , MET, (revised edition) 372ff. and 
DeWolf,, art. 11 pre-ex1stence, 11 in Fer.m ( ed.) , ER. 
122 • :rviH, 77. 
12 3 • MH , : 77 f • 
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This, then, brings us to the threshold of terrestrial 
history, and to the unfolding of its. course we turn . in our 
next three chapters.l24 
124. We shall return again to the metaphysical theme 
in Chap. VII where we consider. ·the end of history. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PAST HISTORY 
A. Pre-Historical Man. 1. Par:tial Truth of Ev.o-
lution. In the previous · chapter we have been b~ought up to 
the opening of terrestrial history. Des-pite his :. pre-
occupation with metaphysical themes, . Berdyaev is not_. b-lind 
to the achievements of scienc·e in acquainting us with the 
beginnings of man. He admits · the process of evolution, the 
ascension of man from lower.· to higher.· states, , and the 
further dev\elopment of · man under:·the conditionsc of world 
forces -.1 This acc-ount is ·not false, but it is to he in-
ter.preted in terms. of a world-view diff~erent _from the usual. 
The evolutionary theory contains a great . deal that is 
true concerning man's origin and destiny in the world. 
But it is pre-occupied with secondary and not pr.imary 
processes; it .. has·: no light to thr.ow .on those deeper 
sour.c.es, which preceded the birth of our world of 
which religious traditions speak and which only meta~ 
physical knowledge can apprehend.2 
There is no clash between science and religion·. here but . the 
interpretation of the data of the one in terms of the other. 
2. IV!an First .Appears Immersed in Nature. The scien-
tific- study of man begins with 11 his immersion in the depths 
of nature" which,. from a theological · standpoint., . was the 
result of the Fall. By reason of this · event man b.ecomes a 
subj~ct for biology, anthropology, and sociology. Here man 
1. MH, 76. 
2. MH, 78; cf. FS, 316. 
appears as a natural being, a child of the world. Tied 
hand and foot .by the natural world in which he is immersed, 
he forgets his higher. origin. 
Of this _first period Berdyaev writes: 
Nature is reg~rded as animate and peopled with bad and 
good spirits:. The Great . Pan is still in existence. 
Primitive magic .. is at ~ once the science of this period 
and its technical application. Man struggles with the 
forces : of nature in order . to live, but in his struggles 
he is associated with the spirit_s · of nature • . In totem-
ism, the primitive for~ of the religious: life of human-
ity, men worship animals, which they regard as.~ the 
protectors of their social groups , and clans. In 
sculpture .there is no d.istinction b:etween the image of 
men and of animals, the images are confused. It is 
precisely to this period that paganism, polytheism, 
and the dissolvlng of . the divine :i:mage in the multi-
plicity _·of nature belong. The g ods of nature are 
revealed and man's: life subordinated to them.3 
3. Significance of :rvry.th and Tradition. Our. earliest 
gl immerings of man are reflected in religious : traditions 
and myths in which we have "the opening page of a · tale 
ab·out man' e terrestr.ial destiny_~' which goes "back much 
further than the consolidation of matter from which . science 
••• dates its study of world evolution."4 Berdyaev cites 
with approval the theory of Schelling accordil~ to whom 
mythology is "the pre-history of the human race ••• the 
reflection of a theogonic and cosmogenic process in the 
3. FS, 22lf. Hegel dismisses briefly this first 
period which he likewise describes as the "immersion of 
Spirit in Nature."(PH, 59) Whereas history is marked by 
mutability and perfectibility,, nature is characterized by 
a "perpetually self-repeating cycle." (PH, 56) 
4. MH, 81. 
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human consciousness."5 These early religious traditions 
and myths, of which the earlier portions of Genesis are 
typical, are not to be viewed as constituting a science or_ 
ob.jective knowledge or as competing with it. Their authori-
ty is not in history, geology, or biology, but they do 
11 represent _the revelation of far deeper truths hearing upon 
quite different spheres."6 
One of the most revealing characteristics of this 
mythology which forms the original source of human history 
_is that there is not yet a sharp division ,_ of time from 
eternity. Man appears still to have a certain portion in 
eternity. The complete break was yet .to come. 
Mythology had its origin in the dawn . of human conscious-
ness when spirit was enveloped in nature, when the 
natural world had not yet become a rigid system, and 
when the frontiers between the two worlds had not yet 
been_ clearly defined. The consciousness of man was 
not yet fully awake, and our language and ideas still 
bear the imprint of this primitive mythological 
consciousness. The core of man's being was still un~ 
conscious, . and it is to his subconsciousness that 
mythological creation owes its orig in. The delimi-
tation of the spheres of spirit and nature is the 
product of later .-ev olut1on.7 
5. FS, 71. 
6. MH, 83. 
7. FS, 72. Cf. MH, 42f. Hegel, though very much of 
a rationalist when he states that "the only consistent and 
worthy method which philosophical inv-estigation can adopt, 
is to take up History where Rationality begins to manifest 
itself in the actual conduct of the world's· affairs-," 
(PH, 6lf.) and critical of the theologians' arguments for 
a Golden Age or primitive -paradise on the basis of the 
Genesis account,(PH, 60) yet in his treatment of the myth 
of the Fall approaches a point of view quite similar to 
Berdyaev.(PH, 333f.) 
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B. Pagan World. Likewise sharing in the primal 
stages of history with their immersion in elemental nature 
are the ancient cultures. We have noted in our chapter on 
epistemology that .the first attitude that is taken toward 
history is that .of mere organic participation in it--an 
attitude marked . by lack of awareness of the movement or 
meaning of history. This epistemological attitude, which 
can also be correlated with the metaphysical status of pre-
conscious -wholeness, is definitely reflected also in the 
cultures· of the ancient non-Jewish world. 
1. Lacked Historical Sense. Thus the Hellenic world 
lacked an _historical sense, had no conception of history 
fulfilling itself, and therefore did not develop--evsn 
among its greatest philosophical minds--a -philosophy of 
history.B This rwa& due to the fact ·. that they conceived of 
the world under an aesthetic category as being a fine and 
harmonious cosmos. Therefore, form .had priority in all 
areas of Hellenic life over matter or content. The element 
of matter, of content--the irrational principle that is 
synonymous with freedom to evil--was lacking. History had 
8. Berdyaev . regards Parmenides as' the most charac-
teristic· thinker among the Greeks. "Parmenides is the 
original source of all doctr.ines affirming the static 
nature of Being and the illusion of all dynamism and 
chang.e."(SS, 143) His :· preference is Heraclitus whom he re-
gards as 11 one of the greatest of philosophers,"(:rm, 50) and 
whom he champi·ons over . against the predominantly Eleatic 
philosophical and theological tradition . in .affirming that 
"the nature of spirit .. is Heraclitic· and not Parmenidean. 11 
Of. also FS, 315. Spengler . shares this enthusiasm. 
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no issue, , goal, ; beginning, nor end. It wasa cyclic, re-
current process which the Hellenic mind was content to con-
template with aesthetic satisfaction.9 
A world without these conditions would b.eworld with-
out beginning, mere fulfilment, .. the perfect Kingdom of 
God, a perfect .cosmos : in the form of perfect good. and 
beauty. But the history of the world did not originate 
in this perfection, but ~ rather in the freedom of evil. 
That .is the idea behind the conception . of the histori-
cal process~ an idea which could not have proceeded 
from the Hellenic consciousness which was primarily 
concerned with the perfection. of .. the cosm.os .10 
2. Static C~nception of Reality. An even more static 
conception of history is to be found in the Hindu culture 
the consciousness and destiny of which are "the most un-
historical in the world." Here the severanc.e of the meta-
physical led to the conception of history as 
a mere external chain of phenomena devoid of any inner 
purpose or significance. History therefore become~ 
synonymous · with the . external empirical world, , a base 
order . of reality which it is necessary to master and 
renounce in order to achieve communion .. wi th . the meta-
physical essence of that higher world which hears the 
stamp of the spirit.ll 
c. The Jewish World. Like many another philosopher 
of history, Berdyaev ·finds:- in "The Destiny of the Jews"l2 
9. MH, 27-30. 
10. MH, 30. 
11. MH, 31. Hegel likewise in his analysis of the 
Oriental world. emphasizes · its static and. non-historical . 
character. But, whereas Berdyaev . hold.s• that this de-
scription .is true of all non-Jewish peoples r, Hegel res:tricts 
it to China. .and India which, he holds; "remain. stationary 
and perpetuate a natural vegetative existence ev .. en to the 
present time."(PH, 180) Spengler regards this condition 
as the end-product of all cultures.(DW, II, 105ff.) 
12. IvJH, 86-107. 
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a touch-stone fnr his interpretations. _ 
1. Judaism and Paganism. As contrasted with the 
Greeks, who saw history as <a cyclic process, the Jews con-
ceived of it as a process of fulfillment. This concept of 
the historical constitutes "the essence of their specific 
m.is sion. 11 13 They were likewise the first ·:__ people to develop 
a philosophy of history. This contribution was specifically 
made by the prophets- who conceived of histor,y as a drama 
moving toward some culminating event. The prevalence of 
eschatological ideas _among the Jews contributed largely to 
the development .of a philosophy of · history. . Priority in t he 
development of eschatology and a pocalypticism_ belongs, how~ 
ever to the Persians who v-isualized history as a strugg le 
between Ormazd and Ahriman that was ultimately resolved by 
a catastrophe ending history and inaugurating something 
else. 14 
The differences in .outlook between the Aryans (the 
Persians excepted) and the Jews is due to differences in 
their religious consciousnesses~ 
13. MH , 28. 
14. Berdyaev recognizes the endebtedness that Judaism 
owes to Persian influence. The Persians were the only Aryan 
people who had an historical consc.iousness and saw history 
as moving toward a definite end and fulfilment. Their es_-
chatology and apocalypticism definitely effected the Jews~ 
(Thlli, 32) Hegel also stresses the importance of the 
Pers-ians. They are "the first Historical People."(PH, 180) 
11 The principle of development begins ' with the history of 
Persia. This therefore constitutes strictly the be&inning 
of World-History."(PH, 181) 
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A comparison between the Jewish religion .and that of 
other pre-Christian pagan peoples confirms the con-
tention .that Jewish history represented the rev,elation 
of God in the historical destiny of humanity, while 
that of other .. pagan peoples represented: the revelation 
of God in nature.l~ 
The specific religious concept that ~accounts for the 
difference in Jewish outlook was· the messianic idea.. The 
Jews looked forward expectantly to the future Messia h, l'lis 
judgment,,, the abandonment of their. sorry historical . pas.t 
and present, and the inauguration of an "all-illuminat ing 
world era." This Messianism has persist.ed in western 
civilization .and · has received its modern expression. in the 
philosophy of . Karl Marx, "a very typical Jew." 
Marxian Socialism, emerging from .an entirely new 
historical background, reiterates th.e demand for earth-
ly bliss. It .is true that,. superficially, the 1VIarxist 
doctrine breaks away from the Jewisn religious tra-
ditions and rebels against . every sacred principle; but. 
in re~lity the Messianic idea of the Jews as God's 
chosen people is ··transferred· to a class·, namely the 
proletariat. The working: c-lass now becomes the new 
Israel, God's chosen people, destined to emancipate 
and save the world. All the characteristics of Jewish 
Messianism. are applied to this clasa • . The same drama, . 
passion and impatience which had characterized Israel, , 
the people of God, are here manifest.l6 
The historical dynamism characteristic of the Jews : 
was · likewise furthered by their conception of God. Jewish 
theology apprehended God transcendentally, envisaging a 
gulf between Him and man. God was likewise-- conceived as a 
person. A duality of persons · made f or a dramatic 
15. MH , 88. 
16. MH, 89. 
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relationship and a conception of history as movement. Con-
trasted with this conception was the Aryan notion of God as 
immanent.. This latter idea receiv-ed its fullest ~ develop­
ment in Hinduism where a contemplative - insight _ into the 
depths of being negated a dynamic religious consciousness' 
capable of creating exterior historical movement. 
A further_ diff.erentia between. the Aryan and Jewish _ 
spirits lay in the fact that ,at best the Aryans were only 
casually concerned with the realization of justice, vrhereas 
the Jews were obBessed by the idea of its terrestrial ful-
fillment. This passion contributed to the Jewish dream of 
a Messianic kingdom of perfect justic.e to be established at 
the end of history. 
Closely c·onne.cted with the a hove varying a ttl tudes 
toward justice are contrastine;:_ ideas of individualLty and 
immortality. Whereas the Greeks . had early come to a con-
ception of personal immortality, the Jews reached such a 
notion only shortly before the Christian era. Therefore, , 
the Jews -adopted "the idea that everything must . find its 
fulfilment and solution .in this mortal and terrestrial 
l:tfe.ul7 Berdyaev finds in .the book of Job_t he attempt to 
explain the calamities· which fall upon a righteous man with-
in the confines of historical life on earth and the failure 
to consider their .. ·transcendence in the per.spective of 
17. MH, -93 • 
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eternal life. Thus for the Jews the historical life--whicb 
was the only life--had tremendous religiou:s significance. 
On the other hand, the Aryan .spirit paid little 
attention to the significance of man's historical destiny . 
on earth. This is well illustrated in . the philosophy of 
Plato who 
was concerned with . the original forms of being and 
with the world of ideas in _which he recognized the 
primal static reality •. He was unab"-le to detach him~ 
self from this · in order to consider. the mobile empiri-
cal world and 1 ts implicit ex:oos 1 tion of th.e histori-
cal process.l8 -
Yet further contras·t between the two spirits is,· 
obvious in the fact that whereas the Aryan was concerned 
with .. the individual and his destiny, the Jew-·was interested 
in cthe collectivet in the people. The notions of individual 
freedom and individual guilt orig·inated with the Aryan 
spirit and culture and were foreign to the Jewish. 
Berdyaev . suggests that a terrestrial kingdom!. especially 
appealed to the Jews because they found themselves "deprived 
in their historical destiny on earth of that elementary 
prerogative which all other . peoples possessed. 11 19 
But, despite the fact tbat .. the Jews were much slower . 
than other peoples of antiquity, e.g. the Egyptians~· or 
Persians, in developing the ideas of immortality and' 
resurrection, they came likewise in time to believe in them 
18. MH, 95. 
19. MH, 99 • 
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as the repeated buffetings of history showed all too clearly 
that man's terrestrial destiny is not always: justified. 
Aspirations toward a different .. and higher world where the 
s ·olution of human destiny might be realized appears· in the 
later literature. Acc:ompanying this was a g eneral tran-
si tion from the objective-national to the subJectiv.e-
individual conception of human.~ destiny •. This dev,elopment 
is reflected in the diverg ent forms that the Jewish Messi-
anic consciousness assumed. _ On the one side it was nationa l, . 
exclusive, and terrestr.ial--on the other individual, univer-
sal, a nd transcendental. 20 
The progressive development of religious thought in 
late Judaism is well summarized by Berdyaev: 
A very deep spiritual :crisis had to take place in 
prophetic circles, , for the consciousness of t he Jew had 
to pass through a period of individualism, by free·i ng 
itself from religious nationalism and racialism,, and 
by experiencing those· spiritua l processes which are 
r eflected in the books of Jbh and of Solomon, while, , 
parallel to the increasing rigidity of the relig ion. of 
the Law; an intense apocalyptic strain had also to make 
its appearance. Tb.en, on the basis of indiv-idualism,, 
during: the Helleni stic period a feeling for univ,ersal-
ism.; had to arise in order that .a spiritual env.ironment, 
mightLb.e created in whi ch it _was possible for the light 
of the New Testament to shine .21 
2. Judaism and Christianity. Thus was the stag_e set 
for the tragedy that .was to oppose Judaism and Christianity. 
2o. MH , 100-103. 
21. FS, 112. I'n his treatment of Judaism Berdyaev, 
is in accord with the views of most modern·l sch.olars. Hi s 
full and · sympathetic account may be · contrasted with the 
virtua l ignoring of the contribution of the Jews by Spengler. 
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By reason of their intense feeling for history and by t heir 
extreme futuristic expectations the Jews were destined to 
give birth to· the Messiah.. But by reason of the nature of_ 
their largely terrestrial expectations--"a king. who would 
realize the kingdom of Israel on earth 11 22--they were 
rendered incapable of accepting the Messiah when he came. 
Judaism 
could not acc.ept Him in the role of a servant. • • • 
It could accept neither Christ nor_the mystery of His 
Crucifixion because He came as a b~arer of a meek and 
not a - triumphant truth on earth • . His whole lif_e and 
death were a repudiation of the longing f .or terrestrial 
beatitude cherished by the Jewish people •••• Christ 
was repudiatefr because He died on the Cross instead of 
using His:- kingly power to banish evil and sufferipg 
and institute the reign of justice and beatitude.25 
False Messianism, both then and in the nearly two 
thousand years that have elapsed, has demanded "a final 
victory over evil, the end of all suffering, torment and 
darkness and the establishment of terrestrial beatitude."24 
False Messianism, both then and in its modern socialistic 
guises·, has been willing to deny spiritual freedom. in the 
cause of a compulsory establishment of the -Kingdom of God 
on earth. This false Messianism--some of the recurrences-
of which we shall have occasion to subsequently examine in 
greater detail--rests upon a basic contradiction. 
This passionate concern for man's terrestrial and 
historical destiny ••• contradicts' the expectations 
of an immortal life in that .the fulfilment of the 
22. MH, 104. 
23. MH, 104f. 
24. MH, 105. 
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highest divine truth is not ex-tended· to the sublime 
plane of immortality. He who believes in . immortality 
ought to look soberly on .terrestrial life and realize 
that it is impossible to achiev.e a · conclusive victory 
on earth over the dark irrational .principle; and that 
sufferings, ev:i:l and imperfections are the inev,itahle 
lot of man.25 
Hence, by reason _of this mingling of true and false 
ideas concerning the Messiah, the Jewish people--sav;e for a 
select few--repudiated and rejected the Messiah in Christ. 
This is the central event in world history, the ev.ent 
towards which history had been moving and from whi ch 
it has since proceeded·; the event .-which makes: of the 
Jews, as it were, the axis of univer~al h1story.26 
D. Early Christianity. 1. Made · Historical Develop-
ment Possible. "With the Coming of Christ a new universal 
era begins."27 As contrasted with the contemplativ.e and 
static religions of the ancient world, which were dominated 
by the frequency and recurrence of events, Christianity, by 
the introduction of historical dynamism, made possible for 
the first time the establishment of a real philosophy of 
history.28 The dynamism of Christianity was derived from . 
the belief that events· were unique andnon"="recurrent. 
Christianity was convinced that in the rev,elation. of Christ 
an event of central importance in history had taken 
place; an event that .had been completed once and for 
25. IVJH, 100. 
2 6 • IVlli , 92 • 
27. 11H, 106. 
28 . Berdyaev holds that the Jews were -the first to 
have any intimation of a philosophy of history, "but it .was. 
reserved for the Christian world to establish a real 
philosophy of history as a particular category of spiritual 
knowledge and Weltanschauung ." ( ruiH , 33) 
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all; a non-recurring, indivisible, incomparable and 
unique event .that was - both historical and metaphysical 
and that revealed the depths of life.29 ' 
Christianity owes much to both Judaism and Hellenism. 
To Judaism it owes its historica l elements; · to Hellenism 
the more contemplative aspects of its faith--its dogma, 
metaphysics, mysticism and aesthetics.30 But it surpassed 
both in tl1a t 11 it conclusively revealed for the first time 
the existence of the principle of free dom, which was i g-
nored by both the ancient .and the Hebrew worlds."3l A.s 
over against , the ancient world which affirmed the reason . 
and necessity of good, holding it to be bas·ed upon irrefu-
table laws and principles', Christia nity affirmed the freedom 
of g ood, holding that it i's· the product of the free spirit.32 
As over against the Hebrew world which affirmed the divine 
necessity, Christianity affirmed the freedom of evil. 
Christianity the~efore made possible real historical devel-
opment by postulating 11 the fulfilment of history through 
the agency of a free subject and spirit. u33 
Thus Christianity. was the fi rst _ to rev.eal conclusively 
the freedom of the creative subject .which had heen ig-
nored by the pre-Christian world. And this: discovery 
of the inner dynamic principles of history determining 
the fulfilment .of the historic-al destinies of man, 
peoples and mankind, eventually produced that .eventful 
world history which coincides· with the Christian era.34 
29. MH , 33f. 
30. MH, 108-110. 
31. MH, 110. 
32. MH , llOf. 
33. IV1H , 110. 
34. MH, 111. 
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A concluding citation well summarizes· the new con-
tribution . of Christianity as compared with .. the pre-Christian 
world and recalls the three component . elements of history 
noted earlier.35 
There would be no univer.sal history without the freedom 
of the human spirit conceived as an ,autonomous prin-
ciple independent .of either. divine freedom or div-ine 
necessity; and one that t.. is both irrational and un- · 
fathomable • . History in the true sense · of the word 
could neither exist .nor be conceiv.ed on the isolated 
basis of divine freedom or divine necessity on the one 
hand, , or, again~ . natural necessity on the other. The 
exclusive existence of the divlne necessity, the div.ine 
principle or the divine freedom would make history be-
gin with the Kingdom of God, : and there would therefore 
be no history. Similarly, the exclus ~ive action of_ 
natural necessity wouldresult . in a meaningless chain 
of exterior facts devoid of all :i,.nner fulfilment, and 
all tragic and dramatic design•36 
2. Freed and Alienated Man from Natur.e. We have al-
r•eady seen that in the primal stages of history man, because 
of his · alienation from God, had he come enmeshed in natural 
necessity. This primal .. stag_e--corr.esponding to the state 
of savage and barbarous peoples, the ancient cultures, and 
the early history of the ancient world--reveals man as a 
slave and an indivisible part .. of nature. Man had. lost any 
consciousness of freedom or awareness of himself . as a 
creative -spiritual subject. 
The ancient religions and ·mysteries had sought to 
free man from the slavery of nature and to achieve immortali-
ty, but though .they accomplished much in preparing the 
35. Supra, Chap. III. 
36. MH, 37. 
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ground for Christianity, they were not able to achiev.e 
redemption. 
In the great . spiritual moments of Greek paganism, in 
~he cults of Dionysos and Orpheus, in the ~zysteries, 
ln Greek trag_~dy and philosophy, in the works of Hera-
clitus, Pythagoras, and Plato, pagan naturalism met 
its defeat, the religious consciousness dev,eloped, and 
the spirit was revealed. Paganism also had· its con-
tacts with the spiritual world, a nd there were stages 
in its revelation of God. The eager.· longing for 
resurrection among the Egyptians, , the·- religious dualism 
of . the Persians, the denunciation of the evil, deceit~ 
fulness, and vanity of the natural world by the 
relig ious mind of India, are important ~moments in the 
history of the ·spirit, in_ the development of conscious-
ness, and in the revelation of the divine to the 
world.37 
The essential contribution of Christianity lies in 
the fact that through Christ and the mystery of the re-
demption man was liberated from "the power of the baser 
elemental nature and demons;',' which .· oppress·ion was "syn-
onymous with his · enslav,ement by hi s own baser. self." 
Through Christ, the Divine Man, . the God-Man, Christianity 
"restituted the power of freedom and the image of his high 
divine origin to man, thus erasing the imprint of his~ 
slavery and animal origin."38 
37. FS, ll2f. Hegel's view ·on this point did much 
toward· establishing the notion of progressive revela-tion •. 
"However _erroneous· a religion may be, it possesses truth, 
· although in a mutilated phase. In every rBligion there is : 
a divine presence, a divine relation; and a ppilosophy of 
History has to seek out the spiritual element even in the 
most imperfect forms."(PH, 204) 
38. MH , 114. Several statements of Heg_el as to the 
significance of the Christian revelation remind one of 
Berdyaev·• Of the new conception of man Hegel writes: 
"Here Man, too, finds himself comprehended in his true 
nature, given in the specific conception .of 'the Son.' 
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As a result of the redemption through Christ man _ac-
quired a spiritual independenc.e which -was able to free him 
from the powers of nature. 
The gods die, -the Great: . Pan disappears into t he depths 
of nature and remains imprisoned there. Men had to 
break free from nature and conquer _·paganism in them-
selves. There hadto b:e freedom from the worship and 
power of demons who had bewitched and terrorized the 
ancient world. There was in _paganism, besides the 
happy life in the bosom of a divine nature, the anguish 
and fear which were the result of mysterious ~ forces. 
Magicians . endeavored to master. these demoniacal power.s 
and the cults of the ancients attempted to placate- the 
gods. But in the pagan world real spiritual freedom 
could not be obtained. In order to fortify the spiri-
tual man and to give him another foundation _for his: 
life the Christian Church set .man in conflict with 
natural demonism and forbade him all relations with 
spirits. At all costs man ha d to be protected from 
the overwhelming forces of cosmic infinity.39 
In that .. Christianity did deliver man from his super-
stitious fear of the powers of na ture and destroyed the 
nature gods and demons which thickly populated his environ-
ment,_ it was making a positive contribution. Howev.er, this 
process of liberation wa~ not without its negativa side. 
Man, who had formerly felt . himself an organic part_, of na ture, 
n ow finds• himself divorced from its inner. life. There is a 
wedge driven between natural man and spiritual man. Nature 
Man, finite when regarded for himself, is yet at· .. t ne same 
t ime the Image of God and a fountain of infinity in . himself. 
He is the object ~ of his own existence--has in himself. an 
infinite value, an. eternal destiny. Consequently he has his 
true home in_a super-sensuous world--an . infinite subjec-
tivity gained only by a rupture wtth mere Natura l existence 
and voiition, and by his labour . to break their power within 
him." (PH, 346) 
39. FS, 222f. 
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now is renounced as part of the pagan .world, and the 
strugg:J_e' against the natural elements both within and with-
out man is reflected in the contempt for the world, ascetic 
mortification of the flesh, and the attsmpt .of the Church 
to hold absolute sway over all earthly powerB--tendencies 
all of which were destined. to become characteristic of 
Christianity. 
A paradoxical outcome of this repudiation_ of nature 
by Christi~nity is that it owas destined to issue in its 
mechaniza tion.and eventually. to lead to the development of 
positive science and .technique. As long as man was immer.sed 
in .nature and communicated with its inner life--as long as 
he was dependent upon•it--it .was impossible for him to know 
it scientifically o~ master . it technically. Sacrifice and 
magic were the means to which pre-Christia.n .man resorted to 
get. along with a nature env,isaged as a living organism. 
Only as the notions of the demonic inspiration of nature 
and the reality of . communion .with .it died out _was it 
possible for man to treat nature as a mechanism and to 
ma ster it. 
This alienation .of man from nature is of prime im-
portance for man's future development .. 
Christianity had freed him from subjection to nature 
and had set . him up spiritually in the centre of the 
created world. This anthropocentric feeling .. had been~ 
foreign to the man of classical antiquity, who had 
felt himself to be an inalienable part _. of nature. 
Christianity alone inspired man with thisanthropo-
morphic feeling which became the fundamental 
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motivating power ... of modern times. . It made modern 
history with all its contradictions possible, . becaus-e 
it exalted man above nature-. 40 
But this is to anticipate. Man-_retired as it . were 
from the arena of the natural world to that of the spiritual 
wh&re in struggle against .the baser . elements in his nature 
he emerged as a free human personality. This ·struggle is 
seen in the records of the great - Christian ascBtica and 
hermits. Christianity inaugurated a new. conception of 
personality based not on . the imag~ of the Old Adam sub":"' 
merg.ed in the depths of na'ture·. b:Ut upon that of the New ·-
Adam freed from nature. Christianity placed infinite valu.e 
on the human soul above all worldly values thus making of 
the struggle against othe natural elements an ;. essential part 
of Christianity and giving rise to a dualism of spirit and' 
nature.· This struggle for human _personality was consummated 
in the Middle Ages~ 
3· Transition from Antiquity to the Middle Ages. 
Before turning to the contribution of, the Middle .Ages a 
brief survey of some of the main tendencies of the preceding 
centuries is in order. Previous to the adv..ent .of Christi-
anity the ancient world had been moving towards a universal-
ism. This process had received a powerful impetus· in the 
conquests of Alexander the Great which had politically 
united East and West. The syncretism of the Hellenistic 
40. MH, 117 ~ 
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period furthered · a cultural and religious blend that ser_ved 
as a spiritua l foundation. Tb.e integrating process t ,ook 
even more definite form in the s ingle political state of 
t he Roman Empire. Christianity--though originating_ among_ 
a people dominat·ed by par.ticularism and nationalism--a 
people who had played · an insignificant part _ in. world history 
--was destined by reason of. its divine revelation .t .o hav-e 
the greatest .role in l a ying . the foundations, for tbe new ... 
41 day. 
The second major event that we obBerve is the col-
lapse of the anctent .world in the day of its· great super-
ficial brillianc·e--a phenomenon occasioned both by the 
barbarian invas·ions a nd by an inner decay. The f a ll of the 
ancient world demonstrates two directly opposite things: 
one, the instability of all terrestrial things and cultural 
achievements; two, the unity and eternity of culture. 
Though an historical catastrophe destroyed its surface 
manifestations ~, Roman law, Greek phi losophy and art, and the 
other ~ cultural achievements of antiquity surviv.ed in t he 
Christian Church .• 42 
41. IIIIH, , ll9f. 
42. MH, 120-122. . Hegel would agree with Ber_dyaevv on 
both of these conclusions•(PH, 75ff.) Spengler ac~epts t he 
first and rejects the second.(DW, I, l05ff .• , 22ff.) All 
three thinkers see change and movement as characteristic of 
civilization. But, whereas : Hegel and Berdya ev emphasiz·e t he 
unity and abiding elements of cultures, Speng~er holds to 
a plura lity of cultures with no continuity whatsoev\er. 
Spengler perhaps allows for an element of c.ontinui ty in his 
concept _. of "contemporaneity."(DW, I, 26) Though f or him. 
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Christianity, ,a cultural-historical rather than 
natural religion, represents- the culmination_ of the union 
of Eastern and Western spiritual and historical forces. 
It postulated the unity of all mankind and of a Prov..ldence 
manifesting . itself in historical destinies. Those peoples 
who acc·epted Christianity became dynamic· forces in world 
history, while those who did not became increasingly static. 
Thus with the advent of Christianity the center of gravity 
of world history shifts from the East ~ to the West.43 In 
the "\Vest under _ the impact of Christ:i.ani ty, which first ., be-
came conscious of the primacy and priority of human nature, 
personality was destined to emerge as the manifestation of 
modern history.44 
E. Iviiddle Ages. Awareness of human personality and 
concern for its eternal destiny was first achieved by 
Christianity. Rejecting any low origin , for man, Christi-
anity "associated the human personality directly with the 
highest divine nature and origin" thus affirming "man 1 s 
primordial nature, independence and, above all, his freedom 
from the baser elemental processes."45 Th.e h.igh . inherent 
there is : a plurality of cultures, each g oes through the 
same pattarn of growth, development~ and decay, and there-
by a method is sugg:ested for identifying uniquely oc_curring 
events within _ chronologically parallel forms. 
43. Cf. Hegel: "The History of the World trav . els 
from East to West,. for . Europe is · absolutely the end of 
History, Asia tl1e beginning."(P'd, 109) 
44. MH, 123-125. 
45. MH, 125. 
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dignity of the human personality was thus apprehended for 
the first time. The development .of the same "constitutes 
the peculiar achievement of the Christian period of 
his tory. u46 
1. Developed Human Personality. The forging and 
fortifying of human personality was the contribution of t be 
Middle Ages. This it accomplished through the institutions 
of monasticism. and chivalry. Through the models:, furnished 
by the monk and the knight man's spiritual . and creat 1 v.e 
forces were concentrated and disciplined. . By means of this 
ascetic. restraint "accumulated and virgin forces" were pre-
served which were destined to contribute so largely to "the 
formation _of the European_man who, in a burst of extra-
ordinary energy, reached his full stature and asserted his · 
rights in the age of t he Renaissance."47. 
2. Failed to Allow for Free Creativity. The Midd:le 
Ages failed, however, and were destined to yield to the 
epochs of modern history. As Berdyaev generalizes: · "The 
results of an historical movement _are usually quite differ-
ent from the ideals which consciously inspire it."48 The 
Middle Ages- had the ·ideal of a theocratic Kingdom of God. 
Its conscious ideals were those concerned with theocracy, 
feudalism, and ·· chivalry, but these turned out . to he 
46. MH, 125. 
47. MH, 125f. 
48. MH, 127. 
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failures or were swept away by the advance of modern history. 
The Middle Ages failed in that they sought to realize their 
ideal by the compulsive force of arms~ Berdyaev suggasts 
the tragedy of the era: 
In the course of the long struggle which is wag_ed in 
the natural world on behalf of the higher spiritual 
l~f~ ~nd in the name of God, of love, of liberty, and 
or Knowledge, the means employed to secure these 
spiritual realities often become ends in themselves 
and here we have the origin of the greatest of all ' 
tragedies in the spiritual life.~ 
49. FS, 42f. Hegel treats at .length of the Middle 
Ages which he characterizes on the whole as a time of re-
action "resulting from the antithesis occas-ioned by that . 
infinite falsehood which rules the destinies. of th.e Middle 
Ages and constitutes. their . life and spirit." (PH, . 380) That. 
portion most closely related to Berdyaev -~ s treatment is what 
Hegel describes as the "third reaction"--"that of the 
church~-the reaction of the spiritual element ag~inst the 
existing order of things.. Secular extnavagances of passion . 
were repressed and kept in check by the Church, but the 
latter. was itself seculariz·ed in the process·, . and abandoned 
its proper position. From that moment be~ins · the intro-
version of the secular position."(PH, 381) 
Cf. for an excellent _, exposition of the essential 
tragedy of the Middle Ages, Toynhee, SH, (abridged edition), 
349-359, where in describing "the intoxication of victory" 
as a cause of the breakdown of civilizations he selects as 
a prime example "the Holy ·See." A single passage carries 
the central idea--one which is markedly parallel to 
Berdyaev's treatment. In answering the question, , "Vlhy was 
it that the medieval Papacy became the slave of its ownl 
tools and allowed itself to be betrayed, by its use of 
material means. into being diverted · from the spiritual ends 
to which these means had been intended to minister?" Toynb.ee 
suggests: "Tb:e ex plana tion·: appears· to lie in the untoward · 
effects of _an initial victory •••• Intoxicated by the 
successes which their hazardous manoeuvre obtained for them 
in the earlier stages of their struggle with the Holy Roman _ 
Empire, Gregory VII (Hildebrand) and his successors per.-
sisted in the use of force until victory on·~ this non~ 
spiritual plane became an ~ end in .itself. Thus, while Grego-
ry VII fought the Empire with the object of removing arr_ 
Imperial ob:s·tacle to a re-form of the Church, . Innocent IV 
fought the Empire in order.· to destroy the Empire's own 
secular ·authority."(SH, 355) 
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So in the Middle Ages man's spiritual forces were 
curb-ed by subjecting them all to a centralized spiritual 
authority. There was a noble purpose in all this-- 11 p_erhaps 
the greatest in history"--the establishing ~ of the Kingdom 
of God on earth.. But, in that 11 it did not allow for a free 
play of man's creative energies," the medieval period was 
defective and destined to come to an end. 
It became · clear that a compulsory fulfilment of the 
Kingdom of God was impossible. The latter could not 
be established without the free co;nsent and part.ici-
pation of man's autonomous forces.~O 
·But, though the Middle Ag~es did not realize their particular 
aims, in the very act of ·attempting to do so by curbing and 
disciplining man at all points, they were unconsciously 
forging the human personality that was to manifest itself in 
modern times .51 
50. 1lli , 130. Hegel is extremely critical of the 
Church's denial of freedom. "This position of things rend-
ered faith a matter of external legislation, and r esulted 
in compulsion and the stake. 11 (PH, 393) It is "a doctrine 
that exalts the obedience of Slavery, imposed by the ar-
bitrary will of the Church, above the true obedience of 
Fre ed om,~ 11 (PH, 396) 51. Berdyaev makes use of a principle here analogous 
to wha t Hegel calls "the cunning of reason." (PH, 33) We 
shall have occasion in the sub:sequent chapters to return . to 
this principle more fully. 
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CHAPTER V 
MODERN HISTORY 
A. Introduction. We hav·e noted in the closing 
section of the previous chapte~ that the essential charac-
teristic of the Middle Ag es was, acc-ording to Berdyaev, 1 ts 
concentration of man's energies upon interior s piritual 
matters- and its failure to allow for the free play of man's 
creative energies in exterior forms. While the theocratic. 
pla n of tl1e Middle Ag.es was one of the "most superbly grand 
ideas in history," it was never actualized a nd "lost more 
and more of its quality of sacredness and gradually deg ener-
ated into a counterfeit Kingd om."l 
It did not take into consideration the fact that there 
must .be a free consent of the human spirit if the 
Kingdom of Christ is to be realizea2 on earth; that Kingdom cannot be ·imposed by force. 
Modern history is a record of the testing of human 
liberty .3 Man looses himself from the religious center 
which had dominated his life during the Middle Ag.es;, and sets-
out upon a free highway.4 Berdyaev has well summarized the 
dialectical movement of modern times in a passag.e that we 
shall quote at some length. 
1. EOT, 197. 
2. EOT, 197f. 
3. For Hegel history is not so much a testing of 
human liberty as it is "the progress of the consciousness 
of Freedom." (PH, 20) Heg;el in his treatment is much more 
the rationalist; Berdyaev, the voluntarist. Cf. Berdya ev, 
SF, 11. 
4. EOT, 16. 
.At the dawn of modern .times, a decentralization took 
place and man's creative forces were suddenly liberated. 
Their ebullience produced that spiritual revolution 
which we call the Renaissance, the consequences- of 
which were still making themselves felt .. in . the nine-
teenth century. It brought .with it the liberation of 
ma n's creativ·e forces, spiritual decentralization a nd 
the differ~ntiation of all the spheres of social and 
cultural life. Science, art, political and economic 
life, society and culture now become autonomous-. This 
process of differentiation . is ·.·synonymous with the 
secularization of human culture. Ev,en religion is: 
secularized. Art and science, the state and society, 
enter t he modern world along a secular path.. The bonds 
holding together the various sphere~ of social and 
cultural life now become relaxed, and these s pheres · 
become independent. That is · the essential character of. 
modern history. The transition from medieval to modern 
history is synonymous with one from the divine to the 
human aspects of the world, from the divine depths, 
interior concentration and the inner core, to an exteri-
or cultural manifestation •. This divorce from the 
spiritual depths·; in which man' s· forces had been stored 
and to which they had been inwardly bound, is accompa-
nied not only by their liberation, but _by their passage 
from the depths to the periphery and tl1e surface of 
human life, from the medieval religious to secular . 
culture; and .it implies the transference of the centre 
of gravity from the divine depths to purely human . 
creation • . The spiritual bond with the centre of life 
grows gradually weaker. Modern history therefore con~ 
ducts European man along a path which removes nim .ever 
further from the spiritual centre. It is the path of 
man's free experience and · the trial of his creative 
forces .;5 
B. The Renaissance. With the preceding pre-analytic 
synopsis before us we pass to a more. detailed examination of 
the progressive secularization of history. The first 
cultural phenomenon to be noted is the Renaissance. 
1. Early Christian Renaissanc:e. The first stirrings· 
of the Renaissance took place within the framework of the 
Middle Ag es in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and was 
5. NIT-I, 130f. 
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essentially Christian. Regarded by Berdyaev as the 11 high-
est point reached in the development of Western .European 
culture," 6 it was marked by the noblest .works of mysticism.. 
and scholastic : philosophy, by Gothic- art and the painting_ 
of the Primitives. It _was the ag~ of Saint Dominic, Saint 
Francis, Joachim of Floris, Saint .Thomas Aquinas, Dante, 
and Giotto. "Th.e showing of man's creative forces -at _ that:_, 
time seems ·almost to be the answer of human revelation to 
divine revelation. 11 7 But, as we have seen above, the path 
which these men followed was laid down for them by the 
medieval consciousness and was not a completely free ex-
pression. "Man had yet to undergo a division of himself, 
a state of separation; he had to make trial not only of his 
strength but of his weakness also .u8. 
It was necessary that man should pass freely through. 
this ·. trying and tragic · experience; that ~ he sl1ould at 
last discover higher .. forms of religious consciousness; 
a nd that he should be able to establish autonomously 
a theonomicculture and devote his creative energies 
to the fulfilment of the Kingdom of God.9 
2. Rena.issance Proper. a. Rediscovered Natural Man 
and ·Antiquity. The Renaissance proper began in .Italy in 
6. MH, 128. Spengler shares Berdyaev' s enthusiasm 
for the earliest Renaissance (although he would reject the 
usual meaning of the term) because it was at thistime that 
Western culture had its beginnings in a new world-feeling. 
( Cf. DW, I, Table I; II, 288-295) Hegel in PH virtually 
ignores the Renaissance seeing it only as one of the ex-
pressions of man's secular activity. 
7. EOT, 20f. 
8. EOT, 21. 
9. MH, 130. 
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the fourteenth century with a division. The Middle Ages 
had been concerned with the interior man, the spiritual man, 
the new Adam of the Christian era; the Renaissance dis-
covered the external man, the natural man, the old Adam of 
the pre-Christ:tan world.. Nature, which for the Middle 
Ages had been a closed book, 1.s now rediscovered and with 
its rediscovery comes a reawakened interest~ in antiquity 
which had been so organically bound up with nature. 
Commun:ton with nature and antiquity led to the development 
of the humanist consciousness which focussed attention on 
the natural man at the expense of the spiritual.lO 
b. Witnessed Clash between Pagan and· Christian 
Principles. While the Renaissance eventually gave rise to 
the Protestant revolt among the Nordic peoples, in Italy, 
becausa of the preservation of ties with antiquity, the 
Renaissance took the form of positive creation that was to 
greatly enrich Catholicism.ll The essence of . the creativ.e 
effort that .so resulted was "the search after perfect forms 
in all spheres of human .creation." 12 Th.e richness and 
complexity of the works of genius 1:.hat .so amaze us was due 
to the fact that the Renaissanc·e men were "divided creatures 
belonging to two worlds."l3 There ·took place within them . 
10. MH, 13lf. 
11. MH, 132f. 
12. MH, 133 • 
13. EOT, 18. 
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the clash of pagan and Christian, ancient .and medieval, 
immanent and transcendental. They were still close tn the 
"spiritual .well""! springs of life," and the Renaissance cannot. 
be regarded as simply a return to antiquity and paganism. 
They had lived in the Middle Ages~ they had been 
baptized, and the waters. of Baptism are not wiped 
away by any return to antiquity, by mingling with 
them a superficial paganism.l4 
Indeed this aspect . of the Renaissance was doomed· to 
failure. It represents an attempt _.to apply the perfect _ 
forms of antiquity to the new spiritual content of the 
Christian life. The inability to express in classical form. 
the Christian content led to the establishment of "a type 
of culture and creation in which all achievements are sym~ 
bolic. ul5 
This impossibility of terrestrial perfection con-
stitutes the peculiarity of the Christian culture. 
By its very nature the latter could not ultimately 
fulfil itself. It symbolizes :· the principle of an 
eternal search, longing and aspiration; and it is but 
the symbolic reflecti~n ... of6the possibilities beyond the limits of this eaPth.l · 
14. EOT, 19. Berdyaevv here is reminiscent of Speng-
ler's denial of linear history and insistence upon a seriea 
of independent cultures each expressing.its - own possibili-
ties.(Cf. DW, II, 2lf.) There is then for Spengler no 
Renaissance in the sense of a revival of the past. "The 
Renaissance had ever the strong faith of the Gothic at the 
back of ita world- outlook. • • • Let us be rid at last of 
the fable of a renewal of Classical 'Antiquity.'u(DW, I, 
291) Or as Berdyaev· puts it: "The Renaissance was not and 
could not be wholly pagan. Ita disciples breathed the at-
mosphere of the classical past, sought there . the source of 
free creation and borrowed from it . the perfect forma of its 
art, but they were emphatically not possessed by the spirit 
of antiquity."(EOT, 18) 
15. MH, 136. 
16. MH, 137. Both of these citations suggest 
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Bott1cell1, the greatest ,painter of the fourteenth __  
century, of whom it was said that "his Venuses had abandoned -
the earth and that his Madonnas had abandoned him"l7 is an 
excellent .illustration __ of this point. But in that it failed 
we find the greatest achievement _ of the Renaissanc-e because 
it made "possible the realization .of the max.imum of creative 
beauty. " 18 Subsequent .Italian _art seems , to hav·e achieved a c 
greater perfection of form, but it is also marked by a 
"lifeless academicism" and an 11 interior lack of souL." 11 By 
that time division in man's soul had become in Italy a 
decadence and a spiritual . disintegration. 1119 
parallel conceptions - in Spengler. Spengler adopts a meta-
physic which "regards· everything whatsoever as having sig-
nificance as a symbol. 11 (DW, I, 163) The prime symbol of a . 
culture is its conception of extension.(DW, I, 174) In 
Western or Faustian culture this is found in infinite space. 
(DW, I, 183) This prime symb-ol is · expressed in form after 
form--each successive form being more sat1sfactor~ until the 
possibilities of the mind .that conceiv-ed it are exhausted 
and the culture yields to civilization.(DW, I, 90) Western 
culture first expressed itself architecturally in the Gothic 
cathedral and then musically in counterpoint. The Renais-
sance is interpreted as- a revolt against . the essential spirit 
of Western _culture and aa an attempt to make sculpture the 
paramount .art .. (DW; I, 232) BUt "this art,. incapable of 
carrying the Faustian burden · has no longer a mission--and.-
therefore no longer a soul or a life-history of specific. 
style development;..-in the Faustian world.'.'(DW, I, 245) 
Spengler holds- that the great Renaissance masters of Italy 
failed to find themselves in the attempt . to be classical 
and succeeded only as: they found their .. way back to the · 
essentially Faustian soul.(DW, I, 274ff.) The "false dawn" 
(cf. Hegel, PH, 428) of the Renaissanc:e was · overcome by the 
truly Gothic· arts of oil-painting and counterpoint. The 
latter was destined to be the most adequate expression of 
the Faustian soul, and in the form of"chamber-music, Western 
art . as a whole reaches its greatest . point. 11 (DW, I, 231) 
17. MH , 137 • 
18. MH":; 138. 
19. EOT, 22. 
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C. Humanism. The guiding spirit of modern history 
which underlay ev·en the Rena is sanc.e was the humanist spirit. 
To understand it is to understand the philosophy of modern . 
history. Humanism is founded upon a contradiction the ex-
pression of which constitutes the modern theme. 
1 • .Affirmed Man ' .s Self-Confidence. On the one side 
humanism represents a positive advanc:e. By its rebellion 
against medieval subjection it discovered and· affirmed the 
individual man whom it set up as the center. of the universe 
and directed upon the pathway of self-affirmation and cre-
ation.20 
2. Debased Man by Severing his Celestial Ties. But 
humanism also had a negative moment which was destined to 
be more powerful. It regarded man as a part of nature, de-
nied that he was the reflection of God, and affirmed his 
exclusively terrestrial or1gin.21 As •-a result 11 the Christian 
consciousness of man began to lose its strength. And this, 
in its turn, gave rise to a self-destructive dialectic. wi th-
in humanism. 11 22 To an examination of the stag_es of_ that 
fateful dialectic which was eventually to lead to the abase-
ment, exhaustion, and enfeeblement of modern man we now turn. 
We have already seen the first .fruits o1· humanism in . 
the Renaissance. This was its - finest product and most _ 
20. MH, 140. 
21. MH, 141. 
22. MH, 141. 
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powerful effort because it was here closest _to its spiritual 
foundations in _Catholic· Christianity and antiquity. 
Catholicism not only showed men the way to Hea~en, 
it also fostered beauty and splendor upon earth. 
Therein is· its great secret. By seeking first ~ for 
Heaven and life everlasting there, it .adds beaut¥ 
and power to mortal life on earth.23 . 
The creativity and splendor of the works of the Renaissance 
was due to its nearness to the Faith. "When it deserted the 
spiritual depths and came to the surface it began to degen~ 
erate." 24 The further man removes himself from his spirit-
ual foundations the more impoverished does he become. The 
significance of this fundamental dialectic is emphatically 
stated by Berdyaev: 11 l'lfan's self-affirmation leads to his 
perdition; the free :play of human forces unconnected with 
any higher aim brings about the exhaustion of man's creative 
powers. "25 Or, again describing modern history: 
It is an unfolding of ideas and events wherein"we see 
Humanism destroying itself by its own dialectic, for 
the putting up of man without :,God and against -God, the 
denial of the divine image and likeness in himself, 
lead· to his own negation and destruction; the affirming 
of paganism against . Christiani t~ means ,· the denial and 
demolition of his : sacred past.2 
23. EOT, 27. 
24. EOT, 28. 
25. MH, 142. 
26. EOT, 29. Hegel does not deal with Humanism as a 
distinct historical phenomenon but does make some suggestions 
relative to man that are worthy of note. History is the 
process of the development of Freedom .• (PH, 18ff.) The means 
whereby the idea of freedom is realized are the passions, 
private aims, and selfish desires of mene(PH, 21) These two 
elements are synthes-ized throu~h the mediating activity of 
the state(PH, 22ff.) which is 'the Divine Idea as it _exists 
on earth • 11 ( PH , 41 ) 
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D. Reformation. The next stage in the development of 
humanism was the Reformation. Like the Renaissance it was 
born in .a revolt of t he new man but differed in that it was 
a protest rather . than a creative manifes·tation. The Refor-
mation had both its positive and negat:Lv·e phases • . It began 
by asserting man's rights but ended by getting rid of man 
himself. 
1. Affirmed Man '.s Freedom from Ecclesiastical Com-
pulsion. Positively it made an essentially humanistic 
. Berdyaev is critical of Hegel's optimism, organicism, 
and especially of his subordination of man to the ends of 
history. Hegel's -philosophy is "absolutely hostile to free-
dom."(SF, 79) "To him (HeRel) history was the conquering 
march of the s piri t towards freedom.,; And although the ca te-
gory of freedom played· an .immense role with Hegel and he 
even defined -spirit as freedom, his philosophy was a con-
sistent and radical logical determinism." (SF, 256) Man--
both in his achievements and iri his tragedies--is a more 
significant factor in Berdyaev 's dualism than in Hegel's 
monism. 
Spengler does not treat of humanism separately, but . 
there are some ideas• which are suggestive of Berdyae~. He 
sees the great cultures as wave-cycles on .the boundless 
stream of human Being (DW, I, 105ff.) and history as the 
process of the actualization of a culture soul.(DW, I, 147) 
"A Culture is born in the moment when a great soul awakens 
out of the proto-spirituality of ever childish humanity, and 
detaches itself, a form from the formless, a bounded and 
mortal thing from the boundless a nti enduring:·· It blooms on 
the soil of an exactly definable landscape, to which plant-
wise it remains bound. It dies when this soul has ac.tualized 
the full sum of its possibilities in the shape of peoples, 
languages, dogmas, arts, states, sciences, and reverts into 
the proto-soul. 11 (DW, I, 106) 
Berdyaev and Spengler both treat Western culture as 
a progressive decline. Both see the cultural achievements 
of man as constituting the essence of that culture and para-
doxically leading to its ruin as man removes himself pro-
gressively from his source. But, whereas Spengler's natu-
ralistic metaphysic sees deatb as the end-product of all 
cultures, Berdyaev's supernaturalism holds out the possi-
bility of transfiguration. 
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c·ontribution in affirming "the true freedom of human nature 
as against the compulsion which had been exercised in the 
Catholic v,rorld. n27 
29 Debased- Man by Denyil~ Primal Freedom. However
1 
the Reformation contained also a negative, _anti-humanist 
principle. This latter was due to the fact that·., whereas· 
Catholicism had affirmed both the independent origin and 
inter~elation of . the human and divine principles, Lutheran~ 
ism affirmed exclusively the existence of God and denied 
t he independence of human nature. This monism, which was 
essentially anti-humanist in that it left little place for 
man, was continued in German idealism and mysticism where 
it tended to r~gard · "human nature as· a secondary nature in . 
no way related to the essence of being."28 
27. MH, 144. 
28. MH, 145. Cf. SS, 39f. The main point in_Hegel's 
treatment of the Reformation can .be briefly summarized. It 
was due to corruption in the Church the root of which lay in 
the tendency to seek and worship the divine in something_ 
sensible and external rather than in . spirit .,and truth. The 
contribution of Luther .was in finding in his own spirit 
what the Church had sought for in external and sensible 
t hings. (PH, 429-432) 
Hegel and Berdyaev agree essentially in the positive 
ach ievement of the Reformation, but Hegel as a Prntestant . 
sees no weaknesses in it. Berdyaev's treatment of the re-
lationship between Luther and Hegel is suggestive of the 
reason for the latter's short-sightedness. Though on the . 
surface Lutheranism and German Idealism appear poles: apart, 
Berdyaev .draws a close connection between them: "Luther 
ascribed everything to Grace and divine intervention, 
nothing to human action or human freedom • . He did not admit 
the reciprocal action of the divine and · lmman natures. 
German Idealism has done little more t han work out this 
monistic tendency. It has secularized Lutheran .Grace, con~ 
sidered as the unique source of all goodness, by 
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The Reformation was likewise anti-humanistic and 
anti-Renaissance in its opposition to all elements in 
Christianity traceable to Hellenic or pagan sources. 
Protestant .attempts to purge Christianity of its pagan 
elements have only contributed to weaken Christian 
aesthetics and metaphysicE, that is, those elements 
pre-eminently associated with the Hellenic spirit.29 
E. Enlightenment. The age of the eighteenth century 
enlightenment marks the next stage in the disintegration _ of" 
humanism. In opening his discussion .Berdyaev makes a par-
ticularly Spenglerian comment: 
I believe that the cultures of all times and all 
peoples have passed through a period of enlightenment. 
The cultural development of all peoples· is subject to 
a certain cyclic movement.30 
1. Affirmed Man's Self-Suffi cient .Reason. The posi-
tive moment of the enlightenment is seen when it is defined 
transferring its attributes to knowledge • . Thus · the transcen-
dental consciousness, the universal reason and the universal 
s pirit, are but the secular forms of Lutheran Grace, which 
had claimed to be the source of all knowledge. Hegelian 
philosophy in particular clearly affirms that the knowing:. 
subject is God Himself, His reason, His spirit, and no~ 
man .. 11 (SS, 39f.) 
Reformation for Spengler is a feature of all cultures 
--"the bringing back of the religion to the purity of its 
original idea as this manifested itself in .the great 
centuries of the beginning."(DW, II, 295f • .) Luther is re-
garded as the last of a series of reformers dating from 
Cluny who fought the Church because it asked too little. 
Luther. completely liberated the Faustian .personality by re-
moving the priest who had formerly stood between it and the 
Infinite. The destruction of this visible link which all 
men had in common was fatal for the weaker snuls.(DW, II, 
298f.) 
29. MH, 110. 
abolished the whole 
myth."(DW, II, 299) 
30. MH, 5. 
Spengler writes: "The Reformation 
bright .and consoling side of the Gothic 
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as the age when "the self-confident human reason rea rs it-
self above the mysteries of being and life, abov.e t hose 
divine mysteries which are the source of all human life and 
cult ure." 31 
2. Debased Man's Ability to Know. But as we_ compa r e 
t he rationalism of the enlightenment with the Renaissa nce 
enthusiasm and f a ith in the power and possibilities of man's 
knowledge to master the mysteries of nature, t he former i s 
seen a s an .impoverishment . of reason itself •. Natur e for t he 
men of the Renaissance was "something divine and livi ng , 
something with which man had to commune a nd blend. "32 But 
now by its denial of mystery in any form--especially t he 
discrediting of myth and tradition- -"reason. itself begins to 
be undermined: its quality is affected because the tie 
with t hffi higher reason uniting man with the divine cosmos 
has- become weakened. "33 Reason .becomes increasingly s elf-
a s sertive and limited and correspondingly less truly en-
lightening and illuminating . 11 This blindness of the 'en-
lightened' reason was t he inner penalty it paid fo r its 
s e l f- as sertiveness and for the eg oi sm with which it enslaved 
b oth t he human and the superhuman. u34 
31. MH, 6. Cf. supra, Chap . II, for full treatment. 
32. lVIH, 146. 
33. MH, 146. 
34. MH, 7. Hegel gives full tr.eatment.:.- to the En-:-
l ightenment. It is rela ted to the Reformation in its stress 
up on the individual which, rendering all particular things 
doubtful, was replaced by abstract and formal thought.(PH, 
456ff.) Man __ searches everywhere for the reason . within .. 
12 7 
F. French Revolution. The French Revolution .forms 
another stage in the dialectical unfolding of the Renais-
sance and humanist s pirit. It represents in the area of 
communa l a nd collective action the same s p irit of self-
affi rmation that the Renaissance, Reformation, and ~n­
lightenment represented respectively in the areas of art and 
science , religion, and reason~ 
1 • .llffirmed Man's .Ability to Change History. The 
p os itive element in the French as in all revolutions is 
that by means of it man believes that .he is capable of 
changing by hims elf the direction of history. "In rev.o-
lution man desires to set himself free from slavBry to the 
state, to an aristocracy, to the bourgeoisie, to lying 
sanctities and idols. "35 
things--every belief and conviction must be clearly present 
to thought and be formally and analytically examined.(Prl , 
458ff.) Pure insight makes ·a glorious~ contribution, b.ut 
Hegel is aware of its short-comings. "The results of thought. 
are thus posited as finite, and t he eclaric.issement utterly 
banished and extirpated all that was speculative from t hings 
human and divine. Although it is of inc.alculable importance 
that the multiform. complex of things should be reduced to 
its simplest conditions, and brought into the form of uni-
versality, yet this abstract principle does not satisfy t he 
living Spirit-, the concrete human soul."(PH, 461) 
For Spengler . an a ge of enlightenment is character-
istic of all cultures. It ushers in the autumn of a culture 
which centers about t he intell.igence of the city and marks 
the zenith of strict intellectual creativeness. Enlighten~ 
ment is marked by belief in the almightiness of reason, t he 
cult of nature, and rational relig ion. The incomprehensible 
is now regarded as irrational and rejected as valueless--as 
superstition or metaphysics.{DW, II, 305-308) 
35. SF, 190. Cf. SF, 189-200 for Berdyaev's most 
comprehensive treatment of the meaning of revolution. 
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2. Denied all Human Rights and Freedoms. 
But the French Revolution was powerless to solve its 
own problems: it could realize neither man's rights 
nor the freedom of human .life e It suffered a defeat .. 
It sugceeded only in realizing tyranny and abusing 
man.3b 
The Revolution set out in 1789 to realize man's rights and 
the freedom of human life, but by 1793 it had succeeded 
only in negating all rights · and all freedom. Human freedom 
divorced from any divtne principles resulted in an orgy of 
arbitrarinessand presumption .. But "by a sort of patho-
logical process working itself out in the organism, revo-
lution begets within itself the forces which will eventua lly 
free it from its devils."37 Thus in France came "Bonapart-
ism • • • a characteristic end to revolution."38 
Its blow was the penalty humanist freedom had to pay 
for its false divorce of the natural from the spiritual 
.man and its loss of all notion of the sp iritual sig-
nificanc.e of freedom.39 
36. MH, 147. 
37. EOT, 129. 
38. EOT, 129. 
39. blli, 148. Hegel's reaction to the French Revo-
lution is best suggested in a passag_e from one of his 
earlier writings where it is de scribed in terms of "Absolute 
Freedom and Terror." The stress upon the individual and 
his rights, characteristic of the Enlightenment, was g iv.en 
in France practical expression .where it resulted in absolute 
freedom. This led to anarchy which can "produce neither a 
positive achievement nor a deed; there is left for it only 
negative action; it is· merely the rage and fury of de-
struct1on."(PM, 604') Hegel and ·Berdyaev are on common 
ground here. Hegel also agrees in seeing in Napoleon a man 
of power _who brings to an end the reign of unmitigated 
freedom.(PH, 470) 
For Spengler_-revolution and Napoleonism are the last 
political manifestattons of culture before it passes. over 
into civilization. It witnesses the break-up of the 
129 
G. Romanticism. 1. Affirmed Man's Spiritual Re-
sources. The Romantic revival of the nineteenth century 
was likewise a manifestation of humani sm • . It was an at-
tempt to save human creativity by turning back to the 
Middle Ages and discovering s piritual resources there. 
Coincidental with this turning to the Middle Ag.es and con-
tacting again .the main stream .of Christianity occurs the 
highest development of humanist culture as this is re-
fleeted in the German Renaissance a nd the personality of 
Goethe. In Herder, Lessing, Goet l1e, and the Romantics the 
divine principle is not yet repudiated. Their humanisa. was 
based upon religion, and the divine and human ~ elements 
blended harmoniously.4° 
2. Denied Ultimate Destiny of Man. But, in that they 
visua li zed man's goal as within h imself, that is, . in human-
ism-, , and were not concerned wit l1 the ultimate destiny of 
man a nd the world, they fell short of an ultimate consum-
mation. Of Goethe, Berdyaev remarks: 
His life symbolized the flower of human creation bBfore 
the dawn of a catastrophic interpretation of universal 
history. It constitutes, in fact, . the high achievement 
of humanist creation. Following his authentic human-
ism, illuminated by the clear image of nature, the 
State-form. The mob, abstract truths, and money become in-
creasingly dominant over the priv-ileged, traditions, and 
policy. It finally comes to a head in Revolution which is 
revolt aga inst .all form • .t!.Ven a dictator. is -acc'eptab.le 
since he acknowledges no rules and is hostile to all tra-
ditions.(DW, II, 398-405) 
40. MH, 148f., 167f.; EOT, 33. 
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humanism of the later nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries b~comes more and more of a shadow of its 
true self.4l 
"The nineteenth century opened with the crisis of humanism 
and the exhaustion of the Renaissa nce spirit. It disc·losed 
the abyss of diametrically opposed principles ."42 
H. Industrialism .. 1. Aff irmed Man's Liberation from. 
Nature. "The end of the Renaissance and the crisis of 
humanism," which Berdyaev regards as: his "main theme, u43 
constitutes the balance of the present chapter. The es-
sential factor in this whole development lies in a new 
attitude toward nature which emerged. as a consequence of 
t he Henaissance.. This new attitude is to be contrasted 
both with the pre-Christian pagan immersion in and direct 
organic blending· with nature and with the Christian divorce 
from and ascetic struggle against nature as the source of 
sin and subservience to the baser elements • . The new ~tti­
tude "is concerned ••• to conquer and master the natural 
forces with a view to transforming them into an instrument 
of human aims, interests and happiness."44 
This new attitude was not apparent ,at the outset of 
the Renaissance. The men of that era attempted to recover 
the organic connection with nature which had been sev.ered 
by medieval asceticism. They 
41. MH, 168. 
42. MH, 149. 
43. MH; 150. 
44. MH, 151. 
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discovered nature ••• desired her abundant blessings 
••• imitated her shapes ••• gave up the struggle 
which medieval man had carried on with her sinfulness 
••• felt the enchantment of the outward appearances 
of Nature and the joys of a natural life.45 
But their search after perfect natural forms was not 
only an artistic quest but a scientific· query as well. 
Berdyaev cites the genius of Leonardo da Vinci as an illus-
tration of this point •. 
He str.ove not .. only to discover the sources of perfect 
forms : in art, but .also to acquire an intimate 
knowledge of nature. He is among those responsible 
for the future mechanization of human nature and for 
the decline of the original Renaissance . attitude to 
nature. He helped to separate man from the latter by 
introducing the machine between them and enclosing man 
in the artifkgial oulture that was being crea ted in 
this period. 
2. Denied Man's Integrity and Dignity. The results 
of this fatal contradict i on were not immediately apparent. 
Duri1~ the sixteenth, seventeenth, a nd eighteenth centuries 
there was a transitional period in which human creative 
forces were granted free play--a per iod "most rich in his-
torical context 11 during which .man wa s " f ree from the organic 
ties of life but not yet subject to its mechanism."47 " But 
human powers- that .escape from . a state of organi sm inevitably 
become enslaved to mechanlzation."48 That . ens1avement .came 
45 • EOT , 42 f • 
46. MH, 153. Cf. Fuller, HP, II, 10-16, for a high 
estimate of Leonardo. Cf. peng1er, DW, I, 278: "The 
whole course of his thought took him right outside the con-
ceptions · of his age." "Discovery was . the sum in one word 
of his whole nature. 11 
47. illi' 151. 
48. EOT, 41. 
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in the nineteenth century with the advent .of the machine--
"one of the greatest revolutions in human destiny."49 The 
machine destroyed any organic relationship which ex-isted 
between man and nature so that .the latter is regarded as an 
enemy with which we carry on war by mea ns of a mechanized. 
life. But, fatal as this step was '~ worse was to follow in_ 
that the machine and the resultant mechanization of life 
gained- power not only over nature but also over_ man whom 
it divides and disintegrates. 
So moves tne fatal dialectic of modern history. Man 
revolts against the discipline of medieval Christianity in 
an experiment _of fre edom and liberates his creative forces 
in a variety of areas. But this humanistic revolt developed 
wi thin it a fundamental contradiction which doomed it .. to 
failure. On the one hand, it brought . man back into organic 
connection with nature; but, on the other hand, by science 
and technology it attempted to exalt man .abov.e nature. This 
had the double effect of first destroying the connection 
which existed between man and secondly, since man is a 
natural being, of undermining his own sense of worth and 
dignity. 
The fundamental paradox that the Renaissance, in 
limiting its attention to the natural man at the expense of 
his spiritual matrix, tends to destroy the natural man; 
49. MH, 152. 
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that .humani sm tends inevita bly to anti-humanism; that _ t he 
denial of God tends to the denial of man is a theme t he 
variations of which Berdyaev . sounds in all his writings. 
The following is typical of many passages that could be 
cited: 
Human p owers were unleashed at the Renais~sance and 
through their impetuous play created a new culture a nd 
founded· a new history. That is to say, the whole 
culture of this period, which in the schools is called 
the history of modern times, was _the testing of human . 
liberty. The new man, indifferent to divine sanction s, 
wanted to be the maker. and master of life, without 
help from on high. He tore himself from his religious 
centre, to which all his life had been directed during 
the middle ag es: he would go forward freely on a free 
highway. In taking this road -it seemed to the modern 
European that man and the human world had bBen .dis-
covered . for the first time, and that in the middle 
ag_es both had been repressed; and even now there are 
still many who, blinded by the humanistic. faith, 
imagine that .the discovery of man must .be credited t o 
Humanism,. 
Nevertheless our own time, _since it has pushed all 
the antinomies of life to their limits and has come to 
a knowledge of its own origins, . at last begins to under-
stand that there was a fatal mistake and abuse of it-
self in the assurance of Humanism and that at .the roots 
of its· creed was hidden .a virtual self-negation_ of man 
and of his fall.. When he broke away from the spiritual 
moorings of his life he tore himself from the deeps and 
went to the surface, and he has. become more and more 
superficial. Vvhen he lost the spiritual centre of 
Being he lost his own at ,the same time.50 
50. EOT, 16f. Cf. MH, 154f. Hegel did not live to 
behold the developments of modern technical civilizations, 
albeit his dialectical method would have made provision for 
it. ( Cf. Marx's dialectical materialism and Berdyaev.' s 
dialectical spiritualism both of which are obviously in-
debted to Hegelian logic.) 
Spengler_ and Berdyaev are in .. essential agreement as: 
to the role of technics in .modern civilization. The con-
cluding cha pter of the former's magnum opus was dev.oted to 
the machine, and a subsequent publication, l\llan and Technics, 
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I. Aspects of Dehumanization. 1. Individualism. We 
turn now to some of t he end-manifestations of the spi rit of 
the Renaissance. One of its pa radoxes is that the new 
s p i r it of individualism which knew neither bounds nor 
authority was destined to disintegrate individuality. Man 
in t he Middle Ages was part of an organic whole and i n 
recognizing and submitting himself to superindividual a nd 
superhuman realities a nd values was strong , fruitful, a nd 
cons i stent.51 But this "organic spiritual_ concord," this 
"spiritual concretion," was lost in the revolt of modern 
man bY which he became abstracted and viewed as a self-
conta ined atom. Such a process "ha d inevitably to lead to 
dealt at .length with the problem. By technics man "is 
emboldened to play the part .of God" and thrusts himself 
upon nature "with the firm resolve to be its master. 11 (DW, 
II, 50lf.) With the power of technics the so ul of ma n 
"stands in irreconcilable opposition to the whole world, 
from which its own creativeness has sundered .i t. It is t he 
s oul of an upstart."(MT, 42) Since man 's creations a re 
a ga inst nature they are artificial and des:tined to failure. 
Wor ld history is "the history of a steadily increa sing , 
f a teful rift between man's world a nd the univers e--the 
history of a rebel that grows up to r a ise his hand against 
h is mother. This is the beginniP~ of man's tragedy--for 
.Nature is the stronger of the two. Man remains dependent 
on her _, for in spite of everything she embraces him, like 
a ll else, within herself. All the grea t Cultures are de-
fea ts. Whole races remain, inwardly destroyed a nd broken, 
fallen into barrenness and spiritual decay, as corpses on 
t he field. The fi ght a ga inst Nature is hopeless a nd y et--
i t _will be fought out to the bitter. end."( MT, 44f.) 
BSrdyaev , sees the debacle of modern history as 
essentially a revolt a ga inst God. His point of view is 
basically that of Christian orth odoxy. Speng ler sees 
h istory not in t he superna tural frame of reference of t he 
Hebr aic-Christian tradition, but in terms of the Hellenic 
s pirit and a natura listi~ outlook. 
51. EOT, 35. 
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excessive individualism and excessiv,e socialism which are 
the two forms of the atomizing process, of the abstract de-
composition of society and personality."52 As illustrativ,e 
of the process whereby humanism is transformed into anti -
humanism Berdyaev select& the diametrically opposed fig ures 
of Nietzsche and · Marx. 
Nietzsche53 held t b.at "man i s a shame and a disgrace 
and should be transcended." In the place of man whom he 
regarded as a merely t ransitory thing Nietzsche affirmed the 
superman who 11 takes the place of the lost God .u54 Natural 
man whom humanism had affirmed is now sacrificed to an ab-
straction, the superman. In the place of the human imag e, 
which now grows dim and faint, 
we ·a r e given the mysterious and poignant image of t he 
Su.perman1 whose .· features are only faintly suggested, . 
but who brings a sort of an authentic religious hope of 
a higher state while, at the same time, holding out the 
possibility of an anti-Christian, , atb.eistic, and 
satanical religion.55 
Nietzsche turned toward the Renaissance which he hoped to 
revive, but he was unable to keep contact eith.er. with it or 
with the sources" of its inspiration . 
Marx:,56 like Nietzsche, is also symbolic of . the de-
cline of the Renaissance and the crisis of humanism. He 
regards human individuality a"s a hangover from the bourgeois 
52. EOT, 38. 
53. IVlli, 156-158; · EOT, 38f .. 
54. EOT, 39. 
55. IviH, 157f. 
56. I\IJH, 158-160; EOT, 39f. 
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world which must be transcended. In the place of man wh o 
for him also becomes a means and an instrument Ma~x affirms 
the collectivity which "takes the place of the lost God."57 
Natural man whom humanism had affirmed is now sacrificed to 
an abstraction, the collectivity. 
Like Nietzsche, Marx gives us the faint outlines of 
the future Superman .and the non-human collective in 
whose name man himself is denied. Man_is, however , 
the : means · and instrument ,_, by which this non-human 
. collective will be established at the expense of his · 
human liBerty and dignity.58 
Unlike Nietzsche, however, Marx had no sympathy with nor 
desire to revive the glories of the Renaissance.59 
2. Democracy. The decline of the Rena is sanc_e is 
likewise to be noted in the spread of democracy, 60 the 
equalitarianism of wh.ich is opposed to the spiritual aris-
'tocracy of earlier days. With the shattering of the organic 
wholes to which he belonged in the Middle Ages and through 
which a creative humanism expressed itself modern man has 
become a mere atom. But the feeling of isolation and 
loneliness thus engendered leads man. to seek sa·lva ti on by 
joining some collective.6l 
57. EOT, 39. 
58. MH, 159. 
59. Spengler's individualism, which he claims is the 
true Nordic life-form, leans in the direction of Nietzsche 
with its glorification of the will of the strong, healthy 
instincts, race, and will to possession and power. Hegel's 
championing of the state over the individual leans more in 
the direction of ~~rx. 
60. ~H , 160f.; EOT, 40f. 
61. Berdyaev, Spengler, and Hegel are at one in their 
antipathy for democracy. Writes Spengler.: 111 Equal rights 1 
137 
. 3. Knowledge. Man 's former unlimited confidence in 
his creativity has·, since the inauguration of the Renais-
sance, been progressively undermined. The realm of 
knowledge can be taken as illustrative.62 As over against 
the apparent ~imiting of man's ~ knowledge by Catholic dogma 
the man of the Renaissance believed fully in his ability to 
solve all the mysteries of nature and regarded his power..s-
as- infinite. In Kant we first meet .with a decided limi-
tation of knowledge which is symptomatic. of the declining_ 
confidence in. man. But in recent epistemological trends as. 
represented· by Cohen and Husserl man himself is affirmed as · 
t he greatest obstacle to philosophic knowledge. 
Th.e same bankruptcy of the humanist conception of 
knowledge is observable in the positivism of August Comte.63 
Comte wished to curb the free and independent manifestations 
of t he human will by reviving a system analogous to, but 
having nothing in common with, medieval theocracy. In 
positiv,ism's attempts to set limits to man's knowledge we 
are contrary to nature, , are an indication of the departure 
from type of ageing societies,.are the beginning of their 
irrevocable decline. It is a piece of intellectual stu-
pidity to want to substitute something else for the social 
structure that has· grown up thr--ough the centuries and is, 
fortified by tradition. There is no substituting anything 
else for Life • . After Life there is only Death."(HD, 92f .. ) 
Of democracy's sovereignty of the people Hegel says: 
"The people without its monarch and without that whole 
organization necessarily and directly coru1ected with him is 
a formless mass, which is no longer a state." (Loewenberg , 
HS, 450) 
62. MH , 160-162; EOT, 48f. 
63. MH , 163f.; EOT, 46f. 
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note a definite decline of the free individualism of the 
Renaissance. Of it Berdyaev writes: 
It knew no creative abundance in the order of knowi ng ; 
the joyous ela t:i. on of knowledge eag_er to unv,eil t he 
mysteries of nature had vanished. Rathen did it wit-
ness those mysteries close up a gain and exnerience the 
limitations of man's ppwers, the weariness-" that_ comes 
from . knowledge alone.o4 · 
4~ Politics. Political life likewise reflects t he 
decline of the Renaissance. 65 The absolute monarchie s that 
preva iled over most of Europe until the French Revolution 
were simply acts of human self-affirmation. The succe edil~. 
democracies which replaced them were likewise. 
When man repudiates his~ superhuman sources and a f firms 
exclusively human principles, an inner .. process of 
revolution ' is set up which must inevitably lead to t he 
ultimate humanist .stage, that of revolutionary de-
mocracy.66 
But both of these aspects of humanist government_are now 
being shaken by "secret non~human principles of rev.olt" 
64. EOT, 46f. Contrasted with the optimistic Hegel, 
who saw knowledge progressing ever to great .. fulfillment, 
Spengler's outlook is quite suggestive of Berdyaev. · Spengler 
lays considerable stress on the inadequac.ies of knowledge 
in the 11 winter 11 of a culture. The great . conclusive systems· 
of knowledge were those of the German idealists~. Following 
them thought is primarily ethical and practical. A mecha-
nistic and materialistic· view becomes dominant. Their -
rational is done with, and the knowing and acknowledg ement 
of mysteries despised. The cult of science, especially the 
utility and prosperity therefrom resulting, is increasingly 
c:entral. Abstract metaphysica l thinking degenerates, a nd 
the lecture-room philosopher and systematizer of knowle d e 
takes over. Of these Spengler notes: 11 All that .these un-
important pedants have done for us is , .•• to write and 
rewrite the history of philosophy." (DW, I, 368) 
65. MH, 164-166. 
66. MH, 165. 
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which tend to take the form of some new organic wholes.67 
5. Morality. In moral life the same decline and 
crisis is seen.68 Humanist morality has bBen bankrupted by 
the influence of Nietzsche's anti-humanist ·.attitude, rev.o-
lutionary and anarchistic conceptions, and the superhuman 
religious and mystical movements of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. These all raised prob:lems: for 
which humanism had no solution.69 
6. Socialism.. A still further aspect of the Henais-
sance crisis is socialism.7° Its · anti-humanist tendencies 
are obvious in that 
it manifests itself not in a free play of creative 
energies but in their subordination to a compulsory 
principle. It once again imposes upon free men tha 
strait jacket of an organized and regimented life.·r1 
67. MH, 165. Again in politics Hegel' s · optimistic 
view that "the State is tr1e march of God through the world" 
(Loewenberg, HS, 443) would probably save him,. even if he 
had lived to the present from an:y such pessimistic views as 
victimize Berdyaev and Spengler • . The latter wrote at length 
(HD, 81-203) of "The White World-Revolution" taking place 
between the ruling class·es and those below. It is the re-
sult of the organization of the c:osmopolitan masses by 
business politicians and professional revolutionists for 
their own ends. Starting wi tl1 a radical democratic anarchy, , 
it eventuates in a virtual "dictatorship from b:elow." It 
is the result · of the inner disintegration of society and can . 
be halted only by Fascism which is a prelude to Caesarism. 
68. MH, 166f. . . 
69. Spengler finds in ethical socialism the West's 
me'ans of spiritual extinction. Under it life is : "to be 
treated as a problem, presented as the intellect sees · it, . judged by 'utilitarianism' or 'rational' criteria."(DW, I, 
353) Its aims are completely nebulous. Of ttle Western soul 
"nothing remains but the mere pressure, the passion_yearning 
to create, the form without the content .. "(DW, I, 363) 
70. I~ , 169-171; EOT, 50-53; SF, 200-222. 
71. MH, 169; SF, 147. 
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Socialis~_ had its origin in the ext~eme development of in-
dividualism which resulted from the disintegration of the 
society and communal life of the Middle Ages. It is 
essentially a reaction against , modern history the individu-
alism and humanism of which hav-.e been .unable to solve the 
problem of the destiny of human society • . Socialism reppe-
sents a new organism, a new mechanical collective society •. 
"This collectivism is a return to the Middle Ages, but on 
a materialistic anti-religious basis ."72 
7. Anarchism. Anarchism is an additional symptom of 
de cadence. 73 It has its origin_ in the instincts· of hatred 
and revenge which, directed toward all past culture and 
h istory, issue in an absolute negativism from .which nothing 
creative can emerge. Anarchism attacks the state which was 
one of the chief achievements of the Renaissance. It , also 
brings about _the self-destruction of personality by a·ppar.ent~ 
ly affirming freedom, but "a limited, gloomy and torturing 
72. EOT, 53. Socialism, says Spengler, owes its rise 
not _ to the economic· distress ~ of the proletariat occasioned 
by capitalism but to professional agitators.(HD, 111) It is 
marke d by an anti-individualistic and impers:onal s·piri t. 
(HD, 198f.) Some of his most scornful diatribe is reserv..ed 
for it. 11 The Romanticism of the insignificant~ The a-pothe-
osis of the herd-feeling~ The last . final way to idealize 
one's - own dread of responsibility! .•• One's own 'I' gives 
no more trouble. The levelling out of brains is complete: 
one meets 'in the mass,' wills 'in the mass,' thinks 'in the 
mass.' Those who do not t hink with it, who think for them-
selves, are felt to be enemies. It is - now the mass, and not 
the godhead-, in which the lazy, stupid 'I,' suffering from 
all manner of inhibitions, 'submerges' itself."(HD, 199f.) 
73. JVJH , -17lf.; EOT, 53f. 
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free d om in_which the tluman ind i v i dua litywither.s and 
perishes, and freedom becomes compulsion."74 
8 • .Art.. For modern art in all of its form.s Berdya ev. 
reserves some of his s ha rpest criticisms.75 It . marks a 
fi nal rupture with t he Renaissance -and thus with antiquity 
as well. The Renaissance search for perfect natura l and 
huma n forms had linked it . with antiquity. But modern a rt 
tur ns a ga i nst both na ture and antiquity and seeks its forms 
in the machine, the mechanism of wh ich has the effect . of 
dismembering all unity so that t he human image is disint .e-
grated and lost. 
Man becomes dissolved in a welter. of objects, lamps, 
divans, streets, which disa ssociate ·him as· an entity 
a nd disintegrate both his image and inimitabl e count e-
nance •••• When pieces · of pa per, newspaper adv.ertise-
ments, or obj ects extra cted from a dustbin a re insert ed 
into pictures, then 1 t is finally patent . that t t1e 
process of disintegration .and dehumanization ha s 
rea ched its - climax.76 
74. MH, 172. Spengler describes· such a state as " t he 
condition of a soul after it has actualized its possibili-
ti e s in full."(DW, I, 352) "The i deals· of yesterday, the 
r e lig ious and artistic and polit ical forms ttlat . have grown 
up t hrough the centuries are undone."{DW, I, 357. Cf. HD, 
95-97) 
75. 1lli , 172-174; ~OT, 44-46. 
76. ]Jlli, 173f. Spengler equals Berdyaev, in his 
withe ring critic ism of modern art--" the product of indus -tri.~ 
ous cobblers and no1s1. fools, who delight to produce s ome-
thing for the market. '(DW, I, 293) The art of today is "a 
faked music, filled· with artificial nois.iness of massed 
instruments; a faked painting, full of idiotic, exotic, and 
showcard effects, that every ten years or so concocts· out of 
the form-wealth of millennia some new 'style' which is in , 
fact .no style at all since everyone does as' he plea ses ~ ; a 
lying plastic t hat stea ls from Assyria, Bgypt, and Ivexico 
indifferently."(DW, I, 294) 
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9. Theosophy. In modern theosophy we have yet an-
other anti-humanist and anti-Renaissance phenomenon. 77 
Whereas Paracelsus "held man so h i gh as to submit the 
problems of creation .to him,rr78 Steiner and contemporary 
theosophists regard man as "but a n instrument ,of cosmic 
evolution , the product of various cosmic forces and the 
point of intersection of the various planetary reV~o­
lutions."79 Berdyaev reg,a.rds it as · "only the transplan-
tat i on . of naturalism into the spi r itual world. rr80 
10. Religi on. Recent relig ious and mystical mov e-
ments have reacted· aga inst positivism and materialism; but, 
in their admission t ha t free uncontrolled crea tive a ctivity 
is no longer _possible, and in their search for s piritual 
authority , they have proved t hemse lves , anti-humanist.81 
J~ Summary and Conclus ion . Summarizing his evalu-
ation of modern history Berdyaev .writes: 
In brief, the final stage of modern history is colored 
by a bitter sense of disillusionment in all its 
spheres• Man is to-day tormented by the disparity 
77. MH , 174f.; EOT, 49; FS, Chap. VIII. 
78. EOT, 49. 
79. MH , 175. 
80. EOT, 49 .. 
81. MH , 175f. 'rhile Western culture is still gener-
ations short .. of its s piritual termination in w'1a t S?eng l er 
calls 11 Second Religiousness," we are moving in this di-
rection. No longer do we hold rigidly to the opinions of 
Darwin, Comte, and Spencer . as did .the best minds of the 
last century. The failure of rationalism to g ive an ade-
quate world-view opens the way for . the return of the old 
primitive first forms. These awaken a sense of piety and 
mystery, but there is nothing creative, sponta neous', nor 
primary about such religion.(DW, II, 310f.) 
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be~ween the creative urKe, energy and daring with 
whlch ~e had embarked upon modern histor¥, , and his 
final lmpotence either to realize his , aspirations or 
to create. Thus · man emerges frommoderri history not 
only deeply disillusioned, inwardly dividedand dis-
integrated, but also creatively exhausted. . Incapable 
of creating, he yet thirsts to create; this is the .. 
sign of both his impotence and the penalty inflicted 
on him for his self-affirmation and humanist refusal 
to submit himself to the supernatural, as a result of 
which his image disintegrates and his forces are 
dissipated.(j2 
We hav,_e come, then, to the end of an epoch--to the 
end of modern .history--and face a new era which Berdyaev 
-calls by analogy "the New Middle Ages." Man in the era of 
modern history has attempted to master the world by tech-
nique, but in the process he has been enslaved by both 
nature and society. Perhaps in .. renouncing the world and 
submitting himself . to a higher power he may be able to 
dominate and rule. 
Two paths· lie open to contemporary man faced by a 
schism at the apex of modern history. He can either 
submit himself to the highest divine principles of life 
and thus strengthen his personality or he can become 
the slave of the non~divine, evil and superhuman 
principles. He is free to choose either . path; and this 
is why univ83sal history is the revelation of the 
Apocalypse. 
82. MH, 179. Spengler claims that his philosophy can 
save modern man from disillusionment by showing him "what can 
happen and therefore of what ~ with the unalterable necessity 
of destiny and irrespective of personal ideals, hopes or de-
sires, will happen."(DW, I, 40) Such knowledge will save the 
squandering of an incredible total of intellect and power in 
false ·directions. "And I can only hope that men of the new 
generation may be moved by this book to devote themselves to 
technics· instead of lyrics:, the sea instead of the paint-
bru'sh, .and politics· instead of epistemology.'.' (DW, . I, 41) 
83. MH, 182. Spengler~ likewise ·finds · modern man at_ 
"The Hour of Decision"--to be the object or sub-ject of 
history, the hammer or the anvil. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONTEMPORARY AND FUTURE HISTORY 
A. Introduction. The material .discussed in t hi s· 
· chapter bears-· directly upon that . in the . one preceding it. 
We shall attempt to delineate the two paths· mentioned at;_. 
the close of the last chapter--namely, that by which man 
continues to be "the slave and subject _. of non~divine, evil 
and superhuman principles" and that by which he "submits 
himself to the highest di~ine principles of life and thus 
.strengthens his personality. 111 This is an .att,empt to p l a ce 
upon the material a certain temporal and schematic pattern. 
which does not appear too clearly in the original sources .. 
'le shall use two general heads · for our . discussion.,.- 11 the new 
barbarism" and 11 the new Middle Ages." 
B. The New Barbarism. In The Mea ning of History 
Berdyaev·; . in dealing with the end of modern. history, spoke 
of "a recrudescence of those barbaric elements which had 
lain concealed in the depths of human culture,"2 and which . 
b.e seemed to regard as- us he ring in the new Middle Ages. In 
The End of Our Time he says, 11 1fe are now taking part in the 
beginnings of the barbarization of Europe."3 It is: an 
"epoch of a new 'civilized,' barbarism11 .l~ that . parallels · in a -
1. MH, , 182. 
2. MH , 177. 
3· EOT, 57. 
4. EOT, 59. 
way the dark ages - that succeeded the collapse of Rome. In 
The Fate of Man in the Modern World Berdyaev wrote: 11 More 
keenly than ever I feel that .night and shadow are descending 
on the world, . just as was the case at the beginning of the 
Middle Ages, before the medieval Renaissance."5 It is ln . 
this last-named volume that Berdyaev gives · his fullest 
account of the historical phenomena of this: new barbarism.6 
1. A Judgment on History. "We are witnessing," says_ 
Berdyaev, "a judgment upon not one epoch in history, _ but up-
on history itself."7 History, he tells us· 
is the tragic conflict between the personal and the 
super-personal or the pre-personal •••• nev..er solves 
the conflict between personality and society, . between 
personality and culture, personality and the mass ••• 
between quality and quantity •••• is merciless in its 
attitude toward personality and oppresses the indi-
vidual •••• . is really the failure of man and of 
culture, the collapse of all human plans ..... has 
used any and all means to attain . its ends •••• de-
ceived him (man), using man's self-seeking as a means. 
to attain quite non-human goals:· •••• was man's 
destiny, but that destiny .never . interested history.8 
The failure of history is the tragic conflict between 
the human and the personal on one side, and anti-human and 
anti-personal objectivization on the other. The historical 
5. FMMW ,· 7. 
6. Of this recrudescent barbarism Spengler. takes note: 
"The age is approaching--nay, :l.s already here--which has no 
more room for soft hearts and weakly ideals'• The primeval 
barbarism ••• is awake again now • . •• that warlike, 
healthy joy in one's own strength ••• that unbroken race 
instinct."(HD, 18f.) "Barbarism is that which I call 
strong race, the eternal warlike in the type of the beast-
of-prey man .. " (HD, 225) 
7. FMMW , 8. 
8. FNIJ.!M , 8f. 
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processes are invariably f a t a l to man since the means wh ich 
hist ory uses cannot be humanized. Christianity itself, 
~hough an historic force, has not been able to rea liz e it -
self with i n history, since as soon as it be comes objectivized 
it be comes a dull .a nd commonplace s ocial phenomenon. 
Christianity , t h ough accepting and operating within h ist ory , 
opposes 'it, hol ding that "every sing l e human soul has more 
mea ning and va lue t han the whole of h istory with its em-
pires, its wa rs and revolutions, its blossoming and fading 
civilizat ions."9 
a. War. }Jian today has been so s ubject ed to the 
objectivizing and socia lizing processe s of history t hat his 
very existence is shaken. From t he c ontemporary standpoint 
"tl1e World War pl~yed a calamitous part .. i n our destinies" 10 
in tha t it openly and ob jectively did what ha d long been 
9. FJ.viJ,fN, 10-12. We hav,e here a g ood statement of 
Berdyaev~s persona lism. It is a protest against the view of 
Hegel. (Cf. Hegel, PH, 21- 39, for his description. of the 
means whereby Freedom realizes itself; for Berdyaev's criti-
cism of t he same cf. SF, 225f.) Spengler is much closer to 
a persona listic po int of v iew t han Hegel, and in his account 
of man gives a much more d ominant place to the individual. 
Thus " ind ivi dua li sm ••• is a rea ct ion against tl1e psy-
chology of the mass . It is the l ast uprising of the carni-
vor e soul against its captiv1ty. be hind the bars of the 
Culture, the last attempt to s hake off the s p iritual and in-
tel l ectua l limitations that are produc ed by, and represented 
by, the fact of l arg e numbers •••• The idea of personality 
in its dark beg innings, is a protest .. against humanity in 
the mass, and t he tension between these grows and grows to 
its tragic finale."( MT, 71) Speng ler a nd Berdyaev are both 
spiritual descendants of Niet z sche with hi s voluntaris m, 
individualism, arist ocra tism, and creativity. 
10. ""OT, 57. 
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done under cover. Human life and personality were cheapened 
in being used mel"ely as means and instruments·. The totali-
tarian processes engendered by the war, during which time 
time all action was mobilized for evil, has been continued 
and accelerated, so that we may say that "the wa r was the 
border beyond which there begins a new form of collective 
human existence." 11 
b. Capitalism. But the war simply revealed openly 
what was already implicit in capitalism--"that man is of no 
account, , that he bas not only ceased to be the supreme va lue, 
12 but va lue of any sort. 11 The process of socialization and 
nationalization began with the anti-personalistic bias of 
capitalistic industry which rega rds man as simply 11 g oods fo r 
11. Fl/Wf~V , 12-14. Berdyaev's ·· fullest sta tement of the 
significance of war in found in SF, 154-164. While not 
taking the point of view of "bourgeois pacifism, 11 since 
"there is a sort of pea.ce which is more abject than wa r ·, 11 
the whole war psychology and method receives a devastating 
criticism. "War and everything connected with it is ••• 
the most extreme form and the utmost limit of anti-
personalism." (SF, 156) Hegel is infamous for his view of 
war as containing an ethicaa element , and as needed periodi-
ca lly to teach individuals their true significance and to 
preserve the state from stagnation and putrefact .ion. 
(Loewenberg , HS, 464-466) For Spengler . a phenomenon of 
every late culture is a "period of contending states." In 
the 'Nest this began with Napoleon and continues to the 
present hour. 11 Only now are the higl'lest stakes being played 
for. Every living nation must rise to greatness or go 
under."(HD, ix) Human .desires, wishes, . or happiness play 
no part in world history. The determining forces of the 
future are those of the past--the will of the strong, 
healthy instincts, race, the will to possession and power. 
Ivian is ever a beast of prey, and conflict is the original 
and basic fact of life. 
12. FNJM!N, 16 ~ 
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sale. ~•l3 Capitalism is simply chaos wearing an appearance 
of complete externa l organization. This' chaos was catastro-
phically revealed in the war. 14 
c. Collectivism. Following the war. there appeared in 
history a series of human collectives in which men v.,ia 
var ious forms of the totalitarian route have attempted to 
conquer . the chaos which confronts them on all sides. But 
these attempts are doomed in advance to failure since 
an organization which in the final analysis not only 
permits, but actually exalts hatred and evil, can 
never conquer chaos • . True victory over chaos demands 
an effort of the s pirit, spiritual change and renais -
sance. This depends, not on the fatality of history , 
not on . dark and irrational forces, but upon human 
liberty and the power of Divine grace. But in modern 
tendencies in the world we find neither the s pirit of 
freedom nor the grace of God.l5 
13 • FMMW , 15 • 
14. Cf. also SF, , l81-189, of which this is typical: 
"The bourgeois' most fantastic creation, the most unreal, , 
the most uncanny and horrible in .its unreality--is the king-
dom of money." ( SF, 185) Wh ile not hav-ing the social passion 
of Berdyaev , Spengler describes in detail the development of 
the artificial concept of money. (DW, II, 469-496) He finds 
in every Culture a desperate c onflict between the soil-
rooted tradition of a race that produces and the spirit of 
money which acquires and uses the former as an object. 
"Civili zation is the stage of a Culture at which tra dition 
and personality have lost t he i r immediate effect iv.eness, and 
every idea, to be a ctualiz ed , has to be pu.t into terms of 
money. "(DW, II, 485) "The Faustian money-thinking 'opens 
up ' wh ole continents ·, t he water-power of gigantic riv,er-
basins, t he muscular power of the peoples of broad regions, 
t he coal measures, the virgin forests, the laws of Nature, , 
a nd tra nsforms them all into financial energy, , which is laid 
out in one wa y or in another--in the shape of press, or 
elections, or budgets, . or armies--for the r ealization. of the 
masters' plans. " (DW, II, , 485f.) 
15 . Flv1MW , 17f. Spengler in noting the cha-os of our 
day writes: "This condition of things is t he anarc hic inter-
mezzo known today as democracy, which leads from the 
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2. Dehumanization. Man 's very future existence is 
threatened by the process of dehumanization that ~ we are 
witne~sing in .all phases of culture and social life. What 
follows is, . in pa rt,, further ·illustrations of tendenci.es 
note in the previous chapter, but since they are likewise 
characteristic of the contemporary scene it ~ ha s ssemed well 
to call attention to them briefly. A restatement. here will 
serve to demonstvate the continuity of the times since "all 
t he elements of our epoch were present in the past, but now 
t hey are generalized, universalized and revealed at l a st in ~ 
their true aspect.nl6 
a ·. Morality. "Above all, m_oral consciousness is be-
i ng dehuma.niz ed.n17 This is seen in the morality of 
bestialism18 which is simply war-time morality carried over 
into conditions of peace and according to which "everyth iP.g 
is permiss.ible: man may be us ed in any way desired for t he 
destruction , of monarchical State supremacy by way of politi-
cal, . plebeian Rationa lism to t he Caesarism of the future. 
There aFe alrea dy signs, in the dictator i a l tendencies o~ 
our time, of this · Caesarism, which is de stined to assume t he 
unlimited rna stery over ·the ruins of histori cal tra diti on. 11 
(HD; 40) "Nations of a new order are about . to aris_e •. •. •. • 
elective affinities of men with a common feeling about life,, 
with the same imperatives of a strong will • • . • • men . of 
rac e • • •. men who feel themselves born and called to b:e 
masters."(HD, 58f.) As we shall note below, Spengler is 
optimistic about the final outcome of thi~ movement--it . 
leadB to the establishment of the imperium mundi and the 
ending of all chaos, of all history in t he sense of dynamic 
movement. 
16. FMMW ; 21. 
17. FMMW, 25. 
18 . Fl~~N , 25-32. Cf. SF, l4lf. 
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attainment of inhuman or anti-human aims."l9 The will-to-
power as objectivized in te:chnics, the state, the race, the 
class, is put above the will-to-justice so that any desired 
treatment of the individual is permitted.20 
b. Culture. We see in the above the dissolution of 
the integral image of man into one of its aspects, namely 
t he will to dominance and power. Such a dissolution. is a 
product of technical civilization which thinks of man not 
in terms of himself but in terms of one of his functions. 
Modern literature, especially the contemporary novel, like-
wise witnesses to this resolution in that man . is not . treated 
as a totality but merely as an aspect or a function. 2 l De-
humanization is seen ,also in the developments of modern sci-
ence, particularly physics, where realities are being re-
v-ealed which have no connectitm at all with man's environ-
ment. 22 Modern philosophy in Heidegg_er, Jaspers, the revival 
of Kierkegaard, and Freud is a ph.tlosophy of nihilism, 
despair, and death.. "Immersion in .human existence, instead 
19. FIVIMW, 28. 
20. Cf. Spengler, ,HD, 21: "Man. is a beast of prey • 
. . • All the would be moralists and social-ethics~· people 
who claim or hope to be 'beyond all that' are only b:easts.·· of 
prey with their teeth broken, , who hate others on. account ... of . 
the attacks which they themselves· are wise enough to avoid." 
Attention should also be called to MT, l9ff., where the 
same thesis receives extended development. 
Cf. Hobbes, LEV, Chap. XIII, for the classic state-
ment relative to the bestial condition supposedly charac-
teristic of primitive man. In the famous phrases it is 
described as bellum omnium contra omnes' where homD homini 
lupus. 
21 • FMl.JNf, 3 4-3 6 • 
22. F:NIMVV, 36f. 
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of revealing man, shows forth his decomposition, and decay. 1123 
In theology Barth represents the dehumanization of Christi-
anity in that .man .is denied or degraded • . Thomism does not 
so much deny man as· diminish him in regarding him as a 
second-rate being possessing neither real freedom nor. cre-
ati v.e capacities. 24 
c. Politics~ The most .powerful tendencies to de-
humanization are, however, . to be found in the contemporary 
developments of state and society. 25 Here the _ problem has 
revolved about the question of liberty, which, . heing only 
formally comprehended, has led to non-liberty • . The basic 
conception of liberty in modern times has been that· of the 
phtlosophy of liberalism which was concerned about the 
rights of man .as a member of soc~ety and of the state. It 
23 ~ FIIAJIJN/, 38. . Berdyaev. dis cusses the existential 
philosophy in SS, 50-70, where he holds it is - "a Personalist 
philosophy."(SS, 70) "Ph1losophy is concerned prima:rily_ 
with man's 1nner .·life ... . .. The purpose of existence cannot 
be elucidated either from things or from objects •••• Un-
fortunately, . degraded Being is at the mercy of objective 
processes abstracting it from authentiec existence, . so that 
it interprets existence in purely material forms~ such as 
hunger, economic necessity (as in Marx), the libido, sexual 
desire (as in Freud), arudety and fear (as in Heidegg_er~. 
(SS, 69) 
24. FW~, 38f. Spengler's description of megalo-
politan civilization is suggestive of its negation of man. 
(DW, II, 99-107) Modern man's very habitat, the cosmopolis, 
marks a complete revolt from nature. His very thinking is 
mechanical. "All things· organic are dying in the gr_ip of 
organization. An .artificial world is -permeating and 
poisoning the natural.!'(MT, 94) The ultimate is - reached 
in the growing sterility of modern man which indicates t hat 
he has turned against life itself. 
25. FMMW , 40-70. Of. SF, 102-117; 139-15.4. 
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was a formal political concept which, since · it did not ex-
tend to the economic realm, resulted in liberty becoming 
"the protection .of the rights of a privileged minority, the 
26 defense of capitalistic property and the power_ of money." 
Such liberty, being an obstacle to needed social reform, 
has called forth the dictators of contemporary life who 
have attacked the whole concept of freedom as being the 
source of our difficulties. "The world is caught just now 
between this sort of false, decomposing liberty on the one 
hand, and the complete denial of liberty, the dictated 
world~view' on the other. "27 
In all history the worker has never been free. First 
slavery, then serfdom, then the false freedom of capitalism 
which has moved from "the exploitation of lahor" to "the 
freedom of t he unemployed." 28 The revolts against capitalism 
which were to free men have only resulted in a new epslave-
ment of labor since "instead of the living personality of 
the worker, his welfare, the r i ghts of labnr, we see pro-
cla i med as the supreme value t he p ower and well-being of t he 
state, the socia l c ollectiv.e .u29 
Communism and Fascism were both protests against the 
degeneration of formal liberty, "but instead of proceed ing 
to the true freedom of man, as an integral being, a s piritua l 
26. Flfil/NV, 43" 
27. F1v1:M:Vv, 53 .. 
2 8 • FMMVI; 53 • 
29. FMIJf.W , 55 • 
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nature, as producer and citizen" they proceed t .o both formal 
and actual denial of liberty, "3° and thus: t he process of de -
humanization and depersonalization is continued. Whereas 
c ommuni.sm is based on the myth and symbol of the class, 
German Nazi sm is based· upon that of the race, and Italian 
Fascism upon that , of the state. Though not in any sense 
mitigating "their thoroughly unhe~lthy nature," Berdyaev.~ 
grants certain positiv,e values. to them .• 
Among such we may note the sound criticism of formal 
political democracy which is. living through a mortal 
crisis, in the desire to set, up a real corporative 
or syndical representation, truly represent-ing the 
economic and professional interests· of the people, . 
in the elimination of party conflicts and ev.en_ in the 
necessity of a powerful .authority for social reform or 
the appeal to direct ac.tion ari sing from popular. life, . 
as contra s ted with the indirect .,action presented in a 
fictitious party representation in the sphere of 
parliament • .Jl 
Berdyaev believes' that human societies· are destined 
to pass through the forms of abs~olutism because of the in-
adequacies of tbe old forms of democracy to further with 
dispatch the radical reforms of society • . The world will 
pass through dictatorship wbich wil l vanish when certain 
reforms of society are accomplished • . Or .. will it ... vanish? 
Can "these dictatorships~ confine themselves : only to 
politics and economics,, or. is it inevi tab-.le that t hey 
also b.ecome dictatorships of, world-v,iew:, , of. ideas-, of 
the soiri t, that :, is to say,- the denial of all free 
spiritual life and work and conscience?32 
30. FMMW, 61. 
31 • FMMW ,' 63 • 
32. FMMW , 68. Cf. SF, 200-222, ' of which the follow-
ing citation is typical: "The metaphysical and· spiritual 
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Berdyaev rea lizes that the second a lternative is the case 
and prophesies spiritual war between monism and dualism, the 
s piritual and the natural-social, the world of, being and t he 
obj ectivized world, the Church and the State, God and 
Ceasar.33 
side of socialism a nd its social and economic side, a re open 
to very different .. appraisement. The metaphysics of social-
ism in its prevalent forms are entirely false .••• But the 
socia l and economic side of socialism is right a nd just, it 
is e lementary justice."(SF, 209) 
33. Spengler .. treats most fully the contemporary dev el-
opments of state a nd society in HD, 81-203~ The followi ng 
note sugge sts the high points of tha t treatment·_ and t he 
obvi ous ' comparisons and contrasts with Berdyaev. Spengler 
see s t he so-called modern movement of liberalism as t he 
result of the orga nization of the cosmopolitan .masses by 
business politicians a nd professional revolutionists for 
t heir own ends. Starting. wi tb a: radical democratic anarchy 
i t .eventuates in a virtual "dictatorship from below." Con-' 
trary to Marxian principles, revolution is not the result of 
economic processes, but is the result of a Culture that has 
ma tured to its limits and is : now disintegrating inwardly. 
A nation when in form is ma rked by a distinct difference 
between r a nks. Society, in fact, rests' upon the inequality 
of men. The doctrine of "equal rights" is a substitution 
for something that has grown up natura lly and that is fort.i-
fied by centuries of tradition. The noble world is opposed 
by the ha tred of the dregs of society who organiz'e t he masses 
of t he city, a nd g ive them the power of franchise, free d om of 
t he press, and terrorism. Its ideal is Ni hilism tha~ see ks · 
to destroy everything of the old Culture and tradition. The 
g oal of the Revolution is the leveling of society. Democracy 
l eads inexorably to Bolshev-ism. The libert'.ies· of which 
liberalism ma kes so much "are checked, suppres sed, a nd com-
pletely inverted once they have done their work a nd g iven 
the power into the hands of their exploiters •••• Liberxy 
ha s always been the liberty of those wt1o wish to obta i n t he 
power, not to abolish it.''(HD, 109) 
The world economic crisis of the thirties was t he de-
liberate work of t he leaders · of the proletariat. Labor has 
conducted a cla ss war that has eventuated in the expropri-
ation of the whole economic system in the interests of one 
class. The demands of labor led to stepped-up production, 
and t he eff ort .to unloa d t he products to imperia lism a nd 
high-powered a dvertising . Accompanying t his wa s an increase 
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3. New Forces. Hence we are in for a trying time, 
but a time of transition. Communism and Fascism a re but 
passing forms born of suffering and misfortune, conta ining 
elements of truth ming led with untruth and injustice, a nd 
representing confused attempts , to bring some sort of orde r 
out of t he chaos occasioned by the advent of so many new 
forces in the world's life. 
in the price of production and a decline in the va lue of 
money. The expansion of finance and the overstra in of 
currency led indubitably to the crash of the ma rkets. With 
t he indebtedness of indus try constantly increasing and in 
dang er of g oing under, the resultant consequence was a de-
mand tha t the State expropriate the works. 
The world-revolution is not over--the most forceful 
de cades a re only settin~ in upon us. The two fronts still 
ex ist. One, the "Left, is characterized by majority 
parties , programs', b:e lief in the p ower of abstra ctions to 
c ontrol ·rea lity, a leveling instinct, and a lack of r e spect 
for property. The other ·front, , Caesa rism, is marked by 
strong minorities, will to possession, rac e , and f orc e of 
arms. Fascism is but a transiti on to Caesarism. The i m-
porta nce of Fa scism for the future lays not in. it s part y 
but in its leader. "Mussolini i s first and foremost a 
statesman, i.ce-cold and sceptica l, r ealist, . diplomat. He 
does in very truth rule alone •••• The perfection of 
Cae sa rism is dictatorship--not the dictatorship of a party , 
but that of one man aga inst all parties, a nd, most of all, 
a b ove his own.''(HD, 187f.) 
The t Ho fro nts ca n b e c ontra sted as "Prussianism" and 
" Socialisrn, 11 the latter in its common meaning as a "mass 
· ide ology with material aims." Prussia nism is not a ca tc h-
word but a living idea l. It is character ized by d isciplined 
devotion, self-command, freedom through duty. Contra sted 
with socia lism it demands that the economic life of t he 
nation shall .be disciplined by a powerful state. It entails 
a precedence of foreign policy over internal policy. For 
individuals it means self-discipline. Through a Prussian 
ordering of existence a starting point for the overcoming 
of the World Revolution may be found. Nationalism as ma n i -
fest in the movements of today is a transition. towards 
Caesarism. Individualism is the true Nordic. life for.rn . 
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a. Dicta tor-led Ma.sses. Among these new forces we 
note the entrance of the masses into the center of world 
history orga nized into collectives and led by a dictator .34 
These masses threaten .the very existenc.e of the s piritua l 
aristocrats upon whom the quality-culture of the past was: 
dependent and which they would replace with a lowered 
qua ntity culture. The collectives of today differ from 
those of the past Gin that they are influenced more than ever 
before by economics and technics and thus present a mechani-
cal r a ther . than an organic aspect.35 
b •. Racism and Nationalism. 1'Jot only have the ma sses 
burst into the c ontemporary scene in new f a shi ons, but t he 
old instincts of race and na ti onali ty have entered v1i th new 
force.3 6 The result has been the paganization of Cb.ristian 
society in which a polytheistic nationalism has gone to the 
shocking ex.tremes of Germany where the naturalist and 
zoolog ical concept of man ha s taken the place of the s pirit-
ua l and personal. God is replaced by nationality which is 
regarded as the absolute value to which all life is 
34. FW~ff, 71-83. Cf. SF, 120ff. 
35. Spengler's view of the masses or "Fourth Esta te" 
has been .noted in .an earlier lengthy foot-note. It is a 
late development appea ring in the stage of Civilization. 
It rejects· "the Culture and its matured forms •••• It is 
the absolute of formlessness, persecuting with its hate 
every sort of form, every distinction of r ank, the orderli-
ness of property, the orderliness of knowledge. It is the 
new nomadism of the cosmopolis •••• The Fourth .Esta te 
becomes t he expression of the :9assing of a history_ over_ into 
the historyless. The mass is the end, the radical nullity." 
( DW, I I , 3 58 ) 
36. Fiv!IVIW , 83-105. Cf. SF, 164-172. 
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subordinated. Racialism is the crudest k ind of materia li sm 
and the most extreme dehuma nization since man is utte rly 
dependent up on physica l characteristics from wh ich there_ is 
no possible sa lvation.37 
c. Caesarism. Closely conn,ected with t he ab:ove is 
the phenomenon _ of Cae sarism~8 in which a demagogue rules 
the masses by appealing to their subconscious instincts and 
emotions. Na tionalism is one of the pa thways of Caesarism 
from wh ose tyranny only a world-federation of peoples can 
save us. " But one fears that t he world will attain such an 
order only after a considerable portion of humanity has been 
37. Spengler, parad·oxical as it may seem to some, re-
jected the idea of race as played up in Nazi Germany. 11 In 
speaking of race, it is not intende d in the sense in whic h 
it is the fashion among anti-Semites in Europe and America 
to use it today: Darwinistically, . materially.(HD, 219; cf. 
D1, , II, 113-131, 165f.) Race is defined as the tendency of 
a kindred gr oup to t ake root in a g iven area and endur e. 
"Thereby the cosmic-plantlike side of life, of Being , is in-
ve sted with a chara cter of duration. This I call race. u(DW, 
II, 113) "Race • • • is a decisive element in every-
que stion of life, something which every one knows clearly 
and definitely so long as he does not try to set, himself to 
comprehend it by way of r a ti onal--i.e., soulless--di ssection 
and ordering. " (DW, II, 130) 11 I n race t here is nothing 
materia l, but something cosmic a nd directional, t he felt 
ha rmony of a Destiny, the sing le ca dence of the ma rch of 
hi storical Being .. "(D ~ , II, 165) It is an i deal expressed 
only by a minority of the population--its wa rrior and noble 
e lement . It is mos t weakly f ound in priestly and schol arly 
natures.(DW, II, 166) 
Today that nation which best preserves r a ce-qua l ity--
the criteria of which seem to be t he prevalence of a n . inex-
haust ible birth rate, a severe s e l ective process, and a re-
crude s cent barbarism--will surv.ive and conquer in t he 
strugg le for power.( HD , 223 - 225) The nation mos t apt to do 
that is Ge rmany.(HD, 225-230) 
38 . Flvi1vlW , 105- 10'7 .. 
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wiped out.rr39 
d. Colored Revolt. A final new force in history is 
the dema nd on the part of the colored races of the world 
I 
for a n active part .in world history. 40 And the colored 
v;orld that . faces the · ~rest is not one schooled primarily in 
Christianity, but one that has learned, from materialism 
and na.tionalism, the worst phases of l:!:uropea n civiliza tion. 41 
4. Failure of Christianill• Yvha t is the role of 
Christianity in this whole crisis ?42 In short, not wba t it 
s h ould be, since "we are witnessing a judgment not on. history 
alone, but upon .Christianity in . bistory.rr 43 This judgment 
39. Spengler makes much of the phenomenon of Caesar-
ism. The dreary train of world reformers is now replaced by 
the Caesars. "High policy, the art . of the possible, will 
aga in enter upon its eternal heritage, free from all systems 
a n d theories, itself the judge of the facts by whi ch it 
r ules, a nd g ripping the world between its ltnees 1:11~e a g ood 
horseman. " (HD, 22) The c ha os of . democracy lea ds to Caesar-
ism":"-tl1e present dicta torial tendencies and current . national-
isms are signs of it. (HD, 194, 40) It will be characte r•.ize d 
by voluntary professional a rmi es swarming about_ a popula r . 
lea der. Against .the factors of money and intellect comes 
n ow the revolt of blood , race, and will to power. .• (HD, 55) 
It will put an end to class war a n d socialism. (HD, 104) and 
will fi ght "s olely for .. power., f or empire, and against, ev.ery 
description of party."(HD, 186. Cf. DW, II, 431-435) 
40. FN'JlvlW, 107-109. 
41. Spengler's atti tude toward the colored popu-
lations {among which l1e includes Russia.) is fully delineated 
in HD, 204-230. Race war b.egan when the colored peoples 
were admitted to the League and allowe d to have a say in 
the a ffairs of tbe white races. Increa singly the West has 
lost their res pect and . its own industrial monopoly. Tbe 
revolutionary movements of the Wes t have everywhere prepa red 
for the colored revolution, the manifestations of wh ich a r e 
mark ed by hatred a nd an unconditioned determination to 
d e stroy the white race. 
42. FMl\iiW, 110-131. 
43. FMIVIVf , 118. 
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is taking place in all phases of life--in the social realm 
where it has urged men to love God butfai led to urge them 
to love their neighbors-- i n _ the cultural. area where its 
ascetic attitude has resulted in antagonism to creativity--
in . the sphere of love, sex, · and marriage where the meaning 
of love was denied and regarded as accursed--in the field 
of theology where Christian truths and sacraments hav.e been 
stifled by rationalization, distor~ted by social conditions, 
and used to justify the most evil and sinful relation~ 
between men-. 
The failure of Christianity to fulfil its prophetic 
function of tra nsfiguring life, and its willingness to 
sanctify the natural-historical social processes, has de-
livered vast .areas of life over to modern demonic forces 
wh ich by an inevitable dialectical pr ocess dehumanize and 
destroy man. And so we are passing through an era of dark-
ness. But 
a new day is dawning for Chri stianity in the world. 
Only a form of Socialism, which unites personality and 
' the communal pr inciple, can satisfy Christianity. The 
hour has struck when, after terrible struggle, , after an 
unprecEdented de-Christianization of the world and its 
passage through all the results of tha t process,_ 
Christianity will he revealed in its pure form ••• •-
It will be seen that Christianity stands for man and 
for humanity, for the value and dignity of personality, 
for freedom, f or social justice, for the brotherhood 
of men and of nations, for enlightenment, for the 
creation of a new life •••• But the true and final 
renaissance will probably begin in the world only 
after the elementary everyday problems of human ex-
istence are solved for all peoples and nations, after 
bitter human need and the economic slavery of man 
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have been finally conquered. Only then may be expected 
a new and more4powerful rev elation of' the Holy Spirit . in t he world. 4 
C. The New Middle Ages. We look now at a more pos·i-
tive aspect of the future scene under the heading of "the 
new Middle Ages." Berdyaev's first use of this term appeared 
in The Meaning of History where he . suggested that we were 
entering an era which would witness a new blendil~ of races 
and cultural types , a resubmission to a higher. power,_ a re-
vival of asceticism. This discipline he visualized as 
preparatory for a new Christian Renaissance.45 However, in 
a subsequent volume Berdyaev devoted a long essay to the 
elucidation of "Th.e New Middle Ages "46 which is the cbief 
source for what follows. 
The cautioning word with wbi cb Berdyaev hegins could 
be equally well applied to the ea rlier sections of this 
chapter: 
I certainly do not mean to foretell the exact course 
that history will t ake; I want only to try to point 
out the characteristics and tendencies which the re- 47 newed aspect of society and culture is likely to hav.e. 
1. Not Reactionary. It ·will not be a rationalistic 
age but a transition 11 to an irrationalism, . or better to a 
superrat ionalism, of the medieval type. "48 This appears on 
44. FMMW;· l30f. 
45. MH, 177, 18lf. 
46. EOT, 69-120. 
47. EOT, 69f. 
48. EOT, 75. 
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its face a reactionary point of view, _but this is to t a ke 
a shallow outlook since "reactionary is the wish to r e turn 
to a near past, to a sta te of mind a nd set of conditions· 
which governed up to the time of a recent change."49 Hence 
the desire to return to the world of modern history--the 
world of rationalism, imperialism, industrialism, capital-
ism, atheism, . and socialism--which has · so patently demon-
stra ted its failure--is the he i ght of reactionism. However, 
it is 
not at all reactionary to wa nt to go back to medieval 
principles , to what was eternal in them; people certain~ 
ly must .not g o back to tha t in the past which was 
tempg0ary and accidental: but to what is eternal, yes. 
So, likewise, despite its many failures, the eternal ele-
menta of modern history will be preserved, for of no histori-
cal V/Orld can it be sa id that "nothing will b:e left of it, 
tha t it has nothing meet for eternity, that its very ex-
. 51 ist ence was futile." Hence "the new middle a ge will g iv.e 
a pl a ce to that experiment in liberty made by the modern 
world, with all the real benefits that we owe to it. 11 52 
49 • EOT, 77f. 
50. EOT, 78 . 
51. EOT; 79. 
52. EOT, 79. This and tne preceding citation both 
contain an essentially Hegelian idea which is expressed in 
the l anguage of the latter by the verb. aufg ehoben and signi-
fies " to annul, to preserve, to elevate.!' Berdyaev;. is in. 
basic agreement with this Hegelian conception which is well 
expressed by Loewenberg's sta tement that an essential part 
of Hegel's system is "to show that. everything has a rhythmic 
destiny: it comes to fruition, it comes to grief, . it enters 
a higher truth."(HS, xiii) 
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2. End of Humanism. The new day will be marked by 
the end of humanism53 for from its debacles we have learned 
that "where there is no God there is no man, " that "the-re 
cannot be religious neutrality or absence of religion," 
that "real relig ion is in the highest degree generalized 
and collective, a nd holds the first place in a society.u54 
It will not, however, be an absolute triumpl1 for Christi-
anity since the humanist realm is falling into two pa rts. 
The second . is Anti-Christianity as represented by the anti-
humanist and atheistic extreme communism of Russia~ and 
between it a nd Chri stianity there ensues a dea dly warfare 
in whi ch 11 the relig ion of Sa t an and the s pirit of Antichrist 
mus t needs dominate quantitatively."55 
3 . End of Individualism a nd Formal Liberalism. The 
new Th i ddle Age s will be characterized also by the end of 
individualism and formal liberalisrn .. 56 Of modern history's 
insistence upon autonomy Berdyaev writes: "I do not cla.irn 
for a minute that freedom of sp ir.it was oibher. than an in-
defeasible and eternal acquisition. But why a nd in view of 
vrha t did there have to be an emancipation<t" 57 Indiv.idual ism 
depr ived man of substance, l eft him without content, was a 
53 • go'r, 79-83. 
54. ~OT, 79f. 
55. EOT, 82. Berdyaev is here reminiscent of Augus-
tine's City of God in which t he entire course Qf history is 
seen in terms of a strug gle between the heavenly city and 
the city of man . 
56. EOT, 83-91. 
57. OT, 84. 
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purely negative reform. " Now he moves tmva r d genera lity, 
an epoch of universa lity c.n d collectivity."58 CoE~munism 
and Fasc ism both belong to t he new day in tha. t they are 
symptoma tic of man 's attempt to discover . substance. But in 
both of these we have idols, false gods, and it is impera-
tive that we mova on to the true God and true liberty. 
4. Simplified Material Culture. A further. phenomenon 
of the new epoch will be "a much more simple and elementary 
ma teria l culture a nd a spiritual culture that ~ is far more 
complex . 11 59 Capitalism was ma rked by a nd socia lism has con-
tinued its ma terialism, a theism, chea p prophets, hostility 
a ga inst the spirit and spiritual life, restless striving for 
success a nd amusement, personal se lfishness, incapacity for 
interior recollection • . In both t he center of gravity was 
shifted from the spiritual to the ma terial, from the in-
terior to the exterior. But that this capitalist-sociali st 
period has been rendered bankrupt is evident by the debility 
of capita l ism itself, . the World War., modern imperialism, a nd 
mi litarism. 
58. EOT, 86. Berdyaev here is ex.pressing essentially 
Hegelian ideas·. Cf. Hegel, . PH, 39-41, esp •. 41, where occurs 
the sentence: "The State is the Divine Idea as it exists 
on earth." Hegel's :cole as the fountain-head. of both 
Fascism and Communism, . the supreme poli tica.l organisms and 
pseudo-religions of our day, is common knowledge. 
59. EOT, 95. Spengler agrees likewi se when he holds 
that "cannon are in the l as t resort stronger than coal," and 
that the future wi ll see the restoration of politics to its 
rightful nrimacy a nd the pushing back of "economics to t he 
second pl~ce where they belong ."(HD, 58) 
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In order to be able to go on living it is possible that 
the bankrupt peoples will have to enter on a new path 
of self-denial, by curbing their covetousness and 
putt ing a check on_ the indefinite expansion of their_ 
wants, and by having smaller families. This would be 
a new asceticism and the negat1onc of industrial-
capitalist principles •••. • . By this path we should be 
obliged' to revive rural economy and return to trades, 
organizing ourselves into economic. associations- and 
trade corporations. _ The town will ha ve to link up with 
the country a ga in,. and competition will be replaced by 
cooperation • . Th.e principle of private property will be 
kept as an eternal foundation, but j_t wilL be limited 
and spiritualized in applicati on: no more of those 
scandalous huge private fortunes with which~ we ar_e so 
familiar. There will be no pretence at equality, . b~t 
neither will there be avoi:.dable hunger and pover_ty.bO 
5. Universalism. Again, we shall see the recrudescence 
of a universalism.61 . Modern nationalisms and separatisms 
Berdyaev credits to the Reforma t-ion and Protestant particu-
larism. Men and nations alike hav.e "ceased to he aware t hat 
they were parts· of an organic and real whole: each rung_ 
claims to be independent of the ladder." 62 Nationalism has 
had enormous influence in. modern history, but the forms that 
it .has taken . in , the last century and climaxed by the World 
war is indicative of the catastrophe that ." b-efalls man:. with 
the breakup of spiritual unity and the resurgence of pagan 
polytheism. But, despite t his, there are more rapprochements 
and attempts at world unification_than _ever before. Para-
doxically this internationalism_ has been furthered by the 
very products of indi vidualism-:--war, imperialism, capital ism, 
60 • EOT, 9 4f • 
61. EOT, 95-101. 
62. EOT, 96. 
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and- socialism. But international ism Berdyaev regards as 
11
a despicable caricatur-e of universalism, 11 and holds rather 
tha t "the universalist s pirit must be rekindled among 
Christians, , they must . have and express a will for a free 
universalism:." 63 Both communist internationalism and 
Christian universalism are attempts .to surmount the old in-
dividual national barriers and inaugurate a new middle ag e. 
I don't mea n to say tha t .the new middle ages will be 
so pea ceful tha t they will know no wars; an enormous 
s trugg_le may even now be imminent . • •. •. But the wars 
will not be so6lfluch national and pol:l.ticaLas r elig ious a n d spiritual. 4 
6. Religious Collectivism. Closely as~ociated with 
the point just made is tha t the new lili ddle Ag es will be 
characterized by the beginning of a new .. religious collec-
tivi ty.65 Aga inst those adVocat es of progress wh o oppos a 
any return to the ideas of the Mi ddle Ag es a nd who rega r d 
the pa ssing of modern times as a rea ction, Berdyaev insists 
tha t the Middle Age s with all their negativ.e and truly dark 
a spects were not so dark a s we have thought, a nd that in 
63. EOT, 100. 
64. , EOT, lOOf. Spengler_ likewise env.is ions a un:t-
v,ersa lism!"'"- t hat of tbe imperium mundi that will be ushered 
in following the present .. a ge of world wars.(HD, 24, 58 ; cf. 
DW, II, 428-435) Hegel never. seemed' able to get beyond the 
period of contending sta t es. Referring specifically to the 
Kant ian idea l expressed in Perpetual Peac:e, Hegel wr_i tes: 
"A number . of Stat e s may constitute themselves into a f amily , 
but t his confederation, as an _individuality, must create an 
opposition and so beget a n enemy."(Loewenberg , HS, 465_) 
Berdya ev, Speng ler, and Hegel are a ll pessimistic as to ~he 
prospects of peace, and the la:lite.r two seem ev.en scornful. 
of the idea l. 
65. EOT , 101-109 • . 
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contrast with t he barba rism and darkness that had followe d 
the collapse of a ntiquity were truly a renaissance. " A re-
turn to the mi ddle ages is t hen a return to a better re-
lig ious type, for we are f a r below their culture in_ the 
spiritual order ." 66 The new Middle Age s will not be a re-
viva l of the old t h eocracy with its ecclesiastical hierarchy 
and clericalism_ able to ma ke use of external force. Rather 
"knowledge , morality, : art, the State, economics, a ll must 
become relig ious, not by external restraint but free ly and 
from wi thin." 67 "We must now experience immanently wha t , t he 
Middle Ag~ s had experienced transcendentally • . '' 68 As con-
trasted with modern religion, which has been cont ent in its 
concern with a small department -of culture, the religion of 
the future "must again become all, , the force which trans-
figures and irradiates the whole of life from within: the 
spiritual energy must be set _free to r>enew tbe face of t he 
earth." 69 
7. Social Characteristics. Finally,, we note some of 
the social charac-teristics of the new l\Uddle Ag_es.7° Th e 
atomism of modern history will be vanquished by the ecumeni-
cal sp:i..ri t of the Church will will replace it with an 
organic hierarchy.. The organic hierarchy of communism. which. 
66. _ EOT, 103. 
67 • EOT , 105 • 
68. MH , 181. 
69. EOT, 109. 
70. EOT; 109-120. 
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has fa lsely conqueredatomism must be opposed by "another 
h ierarchy • . •• . ontologica lly founded, a n organi c and real 
communion.~r7l Power . wi ll be looke d upon not as a right but 
as a duty to be perf ormed by aminority, , a spiritual. aris-
tocra cy, in_an hierarchical order of society. Political 
parties, lea ders, parliaments, press, a nd st ock-exchang_e 
will lose their power. Life will he greatly simplified •. 
It is likely tha.tLmen will form themselve~ i nto unified 
groups, not under . political emblems: •. • . • . but, under 
ec on omic tokens · of immediate importa nce , . according to 
profess·iona l categ ories of tnade , . art ., a nd other work , , 
spirituaL and material;. these . will . t ake the place of 
the present cas·tes and classes:.. There is · a grea t:~ 
future before professi ona l unions, c.o-opera t.iv.e gilds, , 
corporations in general, ; and they are a clear indi-
cation of the middle a ges on . a n ew basis, .. Instea~d of 
poli-tical "talking s.h ops" we shall . have &;:Ssemblies of~ 
professionals representing rea l bodies, , not intriguing 
for political power but bent .upon dea ling wi tl1 vi. tal 
matters--for. themselv:.es and n ot .in the inter_ests of 
parties. Future society will he of t he syndica list 
type, but . understood in_ a very different .. sense from that 
of revolutionary syndicalism. • . . .. . The pea-s a nts and 
industrial workers, on whom the burdens" of social l ife 
bea~more and more heavily, will look to corpora te 
pr of:essional representation . on . the soviet _principle, . 
but in the true meaning of that worli ("coun-cil-") and 
not according to the fict ion which coverB the dictator-
ship of the Communist .Party in_ "Soviet Russ=ia·." It 
will be the business' of t hes e social unions~ to sav.e t he 
state and society _. · from ruin; · these living_ associations:,, 
professional, ._ economic and s piritual, will b:e the 
society a nd the State of the new middle a g es.72 
The unity of states and societies may express itself 
in monarchical forms or in '· even stronger dictatorial 
patterns. The principle of work, , spirt tual and mater.ial.~ 
71. EOT, 110. 
72. EOT, , 112-114 • . Cf. articles " s yndicalism" a nd 
"Guild Socia.lism" in ESS for h istorical parallels. 
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considered qualitatively will exist as the basis of society. 
The leisure and laziness of the privileg_ed will vanish • . 
Work will be sanctified a nd seen as participation in ere-
ation. Attention will shift , from the means- of liv.ing to 
the ends - of 1 ife. 
D. Conclusion. Butt despite this glowing account of 
· the new day, Berdyaev concludes- on a somewhat . sombre note: 
The future is doubtful, and I do not .believe that. we 
are obliged to look forward to a period of radiance 
and joy • . The illusions of earthly happiness= no longer 
have any hold on us, and the sense of evil becomes.: 
stronger and more acute in _the middle ages: the power.s 
of_ wickedness will gr.ow and t a ke on new forms wherewith 
to _ plague us in new ways. But .fr.eedom of s p iri.t., 
liberty to choose his path, ha s been giv.en to man. 
Christians must .will the creation_ of a Christian 
society and culture, , putting before alL things the 
search for _ the Kingdom of God a nd his _ justice. A very 
great . deal depends on . our liber~ty, that. is-, on man's 
creative efforts • . Two ways are open. I -hav.e a pre-
sentiment that an-J_ outbreak of the powers- of evil is at_ 
hand, but I have preferred to outline the possible 
postive traits of a future society .73 
73. EOT, 119. Cf • . Spengler : · 11 The decades in which 
we live are stupendous--and accordingly terrifying_ and void 
of happiness. Greatness and happiness are incompatible a nd 
we are given no choice. No one 11 ving in _ any part_ of the 
world of today will be happy, but many will be able to con-
trol by the exercise of their own will the greatness or 
insignificance of t t1eir life-course • 11 (HD, ixfc.) 
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CHAPTER VII 
METAPHYSICS--THE END OF HISTORY 
A. Concept:Lons of the End of History. In this 
chapter_ we return to the metaphysical as we consider_ the 
end of history • 1 We shall discu·ss three c-onceptions of 
this--the progr.essi ve, the cyclical, . and the eschatolog ical •. 
1. Progressive. The first notion to b:e examined is 
2 that of progress. This conce pt 1 on, .. which has domina t ,ed 
speculation in Europe from the end of the eighteenth century, 
has ancient religious-messianic r oots in Hebraic:· thought, 
believing with it that . the Kingdom of God and: the attendant .. 
reig n of perfection, truth and justic·e would be sooner or 
later established upon the earth. The doctr.ine of progress, 
as it has appeared in recent times, is larg ely a seculari-
zation of this ancient faith.3 The positivist doctrine 
1. By "end" Berdyaev means both goal and cessation •. 
Cf. MH, 68: 11 The conception a nd interpretation of . history 
as a complete whole postula tes a g oal, that is, the t .ermi-
nation of this world aeon a nd stage of eternity which we call 
our world of reality and. life." 
2. MH, 186-206. 
3. Cf. Russell, HWP, 363f. "The Jewish pattern of 
h istory, past a nd future, is such as to make a powerful ap-
peal to the oppressed and unfortunate at all times. Saint 
Augustine adapted this pattern to Christianity, l.1arx to 
Socialism. To understand· Niarx psychologically, one should 
use the following dictionary: Yahweh=-Dialectical Material-
ism; The Messiah::: Ivlarx; The Elect-; The Proleta r .iat; The Church 
: The Communist Party; The Second Coming :.The ReViOlution; Hell 
: Punishment of the Capitalists; The Millennium-= Tb.e Communist 
Commonwealth . • • • A- simila r dictionary could be made for 
the Nazis, but their conc eptions are more purely Old Testa-
ment and less Christian than those of Marx, , and theiv 
1\.iessiah is more analog ous to the .Maccabees than to Christ." 
resulting h olds tha t: 
in t~e.torrent of ti~e and g enerations whereby the 
des t1n1es of human h l story are achieved, man advanc es 
s t ead ily to s ome s trange untr.od den he i g ht, , to s ome 
nob l e r and bett er s t a te in relation to which a ll t hat 
has g one bef ore is but a mea ns and an instrument a nd 
not a n end in it se lf.4 
ga i ns t s uc h a conception Berdyaev directs a barrage 
of c ri tici sm , ho l d ing that its only ve.lue lies in t h e fact 
that it d oes conc e ive of history as ha ving an . end . From re-
lig i ous and ethical considera ti ons the vi ew is invalid since 
its solution of the tragedy of h i s tory excludes t he va s t 
majority of ma n k ind from pa rti.ci pa tion in the den ouement 
wh ich is reserved for t ha t blis sful elect generat i on yet 
unborn . By s uch a vi ew the endle ss succession of generations 
tha t ha v e been a r e empti ed of any intrinsic va.lue, p urpose, 
or significance, and a re t reat e d as mere means and instru-
ments for whom. dea th and t he grave is the ultima t e fate . 5 
Speng l e r makes a simi l ar observation: ".All Communist 
sy s tems in t he West . are i n fact derived from .. Chri st ian 
t heolog ical t ho ug ht •••• Christ i an t heology is the grand-
mother _ of Bolshevism •••• Uarx ism • . •• like any church 
••• has its s a ints·, apostles, martyrs, , fathers, . bib:le and 
miss ion. Like a ny church it has dog ma s, heresy-tribunals,, 
an o:. thodoxy a nd a scholasticism a nd ••• a p opular more.l ." 
(HD, 129f .) 
4. MH , 188. 
5. Cf. Tillich: "The idea of a final stage would ex-
clude all othe r stag es and a ll generat ions of men living in 
them from t he meaning of the ir historical ex istence."{ .Art . 
19381 ' 113) 
Berdyaev . conceives the notion of prog r .ess in an ex-
treme (almos t car ica tura l) p ositivistic secula r . form in 
wh ich the fina lity of this world is affirmed, and t he ex-
ist ence of a n y other is denied. Such a point of view 
obviously excludes any notion of personal i mmorta lity or 
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Instead of seeing absolute life as the transition from 
terrestria l to celestial history , it _presuppose s an 
ultimate solut ion of human .destiny within. the framework 
of terrestrial relations, a final integra tion of t he 
three-d i mensional world. It desires to humanize tha t 
absolute perfection and beatitude whi c h can only be at-
tained i n the celesti§l rea lity a nd only Qontained in 
t he fourth di mension . P 
A second objection to the doctrine of progress .is 
based on its concepti~n of time. This conception is what 
Berdyaev calls " hi st oric:al time, " and is symbolized by "t he 
straight line stretching out. forwards."? Time so conceived 
is sus ceptible of being segmented into pa st, present._, and 
future , and the notion . of progress then consists in a " dei -
fica tion of the future at the expense of past and· present_. 11 8 
But this disintegration of time is an illusi on .9 
Our real task is to break final l y with the expectations, 
l1opes and beliefs involved in th is attitude towards the 
future . The faith and trust which rais e us abo~e the 
pre sent moment into the dimensi on of a great historical 
destiny should inspire us· to d o away once and for. all 
with the_ disintegrati on of time into present, past, a nd 
future , and set up the true era of eternity. Our be-
l i ef and expectation . should tend towards a solution. in 
eternity of- human destiny, towards a perspectiv.e of 
life based not on a detached future but . on . the internal 
and integral present . It is not our f unct ion. to submit 
our contribution to the criteria of some f uture fra g-
ment . of time. The corre sponding generation will attend 
to that.. But our function at every per iod, at every 
conservation of va lue experience. While t h ose of pa st 
generations may have had value experience which was of in-
trinsic worth to them, t hey are regarded by this v~ew 
pr i mar ily as means· and instruments to wba t was to be, r a ther 
than seen as ends in .t hemselves. 
6. MH, 192. 
7. SF , 259. 
8. MH, 187. 
g. Cf. supra, Chap. III; SF , 259f. 
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moment of our historical destiny, is to determine our 
relation to the problem of life and history in_the 
terms and acco~d i ng to t he criteria of eternity • . ·· Only 
when we ha ve s1tua ted human destiny and history in t he 
perspective of eternity will t he future appear no more 
r~a l than.the past a nd.the pressnt no ~o~e real t han 
e1ther. For eternal t1me suffers no dlVlHions •. lo 
Thirdly, the doctrine of progress is refuted by the 
evidence of history itself. All cultures go t hrough a defi-
nite process ma r ked by the stages of birth, infancy, 
10. MH, 195f. Cf., in connection with the illusions 
of historical time, Tillich, RS, 3-13, for his rejection 
of the views that the present is the past or the future, a nd 
h is affirmation tha t the present is eternity • . "If an.y 
present has mea ning it has eternity. Only because the 
present is eternity does it possess a significance which 
makes its study worth wh ile."( RS, 7) "We find self-
transcendence in every time, openness to the eternal, a 
hallowing of time; but .upon the other. hand we see the appro-
priation of t b. e eternal, t he self-sufficiency of time, t he 
secularization of the holy.· There is a movement to and fro 
between self-transcendence and s 0lf-sufficiency, between the 
desire to be a mere vessel and the desire to be the content , 
between the turning toward tbe eternal and the turning 
towa rd the self. In .this action and rea ction we discer·n the 
religi ous situation of every pre sent at its profoundest . 
level."(RS, 11) 
Berdyaev allows for development v1i t hin a genera tion 
but does not sanction a progre ss ive development- across a 
longer time-span . "There is only progr .ess in the tragi c 
sense of t he inner principles of b ei:ng , of' the g ood-evil, 
divine-demonic antithesis, of the principles of g ood and 
evil in collaboration •••• If t here has been any gain in 
huma n consciousness, it consi s ts in a sharpened sense of this 
tragic anti thesis at the core of human existence."( HH, 192f.) 
Hence, while an individual may revolt, suffer, and return to 
God, thus going t hrough a period of development, . it is ille-
gitimate to pass judgments on one generation in terms of 
those tha t preceded or followed it. Berdyaev apposes to t h is 
continuity a pluralism which sees each generation as stand-
ing strictly on its own a nd to be judged solely in terms of 
its relation to the eternal. "Zvery generati on is in contact 
wi th the Absolute and Divine •••• Every generation ha s its 
own g oal, its own justification, its own meaning , its own 
va lues, its ovm spiritual impulses whereby it approxima tes 
to the divine life."( ?1lli, 193) 
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adolescence, maturity, afflorescence, old age, decay a nd 
death. Archeological research has unearthed· grea t anci ent 
cultures whose v ery existence we ha rdly sus pected, but the 
subsequent study of which ha s revealed many superiorities 
to even the twentieth c:::entury. 11 
2. Cyclical. This t hird obj~ction to the notion of 
progress leads naturally to the second conception. of the 
end of history-~that . of cycles, best represented in_our own 
day by the thought of Spengler.12 Berdyaev cites with 
approval the funda mental thesis of Spengler . that civilization 
11. Berdyaev. sees in Comte, Hegel, Spencer, and IViarx 
the chief ·adherents of the relig ion of ppogress. His a n-
tipathy to this vievv eque.ls t ha t of Spengler who, in t he 
introductory chapter ' of The Decline of the West, so forcibly 
challenged it • . Spengler saw the conventional idea of linear 
progress as artificial, as falsely assuming the existence of 
universals, and as mistakenly viewing the West .as t he culmi-
nation of world histor.y. For e. criticism .of progress quite 
similar . to that of Spengler, cf. Toynbee, SH (abridged 
edition), 38f. Cf. Sorokin, SCD, III, 535f., for a scathing 
indictment of the doctrine in both its moderate and revo-
lutionary forms. 
12. The t heory of cycles, widely held in ancient _ 
times, was revived in the l i st century by Nietzsche in his · 
theory of eternal recurrence. It is· given poetic expression 
in Thus Spake Zara thustra and a more pr .osa ic vera ion in The 
Will to Pow,er . .- It may be defined as: . "The view that as the 
dynamic energies of nature are finite, whereas time is in-
finite, only a limited number of combinations· is possible, 
which results in the cyclical recurrence of every situation 
in infinitely numerous times."( Herman Hausheer in Runes 
(e dit.), DP) Of this conception Berdyaev writes: ."A mere 
revival of t he past .. for its ovm sake is not an ach~ev.ement . 
of eternity or a triumph over death, that sovereign ruler. 
of the natural world. On the contrary, such a revival 
would only consolidate the power ·of time. Thus Niet·.zsche 's 
vision of the eternal recurrence is one of the most terri-
fying visions of time's everlasting sway over authentic 
Being."(SS, 140) 
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is the doom of every culture. 13 Like Speng ler, Berdyaev 
rejects the banal theory of progress with its view of an 
eternally ascending line of cultural development. Rather 
culture contains within itself seeds destined inevitably to 
transform it into civillzation.l4 Both agrse that at . a 
certain stag~ of cultural development a period of enlighten-
ment ensues which begins to doubt and criticize the premises 
upon which the culture rests and ends in transforming it 
from ~n organic, spiritual foundation -to a mechanical, . 
materia l basis which eventually kills it. 15 
In his opposition to the d oct~ine of prog~ess, . which 
he counters with the cyclic conception of history, Berdyae~ 
might appear to be falling back up on this ancient . philosophy. 
As the doctrine of progress ha d its source in Jewish messi-
a nic· speculations' so t he cyclic interpretation dates back 
to Hellenic religion and philosophy with its intimate re-
l a tionship with nature. But we shall see that Berdyaev 
brea ks both with this ancient philosophy of history and with 
its modern representative, Spengler, whose notions have been 
referred to as "Hellenism in disguise." 
The cyclic interpretation of history is based on what 
Berdyaev calls "cosmic time."l6 Cosmic time, or nature's~ 
time, is symbolized by the circle returning upon itself:. 
l3. MH, , 207-221. 
14. I\flH , 209. 
15. rJIH, 212f. Cf. supra, Chap. IV-VI, for Berdyaev's:: 
exnosition of t1is basic· idea. 
~ 16. SF, 257ff. 
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As has been noted, this is a n Hellenic idea. 
The Greeks v1ere primarily concerned with the appre-
hens·ion of cosmic time; among them the aesthetic 
contemplation of the cosmos predominated, .· au.d they 
almost failed to apprehend historical time.l7 
Cosmic time, however, can g ive no final interpretation of 
history, since it inevitably leads on to death. 
Natural life, cosmic life in natural cosmic time rests 
upon the alternating chang e of birth and death. It 
knows a periodic sp:i::'l:ng of the revival of life but that _ 
revival tal{es place not for those whom death has carried 
away, but for others. Victory over death is imp ossible 
in cosmic time. The present, which cannot be seized 
because it falls between the pa st and the future, an-
nihilates the past in order to be itself annihilat_ed by 
the future. In cosmic time the realm of life is subject 
to death, although the engendering power_ of life is in~ 
exhaustible. Cosmic time is death-dealing not for toe 
race but for personality; it desires no knowle~§e of 
personality and takes no int erest ,, in its fate. 
But what of the modern representa.tiv:e of this- ancient 
notion? Although Berdyaev. is in full agreement _with what 
Spengler says, he accuses him of not a~lowing for all of the 
possibilities. Whereas Spengler_reflects a definite fatal-
ism which sees decline and - death as the end of every culture, 
17. SF, 258. 
18. SF, 258. ·cf. Speng ler, HD, 21: "The individual's 
life is of importance to none besides himself . : the point is 
whether he wishes· to escape from history or. g ive his life 
for it • . History reeks nothing of human logic. Thunder-
storms, earthquakes, lava~streams: these are nea~ rela tives 
of the purposeless, elemental . events of world history. 
Nations may g o under, ancient cities of ageing Cultures burn 
or sink in ruins, but the earth will continue to revolve 
calmly round the run, . and the stars to run _their c_ourses." 
' II I Cf. Bertrand Russell's famous essay, . A Free vans 
1.l!f orship, ~' for a classic statement . of the annihilating 
as pect of the cosmic process~ 
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Berdyaev holds out another a lterna ti v,e. To this third 
conception of the end of history the next section is 
devotea. 19 
3· Eschatological. Civilization with its technical 
transfiguration of life yielding "a barbarism tainted by 
machine-oil"20 is the end-product for Spengler. Berdyaev . 
likewise regards this' as ~n all-too-real possibility. But 
a different . type of will to 'life' and its transfigu-
ration may spring up ~within a culture. Civilization 
is not the only possible passage from culture with its 
tragic antithesis to 'life' and its transfiguration. 
There is a l s o the pa th of a religious transfiguration 
of life and fulfilment of true being •••• This 
fervent will to mira cle and the organic-spiritual 
transfiguration .of life should reappear and insp ire a 
dying culture v1itb. anot her. s ort of life than . that 
offered it by a mechanical and technical .. civilization· .•. 
Religion cannot remain .. a mere part::.. of life, shelv.ed 
and neglected. It ,must a chieve that . true ontologi cal 
transfiguration .of life wh ich culture attains ~ only 
symbolically and civilization .technically •. But . we 
have, perhaps,.,_ still in store forus a period of aeria l 
ci viliza ti on.~l 
19. Niebuhr likewise uses t he same thr_ee-fold classi-
fication as Berdyaev. "Most of the philosophies of history, 
both ancient ~and modern, have sought .to obscure eithe~ one 
or the other aspect .of history whic~ Biblical eschatolog~ 
illumines. Ancient .philosophies of history either_ denied 
the meaningfulness of history entirely or they saw only the 
limited meaningfulness of its al legedly recurring cycles •. 
Modern philosophies have emphasized the unity of history 
and its cumulative tendencies; but tbey sought to ob-scure 
and deny the perils and evils in the ·cumulations of history, 
so that ~ the~ might regard history itself as the God of 
redempt·ion. '{NDM, II, 319) 
20. 11H , 221. Cf. Spengler, DW, I, 3lff. 
21. MH, 222f. Iviany recent ph ilosophies of history 
are in essential agrEement with the thes.is of Spengler that . 
our . Western .civilization is in the midst .of a crisis. 
Spengler believes that .this crisis which is manifested in 
the decline of the West is inevitable, and that there is 
nothing that .we can do ab out it. However, . sev.eral 
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representative scb.olars join with Berdyaev in believ.ing t hat 
recovery from this crisis is pos s ible. 
Schweitzer holds that "the suicide of civilization 
is in prog ress," and that "what yet . remains. of it is no 
long er. safe." (D:RC, 3) In his study he advances two central 
truths: "The basic ethical chara cter of civilization, and 
the connection between civilization and our theories of the 
universe."(DRC, xii f.) "Civilization is founded on some 
sort~ of theory of the universe, and ca n .be restored only 
through a spiritual awakening and a will for ethica l g ood 
in the mass of mankind." (DRC, ; 78) Schweitzer_ declares t hat 
t he basic idea in. his own .V'leltanschauung is that . "my 
relation to my own being and to the objective wor.ld is 
determined by reverence for life."(DRC, xiii) 
Sorokin's historical studies• lead him to the con~ 
elusion that Western society is "underg oing one of the 
deepest crises · of its life ••••. the crisia of a Sensate 
culture, now in its overripe stag e, the culture that has 
domina ted the 'JVestern World during the last five centuries." 
(BCD, III, 532) "We are seeming;Ly between t wo epochs: t he 
dying Sensate culture of our magnificent _yesterday and the 
coming Ideational culture of the creativ:.e morr.ow .•••• ·The 
night-of the transitory period begins to loom before us a nd 
the coming generations:·, perhaps with their: nightmares, 
fri ghtening shadows-, a nd hea rt-rending horr_ors •. Beyond it, 
h owever, the dawn of a new grea t Ideational culture is· 
probably waiting to greet .the men . of the future."(SCD, . III, 
535) Sorokin joins with Berdyaev. in rejecting the theor.ies 
of progress whether . of a moderate and orderly or of a vio-
lent and revolutionary character. The cyclical. theory of. 
Spengler is specifically rejected--" crisis is. not:... equivalent. 
to either. decay or death.!'(SCD, III, 53.7) Like Schweitzer., , 
Sorokin. sees the ultimate issue in ethical terms. "The 
most "urgent need of our time is t he man who can control 
himself and his lusts, who is compassionate to all his 
fellowmen, who can . see and seek for the eternal~ values of 
culture and society, and who deep ly feela hi~ unique resp onsi-
bility in .this universe. If the conquest. of t he forces of 
nature is the main: function of the Sensate cultur_e, the. 
taming of man~ his 1 humaniza tt on, 1 . his , ennoblement as the 
par.ticipant in_ the Divine Absolute, ha s always,_ been. the 
function mainly of the Ideational culture. 11 (SCD, III, 538f.) 
Toynbee, looking at:. our_ age in. the light . of other 
civilizations, . concludes that: "we are already , far. adv.anced 
in . our time of troubles.!' The most .conspicuous and s pecific 
of them are "nationalistic internecine warfare, reinforced 
• • • by the combined· 'drive' of energ).es genera ted b.y t~e 
recently released forces of Democracy and Industrialism.•. 
(SH, abridged edition, 552f.) Des pite the sinister. plig ht 
of our . present Jsituation, the Spengleriam conclusion. is not 
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Such was the hope h.eld out by Berdyaev in the closing pages 
of his chief historical writing. 
Aga in in the following passage from a more rec ently 
translated volume Berdyaev cl~arly describes the two 
alternatives: 
Th.ere are two ways ' out . of · historical time, in t wo 
opposite directions, towards cosmic time and towards 
existential time. . The submersion of histor..ical time 
in cosmic time is the way out for natura lism,, whi ch 
may take on_a mystical colour.. History r .eturns to 
nature, and enters into t he cosmic cycle •. The other 
way is the submersion of h i s torical time in existential 
time.. This is the way out taken by eschatology. 
Hi story passes into the rea lm of the freedom of the 
s p irit. And a phi losophy of history is alvwys in the 
last resort either natura listic, even though it makes 
use of t~~ categories of s p ir:l. t, or_ it is eschat..o-
logica l. 
In this l a st .. citation Berdyaev introduces the notion 
accept ed as the only pos.·sib:l.lity. "If we are to try to look 
into our future, we may begin by reminding ourselves that, 
though all the other civilizations: whose history is known to 
us may be either dead or dying, a civilizat:l.on. is not like 
an animal organism condemned by a n inexorab:~e destiny to 
die after traversing a predetermine d life curve. Ev,en. if 
all other civilizations tha t hav e come into ex istence so far 
were to prove in fact to have followed thi~ path, t here is 
no knovrn .law of historical determinism that compels us to 
leap out of the intolerab1e frying-pan of our time of 
troubles i nt o the slow and steady fire of a universal state 
wh ere we sha ll in due course be reduced to dust and ashes." 
(SH, 553) Toynbee believes that the decline of our. civili-
zation can be stopped. "Here . is· a challenge which we cannot 
evade, and our destiny depends on our response.!' ( SH, 55.4) 
If the human pr otag onist .were left to his own resources in 
such an hour, he could not be reasonably certain_of t he 
outcome. But such .is not the case. "We may and must pray 
that a reprieve wh ich God has granted to our_ society once 
will not . be refused if we ask for it . again_ in a humble 
spirit and vtith a contrite heart .. "(SH, 554) 
22. SF, 262f. 
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of "existential time."23 It is not to be regarded as iso-
lated or separated from cosmic and n istorical time , but "it 
is a break-through of one time into another." As suc h it 
is "the irruption of eternity into time, an i nterruption in 
cosmic and historical time, an add ition to a nd a fulfilment 
. 24 
of t .1. me ." Whereas historical time ma y be symboliz ed by 
the line, a nd cosmic time by the circle, existential time 
is be s t symboli zed by the point. It cannot be symbolized 
by extension, computed mathema tica lly, summed up or divided. 
It is intense time, 11 prof ound time ," "inward time, 11 "tbe 
time of the world of subjectivity."25 
A moment of existential time is an emergence int.o 
eternity. It would be untrue to sa y t ha t existentia l 
time is identical with eternity, but . it may be s a id 
tha t it i~ a participa tion in s everal moments of 
eternity. 6 
Such moments are b est known in such deeply personal 
experiences as t h ose connected with ecstasy_and the cr.eative 
act. Such experiences are 11 out s ide oh:j ectivized a nd matbe-
matical time," but the results of them are "exter_iorized in 
the time stream of h istory." 27 
The existential breaks t hrough ·. in the historical a nd 
the historical in r eturn acts u p on the existentia l. 
23. This is to be i dentified with the good and true 
time dealt with in Chap . III. 
24. SF, 260. Berdyaev acknowledg es t bat his notion 
of existential time is comparable to t he concept1on of 
Ka iros used by Tillich •. This term is defined by Tillich as 
"fulfilled time., t he moment of time which is invaded by 
eternity." (RS, 138f.) 
25. SF , 260. 
26. SF, 26lf. 
27. SF, 262. 
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Everything· significant and great in history, everything 
authentically new is ' a break-throug h in the existential 
plane, in creative subjectivity. The emergence of 
ev,ery notable man in history ·is a phenomenon of that 
kind • . In_ history, _ therefore, there is a n interruption 
due to th1s break-through, there · is no continuous unin-
terrupted process. Within history there is meta-
history, which is not a product of historica l evo~ 
lution. There i~ the miraculous in . history. The 
miraculous is not explicable by historical ev .. olution 
and the reign of law in~ history; it is the break-
through of events which belong to existential time into 
historical time, , which does not contain these events 
to t he full •••• The meta historical is nev.er con-
tained in the historical, history itself always dis-
torts metahistory in adjusting it to itself. The final 
victory of metahistory over history, of existential 
ti me ov er historical, would denote the end of history.28 
B. Meaning of History. 1. Li.es Beyond History. The 
eschatological notion of the end of terrestrial history 
28. SF, 262. Berdyaev' s thought here bears a marked 
resemb.lance to that t. of Bergson. For each the primal reality 
is spiritual--called by Berdyaev 11 spir.i t .," by Bergson 
"consciousness." For each change -a nd movement is t he 
essential characteristic of this reality •. Both reject 
me chanism a nd finalism and .put .grea t stress up on creativity. 
Each finds·· in the objectiv-e f a ctor a bloc·k to this inner 
creativity, but also a factor for conques~ . lea ding to t he 
emergence of new values. A chi e f point of contrast is in_ 
the more biological orientation of Bergson's thought a s 
over against the religious position of Berdyaev, though t h is 
is f a r . from being an exclusive cla ssification. Tlvo brief 
citations ·: from Bergson suggest common elements· with Berdya ev .• 
"Consciousness a nd matter appear to us, then, as r a dically 
different forms ' of existence, even as antag onistic forms, 
which have to fi n d a modus vivendi. Matt.er.·is necessity, 
consciousness is freedom.; but .th.ough diametrically opposed 
to one another, life has found the way of reconciling them. •. 
This : is precisely what life is--fr.eedom. inser.ting itself 
within. riecessity, turning it to its profit. Life would be 
an impossibility were ·the determination of matter, so 
absolute as to admit no relaxation.!'(ME, l7f.) "I s-ee in 
the whole evolution. of life on our planet __ a crossing of 
matter by a ' creative consciousness, an effort. to set. free, . 
by force of ingenuity and invention, something which in the 
animal still rema ins i nprisoned and is only finally released 
when we reach man." (IviE , 23) 
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leads into the search for its me a ning since " history has 
positive significance only when it has a culmination.u29 
History has meaning f or Berdya ev, . but that meaning lies 
beyond history in the perspe ctiv.e of another. world. -,rundane 
history is the pathway to another world which cannnt be 
realized within history but only beyond its framework.30 
"This is the fundamental conclusion of the metaphysics of 
history a nd the secret of the l1 ist orical process 1 tself. "31 
The problem of history will be solved only on the trans c en-
dental plane by extra-his~orical considerations, super~ 
h istory, metah1story.~2 
To solve it requires an inversion of the entire 
historical perspective, a transfer of attention to 
extr.a-historical .considerations, to the urge of h istory 
towards super-history. . '."/e must admit . within the 
hermetic circle of history the super~historical energy , 
the irruption within the relati ons of terrestrial 
phenomena of the celestial noumenon--the future Coming 
of Christ. Th is concept of the ineluctable end of 
history is a t once the f'i PE.l conclus:ion a nd the funda.-
mental premiss of the metaphysics of history.3) 
29. :MH , 204f. 
30. SF, 263; !JH , 197. 
31. MH, 197 • 
32. Cf. Niebuhr, NDM, II, passim... N.P. Jacobson. 
wr ites of this study: "Niebuhr's entire ph ilosophy of 
h istory is erected upon his c oncept of super-history and its 
role in the progress · of meaning. Super-history i .s the 
foundation of man's historical existence, . standing ab..ov.e and 
beyond an0 lending meaning a nd compl etion to the obscurities 
of life." · Art.(l94lJ.), 211-1. . . 
33. HH , 197f. Cf. Niebuhr: "The light of re:r.elation 
into the meaning of life illumines the darlrness of h~st ory' s 
self-cont radictions, it s fragmentary realization of meani ng 
and its uremature and f a lse completions·. But obvi ously such 
a faith po ints to an end in which history's i nc omp l eteness 
an1 cor r upti on_is finally overcome. Thus his tory as we know 
it is regarded as an 'interim' between t he disclosure and 
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2. Failure of History. "Between the first and the 
second metahistorical appearance of Christ lies the tense-
ness of historical time in .which man passes throug h all the 
lures a nd enslavements ."34 To yield to any of these lures 
and enslavements in a n attempt to solve the problem of 
history this side of eternity within the time-torrent is 
bound to result in disappointment and frustration. Mundane 
or terrestrial history is a failure •. 
Man's historical experience has been one of steady 
failure and there are no grounds for supposing t b.a t it . 
will ever_be anything else. Not one single project 
elaborated within the historical process has ever 
proved successful. None of the probl ems of arzy histori-
cal epoch whatsoever has been solved, no aims attained, 
no hopes realized. This radical failur e of the h istori-
ca l process ', . when we rega rd it as a whole, , ca n only be 
i nterpreted as t he failure to realize the King-dom of 
God. To situate the Kingdom of God as a solution. of 
human destiny within the historical process itself is 
tantamount t.Q excluding its realization .and even its 
preparation • ..?5 
the fulfillment .of its meaning. Symbolically this is ex-
pressed in the hope that i.. the suffering Messiah will 'come 
a ga in' with 'power . and great glory.'"(NDM, II, 288) This 
is to be understood in neither an utopian . nor a strict 
otherworldly sens.e • . "Against .. utop ianism the Christian 
faith insists that the final consummation. of history lies 
beyond the conditions of the temporal process. Against 
other-worldliness it asserts that the consummation, fulfills 
r a ther t han negates, the histor ical . process." ( NDM, II, 291) 
34. SF, 262. These lures and enslavements· are g iv.en 
in grea t detail in SF, passim. 
35. MH, 198. Cf. supra, Chap. V and VI dealing with 
the crisis of humanism. for empirical documentation of this 
thesis. Cf. MH , 198ff., for a summary statement ~ concluding : 
"Christianity also was a complete and utter f a ilure •••• 
Two thousand years have not sufficed to realize the ideas 
of Chris t ian faith and consciousness • . They will nev:.er be 
reaiized within the framework of human time and history. 
They can . only be realiz·ed by a victory over . time, by the 
transition from time to eternity, by the triumphant passage 
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3. Value of History. But is t he historical process 
meaningless then a nd without va lue since it is doomed to 
failure? No, for "that very f ai l ure itself ha s a meaning."36 
It indicates t ha t 
h istori cal success and a chievement do not constitute 
a va lid criterion of t he true •••• t ha t not hine 
perfect ca n be realized in time. ~ •• that the de stiny 
of man reserves a higher rea lization for his potenti-
alities t ha n any to be ac hieved in his purely histori-
cal exper ience.37 
The failure of all that is historical is due to the 
fact tha t ma n is inwardly divided . Even man's noblest 
achievements in art do not rea li ze t he ultima tely real but 
from t he historical to the super-historical process. 11 
Berdyaev. constantly revolts aga inst t he na turalisti c 
tendency to affirm that ea rt~ is enough • . As soon as this 
i s done in .any area of ma n's a ctivity an inner. dialectical 
process is initiated which dooms that s pecific at t empt a t 
self-sufficiency to failure. Thus, as a commentary on the 
last sentence of t he citation in the body of our study, to 
identify as did Augustine the church with the Ki ngd om of 
God was to allow a false chiliasm to triumph and to ha l low 
"something which is too earthly and too human, , and wh ich 
belong s exclusively to historical time. 11 {SF, 266) 
On t he fa ilUI'e of h 1st ory, cf. Niebuhr: "There is no 
achievement or partial realizati on in. h istory, no fuifillment 
of meaning or achievement of virtue by which ma n can . es ca pe 
the final judgment. The i dea of a 'las t' judgment expres ses 
Chr istianity's r efutation of all c onceptions of h istory, 
accordi ng to wh ich it is· its own redeemer and is able by its 
process of growth a n d development, to emancipate man from 
the guilt and sin of his ex istence, and to fr ee him from 
judgment • 11 (NDM, II, 293) 
Cf. Tillich, who seemlng ly take s a more optimistic 
note in regarding world history as "the fragmentary actua.li-
zation of salvation," but is quicl{ to note that this " does 
not mean t ha t salvation can be fulfilled v•rithin history 11 
since here it is always confronted by dest ructi on and the 
demonic wh ich it is abl e to subdue but not to extirpate. 
Art.(l938 )1, 126f. · 
36. SF, 263. 
37. m, 201. 
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merely symbolized it. This inner division is due to the 
fact that man is pulled two ways--toward the pathway of 
freedom and towa rd that ... of compulsion •. Summarizing his 
earlier _discussion38 Berdyaev writes: 
I based the entire development .. of the tragedy of human 
destiny on a double revelat~on--that of God to ma n a nd, 
inversely, that of man to God. The essential tragedy 
of existence lies in this free inner. relationship be-
twe en God a nd man, in the birth of God in man and of 
man in God, in the revelation of God to man and of man 
to God. Th.e history of mankind is: permeated throug h 
and through by this double flow of rev.elation between 
God and man. His creative works, his historical a cts, 
are man's answer to God. But his final a nd most s-ig-
nificant answer is his free dom. His freedom to reveal 
himself, , his freedom to crea te, respond to God's long-
ing for man. God desires a free creative daring in 
man. But in man's historica l destiny, in the wh ole 
pattern of his a cts, we find many deviations from the 
pa th of free d om to that of compulsion and necessity.39 
C. Task in History. Wha t can be said then to be the 
significance of the historical process since the doctrine of 
progress is rejected? . Its significa nce and meaning is to be 
discovered in . terms of its ·end and consummation .wh ich in the 
Christian philosophy of history is depicted in the Apoca~ 
lypse. Berdyaev admits the "extraordinary difficulty of its 
explanation," the l a rgely "futile occupation11 of interpreting_ 
its symbolism, and declines to give an _exposition of 1.t.40 
However, he does g ive some insight into its meaning which is 
suggestive of the task of those within the historical aeon. 
38. Cf. supra, Chap. III. 
3 9 • MH , 2 02 f • 
40. SF, 263. 
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It can be understood either passively or activ.ely. 
The former way has been predominant in the Christian con-
sciou.sness a nd consists in a submissive pe.tient. attitude 
which leaves it all up to God • . The latt:er view, which is· 
shared by Berdyaev, sees the end of the world as the result 
of the activity of man a lso--the issue of divine-human 
work. 41 Elsewhere Berdyaev rejects what he calls the "mono-
physi tism" of both patristic and humanistic anthropology 
both. of which neglect . essential aspects of mankind •. 42 
Ma nkind in the Christian era has been torn by the 
following contradictions; Christianity without human. 
cree. tion; , and human creation without Chris·tianity; God 
without man and man without . God •••• When Christi-
anity has reached its full development this antithesis 
will be resolved and there will be a positive reve -
lation of God-humanity, , the union of the two movements, . 
the uniting of Christianity and creation.~3 
This synthesis may take place in "what Berdyaev 
describes as th.e "fourth period in man' s , attitude toward 
nature . tr44 This new· attitude 
will begin when man .. turns once more towards the inner 
life, . when he will see. once more the divine cosmos 
but wil l unite this faith to a spiritual p ower over tha 
elements, , thus affirming his sovereignty in. the world. 5 
41. SF, 264. 
42. FS, 217. 
43 ~ FS, 238. 
44. The first three have b.een discussed in Cha pters 
IV to VI. They are briefly: (l) primitive· ab:s,or.ption in 
nature (2)detachment ;_ from and spiritual conflict .with . 
na ture: and (3)mast·ery of and material struggle with_ nature. 
For a summary statement -of this· development, cf. FS, 22lff. 
45 •· FS, 224. 
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This goal, "the uniting of Christianity and crea t i on 11 , _ 
cannot be realized apart~ from the activity of man. "The 
creation of the world is not finished, and man . cooperates 
actively · in the process." 46 This crea ti v.e dev.elopment is 
possible 11 because ·freedom spring s from a deep a nd ineffable 
source, and because man bBars the imag e of his Cr.eator, and 
of His fr e edom, . and creative energy."47 Though this process., 
since it is the result of spirit .and freedom rather than 
of na ture and necess 1 ty., is not subject . to law, ther.e is a 
certa in dialectic which may be discovered in it. This "lies 
in the experience of what has· been lived through." 48 
Whatever experience may h.,av,e been, whether. g ood or bad 
it is · never useless, and it always· forms· part of the 
next stage of development.. W...an is never put to the 
test without results, , a nd there ca n nev er be a return 
to an earlier_ stage. We must go forward all the time , 
and even reaction itself in th~ spiritual life is 
innovation and not repetition .. 49 
11 Christianity has not been finally realized and has 
immense poss1.bilities. " 5° I t s development is not to be seen 
a s a movement on .the plane of the exterior world, but a-s "a 
manifestatton of the freedom of t he s p irit wb.ich . comes from 
46 . FS, 3 06 ~: 
47 ~ FS, 307. 
48. FS, 309. 
49. FS, 312. Thus, as we have noted, everything_ has 
a meaning in . terms of "an eschatological perspectiv.e, 11 even. 
the failures of history, since "without them t he freedom of 
man would not hav.e been fully tested E'.. nd proved.!'"( SF, 263) 
Cf. Hegel, PM, passim, a chief aim of which writes 
Baillie is "to shew that the various forms of experience 
constitute a continuous and c onnected series of stages of 
mind that the life of mind is a whole, and a single con-tinu~us movement."{PM, Translator's Introduction, 41) 
50. FS, 313 • 
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within, a penetration of the natural world by the spirit-
ual."51 Thus, there is "no cleavage between the t wo worlds, 
of time a nd et ernity, for eternity is capable of entering 
time, a nd time, eternity."52 
This movement takes place within the Church. wh ich. is 
"the mystical body of Christ."53 As we belong to this 
mystical org_a nis m we share in the mind, _ love, a nd fr.eed om 
of Christ and become new men. 
Since the time of Christ orig ina.l sin has no longer _ 
absolute power over . man , for man a nd the cosmos do not . 
belong exclusively to the natural order_·any more, t he 
breach between the natur:=~ l and supernatural hav.ing been_ 
brought to an .end. Spiritual .life a nd crea tion a re 
now possible within it, a nd belong to the divine~human 
life of t he Church.54 
The conventional ideas of the Church are rejected. 
Ra t he r "the Church is all; it constitutes the whole p l eni-
tude -of being , of the life of huma nity, a nd of t he world in, 
a stage of Christ ianization. "55 The Church has cosmic sig-
nificance, a nd- to "regard it as: a hospital to which souls 
come for treatment,.11 56 or . to 11 conceive of Christianity_ ex-
clusively as- the relig ion of pe r s onal salva tion, tt57 is a 
51. FS, 315. Cf. supra, l79ff. for the discussion of 
"existential time." Creativity c omes from the depths; it is 
a vertical brea k-through from the s p iritual. But this inner 
experience · may be exteri orized, objectivized, g iven sur.face 
or ·horizontal expression in historical time. Cf. SF, 26lf .• 
52. FS, 317 • 
53. FS, 330. 
54. FS, 342. 
55. FS, 331. 
56 . FS, 331. 
57. FS, 342. 
lamentable restriction. The Church has ontological signifi-
cance in being "nothing less than the cosmos Christianized."58 
Christianity "as the relig ion which illuminates and trans-
figures the world enables us to recognize that the creativ.e 
life of humanity really belongs to the Church." 59 
Thus man has a creative role .to play in,_ the cosmic 
process. As Christ was the manifestation_ of the God- :Man, 
as Christianity is the religion of God-humanity, so "in the 
Churcb. also two natures are united in one organism, namely, 
God and humanity. • • • Human _ freedom and act i v.i ty operate 
within it as well as the grace of God."60 The Church. is 
a dynamic creative process which though it belongs to the 
spiritual order is placed within the natural order which it 
is ca lled upon to transfigure.61 
The Church is not manifested and revealed in all the 
fulness of its being and does not realize all the possi-
bilities contained within itself. Its complete actu-
alization .. and incarnation .will mean _ the transfiguration 
of the cosmos, the coming6~f a new world, the setting up of the Kingdom of God. 
58. FS, 331~ 
59. FS, 343. 
60. FS, 339. 
6la F'S, 337f. Cf. W. NorJ11.an .Pitteng-er's essay, "The 
Christian Hope of a Transfigured World • 11 He writes in _ 9art,; 
"In a very real and vital sense the full and proper mea ning 
of 'Church' is the redeemed and transformed cosmos~ from the 
lowest material elements up to the ang els and archangels. • 
•• The main stream of historic Christianity has· never been_ 
content with a p icture of our relig ion ._ v;hich confined sal-
vation to man himself and excluded the natura l world, nor 
with a notion of redempt .ion .vlhich was so narrowly interested 
in_ making life here and now a meaningful reality that it 
forgot ma n's ultimate destiny 'beyond the flaming ramparts 
of space and time.'" Art.(l946), 73. 
- 62. FS , 334. This would seem to be an idea l of 
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D. Levels of Et h ical Behavior . T~is vision of a 
co smos Chr i s tianized l eads directly to the task of creative 
a ctivity or to "The Et h ics of Crea tiveness. " But before 
c onsidering this, two lower levels of eth ical behavior 
should be noted. 
1. Legal. :Man 's t a sk is not, fulfill ed in "The Ethics 
of Law ." 63 Orig inating in t he dua lism of g ood a nd evil, 64 
it cannot over.c orne sin . a nd ev.i 1 but merely denounces them. 65 
It is grounded in v eng ea nce, a n element of which is still 
~perative in t he modern Christian world. 66 It is pr i mari l y. 
a n expression of . herd mora lit y and lea ves out_ of a ccount t he 
cr.eativ.e human personality.?7 Its va lue and inadequacy are 
suggested in a concluding citat.ion. 
progress, but as Berdyaev puts - i t: "For Christian thoug ht 
the primary ideal is not tha t of progress or development, 
but of ill:Umination a nd transfiguration."(FS , 315) Dev.elop-
ment is- a surfa ce ma nifestati on, a purely secondary ex-
pre ss ion of a n inner spiritua l ex·perience •. The t endency in 
h i st ory has too often been to rega r d the surface manifes-
tation as ' the end-all and to halt the dynamic, cr_eat iv.e 
proc ess . It is neces sa ry to rememb er tha t "the Churc h a s 
a ctualiz:ed and incarnate in h istory d oes not . constitute its 
wh ol e unfathomahle depth and fulness; for. its infinity lies 
bey ond its bounda ries. It ,. is i mp oss'i..ble to imprison the. 
infinite i n the finite."(FS , 335) But instead we find "the 
identification of the IUng d om of God and the life of t h e 
Church in its historic earthly_ dest.iny. The Kingdom of God 
takes shape and is organized and a ctua lized in the li fe of 
th e Church. The histori c consciousness stifl~s t he eschato-
logi cal. The Kingd om. of God is no longer_ sought for. nor. 
expected as a miraculous transfig urat:ion of the world to be 
accomplished at· the end of time. !'(FS , 353f.) 
63. DM, 109-132. 
64. DM, 109. 
65. DM, llOf. 
66. DM, ll4f. 
67. DM, 118. 
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The law does not know the c oncrete, unique, liv.tng 
personality or penetrate into its inner life, but. it_ 
preserves that persona lity fro m interference and v.io-
lence on the part, of others, whatever their spiri tua.l 
condition may be. Therein lies the great . and et.ernal 
value of law a6:o.d justice. Christianity is bound to recognize it. b 
2. Redemptive. Nor do "The Ethics of Redempt_ion" 69 
bring about full salvation. This ethic is · to be contrast.ed 
with the impersonal .norms of the. ethics' of the law in that ~ 
it is concerned with the value of each personality • .7° It is 
characterized by pity, , love, forg iv.enesB; and by freedom 
from harshness, compulsion, effort. 11 To he strict .with 
oneself and kind to others--this is the truly Christian 
a ttitude."71 Nietzsche's criticism of the humility of 
Christian morality was justily directed against a decadent., 
bourgeois Christianity.72 Christian morality is rather to 
be seen as "a manifestation of s piritual power in the con-
quest .of self-hood" in showing us how to be free from the 
external world .. 73 Again the shortcoming of this ethic and 
68. DM, 130. Cf. Niebuhr for a statement of Jesus' 
critic ism of legalism. It is ·' defined as 11 a kind o.f arnested 
and atrophied religion of history .. " CNDM, . II, 39) Three 
indictments of it are made: 11 No law can do justice to the 
freedom of man in history •••• No law can do justice to 
the complexities of motive which express themselves in the 
labyrinthine depth·s · of man '-s · interior life •••• law cannot 
restrain evil; for the freedom of man is such tha t - he ca n . 
make the keeping of the law the instrument of ev.il •. 11 (NDM, 
II, 40) -
69. DM, 133..;.161 •. 
70. DM, 136ff. 
71. DM, 144. 
72. DM, 147. 
73. DM, , 148f. 
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the trans-ition to the next is .indicated in. the following 
citation .. 
The Gospel appeals to the inner, spiritual man_a nd not 
to the outer man, a member. of society • . It calls not _ 
for external works in the socia l world but for the 
avmkening and regeneration of the spiritual· life, for 
a new birth tha t is to bring us into the Kingdom of 
God • . The Gospel is addressed to the eternal principle 
in the huma n soul independent of historical epochs and 
social changes •••• . It is left to man himself in his 
freedom to find a creative solution to the problems 
that continually confront ._, him. The Gospel is concerned 
not so much with teaching tis how to solve them as with 
healing and regenerating the texture of the human soul.74 
3. Creat.iv,e. 11 The Ethics of Creativeness 11 75 differ_s 
from the ethics of law in that. every moral task is seen as 
absolutely individual and creative ,!6 and from t he ethi cs. 
of redemption in that it is concerned with va lues rather 
than with sa lvation.77 Creativ.eness 11 presupposes, first, . 
man's primary, me onic, uncrea ted fl'aedom; secondly, the 
gifts bestowed upon man the creator. by God the Creator, and, 
thirdly, the world as the: field for his activ.ity. 11 78 God 
expects of man an answer to His call to create • . Creativeness 
first takes place as man confronts God in the act of 
74. DM, 159, 161. Cf. Tillich'~ broader conception 
of salvation: "While the Chri st ian churches in_the Catholic 
period dealt with the s Alvation of individuals and with the 
salvation of groups and institutions· only with respect to 
the church itself, and in Protestantism the salvation of 
groups and institutions is neglected altogether, the post-
Protestant period of Christianity probahly . will deal pre-
dominantly with the ultimat'e meaning1and the salvation of groups a nd 1ns_ti tuti ons. ~· Art. ( 1938) , 121. 
75. DM, 162-196. 
76. DM, 170 • . 
77. DM, 171. 
78. DM, 163. 
192 
contemplation. "The human soul rises upwards, ascends to 
God, wins for it s elf the gift s of the Hol~ Spirit and 
strives for spiritual arist ocra tism.'• 79 This is' the primary, 
inner aspe ~t of creativeness'~ giving rise to the ins p i ra tion 
and intuition of geniu.s. 80 
But it also descends into the sinful world, shares 
the fate of the wo~ld and of othe~ men, strives to 
help 1 ts b rothers a nd gives them the spiritual energy 
a cquired in the upward mov ement , of the soul. en 
This is the secondary~ oute~ aspect of creativeness as man 
seeks in dem ocra tic love to realize the intuition. and in~ 
spiration gained in his aristocratic contempl a tion.82 
79. DM, 195. 
80. DM, 165. 
81. DM, 195. 
82. DM, 165, 195. Cf. Toynbee, SH (abridged edition), 
Chapter XI, ''An Analysis of Growth." He dismiss-es both t he 
v.iew that society is "an aggregate of atomic individuals_~~ 
and the alterna tive conception t ha t sees "man_as simply a 
part. of a social whole,"(SH, 209) and concludes tha t _ 11 a 
society ••• is a product of the relations between indi-
viduals, and these relations of t he ir~ arise from the coinci-
dence of th e ir. individual fields of action. . This coincidence 
combines the individual fie l ds, into . a commDn . ground,, and 
this c omm on g round is wh~t we ca ll a society .... . . Society 
is a 'field of action~ but the source of all action is in . 
the. individuals composing i t ."(SH, 211) He quotes at s ome 
length from Bergson, Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la 
Relig ion, who points out tha t social .. progress does not t ake 
p lace in any autom~tic f a shion but "is really a leap forvmrd 
which is only t aken when the society has made up its mind to 
try an experiment; this me ans that the society must have 
allowed itself to be convinced, or at any rate a llowe d it:-
self to be shaken; · and the shake is always· g iven. by some-
bo dy."(DSMR, 333; cited in SH , 212) Such . privlleg ed souls 
are rare and superhuman. 11 The apparition of ea ch. of these 
souls · has been like the creation of a new species composed 
of one uniq ue individual. 11 (DSIVIR , 96; c i t .ed in SH, 212) By 
reason of the ir inward spiritual development such persons 
are able to perform seeming miracles: in the societies to 
whi ch. they belong. Bergson, like Berdyaev, holds that i t is 
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Creativ-.1ty may be a path to moral and religiol.ls per-
fection as it realizes the fullness of life, or it may be 
distorted and perverted by sin and lead to evil.83 The 
"the mys tics who are the superhuman creators par excellence, 
and he finds the essence of the creative act in the supreme 
moment of the mystical experience."(SH, 212) Both agree 
that the mystic's experience is not the end-all, . bl.li;, as 
Bergson puts it: "His desire is with God's help to complete 
the creation of the human , species."(DSIV1R, . 223; cited in SH , 
212) Toynbee,. Bergs on, and Berdyaev: agree on the factor_ of 
resistance that .. the crea tive persona lity is apt to encounter 
in the mass of men. All three are essentially s piritual 
aristocrats. Toynbee speaks for Berdyaev when he states 
that "all acts of social creation .are the work either of 
individual creators or, at most, of crea.tiv.e minorities; and 
at each successive advance the great majority of the memberE 
of s ociety are left .behind." (SH, 21L!.) Bergs-on sees the un-
creative majority being led to. follow the creativ.e minority's 
lead either by drill or by mysticism. (DSMR, 98f.; cited in 
SH, 215f.) Toynbee holds that ., the latter method, while 
ideal, "has always ·· had to be reinforced by the practical 
method of wholesale social drill."(SH, 216) Berdr.aev criti-
cizes the course that: church history. has· taken.: 'Christi-
anity in the course of centuries of objectification ha~ 
hardened into a collectiv.e, hereditary, _and national 
religion under the exclusive controL_ of the priesthood, with 
the result that ·the prophetic spirit has been_ quenched to 
such an. extent that it is a ctually rege;rded as heretica l." 
(FS, 360) He declares that "the whD l .e futur_e of Christianity 
and the possibility of its renaissance depends· on whether 
prophetism .will or will not be recognized and revealed with-
in it."(FS, 360) He concludes that "though the prophetic 
spirit has for. a time functioned outside the visible church 
that the hour is at .hand when this spirit .,will be recognized 
as belonging to the Church_, and e.s having its origin within 
it."(FS, 361) 
The latter ·part of Toynbee's - chapter. contains an . 
amazing list of individual'.s and area ti ve, minorities who 
underwent·. the experience of "wi thdrawal-and-return. 11 Cf. 
also, Hoclring 's discussion of the " principle of alternation11 
in his MGHE, Chap. XXVIII, a nd TP, Chap. XXXVI. 
83. DM, . l69f. Cf. Tillich's · conception of the " de-
monic11 as "that destructive, blind, chaotic element which 
is implied in all p owerful creat ing movements_ and drives · 
them toward final dissolution. " Art.(l938)1, 117. 
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latter is an all-too-real possi.bili ty since "cr.eativ.e genius- is 
n ot correlative · to moral perfection." 84 Hence crea tiveness_ 
needs purification. This will not be gained by a purely 
negative asceticism, but by giving the primary vital energy 
a. spiritual direction. 85 This transfiguration may he ac-
complished through love. "Love is ••• the universa l vital 
energy capable of converting evil passions into crea t~iv.e 
86 forces." In this connection a ppears tb.e paradox that 
satisfaction is felt not by tb.ose who take and ma ke 
demands but .by those who give a nd· ma ke sa cPifices. 
In them alone t b.e energy of life does not fail, a nd 
t l1 is is precisely what is mea nt by crea tiveness. There-
fore the positive mystery of life is· to be found in 
love, in_sacrificial, giving, creative love •••• 
The ethics of creativeness is the hSghest and most 
mature form of moral consciousness. "l 
So much _ for man's present _duty which Berdyaev: elabo-
rates in some detai1. 88 How is this attitude applied to t he 
ultimate problems of eschatology? 
~ . Last Tb.ings. 1. Death and Immortality. In dea ling 
with " Death a nd Immortality" 89 Berdyaev criticizes the usual 
appr oach which puts the stress upon the latter and larg_e ly 
ignores the former. The problem of death is seen as of 
84. DM, 167. 
85. DM, 177. 
86. Dlvi , 178. 
87. DM, 180f. Cf. Niebuhr, . J:IDM, II, passim, for his 
treatment _ of aga pe , sacrificial love, which was revealed in 
Christ UDon the cross and which accepted by man as- a norm of 
life will bring about the experience of a new selfhood . 
88. DM 197-314. In the lengthy cha pter on "Concrete 
Problems of Ethics" Berdyaev does some of his finest writing 
in comba tting much of the smugness of conventional morality. 
89. DM, 317-337• 
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prim13: ry sie;nificance, that ' of immorta lity as of secondary . 
Life ha s mea ning only in terms of its end~ 11 If tbere were 
no end, i.e. if life in our world continued for ever. , ther.e 
would be no meaning to it."9° Aga in, , "The meaning of death 
is tha t . tb.ere can b e no eternity in time a n d that. an. endless 
temp oral ser.ies wo uld be meaningless. u9l To regard t b. is 
world as self-sufficient is e quivalent to denying its mean-
ing, beca use within this world everything is tra nsitory and 
corruptible. Death can .g ive meaning to this since it 
"prov.es to be the only way out of tl1e 'bad time' ·into 
eternit¥; immorta l and eterne.l life prove to be only at t a in-
abl-e . through dea th .• u92 
But, though death thu s has p ositive significance, it 
is also the most terrible a nd only evil. 
90. DM, 317. 
91. DM, 319. Italics in_ the orig inal. 
92. DM, 318. Of. supra , Chap. III, for distinction 
between " g ood" and "bad" time. Of . Knudson for a rejection 
of the emphasis on quantitative conce ptions: of t he eternal 
life a nd a stress on the qualitativ.e aspect. "Kant was 
right in hold ing that immorta lity denotes the continuation. 
of consc·ious existenc.e aft er death. But he was mistaken in 
so f a r as he l a i d exclusive s tr.e s s on the fa ct ~ of this 
continuation or . on the endlessness of it • . An inf.init ely 
pro longed life would not .. be 1 eterna l _life 1 in the b.iblical 
and Christian sense of the term. . Ov.er and above its endless 
prolongation_ eterna l life has a d istinct _ qua li t ·y of its 
own •••• It means, to be sure, continued conscious ex-
istence after dea th, it mea ns. also continued growth; but in. 
its essential nature it means something more. It means a 
.uniq ue q ua lity of life , a qua lity of which we hav.e a fore-
taste in the higher r a nges of our present relig ious experi-
ence a nd to· wh ich the New Testament often refers either _ as 
'life ' by .wa y of contrast with s piritua l dea th or as 
' eternal life.'" (DR, 480, 482) 
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Death resists God's crea tion of the world and is a re-
turn . to the orig inal .non-be ing. Death wants to free 
the creature by bring ing it .ba ck to primeval freedom 
that . preceded the creation of the world. There is · but 
one way out for the crea ture .which in its sin resists 
God's conception of it--death .93 
Th.e man who l"enounces the image a nd resemblance. of G-od has 
only one issue--death . From this there follows Berdyaev's 
-
formulation _of "the fundamenta l pr inciple of ethics •• . •-
act so as to conquer death and af firm everywhere, in every-
t hing and in . relation to all, eternal and i mmorta l . life."94 
The struggle against death has taken. a variety of 
form s :. One ha s- been to affirm the natura l immorta lity of 
the soul as derived from its· substantiality_.. This Berdyaev 
rejects as rationa listie ·, abstract,. a nd academic, ~nd con-
eludes with his own positive affirmation. 
Th.ere is no such thing as immortality of . man as a 
natural being •••• In this v.r orld man is a morta l 
being . 'But he is conscious of the Divine image a nd 
. likeness in·. him and feels that he belong s not only to 
the natural but to the s piritual world as well. ljja.n_ 
regards himself, therefore, as helonging to eternity_, 
and yearns for eternity. ~.:vhat is ete,rnal and i mmortal 
in man is not the psychical or physic.al element. a·s such 
but the spiritual element which, ! acting in the - other · 
two, . constitutes personality and ·rea lizes, the image and 
likeness of God. N'J.Bn is immorta l and eternal· as a 
spiritual being belonging to the incorruptible world, , 
but his spirituality is not a naturally given fa.ct; · man 
is a spiritual being in so far as he manifests= himself 
as such, in . so far as the spirit . in .him gains· possessio~ 
of th.e natural elements •. Wholeness and unity result 
from the work of the spirit - in the psychic and bodily 
elements and constitute pers,onali ty. But the natural 
individual as such is · not yet "a personality, and 
93. DM, 321. 
94. DM, 322. 
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i mmortality is not characteri stic of h im • . Natu~al 
immortality belongs to the species or to the race but 
not to the individual • . I mm ortality has to be won by 
the person and involves struggle for pers·onality.95 
The impers onal i mmortality of ab-solute idea lism, of: , 
ma teria lism, . a nd of positivism all i gnore the persona l in 
sacrificing it to the idea, the value, the world s pirit, 
world reason, or to the species, the race, or onc 01:1 ing 
genera tions • . Stoicism and Buddhism. are commended for their 
emotional a ttitude toward death but are censored for their 
inadequacy to do anything a bout it. The Hebrews were no~ 
familiar with the idea of persona l i mmorta lity and only 
l a t e did they dissociate the personal from its involvement 
in the c ollective, racial life . The Greeks in the teachi ng s 
of the Mysteries, the Orphics, and Plato dev.eloped the con-
ception that· immorta lity belongs to the divine element of 
the soul, and t hat a s this is freed from the power of matt . er 
man becomes immortal • . It is only Christianity tha t 
teaches of resurrectlon, of the victory over death for 
every life, . for all t he created world, and i llithis it 
is infinitely superior to the Greek concept ion of im-
morta lity ·wh ich dooms a cQnsiderable part . of the . world 
to death and c orruption.96 
The soul of man, as the ima ge a nd likeness of God, 
arises in the eternal s pir1 tual world where "there g oes on 
a struggle for pers ·onality; for the realization of God's· 
idea . 11 
95. DM, 324f. 
96. DM, 328. 
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Our natural earthly life is but _a moment in the pr ocess 
which takes_ place in the spiritual world. • • • Our 
natu:al world is -the arena of the struggle for eternity 
and lmmortality, i.e • . of the strugg le fo1~ personality •. 
In this struggle the spirit must ga in possessio~ of the 
natural elements of th97s oul and body for their eternal life and resurrection. _' 
Eternal and immortal life is possible for man because Christ 
rose from the dead and conquered the _ deadly powers of the 
world. Death is conquered not by any conceptiom of the 
natural immortality of the soul butby supernatu~a l forces. 
How is eternal _and immorta l life to .be conceiv.ed? 
Objecti vi zed and naturalized it ,_ may be envisaged as life in _ 
the world beyond which is ent ered after _ death.. How ever, 
regarded from withinandnot object1fied, . 11 it is a s piritual 
life, in which eternity is attained while -~till in time. u98 
In f a ct, Berdyaev goes s o far a~ to say : 
If man's existence were wholly taken_ up into the spirit 
and transmuted int o spiri tua 1 life so that the s:piri tual 
principle gained final possession of the natural ele-
ments of the body and the soul, ,_ death as a na tural fact_ 
would not take place at all. . The transition t o eternity 
would be accomplished without th~~ event which ex-
ternally appears to us as death~ 
such is f a r, however, from a ctually, being the case .. 
Mankind and the world have gone too far_ in _ the pathway of 
evil, , and judgment has come upon them as we are constantly 
being made aware by the fact that not .only indiv-idual man, 
but also races, civilizations, mankind as a whole, all the 
97. DM, 328. 
98. DM, 332f. 
99. DM, 333.• 
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world and created things are mortal. "Dee. th comes to all 
life whi ch does not fulfil the divine meaning and t he 
d ivine truth." 100 
Wha t is the role of man in this· situation?. Man _ must 
forsake the creation . of temporary, transit.ory, and corr_upt-
ible go ods a nd values whi ch merely enable him to forget 
death and· the end, and he must devote himself to the ere-
ation of eternal, , perma nent, and. immortal g oods and v.alues 
which further the victory of eternity and prepare man for.. 
the end • . Passive waiting is disparaged, and active struggle 
agains t the forces of evi l a n d crea tive ·preparation of our-
se lves a nd mankind for the end urged • . 
100. Divi , 334. Of. Spengler: "Impermanence, the 
birth a n d the pa ssing, . is the form of all that is actual--
from the stars, whose destiny is for us incalculable, rig ht 
down to the ephemeral concourses on our planet. The life 
of the individual--whether this be anima l or plant or man--
is as perishable as that of peoples or ' Cultures. Every 
creation. is foredoomed to decay, , every thought, ever.y dis -
cov ery , every deed to obliviorr .. "( MT, 13f • . ) This is a good 
statement . of Spengler 's naturalism • . Berdyaev would agree 
with the general point .of vi ew but would understa nd it in. 
terms of another world outlook. 
For Hege l each historica l manifestation or phenomenon 
is a partial and therefore · ina dequate d isclosure of the I dea 
of Spirit and is subject to the process of sublation. 11 The 
life of a people ripens a certain fruit •••• But this 
fruit • . •• becomes a poison-draught to it •••• The taste 
of t ha t dr a ught is its anni hi l a tion, t hough a t the same time 
the rise of a new pr'lnciple)." An impersona l type of i nmor-
tality is a llowed for . " Nothing in the pas t is lost for it, 
for the I dea is ever pres ent; Spirit is immortal; with it 
there is no past, no future, but a n essential ll.QY!.• ••• The 
present form of Spirit comprehends within. it all earlier. 
steps ."(PH, 82 ) This impersonalism is criticized by 
Berdyaev in SF , 255f . a nd SR , 46f. 
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We must . not pas s iv ely wa it for t he Kingd om of Chr i s t 
any J;ll.Or e than for tha t . of the a ntichri s t, but must ' 
a ctively and creatively struggle against t he l a tt er 
a n d preBa re fo r th e King dom of God which is t aken by fo r ce.l 1 · 
2. Hell. Not death but hell presents t he fina l t ask 
for ethics · •. This idea is para doxical since th e admis s ion 
of it s rea lity is mora lly revolting while its denia l is 
eth ically superficia l. Berdya ev s oives this pa radox with 
t he c onception that ·. 
Hell is the mora l postula te of man's spiritua l f r e ed om. 
Hell is necessa ry not to ensure the triumph of jus tice 
a nd retribution to the wicked, but .. to sav.e man fr om 
being forced to be g ood and compulsorily installe d in 
heaven. In a certain sense ma n has a mora l .right to 
hell--the right freely to pref er hell to hea~en~l02 
101. DM, 335. Wa lter Marsha ll Hort-o n has clever ly 
c ontra sted Anglo-Saxon and Continental theolog ies by point-
ing out that while t he proponents of the former, in . the 
spirit of humanistic a ctivism, were 'singing, 
Rise up, 0 men of God, 
His Kingdom t a rries long, 
Bring in the day of brotherhood, 
And end the night of wrong, 
it s eemed as though the supporter s of the latter, in t he 
mood of nee-orth odox quiet~sm, were hymning, 
Sit down, 0 men of God, 
His Kingdom He will bring, 
Whenever it ma y pleas·e His will; 
You cannot do a t h ing. ( CCT, xv.i) 
While not agreeing a bsolutely_ with either ca mp B.erdya ev, by 
his concern with activism and humanism,. is more closely 
rela ted to t he former. 
102. DM, 339f. Cf. Pi tt.eng er . who, defining hell. as 
"the absence · of God," vrri tes: "Hell is always a real and 
live possibility •••• If one be lieves in God ••• and at 
the same time believes in . man as a free and res ponsible 
moral a gent, the possibility of willful alienation from God 
an d persistence in tha t .. alien.ation is a required possibi.lity. 
Further, if God be love in its profoundest depth and at the 
sa me time the respecter. of my moral freedom, He could never 
fo r ce me to love Him; he could only win me to Him by love, 
andi could always decline His solicitations.~' Art.(l946), 
74f . 
801 
What is hell? Seen from the divine point of view· a s 
an objective reality it is incomprehens ible, ina dm i ssible , 
revolting , intolerable, a nd incompatible with f a ith in 
God . 103 Berdyaev. g ives a n int ere sting history of the idea 
f I 11 104 " t ' G k o ne -• .umong ne · r .ee s Ha des was not ass ociat .ed with 
the idea of punitive justice, but as the subterra nea n realm 
of shad ows a nd semi-existence it was the sad destiny· of al l 
mortals • . There was no salvation, a nd man continued on_ 
neither in eternity nor completely dea d • . A second conception 
was c onnected with the religious, a nd moral dua lism tha t 
a ppeared in Persian thought and was es pecially developed in ~ 
Tanicheism . Both Hebrew eschatology and Christian notions 
of t he devil and his kingdom were influenced by Per.sian 
sources. Here developed the notion of hell as "the triumph 
of retributive jus tice reserved for the wicked afte~ the 
salva tion of the g ood has been .ma de ma n1fest." 105 Hell as 
an objective ab ode was l a rgely created by the "good" for the 
Tillich p oints out tha t the realization of meaning i n 
history proceeds through freedom a nd decision, and that "a 
fall into a demonic rather _than ••• a rise into a divine 
fulfillment" is possible. The dec ision for fulfillment can:-
not be enforced since "fulfillment without freedom belongs 
to na ture, not to history a t .a ll. ~eaning ce.n be contradicted 
as long as history is g oing on. Salvation. can _ be accepted 
or can be denied. We ca n exclude ourselves from meaning 
· and no purgatory or hell ca n cha nge this decision; · or, more 
exactly purgatory and hell themselves are the decision 
a gainst ultimate meani ng. "(IH, 282f.) 
103. Cf. the criterion of Dr • . Lowstuter of Boston 
University School of Theology for judg ing the adequacy of. 
any theological cone ept ion: 11 Wl'1a t .. will it do to the 
chara cter of God ? 11 
104. DM, 344ff. 
105. D ·Jl , 345. 
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"wicked. 11 This was primarily a Weste rn development in . 
which Augustine, Aquinas, . and Dante were particularly in-
fluential. Of this deyelopment Berdyaev concludes: 
This separation of the fate of the 'good' from the 
fate of the 'wicked' and the final judgment passed by 
the g ood over the wicked is the greatest perversion of 
a morality generally _ acknowl!3dged to be lofty. It is 
a mistake to imag ine that hell as· punishment. and 
retribution endured for. ever in some objective realm 
of Being is the result ·, of Divine judgment. This is 
the invention of those who consider . themselves 
'good. •106 
But hell _ seen from the hume.n point of v.iew as a sub-
jective reality is c.omprehensible • . It is a part of human 
experience known to all men _ in . varying degrees. The empiri-
cal content for tha t which is symbolized by hell is clearly 
stated: "The experience of hell means complete self-
centredness; , inability to enter into obj ectiv.e - being, self-
absorption to which eternity is closed a nd nothing but a 
bad infinity left.ul07 "Hell is the state of the soul 
powerless to come out of itself, abs ·olute self-centredness, 
dark and evil isolation, i.e. final ina bility to lov e ." 108 
As Berdyaev puts it: "There niay be a psychology of he ll, 
b ut ttlere ca n be no ontology of it." 109 As the "greatest 
106. DM, .350. 
107.. DM, 341. The phrase "bad infinity" is quoted 
from Hegel ( cf. iVIH , 68) who defines· it as "endless pro-
gre ssion11 in which "the same thing is constantly recurring, 11 
a n d g oes on to remark: "This is but superficial alt_ernation, 
which never leaves the region of the finite behind .u "The 
rea l infinite •••• cons ists in . being at h ome with itself 
in its other, or, if enunciated as a process·, in coming to 
itself in its other."(LOG, 175) 
108. DM, 351. 
109. m,T, 355. 
psyc.h:olog ical subjective reality for the individual," it is 
due not to God's: objective justice; but to man's· irra tiona l 
freedom. "Hell really means not tha t man f a lls into the 
hands of God but tha t he is finally abandoned to his own 
110 
devices." Hell is the experience of sepa ration. of man 
fr om God. And since man is only truly man to t he deg ree 
tha t he realizes the divine image a n d likeness:, v1 e may_ say 
the. t hell is the experienc·e of a "div-ided consciousne ss ," 
of a " d isintegrated pers onality." Its pains and torments 
are inflicted not by God but . by man himself who still 
re t a ins within his consciousness the divine image and li ke-
ness. Man's inability to escape. from himself a nd tbe re-
. sulting torment seems to him endless , . a nd from this exper i-
ence has developed the idea of an everlasting hell. 111 
Man may b e liberated from hell in one of t wo ways--
"either in . the victory of the complete consciousne ss-, the 
return to true being and t r a nsitionto eternity, or the 
final anniht lati on of the disint egrated c ons ciousness and 
transition . to utt·er non~being." 112 The former liberation·~ 
wh ic h is the pa thway of s a lva tion, can .be attained only_ by 
t he help of Christ. 
The coming of Christ is salvation from the hell which 
man prepares for h imself. The coming of Christ is the 
110. DM, 352. 
111. Cf. the review of Jean~Paul Sartre's play, · No 
Ex it in The Persona list, 28(1947), 326f., for a comparable 
C'Oi.1:Ception of hell by the leading exponent of Existentialism .•. 
- 112. DM, 343. 
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turning point for the soul wh ich begins to build u n t he 
Kingdom of God instead of building up hell. . Without 
Christ, , the Redeemer and Saviour, the Kingdom of God 
is unattainable for man • .Man's moral efforts do not 
bring him to it. If there is no Christ a nd no c hange 
of hea rt connected .with Chr ist, hell in one form or 
another_ is inevitable, for man . cannot help crea ting it:. 
The essence of salvation is liberation from hell to 
which the creature natura lly gravitates.ll3 ' 
The problem of salvation is how God can_ conquer the 
f a thomless freedom of the creature wbo ha s turn ed away f r om. 
God a nd ha tes Him. God's mercy a nd forg iv,eness is infin ite 
towa r d man, but since the meonic free d om was not crea ted by 
Him, He ca nnot attain a victory over_ it. Man cannot ga in. 
the victory since his freedom has turned into necessity •. 
"It is possible only for the God-Man Christ Who descend s 
i n to the abysmal .darkness of meonic freedom, and in Wh om 
there is perfect union a nd interaction. between the human a n d 
t he Div1ne." 114 
Man can participate in -. the task of delivering others· 
from the torments of hell, but only by "a very ra dica l 
113. DM, 352. Cf. Niebuhr who find s in . the confron-
t a tion of the self by God in Christ .a shattering of the old 
self. "The Christian. experience of the new life is a n, ex-
·oerience of a new selfP,ood. The new self is : more tr_uly a 
real self be cause the vici ous circle of self-centr.edness has 
been broken • . The self lives in and for others, in the 
general orientation of loyalty to, , a nd love of, God; who 
alone can do justice to the freedom of the self ove~ all 
partial interests' and values. This new self is the real 
self; for _ the self is infinitely self-transcendent .; and any 
premature centring of itself around itsc own int erests, 
individually or collectiv.ely, . destroys a nd corrupts its 
freedom."( NDM, II, 110) 
114. DM, 356 ~ 
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change in _moral actions CJ. nd valuations." 115 Instead of 
obj e ctivizing hell and relega ting all t he "wicked" to it, ; 
man must refuse. to create hell either for himself or for 
others, direct _ his moral will toward their . univ,ersal s a l-
vation, take upon himself the fate of the wicked, share 
their destiny a nd further their liheration. 116 
3. Paradise. The cosmic process starts with man 1 s 
ex ile from paradise. There in the orig inal paradi sa ical 
sta te man 1 s ·conditi on wa s one of innoc ence a nd wholeness. 
Had it not been for free dom t h is blissful existence would 
hav..e g one on _ forever. . But t h is orig ina l _paradise would_ 
have been a compuls-ory_ one since in it freedom was unkrwwn .. 
However, "God will ed th~ fr e edom of the creatur_e and based 
His i dea of creation . upon freedom" 117 thus allowing for the 
fall from para d ise. 
The Fall is a manifes t a tion a nd t r .i a l of man's freedom , 
a way out of the orig inal, pre-conscious, natural para -
di se in which s p iritua l freedom wa s a s yet unknown, and 
at the same time the Fall is the loss of freedom and 
subjection to t he lower natural elements. This was 
when the knot ·of the cosmic life was tied. The Fall 
nroved to be necessa ry, since freedom was necessary for 
t h e realization of the higher meaning of crea tion •••• 
The Fa ll is a violation of Meaning and a falling away 
from it, and y e t we must recognize meaning in . t he Fall, 
the meaning of transition _from the orig i na l paradise 
in which fr e edom is unknown to a paradise in which 
there is knowledge of freedom.ll8 
115. DM, 357 • 
116. Divi, 356f f. 
117. DM, 362. 
118. DM, 362. 
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Man cannot return to the origina l paradisa ica l sta.te, 
but "faithful to the i dea of ' man ' " he must trea d the way of 
knowledge , follow the path of t ragedy and herotsm, a nd thus 
reach pa radise ttlroug h human creativeness. The paradise a t 
the end is not the same as the pa radise at the b-eginning. 
W~ now have a full revelation of man's vocation and i dea as 
ove r aga inst a non-awa reness of man's creative v.ocation_ a nd 
non-reali zation of the highest idea of man; we now hawe a 
s p iritual in the place of a n a tural pa r adise; we now hav,e 
t he King dom of Christ as contra st ed with the l a ck of a 
knowledge of Christ .119 
Hovv" is paradiE_~e to he thought of? Not _ in. mora l terms 
a s the triumph of the "g ood 11 sinc e it is b eyond g ood and 
evil , a nd to think of it in such terms is to transfer 
earthly categ ories to the heavenly realm.l2 0 In . fact, al l 
attempts' to think of paradise in positive terms. leads to 
contradicti on as, -e-g. our efforts to describe it as per-
fectipn, fullness, a nd wholenes s r e sults in men imag ining 
tha t it will b e dull, . monotonous, fixed, a nd uncha ngeable •121 
Thus 
paradise in our time, on ea rth, would be t h e end of the 
creative process of life, of infinit e striving , , a nd 
cons equently vrould me a n boredom • . But people ha ve 
managed to as cribe the same character to t he heav.enly 
life in the world beyond. We think in time and proj e ct 
parad ise into the future; hence it appears to us. as a 
119. DM, 362f. 
120. DM , 364. 
121. DM, 365f. 
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standsti ll, as the cessa tion of infinite striving , 
movement , a nd crea tiv enes s , a s t he atta inment of com-
plete sati sfa ction. It is a s tbough in hea v.en. there 
wou l d be no more freedom. • • • But paradise i s not 
in . the future, is not ln , time , but in eternity. 
l:!:ternity is attained in . the act ua l moment, it comes in 
the present~-not in the pr esent which is a part of the 
br oken up time, . but in the present .whicl1 is an escape 
from time. ,, ternity is not a cessation of movement-
and of creative life; it is creative life of a differ-
ent order •••• We must t h i nk of paradise a s: conta in-
ing not l ess but mor e life t han our s inful world, not_ 
le ss but more movement •••• It is impossib le to 
t h ink of perfection as the absence .of crea tive dyna -
mism. In the perfect, . heavenly li fe t here is n o 
anxiety, care, longing and re stlessness born of tip~~ 
but t here is in it a creative movement of its own . 
Parad ise has usua lly been thought of either "in 
sensuous t erms on our earth a11d i n our time, 11 or it ha s been .. 
underst ood in terms· of transferring "everything into eterni-
ty, lea v.ing on t his side of it, in t i me, the non- divine 
world. 11123 Berdyaev so lv.es this para d ox with the ins i ght 
that "the King d om of God or e t ernity c omes not only a t the 
12 4 
end of time but at every moment. 11 • Thus eternity a nd t he 
Kingdom can be reached "through the depth of t he moment and 
throLJ.gh t he end of time a nd of the world." 125 
We t h ink of it a s the Heavenly Kingd om, but it is 
possible on earth too, for earth may a lso be regenera t ed 
and inherit e t ernity. ve ca nnot .draw a d ividing line 
betwe en that new earth a nd earth a s we know it. The 
idea of an ea rthly para dise is a utopia and a false 
h ope. But in a deeper sense we may think of heaven on 
earth ; we can enter et ernity, we can experience~~c­
stasy, contemplate God a nd have joy and ligh~.l~b 
122. DM, . 365f. 
123 • D ' , 3 67 • 
124. Dh , 367. 
125. D:M , 368. 
126. m,r, 368. For a treatment of the Ki ngd om. of God 
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The funda menta l problem of eschatolog ical ethics lies 
in the pa r a dox tha t .parad ise at t he beg inning of t he cosmic 
life ca nn ot be acc epted because fr eed om has not been t r i ed 
in it 1 a nd tha t para dise at the end of the c osmic li f e 
ca nn ot be acc epted beca use free dom ha s a lrea dy been tried 
a nd ha s g iven rise to evil. 127 How are evil and hell, wh ich 
seem to be the only new realiti es - revea led in the cosmic 
process, to be dealt with? This problem can be solved only 
by the conception of Christ the God~Man who "chang es ev.ery-
t h i ng .11 
The cross and the crucifixion enter into t he bliss of 
paradise. The Son of God and t he Son of ma n desc ends 
into hell to free t hose who suffer there •. The myst ery 
of t he cross - solves the c h i ef contradiction of par ad ise 
and freedom. To conquer evil the Good must crucify 
itself. The Good appears in a new as pect: it d oes n ot 
sugg estive in many places of Berdya ev, cf. the followi ng 
citation from Tillich: 11 The Kingdom of God is a dynamic 
conception. It designates the necessity tha t the ultimate 
mea ning of existence is never g iven; it acquires reality only 
in overcoming meaninglessness a nd the distortion of mea ning . 
' Ri ghteousness, peace and joy, 1 the characteristics of t he 
Kingdom, enclose a possible opposition ·which is overcome in 
t hem. It is not completed but always : becoming ; not present, 
neit her immanently nor transcendently, but .always ' a t hand.' 
It expresses that 'God is a living God, .' entering history, 
strugg ling in history, fulfilling history a nd is· not t he 
unity of et ernal essences. Therefore it is wrong to conceive 
the Kingdom of Goo merely as the restoration of the orig ina l 
order ·which ha s been destroyed by sin. We knov1 noth i ng of 
such an order. It is a n abstraction whose roots lie in a 
sta tic conception of transcendence. The Kingdom of God is, 
however, not a sy_ptem of eternal essentialities,, whose real-
ization was g iven in the creation, . was lost at . t he fall, and 
was regained in redemption. The Kingdom. of God is the 
dynamic fulfilment of t he ultimate meaning of existence 
a gainst the contradictions of existence.~' ll.rt.(l938)1, 118f. 
127. DM, 370. 
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condemn "the wicked" to eternal torments but suf fe r .s 
upon the cross. · The "g ood" do not relega te· t he "wicked" 
to hell a nd enjoy : thei r own triumph but ~~scend wit h 
Chri s t into hell in order to fre e them.~ ~ 
This implies another morality than that based upon 
t he idea of personal salvation, which Berdyaev castigates 
as a "minimum morality •. " ·Sa lvation involves my relations 
to all my fellows a nd to t he cosmos. 
Hence there ca n be no individual sa lva tion or salvation_ 
of t he elect. Crucifixion, pain and tragedy will g o 
on . in the world until a ll mankind and the whole v; or ld 
a re sa ved, . tra nsfigured and regenera t ed . . And i f it 
ca nnot be atta ined in _our world-aeon, there will be 
other aeons in which the world of s o. lva tion e.nd tra ns -
figuration will be continued. That work is not limited 
to our earthly life. My sa lva tion is bound up with 
t ha t not only of other men but a lso of a nima ls, pl ants, 
minerals, of every blade of grass--all must be trans -
fi gured and brought _ into the IUngd~m of God. .t\nd this 
depends upon _my crea tive efforts.l 9 
In t his light t he province of ethics becomes the 
whole world . The relig ious man is riot s imply t he saint and 
ascetic bent on_his own salvation but a lso tl1e genius, the 
p oet, the artist, . the sava nt, the r ef ormer, t he inventor--
i . e . th e creator in a ll realms of life. Crea.tion _is a 
s piritua l experienc e , has a de ci.sive mission, is expected by 
God, is capable of posi tive justifi cation at . the bar. of 
religion. Humanism, tbe glory of ma n, is not to be simply 
nega ted, but is to be transfigured into a God-humanism ex-
isting i n a Christianized cosmos. 13° 
12 8 • mv , 3 71. 
129 . DM, 372f. 
130. FS, 230; DA, 373. 
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Evil has p ositive mea ning in the fact tha t _the 
struggle against a nd victory over it results in 2 positive 
enrichment of life. The conquest of evil is seen in_ its 
t ransfigurationand redemption. Hence the last word of 
ethics is 11 theosis, deification, attained t hrough man's 
fre ed om and crea tiveness which enrich the divine life 
itself." 131 
131. DM, 377 • 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CRITICISM AND EVALUATION 
The appraisal of Berdyaev's philosophy of history to 
be essayed in this chapter will follow closely the general 
outline of the earlier expository chapters, and will largely 
consist of what might .be described as · a serie& of extended 
foot-notes to issues, problems, interpretations, and points 
of view therein noted. 
A. Epistemology. The chief negative result of 
Berdyaev's · epistemology is his criticism of rationalism, 
which result forms also the ground for some of the most ~ 
severe criticism directed against -him in turn. While not 
giving a specific definition of rationalism, Berdyaev. obvi-
ously takes it in an extreme form which is content to hy-
postatize or objectivize into absolutes: certain moments of 
the s piritual life and to regard these as the essence or 
fullness of reality.l This naturalistic approach with its 
doctrine of substances gives us a relative truth, but not 
one which can lay any claim to finality or absoluteness. 
Opposed to this conception, which tends increasingly to 
stress the objective to the neglect of the personal factor., 
Berdyaev-_·places the emphasis upon the knower, the person. 
In this stand Berdyaev .gains the support .of the 
personalist tradition. Thus Brightman takes 1ssue with 
1. Cf. supra, Chap. II, 25ff. 
Macintosh's description of Berdyaev as an "irrationalist, "2 
and more accurately classifies the Russian thinker. a-s "a 
practical truthseeker, an empirical rationalist. "3 Quoting 
Berdyaevv' s 11 clear and intelligible statement about exts.-
tentialism"--that "True integrality of thought, which is 
bound up with integrality of personality is:: an existential 
unity, not a loglcal"4--Brightman concludes·, 11 In other words, 
reason is a personal experience, not an abstraction. Hegel 
and Kierkegaard could both accept .. good sense like this ."5 
An earlier personalist, Borden P. Bowne, expresses in 
several passag_es notions comparable to those. of Berdyaev. 
Thus Bowne's tr.eatment of "the fallacy of the universal"6 
and· "the fallacy of abstraction, u7 which consist in "mi~taking 
class terms for thing?, and in ,identifying the processes: of 
our classifying thought with the processes of. reality, "8 
comes to a point quite comparable to that of Berdyaew when 
2. PRK, 35lff. In justice to ~~cintosh it should be 
noted that he is aware that Berdyaev cannot he classified 
with Barth, Brunner, et al. of the more -extreme neo-orthodox 
position; acknowledges that 11 in his various works there is 
much that is original, profound and fruitfully sugg_~sti ve, 
and that not least in his penetrating criticisms of extreme 
rat :t onalism and rationalistic liberalism;" and c_oncludes 
that "Berdyaev is still rational {logical) enough to draw 
from the indicated irrationalistic . doctrines, as premises~ 
some consistent .. conclusions for the philosophy of history 
and for eschatology. 11 
3. Art.{l944), 520. 
4. SF, 8. 
5. Art.{l944), 521. 
6. TTK, 244ff. 
7. TTK, 25lff. 
8. TTK, 244. 
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he concludes: "The root of these two fallacies, or of this 
one fallacy in both of its forms) is the failure to think 
concretely in concrete matter."9 
Again, Bowne writes much in the existential spirit 
of Berdyaev as he describes the limits of logic. 
There is always something deeper than thought; it is 
the thinking, living person. And there is something 
deeper in the person than formal thought; it is life 
and aspiration. Reality is not merely to be compre-
hended under logical forms·; it is also to be lived and 
enjoyed. We have seen that the understanding~ gives : 
only the form and not the content of existence. Hence 
the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious nature 
have always claimed to bring us nearer. to the life of 
being and its· true significanc.e than the understanding 
can _ever _ come. In the contemplation of . the beaut1ful, . 
in devotion to the good, and in .the service and worship 
of the perfect, we enter into the inmost life of 
reality, and become one with the universe. It is the 
gravest oversight on the part . of intellectualism to 
overlook all t~bs, and seek to reduce man to under~ 
standing only. 
In another citation Bowne rejects any deduction of 
existence from the logical categories holding, again like 
Berdyaev, that . existence is given in experience. 
Reason as a system of principles is · only a formal out-
line of possibility, and contains nothing specific and 
actual. The actual is found, not deduced; it is a 
fact of experience, not an implication _of reason.ll 
A final citation from Bowne suggests the prio~ity of 
man over logic. 
It has been one of the perennial shortcomings of in-
tellectualism that man has. been considered solely as 
9. TTK, 257. 
10. MET, 529f. 
11. TTK, 307. 
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an intellect or understanding; whereas he is a great 
deal more. ·Man is will, conscience, emotion, aspira-
tion; and these are far more powerful factors than the 
logical intellect. Life is richer, and deeper than 
speculation, and contains implicitly the principles by 
which .we live.I2 
In his treatment of the relations of philosophy to 
religion and science Berdyaev . writes with understanding. 
His championing of the uniqueness of philosophy and of the 
impossibility of reducing it to either of its traditional 
neighbors is well taken. Two problems of our own day as to 
· the status of philosophy receive illumination from Berdyaev.' s 
exposition. The first is the tendency in some circles to 
see philosophy as the successor to religion. The following 
is a typical ex:pression of such an outlook: 
The theological basis is gone from traditional Christi-
anity so that it is useless to preach a 'going back' 
to religion. It seems to me the function of philosophy 
today is to fill the vacuum left . by the collaps.e of 
the older theology, and to give a new purpose . to 
society.l3 
Perhaps we have not sufficient data as yet to know 
whether anything can take the place once filled by the 
traditional religious faith, or whether moral idealism can. 
stand alone without any religious buttr.essing. But for 
Berdyaev the answer is clear. His whole analysis of the 
history of western . civilization is a delineat~on L of the 
crisis of humanism--a portrayal of the tragedy which results 
12. KS ~ 66. 
13. Alfred M. Bingham, cited in Blandshard, et .al., 
PAE, 27. 
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from man's attempted self-sufficiency. Berdyaev is sympa-
thetic with the degraded role which philosophy has played 
as the hand-maid of theology and would in .no sense advocate 
a going back of philosophy to its captivity • . But philosophy 
can neither ignore nor isolate itself from the deliverances 
of religion. 
It is in vain also that philosophers strive to persuade 
themselves that a philosophy is possible which is 
absolutely free and independent . of all liviw religion 
and of every sort of connection with life.l4 
Berdyaev!s insistence that philosophy must consider the data 
of religion--though it need not necessarily accept religion's 
interpretation of that data--suggests a ground of compromise 
between positiv1stic philosophy and dogmatic theology that 
is much needed in many circles~. 
A second problem that has appeared increasingly on 
the contemporary philosophic scene is the debate as to 
whether philosophy has a subject .. matter ·of its own. Logical 
positivism has raised this issue in the past two decades· in 
such a fashion as to present philosophy with the dilemma of_ 
either talking_ "nonsense., or devoting itself to the ana:~ 
lyzing and clarifying of the propositions of sc.ienee. A 
recent expression indicates the basic attitude of this, 
school. 
Being substantially a positivist, with very little 
interest or belief in an.y kind of metaphysics or 
14. FS, 3· 
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theology, my own opinion is that the only substantial 
result of teaching philosophy must come from its 
indirect results on other subjects. It . is · a mode of 
clarifying thought and becoming, self-consc-ious about 
problems, and of becoming critical about solutions. 
Apart from the history of philosophy, therefore, I 
should ~e inclined to doubt ~whether philosophy has any 
subject-matter of its own at all.l:> 
Berdyaev' s indictment of the abEtractness and parti-
ality of the approach of this · modern "scientific ternorism," 
which under the guise of being a philosophy of s~ience 
would subject philosophy to a new enslavement, finds an echo 
in E.S. Brightman's censoring of this neo-positiv,ism as both 
"unempirical and ~nphilosophical."l6 
Nowhere is Berdyaev\' s essential personalism more ap-
parent than in·. his criticism of the objective, rational 
approach to reality as yielding only the general and im-
personal.17 One is reminded of certain of the results of 
the newer physics in increasing the emppasis which i ·s placed 
upon the statistical character of the laws of nature. 
Neither the b'eha vi or of the individual electron nor the 
individual person can be predicted with _certainty. Laws in 
bDth realms are statistical and are concernefrwith the be-
havior of the average. The resulting knowledge is general, . 
objective, and universal, but fails to give adequate insight 
into existence which is specific, sub'jecttve, and individual. 
15. G.H. Sa~ine, cited in Blanshard, ~tal., PAE, 27. 
16. POR, 5. 
17. Cf. supra, Chap. II, 30ff., esp. 32n. 
217 
Hence Berdyaev adopts in. his own positiv~ epistemology an . 
anthropological approach which concentrates upon the sub~ 
' jective, the concrete, and the particular, rather than 
stressing the objective, abs!trac.t ~ and. general. In. other 
words, Berdyaev . finds in personality the k.ey to reality. 
r~n is a part . of ultimate reality, and by a study of his 
inner being the clue to the me.aning of everything else can 
be discovered. 
The clue to meaning can best be found, Bardyaev be-
lieves, in man's historical existence. History can, of 
course, be viewed objectively as· a natural phenomenon. . But 
it can also be conceived as revelatory of inner reality. 
This Bsrdyaev proceeds to do when he regards history as a 
symbol representing the nature of ultimate rea lity. ~~n can. 
gain insight into this ultimate reality through the exercise 
of his ''historical· memory, 11 which is awakened to activity 
by the external stimulus of the historical myth found in 
religion. It is the myth of the Fall which Berdyaev. regards 
as expressive -of the deepest and ·most .central realit:i,es of 
the world. Thus, though Berdyaev l eads ph.ilosophy back to 
religion, it is not to a prison-house where philosophy is to 
resume its ancient role of hand-maiden. Though the religious 
myth supplies philosophy with a certain content of faith, 
philosophy is not bound to merely repeat the conventional, 
naturalistic, and lite.ral interpretations of such myth and 
tradition, but using it as a spring-board may by a 
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speculative process derive from it the deeper spiritual 
truths revelatory of the inner reality. Such a procedure 
is not one of which all men are capable, but only a few 
spiritual aristocrats or Christian theosophists of whom he 
regards Boehme as the greatest. 
What can be said of BerdyaevJ a use of mythology? In 
having recourse to mythology he has. the ancient authority 
of Plato on his side • . Plato falls back upon myth vYhen he is 
dealing with the moat important questions of life--questions 
for which a final conclusive logical answer. is impossible to 
attain. As Inge puts it: 
Plato attempts more than once a logical demonstration 
of God's existence and of its- correlate, the immortality 
of the .human soul. By common consent his arguments are 
not such as to carry conviction to so keen a thinker as 
Plato himself. And yet he is unquestionably a theist 
and a believer .. in human imm-ortality. His arguments 
have not had much effect; his personal conviction has 
carried immense weight • . It is in"myth that he prese~~s 
both ideas--a personal God and personal immortality. 
Plato, like Berdyaev, borrows his myths from the tra-
ditional religion of his day • . It is not certain as to what 
extent either thinker regards'. the myth as having an essential 
connection with historical fact. Plato on occasions seems 
to have been .unscrupulous in his use of such myths as . when 
in the Republic he advocates the telling of a "royal lie. 11 19 
However, in Plato's defense it might be said that there is 
an actual historical fact- - namely, that men do differ by 
18. Art.(l936), 141. 
19. REP, 414C. 
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endowment and ability and fitness for various tasks--at the 
root of the myth. 
Plato would seem to regard the myth as a device for 
projecting into the world of sense a reality but .. dimly seen 
by the soul and incapable of complete rational and logical 
justification. Thus Socrates remarks to Callicles: 11 These 
notions are strange enough, but they show the principle."20 
The use of such devices could perhaps ~ be justly condemned 
as old wives tales "1f by searching we could find out any-
thing better or truer. 1121 The obvious implication is that 
reason has reached the end of its tether- and that another 
way of knowing--the venture of faith--is justified. Thus at 
the conclusion of the Phaedo in which Plato relies heavily 
upon Orphic eschatology he writes: 
A man of sense ought not to say, nor will I be very 
confident,, that the description which I have given of 
the soul and her mansions is exactly true. But I do 
say, that, inasmuch as the soul is shown to be immortal, 
he may venture to think, not improperly or unworthily, 
that something of the kind is true. The venture is' a 
glorious one, and he ought to comfort himself with 
words like these, which is the reason why I lengthen 
out the tale.22 
We have noted earlier23 brief statements from . Inge 
and Reinhold Niebuhr, both of whom are in essential agree-
ment with Plato. Inge holds that poetry, symbol, and myth 
is the inevitable recourse of the mind when it communes with 
20. GOR, 4930. 
21. GOR, 527A. 
22. PHA, ll4E. 
23. Supra, Chap. II, 38n., 4ln., 42n. 
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the world of values. The world is not through and through 
penetrable to reason--reason is confronted with a given 
content which it must be satisfied to accept acknowledging 
that it has reached its limits. However, by means of the 
creative imagination man seeks further insight into the 
meaning of ultimate questions. Inge defines myth as 11 a 
sensible representation of a universal truth."24 Again, it 
is "a 'fact-like story' with a spiritual meaning." 25 The 
mystic does not create the myth but accepts those current 
in his own religion 
and turns them into allegories, dramatizations of the 
normal experience of the soul in its ascent to God. 
In this process they almost cease to be myths; thei~ 
factual historicity has no longer much impo~tance.2o 
Inge, as has been previously noted, believes that philosophy 
must "include within its scope the higher religion and 
mysticism although these can only express their aspirations 
and intuitions in imaginative and symbolicallanguage." 27 
The alternative is to be enslaved to natural science (pre-
cisely also the stress of Berdyaev) which is increasingly 
"a matter of pointer-readings and mathematical symbols ••• 
out of contact with reality."28 
Reinhold Niebuhr criticizes the too complete retreat 
that religion's modern supporters have made on _the subject 
24. Art.(l936), 132. 
25. Art.(l936), 133· 
26. Art.(l936), 137. 
27. Art.(l936), 144. 
28. Art.(l936), 144f. 
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of myth by rea son·. of the critic isms of science. 
Their errDr was to disavow permanent myth with primi-
tive myth. Religion had no right to insist on the 
scientific accuracy of its mythical heritage. From 
this position a retreat was necessary. That part . of 
mythology which is derived from pre-scientific thought, 
which does not understand the causal relationa in the 
natural and historical world, must .naturally be sacri-
ficed in a scientific age. But there is a permanent 
as well as a primitive myth in every great mythical 
heritage. This deals with aspects of rea lity wh~Qh 
are supra-scientific rather than pre-scientific. ~ 
Among the aspects of reality which can be stated only in 
mythical terms are the aspects of value and of depth. ]Jyth 
may offer . illumination to the facts of life and to the course 
of history by its affirmation that they have meaning, and 
that the source and fulfillment of that meaning lies beyond 
history. 
A still further example of the use of myth is 
furnished by the contemporary historian_ Toynbee. In dealing 
with the geneses of civilization he rejects as· inadequate 
the biological solution of an innate superior race, or the 
physical solution .of an environment that presented easy and 
comfortable conditions of life. Toynbee warns against the 
error of applying to historical thought, which is a 
study of living creatures;, a scientiflc method devised 
for the study of inanimate nature. In our final at-
tempt to solve the riddle let . us follow Plato's lead 
and try the alternative -course. Let us shut our eyes, 
for the moment, to the formulae of science in~ order 
to open our ears to the language of mythology.30 
And it is following a survey of the world's great myths 
29. Art.(l937), ll8f. 
30. SH (abridged edition), 60. 
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which furnish him his clue, that Toynbee concludes that 
man achieves civilization as the result of a response to a 
challenge in a situation of special diff"iculty which rouses 
him to make a hitherto unprecedented effort. 
We may conclude then that Berdyaev stands in a 
definite philosophical and religious tradition . stemming from 
Plato {and Aristotle31 ) that ;in;~ real value in the 
religious myth. All the thinkers in. this tradition have 
recourse to the myth as a result of the failure of reason 
to give insight into ultimate reality. All the thinkers 
likewise stress the necessity of. going beyond a naive 
realistic acceptance of the myth in an attempt to discover 
its inner meaning. 
Berdyaev may be classified as an empiricist if the 
much abused term "empirical" be used in its broad sense as 
including all conscious experience. He stresses the whole 
man as over against the merely intellectual, thus allowing 
for the voluntary and sentient sides of our nature. Ber.dyaev 
in his disparagement of reason is better classified as a 
non-rationalist than as an irrationalist. He does not so 
much fly i~ the face of reason, as he suggests its need for 
supplementation. In his stress upon the heart and conscience 
Berdyaev allies himself with the whole existential movement 
31. Thus from a fragment of one of his letters we 
read: "The more I find myself by myself and alone, the more 
I have become a lover of myth." (Cited . by Barker, Art. 
"Aristotle," EB, 14th edit., Vol. II, 351.) 
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which has experienced such a wide revival in _ our day. This 
stress upon the inner man and the immediacy and directness 
of the subjective persona l experience leads Berdyaev to 
affirm that th.e indispensable condition of knowing in 
philosophy is intuition. The range and depth of this experi-
ence varies in men--the opinion of those who have undergone 
the maximum exper.lence, e.g. knowing all the trag~dies of 
human existence, are obviously to be . preferred to those 
whose knowledge is limited to either religious ' or_ scientific 
dogma. But, though individuaLmen .may be limited as to 
experience, . they may through the church and its historic 
tradition share in this broader ·experience. 
Wha t is to be said of this stress upon intuition? 
It is very doubtful that there is a ny separate f a culty, 
special organ, or unique way of knG>wing truth that we may 
call 11 intuition. 11 Hocking points out that "knowledg e beg ins 
wi th intuition; and intuition is always ahead."32 Again, 
that "intuition is always in da nger of getting lost, u33 and 
that it "must always be accompanied and followed by con~ 
ceptual thinking ."34 Intuition, though basic, is a moment 
in the knowing process, and it cannot be separated out from 
that process without becoming involved in serious defects •-
Hocking has made this point clearly: "Both intuition and 
32. TP, 208. 
33. TP, 210. 
34. TP, 211. 
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a nd the intellect are the mind in action: intuition recog-
nizing the presence of objects, intellect defining what 
they are. They are inse~arable. They constitute a working 
pair."35 Thus the att~empt to make intuition self-sufficient 
would be the destruction of any contribution it . can make. 
It cannot define what it perceives; for a definition 
makes use of a concept. _ It _cannot communicate what-
it perceives; for . language is· made of the common c oin 
of concepts. It .cannot defend its- truth, nor dis-
tinguish true from false interpretation, without the 
aid and criticism of the intellect.36 
Berdyaev is on _ firm ground in strsssing heing and 
l t fe as the primal realities. These ultimate rea lities are 
known intuitively in the first-ha nd experience of each of 
us. Behind this experience we cannot go, for . it is the 
very stuff of reality. But, though ultimate in this sense, 
i t may well gain as we seek to clarify it and define it, 
communicate and share it with others, defend and interpret 
its significanc:e. Analysis and conceptual definition of the 
experience will always fall short of conveying its uniqueness 
to another., but they need not necessarily destr.oy it. Thus 
it- i~ quite possible that Berdyaev!i laborious study of the 
da ta of the spiritual life has brought further understandings 
of its significance to him--certainly it has opened the 
minds of his readers to new insights. Berdyaev constantly 
employs the very rational processes he so often despairs of, 
35. TP, 201. 
36. TP, 211. 
225 
and to good use. He is justly critical of abstract reason, 
but no one but the most extreme rationalists would ev.er 
seem to have . employed it in the sense in .which Berdyaev .-
describes it. Reason is employed constantly in a concrete 
sense in dealing with the ultimate data of experience known 
intuitively. 
:WJYsticism as a method of knowing is open to much the 
same type of objection as intuition, of which it is a 
further stage. Mysticism is not to be identified with 
intuitionism. It surpasses the latter in being not only a 
way of knowing, but also a definite metaphy~ical doctrine 
and an ethics or way of life. Here we shall note only its 
epistemological significance. Berdyaev, as noted above,37 
distinguishes between types of mysticism and definitely 
rejects the more extreme varieties of Hinduism and Latin 
Christianity which have tended to annihilate both man and 
the world in God.38 Berdyaev holds the true end of mysticism 
to be not annihilation but transfiguration. 39 By this dis~ 
tinction Berdyaev escapes many of the criticisms that have 
been justly leveled at much mysticism. A single brief para-
graph indicates his orientation. 
The problem that disturbs me may be expressed in_the 
following manner, in the terms · which I have adopted; 
how can the natural world be transfigured and brought 
into the spiritual world as something real and not 
37. Supra, Chap. II, 52f. 
38. Cf. for a comparable evaluation Pratt, RC, 470f. 
39. FS, 265. 
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illusory? How can the "psychical" be related to the 
spiritual? So far as mysticism is concerned the 
question may be stated thus: how will man and the 
cosmos when spiritually transfigured bE affirmed in _ 
mystical experience? · .God does not .merely desire His 
own existence. Man, the c·osmos, and the divine 
creation are not merely for time but also for eternity. 
The deification of, creat-ion does not _mean any loss in 
its· significance, still less its ex:t;.inction. Man .and 
the world are not annihilated in God, but illuminated 
and transfigured. They are now definitely part of 
being and are set free from non-being.40 
What validity does the religious experience hav'.e? 
Knudson writes: "What we call religious experience has no 
necessary ontological significance. It may be valid, but it 
may also be invalid. u41 Brightman doubts that the mystic's 
claim can be accepted literally and concludes that "the 
mystic's knowledge-claim, although exaggerate.d in many 
respects, and false in so far as it .asserts identity with 
the divine, furnishes nevertheless important data regarding 
the objective source of value."42 The data p.re .not . so much 
to be accepted at face-value as to be regarded as an hy-
pothesis for further investigation. Montague in his classic 
epistemological study--after making a distinction between 
negative mysticism (the excesses of which he deplores) and 
positive mysticism, which he appraises in a manner comparable 
to Berdyaev--writes: 
Perhaps· we can best guard against the moral and in-
-tellectual dangers c of negative mysticism and best avail 
ourselves of the values of the positive type by 
40. FS, 264f. 
41. VRE, 71. 
42. POR, 170. 
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remembering that the ideas, and beliefs : which are 
yielded by intuition should neither be discarded as 
false nor accepted as : true, but taken tentatively as: 
hypotheses which need to be tested by further experi-
ence. They should, in short, be treated precisely 
like those ideas that are derivedfrom the testimony 
of others--as suggestions which we ar~ thankful to 
receive, but careful to substantiate.43 
Macintosh in his critical evaluation of religious mysticism 
suggests that 
if the mystical assurance is knowledge at all, it is 
knowledge not primarily hecause .. of the mystical incre-
ment in the degree of subjective certitude, but rather 
by virtue of empirical verification in t~e world of 
normal inner and outer human experience. 4 
These writers all agpee that the mystical experience, 
. while a possible source of truth, cannot b:e acc:epted as 
truth itself • . Thus, when Berdyaev would attempt to make 
such experience its own criterion of truth,45 we must con-
clude that all that is known with certainty is that there 
was experience, but that what that experience is is not 
known with certainty. The psychological experience while 
indubitable does not necessarily carry with it ontological 
validity. That validity must be secured by other criteria 
such as Berdyel:ev himself suggests when, after pointing out ... 
that there is 11 a false mysticism.. and a purely fictitious :. 
spirituai knowledge, u46 he concludes that .11 it is necessary 
to try the spirits. 11 47 
43. WK, 64. 
44. PRK, 38. 
45. Cf. supra, Chap. II, 50n. 
46. FS, 30. 
47. FS, 31. 
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In his emphasis u~on .revelation and faith as ways of 
knowing Berdyaev largely escapes the criticisms which have 
been leveled against revelation by those who have virtually, 
identified it with some external authority.48 "It is simply 
a form of materialism to regard revelation as authority."49 
Berdyaev is rejecting what Brightman has characterized. as-
the 11 dogmatic~ and intellectualistic vlew of revelation~ 11 and 
comes much closer to what the same thinker has. described as 
the "teleological or . dynamic theory of revelation.u50 The 
latter theory, according to which the essence of rev.elation 
is "the guidanc.e of human life to higher levels by divine 
pow~r,u51 closely approximates the view of Berdyaev that 
revelation is inward and involves internal illumination. 
Berdyaev strikes an essentially modern .note likewise in his 
rejection. of the distinction b:etween revealed and natural 
religion, thoughwithout in any vital sense compromising his 
faith in the full revelation · of Christianity.52 
Faith is seen by Berdyaev not ,.as:, in the sense of 
Calv:in and Barth, a gift :.of God, but .as~ ".a free act of the 
spirit.u53 Its essence lies in"a voluntary re-direction of 
our power of choice"--tbat .is ·, it would seem in the final 
analysis to be trust. Trust on · the part .. of man 11 crea tea 
48. Cf. for such criticism, Montague, WK, 39-53. 
49. FS, 94. 
50. POR, 175ff. 
51. POR, 176. 
52. FS, 88f. 
53. FS, 104. 
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fresh possibilities of knowing the spiritual and divine 
world."54 Faith would seem to clash with reason when 
Berdyaev writes that 
it prefers folly to the wisdom of this world; it 
accepts · antinomies and paradoxes no matter how great. 
Faith necessitates the sacrific-e of the lower reason, 
and- it is only by this sacrific:e that .. man attains the 
higher reason and that .the Logos ~, the meaning of the 
world, is revealed. "If any man thinketll that .. he is 
wise among you in this . age, let him; become a fool 
that he may b'ecome wise. For . the wisdom of this world 
is foolishness with God." _"The wisd·om of thisr world" 
is associated with a normal consciousness directed 
towards visible things. This <- consc.iousness is; 11qui-
da ted through the sp1ri tual experienc.e which weo call 
faith~ and man of necessity becomea a fool.55 
Berdya_ev, in the eyes of the present _,writer, is not 
to be here viewed an. an .irrationalist in the sense of a 
Tertullian. The "lower reason," ''the wisdom of this world," 
he identifies with "a normal consciousness directed towards· 
visible things." It is the view that is shared to a degree 
by _both common sense and science that--compelled by the 
visible and objective reality of. the natural and empirical 
world--sees in these things ultimate reality. The sugg_estion 
that such is not the case does appear foolishness, but it 
may well be the first step toward true w.isdom. An orientation_ 
of the spirit of man _toward the mysterious and hidden w.orld 1s 
an ac.t of faith~. 
In the spiritual world reality is not determined by 
anything g~i ven from without, for it is the result of a 
fervent orientation _of the spiritual life itself • . The 
54. FS, 107. 
55. FS, 106. 
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to be 
dlscovery of reality · depends upon the activity of 
spirit, its intensity and its ardour. We cannot expect 
that spiritual realities·. should be . revealed to us :tn , 
the same way as objects' in the natural world which-.are 
presented to u~6exter1orly like stones, _ tr.ees, tables-, chairs • • • • 
Thus, though faith may in its initial st'eps appear 
irrational, it cane lead to the gaining of the "higher 
wisdom'' and of true insight into the meaning of the world. 
One might go so far ,·as- to hold that Berdyaev is, in. essence, 
applying the way of coherence as a means of knowing. He is. 
interested in .gathering all the facts, including those 
empirical facts of religious experience su often ignored. 
He constructs in his metaphysics. a working hypothesis to 
interpret . the facts• The chapters on the actual historical 
proc.ess may be viewed as relating this segment of data to 
the metaphysical hypothesis in_an .attempt to show its 
adequacy• 
B. Metaphysics. The firs·t thing that .. must be said 
- . 
of Berdyaev~ s historical views is that -they mark a fTank 
return to metaphysics in the classic sense. He rejects bDth 
the cosmo-centric views of the Greeks and the modern revival 
of this secular . reflection :. which has taken a naturalistic 
neo-pag~n outlook as · illustratedin the materialistic Marx-ian 
conception of history • . Berdyaev is much more closely_ 
related to the providential outlook of which Augusti~e is·: 
a first rank exponent; to the f?peculativ-e thinkers of 
56. FS, 12. 
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Germany-~Lessing, Herder, :Kant, , Fichte, , Schelling, and 
Hegel- - who created a philosophy of history which . att:empted 
to combtne both the Christian and modern ideas; ·and to the 
contemporary exponents of the theology of crisis. Hence for 
Berdyaev the temporal, the historical, the physical facts 
are not self-explanatory and self-suffic.ient, but are to be 
understood in terms of the eternal, th.e metaphysical, tne 
ultimate spiritual reality • . Berdyaev does not argue the 
issue of supernaturalism versus naturalism but rests his 
cas·e upon .the experience of the mystics and saints.. For 
those who have had . the .experience it is self-evident,, and 
for those who do not it .. is impossib'le to demonstrate. 
It is impossible to ask the question whethe~ there is· 
a reality which corr.esponds to the experience of the 
great ~ saints, to that ~ ... of the mystics, . to that of men 
who live on a higher spiritual plane, for that is a 
question arising only within:, tp.e sphere of psy.chology , , 
naturalism, and a naive, and· non-spiritual realism • . 
The spiritual experience of the saints, mystics, and 
those who possess a higher. type of spirituality, is 
reality itself, the appearanc.e and manifestation of 
the Spirit of ·God. SpiritL1s real existence, . and 
spiritual life does in fact appear. and manifest . itself. 
It is a basic · fact which can be undeniably established 
but ~. which cannot be proved. Spiritual experience is 
the greatest reality in human life. Th.e divine is 
manifested in it, but its existence cannot be demon-
strated. God and His divinity, spirit and the spiritual, 
are given to us in .the experience of life; they rev·ea.l 
themselves but they cannot be established by ratioci-
nation.57 
Berdyaev's approach will carry conviction to those who share 
his acc:eptance of the main elements of traditional Christian 
57. FS, 11. 
232 
supernaturalism, but it will not make much appeal to those 
who find themselves incapable of accepting_ it. A more 
rational approach would carry greater persuasiveness to a 
larger number. 
BerdyaevJ s rejection of theistic ab.solutism by reason 
of its inability to explain the world in_terms of God, its 
contradiction of basic Biblical doctrines, its- impersonalism, 
and its moral inadequacy have been noted above,58 but may 
be examined in more detail here. 
Berdyaev . is on., sound ground when he arwes! that if 
God is absolutely self-sufficient, then the historical 
process would apparently have no significance. . And ala o in_ 
affirming that if the historical process makes a dif~erence 
to God, then God is ' not absolutely self-sufficient, and the 
historical process gains meaning. If God be completely self-
sufficient, it is . difficult to comprehend why there was a 
creation. And if there be any motive behind the creation, 
then to that degree there would seem to be a diminution of 
Gbd's absoluteness. 
Aristotle represents the classic example of the point 
of view which Berdyaev rejects. Thus for Aristotle 
God's life • • • always - is :• • • • Pure self-activity 
of reason is God's most blessed and everlasting life. 
We say that God is living, eternal, _perfect; and con-
tinuous and everlasting life is God's, for God is: 
eternal life. · ••• The seed is not first, but the com~ 
plete plant. • • • Th.ere is then a substance which is 
58. Supra, Chap~ III, 59ff. 
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eternal and immovable and separable from the objects of 
sense •••• This substance cannot have parts but . is 
without parts . and indivisible •••• God cannot have. 
limited magnitude; nor yet can he have unlimited magni-
tude •••• God is free from passion and from. quali-
tative change ••• for all other changes are subse-
quent to motion in space.59 
Schwegler has given a model answer to this conception 
that is fully in the spirit .. of Berdyaev. 
Why the ultimate ground of movement, which properly is . 
all that his absolute spirit is, must be also thought 
as a personal being, it is impossible to see. It is 
impossible to see also how there can b:e something that 
is a moving cause and yet ~ itself unmoved; a cause of 
all becoming, that . is, of all origination and decease, 
and yet itself without potentiality_-: for what moves 
must at least .stand in a relation of action and reaction 
with what is moved. On the whole, Aristotle has not, 
as already appears from these contradictions, with 
completeness and consistency established the relation 
between God and the world. Since indeed he character-
izes· the absolute spirit one-sidedly only as contempla-
tive theoretical reason, . and excludes from him., as the 
perfected end, all action (which were to presuppose an 
unperfected end), any right motive of activity .in re-
gard _to the world fails. In his only theoretical 
relation, he is not even truly the first mover:; extra-
mundane and unmoved, as in.essential nature he is, he 
enters not at all with his activity into the life of 
the world; and as: on its side matter ·is never quite 
resolved into form, there manifests itself here too the 
unreconciled dualism .. between the divine spirit and the 
incognisable in .itself (potentiality) of matter.bO 
Berdyaev is right in hi~ declaration that . the Biblical 
conception of God is far from being an actus purus. The 
Biblica·l conception . in its historic spread became involved 
in Greek philosophic notions and received its clas~ic 
theological formulation in the thought of Saint Thomas .. 
59. MET, XI, Chap. 7. Cited in Bakewell, SBAP, 232f. 
60. HP, llOf. 
234 
Aquinas. That in his synthesizing, of Augustine and Aristotle 
the thought of the Lyceum tended to predominate is to be 
seen _in Aquinas's statement than "in God . there is no potenti-
ality."61 To this notion Berdyaev replies: 
But such an understanding is taken not so much from 
biblical revelatton_as from :the p~ilosophy of Aristotle. 
If God is Personality and not the Absolute, if_ He is 
not only essentia but also existentia, if there is.-
revealed in Him .a personal relation to the other, to 
the many, then suffering is inherent in Him, and there 
is a tragic principle in Him. Otherwise God is not 
personality, but an abstract idea of b~ing such as is: 
conceived by the Eleatic philosophers.62 
The same sentiment is echoed· by Brightman: "God • • • 
is more like the Btblical God than like Aristotle's; more 
like the Logos of Heraclitus· than like the One of Par-
menides."63 Hartshorne goes further still, but in the spirit 
of Berdyaev, in stating that "the purely absolute and wholly 
unlimited God of the main philosophical and tP,eological 
tradition is scarcely to be termed personal, if words are to 
retain any meaning."64 Berdyaev is right in denying that-~ 
neither the Biblical nor personal conceptions of . God can .b.e 
preserved or adequately represented in the tradition. of 
theistic absolutism, since the notions of the latte~ are 
thoroughly incompatible with the values of the former. 
Berdyaev refuses to see God as ideal perfection and 
completion. God, if a personality, is not in a congealed 
61. Cited in Brightman, POR, 285. 
62. SF, 51. 
63. FG, 122. 
64. ER, Art. "God, as personal," 303. 
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condition nor a ready made datum, but is capaale of enrich-
ment and development. God is not substance, but spirit,. and 
is to be understood in .terms of activity, . oppositton, effort, 
·and conflict. Berdyaev holds that traditional absolutism 
envisages a God who is morally inadequate, in that the very 
qualities that in man are condemned as sinful are ascribed 
to God • . He would be in complete accord with the view of 
Brightman who holds that if "we substitute for perfection_ 
the ideal of inexhaustible 'perfectibility we havB a ·concept 
applicable to both God and man and adequate to man's 
religious need.''65 
As has been noted, Berdyaev has recourse to the 
mystics in making his case for a more dynamic conception of. 
God. Unless there were some movement within the Divine the 
mystic experience itself would be inconceivable. Brightman 
suggests a comparable notion when he writes that "religious 
experience would be possible and necessary only if God were 
finite." 66 
In interpreting the divine life Berdyaev rejects the 
approach of abstract philosophy and substitutes that of a 
concrete mythology. This myth "conceives the divine life as 
a passionate destiny of concrete and active persons, the 
divine Hypostases."67 Mythology thus becomes the "key to 
the metaphysics of history." The central notion that results · 
65 • POR, 3 40. 
66. FG, 121. 
67. MH, 52. 
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from this mythological approach to the divine reality is 
that "the divi'ne life is interpreted as a drama between God 
and His other self, in the centre of which stands Christ, 
Who _is both perfect God and man." 68 This "deeper current 
of Christian thought" coincides and finds concrete illus-
tration in the doctrines of the German mystics, especially 
Boehme. 
In -turning to the doctrine of the Ungrund or Gottheit 
in Berdyaev one would gladly seek refuge in·. Phytllian-Adam' s 
concluding comment: "Berdyaev is not a subject for academic 
disputation, he is an air to be breathed."69 Retaining the 
metaphor one might add that the air is v.ery rare, and that 
dizziness often results from too long habituation in it. 
The first thing that can be noted concerning the Ungrund is 
that it is, at least in theory, a purely nega tive conception_ 
to which none of the categories: of thought :..are applicable. 
But, like Spencer's "much-known .. unknowable," and ih contra~ 
diction . to his own basic approach, Berdyaev , manag_,es to apply. 
quite a host of rationalistic categories to it in the process 
of elucidation.. Secondly, it must be admitted' tha t while by 
t-he use of this conceptio!). B'erdyaew does manage to introduce 
some dynamic movement into an erstwhile static substance , 
by the pr_ocess· of self-distinction and inner diremption, , he 
does so only at the cost of relegating the revealed Biblical 
68. MH, 54. 
69. Art.(l938), 268. 
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God to a secondary position~ Thirdly, the means whereby 
the whole theogon1c. process takes place seems unconvincing 
and inadequate. 
Positively there are insights 1n Berdyaev's general 
treatment that are valid and worthy of being incorporated 
into any religious world view.. In placing God and freed.om 
over against one another, and in seeing the process of cre-
ation as being that of "conquering non-being," as "the il-
lumination of this dark irrational principle," Berdyaev . 
gives a seriousness to the Whole creative process that has 
often seemed lacking in .the traditional interpr,etations of 
creation • . In this connection, however, there is a tendency 
' •. 
for Berdyaev to fall into a dualism with the irrational as 
external to God. _ In this regard he is closer to Plato, who 
is a dualist or pluralist, than .to Brightman, who "enlarges 
the idea of. god" to include within·· the divine personality 
al1 of the· .factors · going into .the creative pr.ocess.7° 
Berdyaev' s treatment of man is daring. In seeing_ 
God and man as correlative Berdyaev makes a point that gives 
tremendous significanc.e .. to man and his creative task. To 
the nee-orthodox such an unduly anthropocentric conceptaon 
is near-sacrilege, and even a modern liberal theologian 
such as A.C. Knudson is willing to consider seriously the. 
possibility that man may not be as central in the scheme of 
70. POR, 339. 
things as he has often thought.71 
Berdyaev' s interpretation of man is "sp1r1 tualLy · 
emp1rical"--i.e., he recognizes within man a certain . duality 
which escapes the monism both of the classical, rational-
iatic and of the biological, scientific v1ews. In other 
wo_rds, man finds within himself both the image . of God and 
undetermined freedom. As image of God, man is a creator--
he shares also with God the confrontation of freedom. 
Brightman has indicated comparable elements in. God and man 
when he writes: "Thus when man is created· there enter into 
his being the same constituents that ,obtain eternally in _ 
God and in·_ all his deeds. "72 Berdyaev' s interpretation~ of 
man is commendable in being a synthesis in which extremes 
are avoided and recognition given to all factors. 
ThE! most spectacular us·e of the notion of the Ungrund 
is its obvious connection with the problem of ev11. This 
has= been noted in some detail above, and in a lengthy foot-
note compared and contrasted with the interpretation_ of 
Brightman. 73 Th.e great .advantage of Berdyaev·.' s treatment is: 
his willingness to break with conventional handling_s of ·the 
issue, to face frankly the inner . contradic.tions that th.es:e 
contain, and to follow the implications to their logical 
conclusion. In :so doing, Berdyaev adds hie name to a long_ 
7l. DR, 70ff. 
72. POR, 333 • 
73. Supra, Chap. III, 72ff. 
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and persistent tradition of thinkers in. botb.. . philosophy and 
theology who, adhering to the deliveranc.es of their own. 
experiences and eschewing the orthodox rationalisms that 
would explain away all the harsh aspects of existence, have 
come to the conclusion . that life does not follow an even 
tenor. Edwin Lewis sugg~sts the appeal of this general out-
look to the ordinary man ,.who 
is much more likely to believe that .gr.ea t .,and perhaps 
fundamental divisions run .acr.oss the very fac.e of. ex'!"' 
istence. "Life is a struggle against odds": this is 
his dictum. There is always an .enemy. He may not .. be 
sure as: to what Berdyaev. means by, "meonic freedom,!' or 
Paul Tillich .by "demonism," or Brigntman. by "The Given," 
but in so far . asthese terms represent .. the recognition 
of an opposing element 1m life and an a tt.empt to ~c­
count for it and its dire consequences, he would be in. 
entire sympathy with them.74 
Berdyaev brings the elements of Christian tradition 
and German mysticism together in .the Biblical acCDunt of the 
Fall, which, in his interpretation, tells of "the power~ess­
ness of the creator to avert . the evil resulting from. the 
freedom which he has not created.u7S Berdyaev's treatment 
of the Fall is noteworthy on a number . of counts. He reg?-rds 
it as mythical, thus refusing to see it . in an obj.ectiviz.ed 
naturalistic sense as has• so large a section . of Christendom.. 
Man-, therefore, ls not envisaged as lapsing from. an earlier 
or higher state of being and, as a result of this cataclysmic 
experience, being sunk into a state of corruption which is 
74. PCR, 296. 
75. DM, 34. 
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passed on from ,generation . to generation. On the contrary, 
Berdyaev sees the Fall not traditionally as. an humiliation 
of man but as "a proud idea'_' which "exalts man." 
Berdyaev's view of nature ·is not apt .to appeal to 
many. According to hlm the Fa.ll preceded rather than. 
followed the production . of the natural world. . The di v,ided-
ness, multiplicity, and externality of the world of nature 
is simply the result of the Fall which took place . in .. the ·. 
spiritual world and plunged it ·into the bad infinity of 
time.76 The average Western.mind is not impressed with the 
description of this world .as. 11 strang€3 and hostile, 11 and as 
Phythian .. Adams put it is inclined "strongly to accept the 
more orthodox 'mythology' of Creation."77 
-
Berdyaev' s conception. of the enslavement of man would 
seem to be existentially accurate. Man as we know him vri t h in 
our own selves is a creature of contrast and contradiction. 
On this point Greek mythology, Platonic. philosophy_, Hebraic 
scripture, Christian theology, and modern psy~hology are in . 
essential agr.eement. Berdyaev·. states well the dilemma. of 
man whose freedom must be maintained if he is to achieve his 
possibilities, but the exercise of which involves him in. 
contradictions and threatens him with destruction• 
Berdyaev 's conception that .~ only in . the coming of 
Christ the God-man .can .the essential contradictions of human 
76. FS, 22. 
77. Art.(l938), 267. 
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existence be solved is central in .all forms of Chris,tianity. 
His view of redemption is, in this author' s ~ . understanding, 
quite in .the spirit of modern liberalism. Thus he writes: 
The grace of Christ is the inner illumination of freedom 
without any outward restraint or coer.cion. The truth 
of . Christ which makes men free constrains no one; it 
differs in this respect .,from the truths of this world 
which seek to organize the life of man by constraint 
and end by depriving him of the freedo~. of the spirit. 
The light of Christ illuminates the dark irrationality 
of freedom without imposing external limits upon it.7~ 
Berdyaev·.'s rejection of any antithesis between free-
dom and grace is wholesome. He rejects equally the extremes 
of libertarianism with its belief in .a humanistic self-
redemption, and necessaritarianism which would make re-
demption an exclusively divine affair. Berdyaev would accept 
Knudson's stating of the issue: 
Freedom is the· deepest bond of union between man and 
God. Instead -of separating man from;; God it is the 
medium through which the divine grace manifests itself 
in_human life. Between the human and the divine there 
is no sharp line of cleavage. We cannot say where the 
divine begins and the human leav.es off. The two inter-
penetrate, and they do so by virtue of their common 
freedom. The human spirit appropriates the divine 
through its own moral obedience, , and the divine in turn 
makes possible the appropriation through its own free 
cooperation. The process is a dual one. From one point 
of view it is human, and from another point of view it 
is divine, but in both aspects it is made possible only 
through freedom.79 
Berdyaev stands opposed then to the monergism of Augustine, 
Calvin, Barth, and their followers, and espouses a synergistic 
position .. providing for the correlative ac:tion of God and man. 
78. FS, 135. 
79. DR, 166f. 
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The close correlative action between God and man- -
their mutual and reciprocal interrelation--leads Berdyaev 
to stress the importance of the historical and the temporal. 
for the inner nature of rea lity ,or. being. The historical 
and temporal is for him rooted in the metahistorical and the 
eternal. Berdyaev, by this conception, steers a middle 
pathwa y between the Scylla of an immobile eternity or static 
Absolute envisaged as the deep and true reality with its 
consequential belittling or denial of . any real significance 
for the phenomenal temporal world, and the Charybd i s of a 
self-sufficient temporal world process which affirms the 
finality of this world and denies the existence of any 
other. Berdyaev here a gain .avoids the extreme views that 
have plagued much of Western thought and remain with us still 
in such contemporary conceptions as neo-orthodoxy and 
humanism. Berdyaev conserves the values of historical time 
by seeing them as capable of being related to eternity, to 
celestial time, i.e., to God, to whom . they make a contri-
bution and in whom alone they retain their meaning. 
If God be a timeless absolute--timeless in the sense 
of "lacking all properties of or relations to time"8o __ then 
it is difficult to see that history has any real significa nce. 
Even such conceptions as the creation .. and the incarnation 
are robbed of any m.eaning. But if time be ontologica:lly_ 
8o. Brightman, Art.{l947), 260. 
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real, then the whole historical process ceases to be merely 
a phenomenal realm with only transitory and relatively un-
real significance. History itself gains ontological import 
and makes a differenoe :, to God who now is no longer seen as 
an unmoved .Parmenidean One or as .Aristotelian. Being. A God 
for whom time is meaningful is not an Absolute God but is 
in some sense finite. This finitude may take two forms--
either that of self-imposed limitations or of non-self-
imposed limitations . The former alternativ,e, however, does 
not in .. any way compromise God's absoluteness~, but _rather is 
seen as an expression , of it. This attempt to mediate 
between an absolutism and a finitism fails ~, since in the last 
analysis it reduces back to the former. This Berdyaev 
realized and opposed. strongly. Thus he writes: 
The ordinary theological conception_of the creation of 
the world and the Fall.Lturns it all into a divine 
comedy, a play that God plays with Himself •••• Evil 
is said to be due to the abuse of freedom with which 
God endowed His creatures. But this explanation is 
purely superficial. The freedom through which the 
creature succumbs to evil has been given to it by God, 
i.e. in the last resort determined by God •••• He 
knows ,. the answer beforehand and is only playing with 
Himself •••• The logical conclusion is that God has 
from all eternity predetermined some to8eternal sal-vation and others to eternal damnation. 1 
This. notion again reduces the historical to relativ,e in-
significance since it adds nothing whatsoever to God. The 
only alternative--if both theism and the values of history 
are to be maintained--is to conceive of a God whose power 
81. DM, 32. 
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is limited by some uncreated source of evil, either within. 
or without himself, the controlling of which gives meaning 
to the personality of God and significance to the processes 
of history. 
One of the points in_Berdyaev's metaphysics that is 
most difficult for Western minds to accept is that of pre-
existence. Rejecting the evolutionary conception of man as· 
an adequate account of man's destiny, Berdyaev . holds that , 
the Fall preceded man's evolutionary process. He concludes: 
To admit the manifestation of . man's destiny in world 
history, it is also necessary to admit his pre-world 
existence; that his destiny originated and was determined 
prior to the establishment of that world of reality 
where occur all those processes of evolution .and de-
velopment by which the evolutionary theory tries to 
explain .both man's origins and further development.82 
But most thinkers will express agreement with Knudson's 
opinion ' concerning pre-existence, that it is "an interesting 
but fanciful speculation, "83 and with Bowne, that ~'. it is so 
utterly without any positive foundation or speculativ,e ad-
vantage, and involves us in so many gratuitous· difficulties, 
that it is likely to be confined to tb.e dreamers;." 84 From 
a religious standpoint it would s eem that man can well be 
"a child of God" without necessarily having a pre-world 
existence. Berdyaev, as we b.ave noted earlier, accepts the 
view of creationism. To hold that this act took place in 
82. MH , 76f. 
83. DR, 255. 
84. MET, 373. Cf. also the article, "pre- existence," 
by L. Harold DeWolf in ER, for a brief historical survey of 
the notion. 
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eternity prior to the temporal world-process seems to un"!"' 
necessarily complicate the issue. We may agree with Berdyaev 
as to the inability of the temporal evolutionary process .in 
and of itself to account for the origin. of man, but ~ 
doctrine of pre-existence seems to make for too great a 
break between the present life and its supposed pre-existent 
state. The question as to the origin of the soul 1~ 1m~ 
possible of final solution, but the suggestion of Bowne that 
"where and when the divine plan, which is the law of cosmic: 
activity calls for it, there and then a soul begins its 
ex istence and development."85 Such a . conception is not 
i ncompatible witn many of Berdyaev's other notions, and is 
much more in harmony with the Christian tradition and 
philosophic criticism~ 
c. Past History. Berdyaev in his account of pre-
historical man mediates between a naturalism which v1ould 
account for man completely in terms of the evolutionary 
process and a supernaturalism which denies or ignores the 
natural process • It is the same point which was . noted 
earlier _in the discussion of epistemology where Berdyaev 
insists that philosophy, while it must .account for the data 
of both science and religion, must not be subservient to 
either in its dogmatic_ form. Here he points out the in"!"' 
sufficiency and partiality of science and the necessity of 
55. MET, 373 • 
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its facts being interpreted in terms of a lar&er metaphysical 
whole. Hence the scientific account of man .which begins 
with his immersion in nature presupposes man'.s earlier Fall .. 
For his information concerning _ pre_-historical man Ber_dyaev .. 
relies on the earliest religious traditions and myths:: which, 
in his view, had their origin _before the realms of spirit 
and nature were sharply delineated. Hence they reflect deep 
truths concerning man's ··origin. 
In earlier portions c of this chapter we hav.e ref.erred 
t o Berdyaev' s use .·of myth • . Toynbee' s reliance upon the clue 
furnished by mythology has also b:een._ noted. Two further .· 
brief citations from. Toynbee will indicate how; in a fashion . 
comparable to Berdyaev, he makesuse of the mythological to 
indicate the genesis of the historical. Thus he concludes 
his statement of 11 the mythological clue" with this brief 
summary paragraph: 
The first stage, then, of the human protagonist's ordeal 
is a transition from Yin to Yang through a dynamic act--
performed by God's creature under temptation from the 
Adversary--which enables God Himself to resume His cre-
ative activity. But this progress has to be paid for; 
and it is not God but God's servant, the human sower,, . 
who pays the price. Finally, after many vicissitudes, 
the sufferer triumphant serves as the pioneer • . The 
human protagonist in . the divine drama not only serv:.es 
God by enabling Him .. to renew His creation but also 
serves g~s fellow men by pointing the way for others to 
follow. 
How Toynbee arrives at this general princip;le is indicated 
in his interpretation of the myth of the Fa.ll. 
86. SH, 67. 
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The picture of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden is a 
reminiscence of the Yin- state to which primitiv,e man 
attained in, the food-gathering ppase of economy, after 
he has · established his ascendancy over the rest .. of the 
flora and fauna of the Earth. The Fall, in response to 
the temptation to eat of the Tree of the Knowledge of. 
Good and Evil, symbolizes the . acceptanc.e of a challenge 
to abandon this achieved integratton .and to venture 
upon a fresh differentiatd.on ~ out .. of which a fresh in-
tegration may--or may not-- arise. The expulsion from 
the Garden into an unfriendly world . in which the Woman 
must bring forth children ,. in. sorrow· ·and the Man must 
eat bread in the sweat of his face, is the ordeal which 
the acceptanc.e of the Serpent's challeng_~ has:· entailed. 
The sexual intercourse between Adam and E've, which 
follows, is an act of social creation. It -b:ears fruit 
in the birth of two sons who impersonate two nascent . 
civilizations: Abiel the keeper of sheep and Cain the 
tiller of the ground.87 
Berdyaev ~.· s description . of ea rliest man as being 
t horoughly at home in ,the universe, as virtually forming a 
part .of nature, is quite in keeping with .our modern :anthro-
pological knowledge. That this attitude likewise charac-
terized most of the ancient non-Jewish civilizations is also 
acknowledged by most authorities. Thus, for example, Windel~ 
band points out that Greek science was interested primarily 
in the abiding essence so that 
-the chronological course of events had always been 
treated as something of secondary importance, having no 
metaphysical interest of its own •••• Greek science 
regarded not _ only the individual man~ . but also the whole 
human race, with all its fortunes, deeds; and experi-
ences, as, ultimately but an ~episode, , a special formation. 
of the world-process whs§h repeats itself forever 
according to like laws. 
Of Greek thought .. in .general Windelband concludes: 
87. SH, 65f. 
88. HP, 255. 
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The inquiry for a meaning in human..history taken as a 
whole, for a connected plan _of historical development, 
had never once been put forward, and still less had it 
occurred to any of the old thinkers to see in. this t he 
intrinsic·, essential nature of the world.89 
Berdyaev's treatment of the Jewish conception of 
history is thoroughly in ,accord with the views of modern 
scholarship. A single reference wilL indicate the close 
parallel between Berdyaev's views and those of presenu 
criticism. Thus Knudson points: out that to understand the 
Hebraic conception ,of . the future course of events that .. it 
i s necessary to see it in contrast to the ancient .belief inc 
a ,series of world cycles. 
This was a widespread helief. We find it in .all the 
great .. nations with whom the ancient Hebrews~ came into 
contact. According to this belief, there was:. a world 
year, or cycle, embracing- thousands ofour years •••• 
During this cycle the world passed through a period of 
development and decline, com;ing at ::, the end of the period 
into a condition ,similar to that with which .it began •. 
The same process was then repeated, _and so on through 
the endless ages. There was no progress:, no permanent 
development, but simply a ceaseless repetition of the 
past.90 
Knudson points ~ut that the Hebrews early came into contact 
with this belief, but rejected it because of its conflict 
with their native optimism and disharmony with their belief 
in a personal God. 
so the -Hebrews substituted for the common. ancient be-
lief in a series of world cycles the great ,.belief in a 
89. HP, 255. Cf. supra, .Chap. III, 60n., for an 
alternative interpretation of Plato. Cf. also Harkness's : 
article, "Plato • s Philosophy of History, 11 Christendom, 
2 ( 1937), 436ff. 
90. PMI, 16lf. 
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day of Jehovah. According to this belief the pres-ent 
world cycle would co rue to an .end, as the heathen be-
lieved. But when it came to an end, the old process 
would not b'e repeated; instead there would be es:-
tablished a new and eternal world order, over_ all of 
which Jehovah would directly rule. _ This in some 
respects was the most oharacteristic .. element in Hebrew. 
thought.91 
Berdyaev's distinction between the two principle 
forms of the Messianic expectation .that .had such cructal 
importance in the events - surrounding the life of Jesus and 
led to the separati-on of Judaism and Christianity is 
generally accepted by all scholars. _ Berdyaev . ' s exteilB ion 
of the conception of false Messianism--which in Jesus' day 
took an utopian form of forcibly establishing a bEatific 
terrestrial kingdom in which all evil and suffering_would be 
banished and justic.e established--as a notion applicable to 
all totalitarian .regimes since, which would ignore individual 
freedom and hallow the status quo, is an excellent insight 
which enables one to find a thread tying together historica-l 
developments formerly s een as separate and disparate. 
Berdyaev's judgment tha t the dynamism of Christianity 
is due to its belief that events are unique and non-recurrent 
receives strong support from Augustine who belabDrad the 
cyclical · view ·of history and concluded his examination with. 
this remark: 
God forbid I say tha t we s~o~ld ~b~lieve : thts. 'For 
Christ once died for our sins,- and ris1ng aga,in, 
91. PMI, 162f. 
dies no more, . nor hath death 9-n:y future dominion over 
Him': 'and we · (after our resurrection) shall be always 
with the Lord,' to whom now we say with the psalm: 
'Thou wilt keep us, 0 Lord; and preserve us from this 
generation for ever.'92 
Berdyaev.Js reading of the significance of the 
Christian conception of history is echoed by Windelband im 
his contrast of the Hellenic and Christian notions·. "Instead 
of an eternal process of Nature, 11 w·e now have "the drama of 
universal history as an onward·. flow of events that were 
activities of free w111."93 "In contrast with the natural-
istic conceptions of Greek thought, history is conceived of 
as the realm of fl;'ee acts of personalities~ taking place but 
once."94 Berdyaev again steers a mediating course in. point-
ing out that history ' needs the factor of the free human 
spirit as over against exclusive preoccupation with either 
God which would tend to deny history's significanc·e or nature 
which would not giv·e history any meaning • . All thr.ee factors . 
are necessary--Christianity is of epochal importance in 
bringing into prominence the conception of man as: a free 
creative spirit. 
Berdyaev again reflects an essential modernity and 
lib'eralism in his appraisal of the highly valuable religious:· 
-... 
contributions made by earlier religions outside of the 
Hebraic-Christian tradition. However, he see~ redemption 
92. CG, XII, 13. 
93. HP, 256. 
94. HP, 257 • 
as coming only through Christ who freed man_ from_ subjection 
to hie own lower self and restored within_ him __ the div-ine 
image. Christianity revealed man as not merely a determined 
part of nature, but as likewise a free eon of God. It is 
this latter emphasis that Berdyaev rightly stresses as so 
basic to Christianity. For, as Windelband has· summarily 
stated it, after pointing out the basic impersonalism of 
Pl.otinus: 
Hellenism sees in personality ••• a restriction and 
a characteristic of the finite. • • • Christianity, as-
a living religion, demands a personal relationship of 
man to the ground of the world conceiv-ed of as supreme 
personality, and .it expresses this :·demand in the 
thought of the divine s onsh1p of man. • • • Nee-
Platonism turned :back to the old idea that saw in 
personality only the transitory productLof a life which 
as :· a whole is impersonal. It is · the essentia:L feature 
of the Christian conception of the world that it re-
g?-rds the person and the relations ·: of persons to one 
another as the essence of: reality.95 
Berdyaev . notes well the transition from .. Grecian mon-
istic naturalism. to a Christian . dualistic~ supernaturalism. 
As Russell writes~ 
The medieval world, as contrasted with the world of 
antiquity, is c-haracterized by various forms of dual:i.sm. 
There is the dualism of clergy and laity, the dualism 
of latin and Teuton, the dualism.of the kingdom of God 
and the kingdoms of this world, the dualism of the 
spirit and the flesh.96 
With the exception of the OrpP,ics, the Pythag,or.eans, , Socrates, 
Plato, and the later Nee-Platonic · and Neo-Pythagorean . mo~e­
ments--all of which haddef1nite dualistic tendencies--
95. HP, 238. 
96. HWP, 302. 
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Greek ethical thought was by and large naturalistic. Though 
the ethical consequences which followed from the dualistic 
emphases among various of the Greek theolog.1ans- and philoso-
phers · tended to coincide in great part with the doctr.ine of 
the Church, the latter never accepted a metaphysical dualism 
and has condemned all such doctrines as heterodox. That 
Christianity had to walk a narrow path here is indicated by 
Windelband' s comment that 
.the optimism involved in _the doctrine of creation, and 
the pesstmism involved in the felt need of redemption, 
the theoretical and the practical, the metaphysical and 
the ethical momenta of religious faith strike hard 
against each other.97 
Hence, though Christianity regarded ev·il as not primarily 
matter, but as a rebellion of free spirits ag~inst .God--as::: 
the departure and falling away from God--this falling away 
was viewed as not merely the absence of the good, but as a 
positive perverted act of will. Windelband describes the 
result in full accordance with the treatment given by 
Berdyaev: 
In accordance with this the dualism of God and the 
world, and that of spirit and matter, become indeed 
deeply involved in the Christian theory of the world. 
God and the eternal life of the spirlt-, - the world and 
the transitory life of the flesh,--these are here, too, 
sharply enough contrasted. In contradiction with the 
divine pneuma · the world of sense is filled with "hylic" 
spirits, evil demons who ensnare men . in their pursuits 
which are animated by hostility to God, stifle in him 
the voice of universal natural revelation, and thereby 
make special revelation necessary; and without departure 
97. HP, 252. 
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frnm them and from the sensuous nature there is for the 
early Christian ethics, also, no rescue of the . soul 
possible.98 
Berdyaev is right in stressing the essentially anthro-
pological feeling which became increasing-ly characteristic 
of Christianity. As Windelband describes it: "The teleology 
of history becomes raised above that of Nature, , and the 
former appears as the higher in worth, in whose · service the 
latter is employed." 99 After pointing out by specific refer-
ences to a number : of the patristic writers his reason for 
holding that "man and his u destiny becomes the centre of the. 
universe," Windelband concludes his survey of Hellenistic-
Roman .philosophy with the comment: 
Thus the anthropological movement, which at first forced 
its way into Greek science only as a shifting of the 
interest, as a change in _the statement of the prob~em, 
developed during the Hellenistic-Homan period to be more 
and more the real principle from .which the world was 
consid~red, and at ulast in .league with the religious 
need it took possession of metaphysics::. The human·"rac .. e 
has gained the consciousness of the unity of its hi£-
torical connection and regards the history of it~ sal-
vation as the measure of all finite things. What arises 
and passes away in space and time has its: true signifi-
cance only in so far as it is taken up into the relation 
of . man to his God.100 
Berdyaev•s personalistic treatment of Christianity in. 
strongly emphasizing its higp valuation; of and concern. for. 
man is thoroughly in accord with the comparable emphasis by 
American personalism. Thus Knudson writes: 
98. HP, 253. 
99. HP, 260. 
100. HP, 26lf. 
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The most fundamental and distinctiv,e element in the 
Christian view·.of man is its emphasis upon. tqe supreme 
value of the soul, the sacredness. of personality •. This 
high estimate of man has expressed itself in. two forms:: : 
in the high ethical conviction that the individual man 
is an end in himself and hence inviolably sacred, . and 
in the religious conviction that he has kinship with 
God and is capable of eternal fellowship with him_.lOl 
Berdyaev·! s handling of · the Middle .Ages, while s·ketchy, 
is essentially accurate. The Church by its control developed 
the personality of man from a formal standpoint, but .. did not 
al l ow this personality to develop concretely and freely in: 
any direction. The individual was bound up in the group, 
lost in the general social mass,. having no independent-. in-
tellectual or spiritual rights. The Church. distrusted the 
ability of most men to do any real thinking and feared the 
effect of any independent _mentality on its own authority. 
The authority of tradition, hierarchy, . and law was so power-
ful that few opposed it. Berdyaev, while glorying in the 
ideal of theocracy, rejects the form that it _took in the 
Middle Ages as tending to identify the Kingdom of God with 
the empirical church and the resulting absolute control of 
the free individual by the authoritativ~ institution. 
Euberweg's summary of the essential characteristics of the 
Middle Ages and the transition to modern times correlates 
precisely with Berdyaev and may serve to conclude this section .• 
The primitive creative epoch in the history of Christi-
anity was followed in the Middle Ages by a period es-
pecially characterized by the evolution of the 
101. DR, 78. 
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consciousness of opposition between God and the world, 
priests and laity, . church and· state, and, in general 
between the human .spirit, on the one hand, and G.od, ' 
the human spirit .itself .and nature, on the otlfler, and 
hence by the evolution of the sense of the limitation 
and bondage of man. Th.e period of Modern Times, on the 
contrary, is marked, in_ the main, by the development 
of the consciousness of restored:· unity, , and henc:e of 
the reconciliation and freedom of the human spirit.l02 
D. Modern History. Berdyaev, .· in viewing mndern history 
as- a record of .. the testing of human liberty, has chosen a 
category well calculated to link togetber the multifarious· 
activ-ities of modern .man. From a negativ.e standpoint the 
most characteristic phenomenon. of the modern era has been the 
rejection of ecclesiastical authority and. the progressive 
secularization of one area of life after another. 
Berdyaev~s treatment of the early Renaissanc~ is: 
thoroughly in accord with modern .scholarship. Thus Haskins, 
when twenty years · ago his The Renaissance · of the Twelf..th 
Century was published, felt it nec:essary to defend his title.103 
Haskins agrees :: wi th Berdyaev as to the high merits of this·-
age, and in calling it the 11 Medieval Renaissance, ul04 and in 
contrasting it with the later Italic Renaissance as bBing 
more concerned with philosophy and science than with litera-
ture,l05 he would be in "accord with the latter's estimate of 
its essential Christianity. 
102. Vol. I, 261. 
103. RTC, vii. 
104. RTC, viii. 
105. RTC, 278. 
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.Maritain·'s point of view is comparable when he dis~ 
tinguishes between two conceptions of humanism: 
a theocentric conception, which is the Christian con-
ception; and an anthropocentric conception, which has" 
its' first .. origins .in .the spirit . of the Renaissance. 
The first .( theocentric) conception _ may b:e _described 
as authentic Humanism; the second (anthropocentric) 
conception may be called inhuman .Humanism.l06 
The Renaissance proper is adequately and accurately 
described. The rediscovery of natural man, of nature, and 
of antiquity are central conceptions. Berdyaev is to b:e 
commended for emphasizing the fact that . the Renaissance was:· 
not merely a revival of the past, but that it represented a 
creative synthesis of Christianity with antiquity, and for 
his insight that the greatness of its accomplishments lay in 
its attempts to express the new spiritual content of the 
Christian life within the perfect forms of antiquity •. 
Hulme's study, Rena issanc:e and Reformation, contains 
a suggestive comparable passage. ·After . denying that Italian 
pag~nism was due to the study of Greek and Roman life, and 
holding instead that "the resuscitation of the paganism of 
antiquity was merely a confirmation of their own," Hulme 
goes on: 
Eventually they discovered that "a system which sacri-
ficed what .was inward" could not satisfy them; and, 
profound as was the indebtedness of the Renaissance to 
the new paganism;, much of the finest work of the er.a 
106. FMW, 83. While agreeing formally with Maritain's 
distinction, Berdyaev does not agree with the historic con-
tent that the modern scholastic puts into the two periods or 
with his evaluation of them. 
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was accomplished when "the glow of medieval faith" in~ 
spired it. Michelangelo's greatness:, for instance; 
was due to the fact t:hat .,his geniu·s was "spiritualized 
by the reverie of the .. Iviiddle AKe, penetrated by its; 
spirit of inwardness and introspection," that he lived 
"not a mere outward life like the Greek, but . a life 
full of inward experiences, sorrows and consolations •. " 
po, in the later Renaissance, did the Hellenistic and . 
medieval ideals tend to mix and mingle, to become con-
current and concomitant. for<;:es ·.l07 
Berdyaev regards the ending of the Renaissance as due 
to the increasing inner . division within man that was tore-
-
sult eventually in decadence and spiritual disintegration. 
This spiritual interpretation is only ·vaguely_ and partially 
suggested by Hulme's ·remark that "the artistic Renaissance 
died a natural death.. Like all other outbursts of the human 
s pirit it was followed natur~.lly by a period of the sere and 
yellow leaf, a time of lassitude and decline.nl08 This 
rather naturalistic~ interpretation is, however, . temper.ed 
when in a later - passage discussing the period of decline he 
writes: 
Literature and art in Italy had spent .. their force and-
declined from the summits of poetr¥ and· inspiration. to 
the depths · of a facile skill that "G had nothing_ to say. 
The motives t hat inspired the brush of Raphael and the 
·pen of Ariosto were exhausted. Painters and poets alike 
depend in great ~ measure upon .their epoch. They give 
utterance to its thought and aspirations. When these 
have been expressed a pause must come until a succ.eeding 
ag.e has made its contribution , in thought-:,. emotion, and 
ideals, to the history of the world.l09 · 
Berdyaev!s conception of humanism is central for under-
standing his treatment of modern .. history. He rightly sees 
107. RR, , 94f. 
108. RR, 5~3f. 
109. RR, .553 ~ 
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its essence as, a secularism which recognized huma n and mun-
dane values as- having a sufficiency unconditioned by any 
religious sanctions or, considera t ions• Garrison interprets, 
as does Berdyaev, the Renaissance itself in terms · of this 
spirit when he writes of that awakening: 
It was the apparatus by which men could be DUt into 
possession . of patterns of life and thought which had · 
prevailed before humanity had lost the title deeds to 
joy and freedom... This secular ~umanistic delight in the 
life that now is and the classicism which gave it .. an 
honored tradition and an intellectual formulation wer.e 
the primary characteristics of the Renaissanc-e.l..LO 
Hulme pointe out that the huma nistic attitude was not 1mmedi-
a t ely, universally, and unquestion ingly accepteq by a=ll 
scholars. Its aim was to interest~ men in the things perta in-
ing to human life and to free them from the b ondag_e of the 
Middle Ag_es. 
It lacked the piercing spiritual vision of the Age of 
Faith; but, in its purest form., it wa,s by no mea ns de-
void - of the element of relig ion. It sought ,to unite 
the feeling for . b'eauty with . t he spirit of re l igious 
exaltation, _not in moods of rapture and ecstasy, . but in. 
a manner more expressiv-.e of the daily and norma.l life 
of man.lll 
However,- Hulme is forced to conclude: "The medieval and 
humanistic ideals are irreconcilable and mutually, exclusive •. 
One or the other of them had to give way. In the struggle 
that ensued it was the former that .. succumbed."ll2 
110. Art. "Renaissance," ER, 956. 
111. RR, 87. It should be pointed out that .Berdyaev 
excepts early Christian humanism and that of Paracelsus, 
Pico della Mirandola, Erasmus, and More from the negative 
moment that came increasingly to mark the movement. 1lli , 140n. 
112. RR, 88. 
259 
Berdyaev in. his treatment .. of the Reformation . limits 
himself to its Lutheran phase and here ·succeeds well in. 
~ pointing out the ·paradoxical fact that, though Luther freed 
man from the dominance of an absolute church, he tended to 
substitute for 1 t an ab:solute God. This point .. recei vee 1 ts 
most graphic illustration in the relationship of Luther. to 
the humanists, especially to Erasmus • . The difference in 
spirit and ~deals between Luther and Erasmus came to a head 
in _l524 when the latter wrote on ."Tb.e Freedom of the Wi ll," 
in which the reformer's d'octrine of human bondage was-
attacked. On this -position Luther differed both with the 
Romanists and the humanists. As his biograpb.er. has put it: 
In denying the freedom of the human .will and in. insist-
ing upon absolute divine control he was not only reject-
ing the basis for the Catholic belief that . the Christian 
must earn his salvation by meritorious works but was 
also flying in .the face of the modern tendency to empha-
size the natural ability and independence of man~ll3 
Luther replied the . following year with "The Bondage of the 
Will, 11 which was the stiffest possible ass-er.tion of determin~ 
ism and predestinatio~ denouncing any dependence -upon human . 
reason as impious and h~athen, and advocating the unquestion-
ing acceptance of God's revelations, no matter how irrational 
their appearance, and the uncomplaining. submission to God's 
absolute decrees, no matter how harsh they seem.ll4 
Berdyaev; in limiting his attention to Luther, fails 
113. McGiffert, ML, 266. 
114. For a comprehensive statement of the relation of 
Luther to humanism; cf. McGiffert, ML, Chap. XVIII. 
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to see the more far-reaching results of the Reformation •. 
Hulme calls attention :to these in a significan~ chapter, 
"The Results of the Protestant Re.v.olution," in_ which he 
concludes: 
The deepest ~ significance of the ·Revolution liea not . in 
its -::. negative element~ _ nor in. the facts that . it ~ gav.e_ 
birth to new dogmas and organized· new churches, but in 
its deepening of the religious sentiment, the awakening 
of which we have studied in the Revival of Conscience, . 
in .its increasing in the hearts' of men the desire to be 
in harmony with God. In doing this . it exaggerates~ the 
dogmas of _original .sin, grace, and predestinat-ion;, . to 
such a point as. to reduce man t o ,"\ cipher.. The recti-
fica t1on . of this1~rror is the . task of the later s.tag.es of the .movement. ~ . · 
Berdyaev's handling of the period of the Enlightenment. 
is essentially accurate. He . correctly sees it as.· a contin\:l-
ation of the humanist spirit liberated by the Renais:sance, . 
and also sees· it .in contrast to the ini~ial.. enthusiasm of 
that earlier manifestation • . Man's confidence in_his abilities-
lessened as the sceptical spirit began to tell. Metaphysical 
interests lost · their attraction, and in the stead of transcen-
dental inquiries came a delimiting of man's interests· to the 
human realm. Roger's listing of its distincttv,e features are 
in thorough accord with Berdyaev's discussion: 
a certain lack of imaginat1on~ .. a hatr.ed of vague en-:-
thusiasms · and of misty ideas- and ideals, a determination 
to apply the test of a sev·erely critical r .eason . to 
everything and to reject whatever.·will not stand. the 
test, and the constant .. referen.ae im all this,, . as the 
court of final appeal, to the one undoubted fact~-the 
individual man exercising his rational powers · of under-
standing, . and possess,ed of inalienable rights which. 
society is · b..ound to respect.ll6 
115. RR, 370. 
116. SHP, 352. 
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Berdyaev' s dialectical tr~a t:ment 'of the era is eminently 
justified by the fact that . the Enlightenment started as a 
justification of the individual man free from all restra ints, 
but its results tended by reason of. its lack of historical 
appreciation, opposition to feeling, _and general superfici-
ality to a one-sidedness and abstractness· which emptied life 
of much of its concrete and actual content, and was blind to 
many of the deeper aspects of the human spirit •. The impov..er-
ishment of man's ability to know, stressed by Berdyaev as the 
chief negative result of the epoch, finds ample illustration 
in the scepticism of Hums, the materialism of the Encyclo-
pedists, and the agnosticism of Kant's first Critique. 
Berdyaev fails to stress sufficiently the positive 
results of the Enlightenment--its criticism of certain 
medieval and feudal institutions, which, together with some 
beliefs of the Church, were allied with reactionary tendencies 
in the social and political world. Williston Walker . gives 
it credit for certain positive achievements: 
It did a remarkable work in questioning that which had 
been accepted on tradition, in_sweeping. away ancient 
superstitions and abuses, and de~!nding the rightfulness 
of that which claimed authority. ·r 
Berdyaev's analysts of the positive and negativ.e ele-
ments of the French Revolution .are clear and convincing. 
Though the dialectical process of the years 1789-1815 tended 
' to cancel out its achievements, Berdyaev doet;~ : hold that 
117. HCC, 529. 
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some forms of slavery after all are destroyed in 
revolution.. The possibility of historical activ,ity is 
always -conferred upon new str ata .of society. The 
chains which _fettered energy are struck off.ll5 
Whether one will agree with Berdyaev in seeing the Rev.oluti on 
as a failure, or in finding in it permanent andcontributing 
' . 
elements, will depend upon one's basic outlook. Among its 
enduring results may be noted the blows· to absolute ' monarchy; 
the destruction of the remnants of a decadent feudalism such 
as ~ serfdom, ~ priv1leges of the ~obility, guilds, mercantilism; 
the separation of church and state; ab.olition of s:lav,ery in 
French colonies, the elimination of imprisonment for debt, ' 
abolition of primogeniture, wider distribution of land, , 
educational reform, and co.d1fication of law. Among_ the new 
slaveries that emerged were jingoistic and vtrulent national-
ism, fanatical and militant patriotism, and a deplorable 
cheapening of human life.ll9 
Berdyaev. is undoubtedly ri ght in his judgment on the 
Revolution. 
The sla V'Bry of man is not destroyed at the root. 
new man is not an article of manufacture; nor_ can 
a product of social organization. The !~8earance 
the new man is a new spiritual product. 
The 
he be 
Ofc 
Also in his affirmation that "the spirit .J of. revolution shews, 
itself to be hostile to the revolution of .. the spirit." 121 
But there w_ill be those who with a less pessimistic v-iew 
118. SF, 199. 
119. Burns, WC, 598ff. 
120. SF, 199. 
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will agree with Shailer Matthew's concluding remarks in his 
study of the French Revolution: 
Thus it is that although a comparison of the France of 
the Old Regime and the France -of the Restoration. does 
not disclose the realization of all the ideals: for which 
the men of 1789 had hoped, it must be said that, despite 
the Terror and the distortion and perv,ers'ion of French 
idealism:. by Napoleon's militarism, the Revolution_ 
brought to France and·, through .her expanston, to Europe 
permanent good. In ,politics; industry, commerce, land 
tenure, law, , education,. the status of women and children 
and social privilege, old things had passed away. And 
if all things had not become new in . l815, the promise 
of such creation had been given and partly fulfilled.l22. 
Berdyaev rightly sees the tragedy of· Roma nticism. It 
had its orig in in .a rebellion against classicism •. 
Romanticism means·· the breaking apart;: of sub:jectiv.e and 
objective; the subject does not wish to be a part of the 
object, the infinity of the sub jective world is re-
vealed •••• Romanticism . in its torments is a st ruggle 
to set the subject free.l23 
In emancipating the ego from the tyranny of the objectiv,e and 
social world, and in stimulating it s creative powers, the 
Romantic movement served an importa nt purpose •124 
But romanticism itself may become a lure and a slavery • 
• • • Subjectivity ca n become the shutting up of a man 
in .himself, the loss of . communion with reality, the 
mounting up of artistic emotionalism, slavery of the 
individual to himself.l25 
The freeing of theego from the objective world giv.es its 
emotional aspect free and unhampered development with the 
result that the human personality loses its integrity and 
tends tb disintegrate in the ocean of the affective life. 
122. FR, 446. 
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Berdyaev!s analysis is corroborated- by Russell's 
suggestive chapter on "The Romantic Movement,"l26 in whicb. 
the latter concludes that 
the romantic movement, in its essence, ai~ed at liber-
ating human personality from the fetters of social 
convention and social morality •••• But egoistic 
passions, when once let _loose, are not easily brought 
again into subjection to the needs of society •••• 
By encouraging a new lawless Ego it made social co-
operation impossible, and le f t its disciples faced with 
the alternative of anarchy or despotism.l27 
Berdyaev's dissection of the meaning and development 
of industrial and technical civilization is sound. It has 
brought with 1 t an immense increase in the sense of human _ 
power which has enabled man in his conflicts with nature to 
treat it as just so much raw material to be molded to the 
fulfilment of his desires ·. Btit this power. which science has 
given man may also he turned against .man himself, and tr.eat 
him in turn as mere object and raw material. This we have 
seen happen repeatedly in a variet~ of forms from the evil~ 
of the capitalist system of exploitation so vehemently de-
nounced by Ma-rx128 to the contemporary propaganda mills that 
use men a~ mere means to selfish endsi Of the attitude re-
sulting from the release of so much power Russell has written: 
It has already produced immense cataclysms, and will no 
doubt produce others in the future. To frame a ph.ilos-
ophy capable of coping with men intoxicated with. the 
126. HWP, 675-684. 
127. HWP, 683f. 
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prospect of almost unlimited power and also with the 
apathy of the powerless is the most pressing task of 
our time.l29 
Berdyaev's central thesis as to the meaning of modern 
history has been re-echoed in a number of circles · It has 
_received what may be its classic Americ.an statement in the 
thoughtful words of D. Elton _Trueblood: 
The terrible danger . of our time consists in the fact 
that .ours is a cut-flower. civilization. Beautiful as 
cut flowers may be, and much as we ,may use our ingem:1ity 
to keep them looking fresh for a while, they will 
eventually die, and they die · because they are sev-.ered 
from .. their sustaining,roots. We are trying to maintain 
the dignity of the individual a part . fro~ the deep faith 
that every man is made in God's · image and is therefore 
precious in God's eyes.l30 
Maritain, the outstanding neo-Th.omist, who has un-
doubtedly been. influenced bJ7 Berdyaev, 131 expresses a general 
philosophy of culture quite comparable to h.is Orthodox· con~ 
frere. We have noted abDve the distinction, which he draws: 
between the theocentric and anthropocentric conceptions of 
humanism.l32 It is this latter of which he says : "the world 
has had . enough to make it sick and tired--of which indeed 
even God is sick and tired, for it is of just that kind of 
Humanism . that .. He is now engaged in. making an end • 11 133 . In 
his volume True Humanism he points out that thls anthropo-
centrism is fatal both to the idea of man .and to the ideas of 
129. HWP, 729. 
130. PMM, 59f • 
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culture and God that are linked up with it, and which lead 
respectively to disintegration, materialism, and atheism.l34 
He sees in Thomism the salvation of our day in that_" it 
dignifies and rehabilitates the creature in God and for God • 
• • • It is theocentric humanism,. rooted where man has 
roots." 135 
Brunner in his Man in Revolt is concerned with the 
theme of man as he actually is--i.e. in the contradiction 
between Creation-. and- Sin. Man is created· in the image of 
God and is originally united with Him, but . in sin asser..ts 
his false independence. Man may remove this contradiction by 
faith, which is "saying 'yes' to the Word of God as the exis-
tential decision, it is man'.s return from his enmity against 
God to his Origin. ul36 A fuller. citation_ suggests the close 
parallel to Berdyaev• 
The original ground and the orig inal nature of sin is 
the seYerance of man from. his origin, from the loving, 
grac-ious and generous Word of God, which makes him free 
while it binds him, which gives him life in the very act 
of requiring it from. him. In his insane desire to be 
inde-oendent .and autonomous, man denies this dependence. 
The autonomous reason, the man .who makes himself 
autonomous in .his reason, 'captain of his soul,' this 
proclamation of his own-_ glory, . and of reason as- the 
final court of appeal, is the real core of sin, the 
secret .heart·-- of the contradiction in the nature of man. 
For in: point of fact the reason is not autonomous; man, 
even in his reason, is not equal with God, he is not 
his own Creator and Master, and above all he does not _ 
gain. freedom. but .the opposite ·when he severs himself 
from the ground of his freedom:, fr.om th.e Word of God. 
134. Horton, CCT, 59f. 
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This freedom is a lie, and this lie manifes;ts itself 
in the contradiction; in his nature.l37 
A foot-note from Brunner may conclude these refer.-
ences, and serv:e to point out .the obv-ious widespread agree-
ment among four individuals of varying national and religious 
connections' who yet .. agree on a central point relativ.e to the 
destiny of modern man. 
The whole of the more recent history of philosophy--
indeed, the whole history of the modern mind--is the 
parable of the Prodigal Son, a·s told by Andre Gide: 
the son who sev,ers= his rela ti qn with the Father, be-
cause. he wants at .. last to become independent:, fr.ee., and 
thus a human being,, without notici:ng that. in. so doing 
he falls into falsity and misery.l3B 
Berdyaev 's description of the process,· by which indi-
vidualism, unrestrictedby bounds and authority, leads to it~ 
very disintegration has received its fullest documentation 
in the history of our own times. Niet~sche's superman we 
hav.e seen interpreted in terms of a mystic. rac.ialism. that 
ruthlessly exterminated vast numbers of the human·: race. 
Marx's collectivity continues its world-conquest blotting out. 
tt1e image of the individual and free man"';Vherever the 
amorphous communist ., state becomes established • . 
Berdyaev' s indictment of . democracy for its= a t ,omiza ti on 
of society is a just .. criticism;. Democracy's fe.ilure to em-
phasize the community: sufficiently, and its lack of an 
integ:ral purpose · on which all unite, hav.e been glaring 
137. MR, 480. 
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weaknesses in our own day. Berdyaev.' s insight that these 
weaknesses, which threaten man with both material and spiri-
tual starvation, tend to give "birth by way of reaction to 
that of commun~on . with a collectiv~ and the establishment of 
a new principle which shall rescue him from his isolation" 
has been all too evident in our day. Trueblood expresses a 
comparable point of view: 
The danger of emptiness is seen vividly in the desire 
for unity and community •••• Men •••• longed to 
belong to something, and thus arose the new solidari-
ties, which are of so perverted a kind as to menace the 
future of the human race.l39 
We have witnessed, however, in recent ·. years an att.empt by 
democracy to liecome more organic·, . also an effort . to red is-
cover its spiritual roots and heritag_e. 
/ 
Berdyaev!.s description of the progressive delimiting 
of man's capacity to know is true as far_as· it goes, but it 
presents a one-sided· picture. Berdyaev seems: content to 
trace what Windelband calls the . "natural science elt:-
anschauung" which reached its high point in the posi ti visrrr. 
of Comte. This outlook has tended to limit the nature and 
extent . of man's epistemological inquiries by insisting that:. 
all knowledge conform to the certainty and definiteness of . 
natural-science knowledge and be useful. Opposed, howev . er, 
to this point of view is the continuing tradition of the. 
"historical Weltanschauung" which reached its high-water 
139. PiviM, 51. 
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mark in the absolute idealism. of Hegel for, whom. the n.a tural 
was but 
the phenomenal form and vehicle of a purposefully 
developing inner world, and that the true comprehension 
of the par~icular has to determine the significance 
that belongs to it in a purposeful connected whole of 
life.l40 
The reawakened interest in full- blown metaphys ic.s~, ; systematic 
theology, and philosophy of history, of which Berdyaev, him~ 
self i s - typical, testif.ies ~ to the continued V·.-i tali ty 'of. this~ 
tradition in 'knowledge-theory. 
That we are ·witnesBing in our day the shaking of the. 
foundations of both humanist monarchy and humanist democracy 
by the revolutionary advocates of anoth.er org_anic principle 
is obvlous. In _the place of the atomic notion of democracy 
has appeared . increasingly the corporativ.e idea, and in plac.e -
of the national has appeared increasingly_ the imperial.. That 
these notions, in the form of stat e socialism. and dictatorial 
imperialism., are destructiv.e of humanism goes without sayirig, 
but that the increas.ing concern .with the organic notion; both 
within the state and inter-state, need necessarily be non~ 
humanistic is not so self-evident • . The individual and the 
nat1onal state may still be the ends for the prea-ervat1on. of 
which some increasing form of organism may be the essential 
means :. 
Berdyaev' s judgm.e.nt that humanist morality_ has· been 
bankrupted in modern .times is, while a radic:al statement, 
140. Windelband, HP, 625. 
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not without basts. By humanist moralityis meant that ethi-
cal point of view which considers man, his interests, happi-
ness and necessities~ _ as the fundamental problem. Nietzsche's 
notion of the superman, with the new morality . of trampling 
~ 
down those in _ the way and unfettering the b-east ill: _man., has 
challenged the humanist ideal Ln many minds. Rev.olutionary 
and anarchistic conceptions -worked agains"t? ~ humanist .morality 
by regarding all .ethical points of view as relative, and in 
allowing the end of the classless society to sanction all 
means of . reaching it. Religion itself tended to the defeat 
of humanist .. morality by the inculca td. on of other-worldly 
notions which made humanity in some sense secondar_y. 
Socialism, . Berdyaev . is well aware, has a "two-fold 
image." 141 The collectivist, state, fascist, servile brand· 
of either national socialism_ or communism is condemned for. 
its false metaphysics; it is a form of monism. denying the 
reality of the individual personality _ in·" the face of the 
omnipresent, omnipotent .state. Hence, while socialism has: 
taken largely an anti-humanistic cast, it need not necessarily 
be limited to this · manifestation• Of_ other.-socialistic 
possibilities we shall see more below. 
Anarchism; Berdyaev points- out, has a negative value 
in .. expos1.ng the wrongness of despotic c.entraltzatton.. How-
ever it lacks aposttive element and -becomes anti-humanistic, 
141. SF, 200-222. 
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as in Bakunin, .with whom it is ferocious and armed with 
bombs as it confronts the power of society and the state 
with the freedom of the elemental masses, or. in Tolstoi, 
with whom it is benign, idyllic, and given to believe in the 
goodness of human nature so that it takes little interest in 
the victims of violence and compulsion. 
Berdyaev takes a radical view relativ.e to modern art, 
and tends to criticize all of it in terms of some of its 
more extreme aberrations • . He interprets modern art _.from a 
spiritual point of view instead of seeing it in its total 
cultural context. Th.e modern artist faces the problem of. 
finding a natural place in the modern cultural fabric. The 
day of the patron for . the artist . is gone, and as the artist 
finds himself free "he is most likely to conc.entrate upon 
the problems peculiarly his own--form and formal relations.ul42 
Again this same art historian writes: 
Probably one is right in saying that .in _proportion. as 
the painter is excluded from functionlng normally in . 
the social and economic system, he is thrown , into sub-
jectivism, expressionism, theory, and experimentation_.l43 
The anti-humanistic note of modern theosophy which 
Berdyaev contrasts with the full humanistic note of the 
Renaissance is to be interpreted largely in terms of. the 
differing scientific notions. Albeit for the latter the 
Copernican astronomy ha d already displaced the anthropocentric 
142. Gardner, ATA, 717f. 
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idea of the world, the analogy between .macrocosm and mic.ro-
cosm tended to elevate man by an. idealistic theory of_ 
knowledge which held that man is a mirror. of the univ . erse 
and can know all things in so far as he is th.e all.l44 
Modern theosophy _ has developed much more under the influence 
of the idea of evolution in which man, far from being a 
mirror of the universe, is relegated to a v,ery minor plac:e. 
Berdyaev's characterization .of modern~ religion as 
denying: individual .freedom is well illustrated by_ the re-
crudescence in recent . decades of the authoritarian principle 
both within ;the Roman Catholic Church and. within many seg-
ments of the Protestant . Church. This falling back upon_ 
authority would seem to be marked either_ by a lack of con-
fidence in human reason or a fear of it. While both are forms 
of antihumanism, in the one case it sppings~ from man himself,_ 
and in the other from an institution which fears that . the 
further development of humanistic .. learning and insight may 
contribute to its d-ownfall. 
E. Contemporary and Future History . Any;; critical re-
marks on Bsrdyaev• s v.iews of contemporary history seem_ 
superfluous in the light of the commentary of the ev.ents of 
our own days ~. His judgment that we are entering a period 
that may well he described as a "new barbarism" will find no 
rebuttal from any student who has witnessed the events of the 
144. Windelba.nd, HP, 369f• 
273 
past third of a century. The events of these -years have pre-
cipitated a series of interpretations of their meaning_ in the 
writings of Spengler, , Schweitzer, Sorokin, Toynbee, .Berdyaev, 
et al., who stand in relation to these crucial years much as 
did Augustine to the sack of Rome in .410 A.D. An ominous 
note sounds through the writings of these modern authors as 
they_, like Augustine, proceed to pass judgment on history. 
Berdyaev, like Augustine, tolls the bell not for any 
isolated epoch but for the entire "city of, earth." Thus he 
sees in the debacle of our days a judgment upon history it-
self. The essence of that . judgment is ,. that human personality 
is seduced and crushed by the objectiv1e processes of· history 
which are non-human and non-personal.. Berdyaev in_ all his 
writ ings rings the changes upon this theme which is the 
eternal one of means and ends. 
Berdyaev 1 s scathing indictment of the total war system, 
which he sees as "the most extreme form .. and utmost limit of: 
anti-personalism,nl45 is a pointed expression of the besetting_ 
problem of our time. Its inevitable connection with the 
social structure of the modernmational state; its fals'e 
scale of values' which sees human personality as a means to 
an end, a subordinate part . of a superhuman whole; its present 
totalitarian, mechanistic, and industrlaLnature which dis~ 
closes "a demonlacal world slaughter house which destroys 
mankind and civilization on a grandiose scale"l46 are seen .. 
145. SF, 156. 
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about us on all hands. Berdyaev's positiv,e suggestions are 
I 
noteworthy. Warlike instincts cannot be upr.ooted but_ only 
sublimated in 1a struggle a gainst war itself, . class· society, 
injustice.147 This is the basis of his objection . to abstract 
11bourgeois pacifism," wb.ich he interprets as pure pa.ssivity. 
In the final analysis war can be conquered only by a "radi-
cal change in the scale of values" which will place humarr . 
persona lity at the center and recognize it as t he supreme 
value. 
Berdyaev in his opposition to capitalism sees the 
question not in terms of property, but in terms of personali-
ty. Thus "proper~ty is always relativ.e to man, it ,.is 
functional, human, it exists for man. There is nothing what-
ever sacred about property, it ois man that is sacred."l48 
Capitalism -is condemned bBcause under it the majority of 
people are deprived of property, a nd thus lose a guarant·ee 
of their freedom and independence, and because under it 
property b'ecomes an _instrument ... of enslavement .and oppression 
of man by man. Berdyaev reali zes, . as Marx did not, that the 
problem runs deeper than economics. 
It is a question not of social structure, but of 
structure of soul. It does not follow from this ••• 
that there is no need to alter the social structure. 
But it is not to be believed that the social structur e 
will automatically create a new man. socialism. and 
communism may be bourg~ois in spirit.l49 
147. Cf. James 1 s f amous essay, "The l'v1oral Equ i va lent 
of War, 11 found in his Memories and Studies. 
148. SF , 186. 
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Berdyaev' s judgment up'on collectivism which since the 
first World War. has stretched · its tentacles increasing~y into 
all EJ,reas of life is again on . that in .the present hour needs 
nn comment. He is thoroughly aware that organization may 
expand the scope of personali y; l50 s:ee:s that the objectiv.e 
soc·ial world has a positive role to play_ in the introduction 
of order, law, and author1ty; 151 and h·olds' that there are a 
number of areas in which its functions should be br.oadened.l52 
But this necessity, of the state "simply points· to the fact 
that in the hierarchical scale of values it belongs to those 
of the lowest order. rtl53 The dangE}r of. orga nization. in alL 
its forms is that it tends to become the end and regards the 
rest of life as an instrument . and means to that, end. This is 
what has taken place in our_ own day in Germany, Italy, , Spain, 
most of eastern Eunope, and which threatens to embrace within 
its grip .the democratic. nations, either fr.om without by con-
.quest, or . more insidiousl;v from within as they seek to cast _ 
out Satan by Beelzebub. This monster in . the making has been 
well described by Paul Hutchinson in . his Th.e New Leviathan: 
This ne.w Lev1athan .. insists that, in order_ to b:e ready 
for any eventuality_, the will of the state mustc control 
the will of every individual in . the sta te •••• Levia-
than -. insists that uman lives only to perform. his duties 
pertinency of Berdyaev's criticism cf. "The Blast in_Centralia 
No. 5, 11 in Harper's .Ma gazine, 196(1948), 193-220 • 
. 150. SF, 203 :~ 
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to. the state and that man's life has importance only a s 
a servant of the state •••• Leviathan. insists that the 
ultimate fact . in . the universe is· power., and that .. t.he 
morality of the state must .be based on its assumption. 
• • • Leviathan insists that the only security fo~ me~ 
and nations ·· is to be found in .fac.ing the world in arms. 
in .proceeding on the assumption that all men are ' 
potential enemies· and the enemy is never to be g_ra nt ed 
peac:e until he has acknowledged the rule of the 
superior power.l54 
Berdyaev's description of our morality as that of 
l:)estialism would have appeared anomalous to us a few years 
ago, but in the light of the events of the past decade it 
would seem that there are scarcely any depths to which we 
cannot sink. .And worse still is the fact that _ such conduct 
may be rationalized _(e.g. our use .. of the atom bomb_), or be-
comes so commonplace that it no longer bothers us (e.g. the 
continued revelation of the atrocities of concentra tion 
camps). Like Macbeth we ·· can . say: 
I have almost forgot the taste of fears. 
The time has been my senses would have cool'd 
To hear a night-shriek, and my fell of hair -
Would at a dismal treatise rouse and stir 
As life were in't. I have supp'd full with horrors; 
Direness.; familiar to my slaughterous thoughts, 
Cannot once startcme.l5? 
Reinhold Niebuhr's contention that .a sharp distinction. 
must he made between .individual morals and conduct on the one 
hand and the behavior of social group& on the other, that . 
there are elements in man's collective · b:ehavior that~ cannot _ 
be brought under the guidance of reas,on .and conscience, and 
154. TNL, 16. 
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that therefore relations between groups will bE more ruthless 
than those between individuals - is quite. comparable to 
Berdyaev's contention that .the behav.ior of the c·ollectiv.ized 
will-to-power. of industry, state, race, or class is apt~ to 
result in a marked moral degradation of the · individual who so 
lets his conscience become externalized and ohjectivized.l56 
The dehumanization of man that .. Berdyaev·, ob.ser:ves in 
the modern novel, science, philosophy, and= theology would 
take a corps of experts to appraise adequately. A common 
characteristic in all of these areas is perhaps to be found .· 
in the tendency of each to take a part, and to interpret . man, 
who is a whole, in terms of that part. This method of analy-
sis, which is peculiarly the approach of science, has, in an 
age where technics seemed to cry, "Open, Sesame," to all 
problems, been applied to other areas where the human factor_ 
looms large, and where such a method is apt to result in a 
decomposition of man. Such a method is not so false as it ._ is: 
inadequate. Thus the criticism which Berdyaev levels against 
much current literature is justified in that many modern _ 
authors·· describe man not as· what he really is, a unitas_ 
multiplex,l57 but envisage him as a part. The dehumanization 
which Berdyaev finds - in science's discovering_ realities which 
have no relation to man's environrnent . seems rather far-fetched 
since increasingly these realities are being found to have a 
156. For Niebuhr's point of view cf. IvliviiS~ . passim. 
157. ss, 163. 
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very integral connection with him-. His case for the de -
huma nizing influence of applied sc·ience, or technics, is 
much sounder. Again, much of modern philo sophy and theology 
seems t o have been victimized by a sudden awareness of s ome 
hithert o unnotic.ed or unemphasized ' aspect of man, wh ich it 
has proceeded to develop into a new 11 ism11 --e. g . man as sex, 
man as sinner, man as producer, man as anxiety. 
Berdyaev constantly inveighs against the dehumanizi11g 
tendencies inherent in modern developments of state and 
society. He ri ghtly sees that these newer . political notions 
have come to the fore as a result of the inadequacies of 
democracy--primarily democracy's concern .with a formal ab-
stract sort . of political freedom. This impartial political 
liberty has been scornfully satiri zed by Anatole France: 
11 The law in its majestic equality equally forbids the rich 
as well as the poor to beg in the streets, to sleep under 
bridges , and to steal br.ead. 11 l58 Berdyaev' s frequently dis-
paraging remarks relative to democ,racy seem best understood 
as referring to what he calls "the decadent forms of de-
mocracy,"l59 which he sees best illustrated in "the secret 
dictatorship of money in sham democra:cy." 160 That democracy 
has been interpreted largely in terms of laissez-faire, i.e. 
in terms of rights, non-interference, defense of the status 
158. Cranquebuille, cited in the Pocket Book of Quo-
tations~ 177. · 
159 • l<_,MMW, 41. 
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quo, is one of its historical weaknesses which, in the 
present hour, has come to judgment. It is this abstract, 
formal notion of democracy, concerned only with an aspect 
of the individual, rather than a complete democracy ~oncerned 
with the full personality, that Berdyaev condemns. It is 
this inadequate notion .of democracy that has unwittingly 
conj~red up in our day the demons of the modern authoritarian 
states. Berdyaev' s description of their. origirr, differentia, 
and nature is sound. His evaluation-, of their positiv.e con-
tributions is judicious inLlaying stress on their ability to 
avoid the dela.ys of parliamentarianism, solve economic 
crisis, and give immediate and unified action. With prophetic 
insight Berdyaev . rightly discerned the course tha t these 
new political orders, possessed by "the lure of sovereignty," 
would run--that they would continually be encroaching upon 
all other areas of life and seeking to become totalitarian •. 
His judgment that Jthey are merely passing forms would seem 
to be partially verified by the decline in Italy, Germany, 
and Japan. of dictatorship from the right, but . to be falsified 
by the continuing expansion of the.t from the left re.presented 
by the constantly broadening spread of Russian Communism. 
Berdyaev rightly describes · the power of the dictator-
led collective masses that have emerg_ed in our day, and 
appraises correctly the psychological characteristics· of 
such groups: 
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a lack of expressed personality, .an absence of personal 
originality, a disposition ~. to swim with the current of 
the quantitative force of any given movement, an extra-
ordinary susceptibill~Y to mental contagion, imitativ.e-
ness, repeatability. l , -
The threat to any qua.litative culture in such mass-movements 
is obvious~ since the spiritual aristocracy is either 
swamped or crushed • . The collective masses, motivated pri-
marily by economics, appropriatethe technical side of 
civilization, but, lacking any spiritual cultune, . are pe-
culiarly susc:eptib'le to the myths and symbols instilled into 
them by the demagogues--those of rac·e, nation, state, class, 
etc. 
Berdyaev's delineation of the recrudescence of racism. 
and nationalism;. needs no critical remark here beyond that ._. of 
calling attention to the obv.ious racial, , nationalistic bases 
of the majority of the strained relatio_r:1s ex:l,sting irL the 
- ' 
world today. The dehumanizing effect of all such mov.ements, 
which- find the existentia l center in some mythical race or 
national g r oup, instead of in human personality, is obv.ious. 
The phenomenon of Caesarism is increas-ing l y preva l ent 
in our world. Berdyaev! s linking of it with: nationalism., . 
and his forecast that we sha ll be saved from it only_ by world 
federation is in line with most progressive political thought. 
Likewise his foreboding prophecy that such an order will be 
attained only after a considerable portion of humanity has 
161. SF, 121. 
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been wiped out is an hypothesis that is not without serious . 
poss-ibility. 
Again, no comment other than that of the daily head-
lines is ne.eded relative to the emerg.enc.e ·of the colored 
races of the earth who face the Western world with a 
.' 
materialistic, nat~onalistic · outlook. 
Berdyaev's indictment of Christianity is a justifiable 
one. The essence of it appeared in Paul's letter to the 
Romans: 
I beseech you .therefore, brethren, by the mercies of 
God, that ye present , yo.ur· bodies a living sacr.ifice, 
holy, accepta ble unto God, which is your reasonab-le 
service. And be not conformed to this world: but be ye 
transformed by the renewing of your mind, . that ye may 
prov.e what 1~6~hat good, and acceptable, and perfect will of God. 
Christianity has failed, Berdyaev believes, because it has 
so conformed itself to this world that its essential mea ning 
has for great segments of humanity been lost, deformed, , and 
beclouded •. That this is all too true is evident from the 
answers that one gets from questioning people about the sig-
nificance of relig ion. Berdyaev justly sees that the judgment . 
that has come upon Christianity is one primarily upon. its 
distortion and defilement. The new Chr1stian. p1ety, upon 
which he believes the fate of both man and the world to rest, 
will be found as man . turns to God and recovers there his 
int egral human image and then returns to the world and to 
162. Romans 12:1, 2. 
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his fellows in sacrificial love and serYice. This notion 
of Christianity which . s·eerris c ommonplac.e (though by no mea ns 
common) to those reared in the· atm osphere of liberal evan-
gelical Protesta ntism, which has -cultivated both an inne~ 
piety a nd urged the ne ed for . devoted service to ma n, has not . 
been cha racteristic of most Europea n Christia nity aga inst 
which .background Berdyaev is writing. 
As the barbarism which marked the transition per iod 
from the classical to t he Christian world blossomed in the 
Middle Ag es·, so Berdyaev env·isages that . the new barba rism 
characteristic of the end of modern times may serve as an 
int r oduction to "the new Middle Ag es." He wisely, howev.er , . 
limits himself to describing the general characteristics that 
such a period will have. 
Berdyaev' ~ assertion t hat the new vliddle Ag es will not 
be reactionary is adequately defended on the basis of his 
definition of' reaction as . "th'e· wish to return_ to the near 
past, to a state of mind and set of conditions which g overned 
up to the time of a recent change." 163 It .is thus reactionary 
to attempt to go back to the temporal and-accidental of the 
past, but .not t o that which was eternal of the past. This 
is not a too satisfactory criterion, since it would be v.ery_ 
difficult to get agr.eement as ·to the "temporal," "acc.idental, 11 
and "eternal" features of any given historical era by reason 
163. EOT, 77f. 
of the fact that what is evanescent and: passing_ to one may 
to another be permanent and abiding. Thus Berdyaevrather 
arbitr-arily lilmps together as outworn ; manifestations of 
modern history rationalism, individualism-, , humanism, de-
mocracy, industrialism; capitalism, . a theism, and socialism, " 
and declares that the attempt to restore them .would be re-
actionary. Ov-er against them, as worthy of preservation ~ in 
the new Middle Ages, is the ·eternal element of the self-
affirmation of the human spirit which in its creative genius 
has given us Leonardo, Michelangelo, Shakespeare, Goethe, 
and the like. 
Berdyaev's . point of view on this score is quite com-
parable to that of Ma.ritain who insists that he is not "anti-
modern," sav'-e as modernity is self-complac:.ent and marked by 
a hatred of the past, but that, in reality, he is "ultra-
modern" in his desire to preserve the truths of modern_culture 
which are in .danger lest they can be integrated frDm some 
higher perspective tha n the unaided modern mind · can. r .each_. 
Like Berdyaev, he sees the impossibility of r:estoring the old 
Middle Ages, but, again .like his Russian culleague, he looks 
with. longing 
to see restored · in a new world, and informing a new-
matter, the spiritual principles and eternal laws of 
which the civilization of the Middle Agss, in its best 
periods-1 offers us only a particular historic reali-zation. 64 
164. The Angelic Doctor, Preface, cited inJHorton, 
COT, 54. 
Berdyaev sees the new Middle Ages as marked by .the 
end of humanism. ' This will be the case no matter whether 
that age be one of a theocracy or a satanocracy~ since in 
ei th.er outcome humanisiiL in the sense of religious neutrality 
is passe. Berdyaev . helieves that .the essential and et.ernal 
values of the humanist venture of . s ·elf-affirmation,will be 
preserved by the new middle age of Christianity, , but. see.s 
only their. destruction1in the new medievalism of communism. 
Berdyaev is sugg_esting that ,our humanist culture cannot re-
main neutral or in an intermediate state of sec.ular. compro-
mise--that . it must either lose . itself in . Christianity or be 
lost in anti-Christianity. 'Berdyaev is right--a culture or 
civilization is not autonomous but is the expression_ of a 
basic Weltanschauung, and its preseryation~ depends upon its 
remaining attached to the spiritual .matrix that ,. has brnught·. 
it .. into being~ 
The failure of the modern age to achieve "an . inter1or 
unity" has led to an atomistic individualism in ; which. each 
man and each cultural activity _ sought .to be free and emanct-
pated. Berdyaev, in the spirit of Heg.~l, , points out the ah-
stract nature of such notions: "Human .. liberty is , simply a 
formula without any content, and indi vidualisiiL is in, es s.ence 
a negative reform whose development can bring no help to 
anybody ."165 This false liberty, Berdyaev points out with. 
165. EOT, 85. 
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insight, . has led both to the atomization of society, and to 
the reverse process in the mechanical amalgam of socialism .. 
As noted in . the preceding paragraph, man stands to lose in 
either situation qertain notions of individualism and free-
dom~. In some of the moves toward generality, universality, _ 
and collectivity it is obvious that there is no place for 
the achievements and acquisitions of the free spirit of 
modern .times. However, there may be in a recrudescent 
Christian order a saving of these eternal elements. 
Berdyaev's whole treatment of modern histor~ revolves 
about the shift from spiritual and interior to material and 
external values. The domination of economic va lues has 
threatened b.oth the spiritual nature of man and. th.e cultural 
manifestations of society. "For the creation of a new world, 
for . the trans.ition to a new social order . it is nece.a.sary to 
pass through the experience of a real and serious asceti-
cism.11166 This hears a marked resemblance to the asceticism. 
of the historical Middle Ages, which Berdyaev lauds as a 
means whereby man 1 s spiritual and creativ.e forces w.ere con-
centrated and· disciplined·. It would differ. from that. era, ,. 
however, in . that it will come about voluntarily and ~rom 
withfn by the free-act of man by "obedience to his own human_ 
spirit."l67 There would be renewed personal concern . for. the 
social and organic., and a curbing of the lusts of 
166. SF, 222. 
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individualism, but at the impetus of man's own enlight'ened 
freedom, and not as the result of the determinism. and 
slavery of any collective which .would impose such re-
strictions from without. We have seen in our time an in-
crease of coercive asceticism in the interests of war-effort, 
feeding the hungry of the world, and the like • . But by and 
large these coercive acts have been the sou~ce of wide-spread 
complaint, and .when placed . on a purely voluntary basis hav_e 
been largely disr.egarded. A more wholesome trend is p.erhaps 
to be noted in the great relief work carried on . by private 
agencies and in the current "crusades 11 in many of the branches 
of Christianity. These last-mentioned movements are putting 
the emphasis on self-denia;L and are meeting with impressiv.e 
results. 'rt is not obvious to this writer .. that .. the negation 
and replacement of capitalist-socialist . motivations need re-
sult in a generally lowered standard of living to be mani-
fested by a check on expanding wants and. smaller. families. 
Berdyaev's analysis of the growth of modern national-
isms and separatisms; their positive historical values, their 
more recent dangerous forms, , and the current att-empts at 
world unific2Il.ti on are all marked by clear. insight. Hi'.s : an-
tipathy to internationalism and his characterization of it 
as an 11 even worse -idol"l68 than nationalism, "a despicable 
caricature of universalism,ul69 is more difficult to 
168. EOT, 97. 
169. EOT, 98. 
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understand·. Yvhile this reaction is not developed, :l.ts basis 
would s.eem to be clear. To the degree that the emerg.ing 
attempt to reach world unification is seen as inter-national, 
the nation or state remains the ultimate unit, and the 
person is ignored~ Thus Berdyaev would seem to have little 
use for the League of Nations or the United Nations in both 
of which_the sovereignty of the nation remains relatively 
unchallenged. This may be observed from reading the preamble 
to the charter of the United Nations, which, while containing 
fine pe rsonalistic sentiment, has only moral binding force, 
which, both in th.e succ:eeding articles and ·in subsequent 
hist ory, has been ' largely lost in the fictitious realities 
of the states. Berdyaev's criticism of internationalism. is 
perhaps too strong. An internationalism composed of nations 
which envisage the state as a means to the end of the person 
would be a great .step towa rd the attainment of b.is prophecy 
of Christian univer~alism. 
To the degree that the emerging attempt at world uni-
fication .takes the form of an imperium mundi it crushes not 
only the individual but also the na tion .which had at least 
some ontolog ical basis • . Over against the various stripes of 
internationalism Berdyaev . apposes Christian universalism., 
which sees men not in terms of nation, class-, or race, but 
as images of God, as brothers. This notion of men, wh ich 
finds in them a ll a common charact eristic, is the basis then 
for true world unification. The possib.ility of Christian 
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universa lism is pos s ible then only by a rea cceptance of the 
impl ica tions of monotheism, 17° wh ich has bEen eclipsed by so 
many secondary pagan deities each of which in a s~paratist 
fashion has claimed a segment of man. Berdyaev, howev.er, is 
perplexingly vag~e as to the objective manifesta tions tha t .. 
Christian universalism may take. 
Berdyaev's rejection of the possibility of returning 
to the historirr Middle Ag es and a revival of a theocracy with 
its ecclesiastical hierarchy and clerica lism is sound. 
Equa lly indi ca tive of his good sense is his rejection of the 
notion of the Middle Ages' as a time of darkness, his analysis 
of its good and bad qualities, and his judgment tba t it was 
marked by a higher spiritual culture and better relig ious 
type than our day. Between these contrasting evaluations 
Berdyaev takes a mediating stand as is indica ted hy_ his full 
realizat:Lon that "no ecclesiastical hierarchy can now rule 
and regulate society and the life of the State," and that 
equally certain is it that we "cannot re-create the St a t ,e and 
a decayed society otherwise than in the name of religious 
principles."171 
Berdyaey is extremely vague as· to what pos·itiv.B form 
this aspect of the renewed Middle Ages will take. Thus, "God 
must again be the centre of ·our whole life--our_' thought, our 
170. This was first realized historically by Deutero-
Isaiah. Cf. Leslie, OTR, 230f. 
171. EOT, 105. 
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feeling, our only dream, our only hope." 172 A more concrete 
notion is indicated when he holds that "the spiritual centre 
in the nea r future will be as in the old middle ages, the 
Church alone."l73 This last, howev,er, must be interpreted 
in view of Berdyaev's conception of the Church as "cosmic 
by her nature," as containing "within _herself the fullness 
of Being," as 'ithe -universe baptized."l74 
Berdyaev's insistence that whether wa will or not we 
are h_eaded for a new religious collectivity is convincing. 
His view that none of the spheres of creation no~ aspects o~ 
" culture and social life can remain neutral, secular, or com-
pletely autonomous has been the opinion of philosophy 
throughout its history as it has urged men to "see life 
steadily and see it whole." A philosophy is inevitable--
today the sort of philosophy we shall have seems to be 
narrowed down from a cultural standpoint to either "an .atheist 
and anti-Christian civilization, 11 which takes the f .orm of a 
chu:rJch and of a pseudo-religion, or "a sacred culture ani-
mated by the Church." 175 Berdyaev . has rendered great service 
in driving home the idea that life must hav.e a core or center, 
and that the nature of that unity is all-important .. 
Berdyaev's prognostication that .the society of the new 
Middle Ages will take a hierarchical pattern is borne out by 
172. EOT, 106. 
173• EOT, 108. 
174. EOT, 108. 
175. EOT, 108. 
290 
most socia l trends of the past third of a century. There is 
little evid~nce y~t for . his hope that .. the Church and the 
ecumenical spirit will furnish the firm foundation for such 
an order, though the growing ecumenicitywithin the Church 
itself may augur . the day when it may once a gain supply the 
needed spiritual bases for a new society. There is some 
evidence in the continued· growtb.of the lab:or movement that 
other categories than those of party and politicsomay emerge; 
but thus far .· the tendency of such economically unified g roups 
to play politics, . struggle for power, _ and to abus·e it when 
acquired, hardly indicates anything basically; new. 
-BerdyaevJ s distrust ~ of democrac~ which he seems per-
sistently to identify with laissez-faire economics, and his 
failure to see that democracy may embody an orga nic principle, 
g ive many of 'his ideas- a doctrinaire bias • . He often tilts-" 
with a windmill of atomic ind1vidual1.s·m which has few de-
fenders today • . There is in . his reac-tion a g13, inst the political 
principle of democracy a tendency to fall into an equally 
abstra ct 0economic principle of syndicalism. In one of his 
last works in which he wrote most fully on social topics 
there is happily a corrective: 
At the basis of personalist . society at its b..est there 
lies the idea not of the citizen nor the idea of the 
produceri _not a political idea nor an economic idea, . but. 
the spiritual idea of the whole man, of personality .176 
Thus in this same volume Berdyaev takes a milder. stand 
176. SF, 216. 
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relative - to democracy, and in describing his social ideal 
he rejects the notion of "democratic socialism" because of 
the relative significance of t he term "democracy" and 
sub-stitutes that of "personalist socialism."l77 
F. Metaphysics Again. Berdyaev is und-oubtedly right 
in seeing the modern idea of progr~ss as largely a seculari-
zation of the Hebraic-Christian tradition. However, the 
idea of progress which he criticizes- is an extreme conception . 
that would not be shared by all advocates of progress. 
Granted that there ha ve been those thinkers such as Hegel 
whose ob:jective was already realized in the Prussian state, 
Comte for whom the final- pos~_tive stag e ha d already been 
J 
entered, and Marx who envisaged in the establishment of a 
classless society the ultimate good. All of these thinkers 
are guilty of a certain finality and hence seem to advocate 
a condition tha t is finished, settled, and complete. It is 
this concept ion that Berdyaev rails against in decla ring 
that from a religious and ethical standpoint it is inde-
fensible in relegating all men who preceded the final stage 
to the status of mere means and instruments. 
However, a richer conception of pr ogress may be noted. 
H.E. Jensen writes: 
The problem of progress is concerned with the extent to 
which man is able rationally and volitionally to 
determine his own destiny, while the demand f or a fixed 
177. SF, 210. 
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goal implies that he is mo~ing automatically, irre~­
sistibly, .· inevitably toward an end which he can not 
miss, which his intelligence may ha sten or his stupidi-
ty delay , but which in any event his errors can ·not 
ultimately defeat. • • • The problem of progress is·, 
to what extent can he profit by what experience ha s 
taught him of success or f ailure in modifying his 
methods and changing his goals? To demand a fixed 
goal by which progress can be measured reduces to the 
absurdity of demanding that man's control ov.er his own 
destiny be measured by a standard8which .places hi~ destiny b:eyond his own control .l7 
Of progress in the first ,sense Berdyaev is justly critical, 
as are many sociologists. But of the second conception. of 
progress which envisages it not as a state of quantitat-ive 
finality but as qualitat ive improvement Berdyaev is himself 
- I 
a staunch advocate. 
Berdyaev .. ' s criticism of the idolatry of the future 
t ha t has played so large a pa rt in the doctrine of progr ess-
is well taken. 11 The illusion of progress 11 which seeks 11 in . 
t he f ut ure for the fullne s s of a ch ievement and the perf e ction 
of m.eaning 11 is one of the peculiar de ceptions of h i s t orica l 
time.l79 By this illusion me. n i s enslaved to t he histor ica l 
process and is continually oriented toward the future t he 
n.ove lties· of which. he expects will eventually disclose the 
meaning of history• Past a nd pr esent are belittled or ig-
nored, and the future is virtua lly deified as that which shall 
in time bring deliverance. Time cannot be -arb.itrarily 
chopped up into a bad past and a b.eatific future. To stop 
178. ER, Art. "progress, 11 613. 
179. SF, 260. 
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the eternal flow of progress with a ny specific futLU'e s t a te 
beyond which therB can he no further progress is· both on-
tolog ically impossible and lo&i ca lly incompatible with the 
very notion of progress~ And t hus the beatific future i& 
constantly being relegated to t he bad past, and any sta ndard 
of absolute values is lost in t he flux of a rela tivity of 
g ood and evil. 
Berdyaev accepts the .cyclical theory as fur nis hi ng 
negative evidence of the theory of progress. In this regard 
we ha ve pointed out the marked simila rities which are easily 
observable between Spengler . and Berdyaev • . But, though 
Berdyaev is quite willing to wield the cyclical ax in . de-
molishing the bean stalk of progress, he does not acc·ept this 
c onception as an adequate posit ive account of history •. The 
events of the past decade have grea t!ly str.engthened Spengler's 
thesis that our Western civilization is following a pat tErn 
that many others prior to it have taken. While Spengler can-
not be accepted in a doctrinaire sense, we have pointed out 
that several of the outstanding cultura l historians of our 
day a ccept his thesis of decline as descriptive of r .ec.ent 
Western history, though they tend to side with Berdyaev in. 
allowing for the possibility of r ecovery. 
Berdyaev believes- that a "religious transfiguration of 
life and fulfilment of true being," 180 a " submersion of 
180. Ilf!H, 222. 
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hist'orical time in existential time,"l81 is the way_ in which 
culture may esca pe the naturalistic doom. which Spengler re-
gards as inevitable. What Berdyaev is consta ntly driving at .. 
is the conviction that "in cosmic and in historical time, in . 
nature and in . history, everything passes away, everything 
disappears."l82 If life and its values are to b:e conserved, 
it can be only in some realm other than the historical and 
the natural. The alternative then is to see life and its 
values not in objective terms--as is done when thsy are re-
garded as mere naturalistic phenomena--but to comprehend them 
inwardly, in relation to God, to the eternal. This inter-
section of time and eternity sym.boliz·ed by the point is 
ex istential time • . This experience Berdyaev reg9-rds183 aa 
comparable to the "instant" of Kierkegaard, who write& of it ,: 
Such an instant .has a peculiar character • . It is short, 
indeed, and temporal, as eV'ery ·instant is; fleeting as 
every instant is, gone like all instants, the following 
instant, and yet _it is decisive, and yet L. it is full of 
eternity. such an instant must h~ye a special 1~me, l et 
us call it the fullness of time.l~4 
Lowrie comments further: "An instant, if it is only an in-
stant in time, is 'filled with emptiness.' What fills it 
with eternity is the apprehension_of the paradox that God 
became man."l85 Chaning,-Pearce on the same passage writes: 
181. SF, 262. 
182. SF, 267. 
183. SF, 260. 
184. Cited in Lowrie, KIE, 312. 
185. KIE, 312. 
295 
In the i ns t a nt a man, stand i ng within his time and ex-
istence, tE•. ke s · is sta nd i n t he immuta ble and et .erna l 
e s sence or b e ing which unde l~lie them. Exis tence is a 
s tanding out or forth from t ha t pure being; the i ns tant 
is a return to it, a stand i ng within_ it.- Thus t he 
existentia l movement, accord i ng to Kierkegaard , i s from 
a nd thr ough existence to t he 11 insta nt., 11 and t ha t move-
ment i s one of inwardness •••• In tha t~ instant t he 
inward a nd the eternal meet in a timeless he re-a d- n ow 
reached through and within, yet ever beyond , our spa~e­
time continuum. T~ere is t he point of intersection 
where t be long itudina l line of hu.man .life, love (eros), 
thought a nd time meet .the vertical line of eternity and 
the dovmpouring love (aga pe) of God .186 
Kierkegaard's approach, which is substa ntia lly t ha t 
also of Berdya ev, is prima r ily but a reint~rpreta tion i n t he 
l a nguag e of existential psychology a nd philo s ophy of the ag e-
old relig ious phenomenon of conversion. fillia m James's 
definition of the process is equa lly applicable to the ir more 
t he olog ical formulations. 
To be converted, to be r eg enerated, to receive gr a ce, 
to experience relig ion, to ga in an as s ura nce, a re so 
many phra ses which denote the process, gradual or s udden, 
by which a self hitherto divided, and consciouFJly wrong , 
inferior and unhappy, bee ome s unified and c onsc iou.sly 
ri ght, superior and happy, in . consequence of its firm.er 
hold upon relig ious rea liti es.l87 
This experience, while taking place within hi s to r ical 
time, is interpreted as putting t he individual into contact 
with s uper-historica~ realities, wh ich contact. brings a h out a 
transformation of the individual and of his attitude toward 
the historical natura l world. This experienc.e has been g iv.en 
classic poetical form. in The Everlasting Mercy of John 
186. Art.(l947), 58. 
187. VRE, 186. 
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Masefie ld whose Saul Kane up on his conversion cries out : 
0 g lory of the lighted mind. 
How dead I'd be en , how dumb; how blind . 
The station brnok, to my new eyes, 
Was babbling out of Paradise, 
The wa t er s rushing from the r a in 
Were sing ing Chr ist has r isen again. 
I though all earthly creatures knelt 
Fr om r a pture of the joy I fe lt •. 
The narrow stat i on-wa 11' s brick ledge , 
The wild h.op v; i thering in the hedge, 
The light in huntsman's upper. storey 
Were parts of an eternal glory, 
/ere God's eternal garden flowers.l88 
In his advocacy that the meaning of history lies be-
y ond history Berdyaev is to be seen as return i ng to the 
hist orical dualism tha t received exemplary for~ . in Augus-
tine 's The City of God. Gone is the nineteenth century ex-
c lusive preoccupa tion with the mundane actualities and human_ 
activiti es, and once again there is a return to the transcen-
dent a l a nd to the divine. The exclusive worship at the 
s hrine of empiricism has been eschewed, a nd once again meta-
physical speculation has come to the fore . Unity_ and con-
tinuity in t he historical pr oces s are increa s i ng Ly dubious, 
and the f a ctors of conflict and contradictionl have come 
proportionately more to t_he front. Shirley Jackson . Case had 
well summar i ze d this new ·outlook: 
The whole world is one va s t a rena of embattled opposites, 
and its ultimate na. ture is incapable of being understo od 
by the unifying hypothesis of progressive histo~ica l 
development. Its secret ca n be di scovered only by recog-
nizing t he f act .of irreconcilable contrad ictions, . by 
setting up against every affirmation its corre sp onding 
188. POE, 118. 
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negation, by admitting ·the necessity of dealing constant-
ly with pros and cons, a nd by refus:ing to be deluded 
into believing that the conflict cameve~ be resolved 
upon the plane of mundane existence.l89 , · 
Though reacting against a n exclu.sive historical natu-· 
ralism, . Berdyaev does not swing to the opposite extreme of 
an exclusive super-histo~rica l supernaturalism, which would 
belittle a nd mitigate the entire terrestrial prncess as of 
little meaning or significance. Thus Berdyaev. is in ag_ree-
ment with Ma ritain when the l a tt er writes: 
An es sentially anti-humanist philosophy would involve .an 
absolute condemnation of culture or of civilization. 
Such is perhaps the tendency of the ultra-ca lvinist 
theology of persons like Karl ·Barth. But this absolute 
conde:.mnation of human . values is Manichea n a nd non-
Christian; it is incompatible with the central truth 
of Christianity;, the dogma of the Incarnation.l90 
Berdyaev is concerned with the wh ole and seeks not so 
much a nega tion of the historical pr ocess as its fulfillment •. 
But he equally asserts that tha t f ulfillment must . be compre-
hended ip. other than utopian terms • . His is a philosophy of 
synthesis a nd synopsis which seeks to bind together the 
natural and superna tura l, the terrestrial a nd celestial, 
earth a nd h.eaven, man and God. 
It is the multiple a ttempts to find the ultimate 
meaning of h.istory in events within the hi s tor:l..ca1 process 
itself tha t lea ds Berdyaev to h is apparently appa:lling_ pess-i-
mistic utte rance that history is a r a dical failure. If we 
189. CPH, 93. 
190 •' FM!N, 83 . 
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grant Berdyaev's ma in thesis that terrestrial hist ory is to 
be understood only in terms of a larger whole, t hen it must 
log ically follow tha t any attempt to by-pass this l arger whole 
and find ultimate mea ning in t erms of the part:s is doomed to 
frustration. This is true i n a ll a reas of life as case 
studies in psychology , sociology , and history show . Ian ' s 
exclusive dependenc e upon his own. strength has l ed continually 
to h is frustra tion. and has proved "the hopelessness of t he 
situa tion from the world's viewpoint."l9l Berdy.~ev would b.e 
open to the cha rge of an . unmitiga ted pessimism if this were 
his final word, but as be decla res: 11 Tb.e end is a div,ine-
human matter . And the l as t word, wbich is God's, wil l i nclude 
a lso a word of man. 
impossible . rr 192 
Thus an absolute pessimism is • . . 
Maritain's view of the future is likewise a mixture of 
pess·imism a nd hope as he looks forward to a theocentric 
humanism and yet concludes: 
However, the time for this bas not yet,. come. A torrent 
of blood, a veil of sorrow, indescr.ibab.le humiliation, 
wretchedness a nd cruelty sta nd· in. our way • It seems 
that our eyes have witnessed too ma ny unpunished crimes, 
too ma ny deaths· in despair .·to see, save as a mere hope , . 
the arrival of a new Christendom. The liquidation. of 
four or five centuries of history cannot take plac e in 
a single day. But let . us hope at least that~ when the 
period of darkness, of whi ch God a lone knows the extent, 
is· over and when the nece s sa ry cha nge of s pirit, of. 
wh ich God al one knows the depth, has taken place, there 
will . come a new Christian .era of culture, an age of 
integral humanism ••.• There is · no despair of man, once 
our entire hope is plq.ced in"God.l93 
191. Berdyaev, Art .(1936), 426. 
192. Art .(1936), 427. 
193. Art .(1947) , 310f. 
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In his rejection of wha t he describes a s tl1e "mono-
physi tism" of both patristic: and humanistic anthropology, 
b oth of which he condemns for neg l ecting es sential aspe cts 
of mankind, a nd in his proposed synthesis of God and man, 
Christianity a nd crea t ton, Berdya ev has render.ed a signal 
contribution to the liberal cause smarting under the attacks 
of neo-orthodoxy for its lack of depth and yet loathe to 
return to eitQer Catholic or Protesta nt cscholasticism. He 
has· indicated h ow a tL1eistic world-view can steer. b:etween 
the extremes of deistic- superna tura lism and humanistic. 
na turalism and preserve the essential values of. each. 
Be r dyaev is concerned with preserYing the va lues .of humanism, 
which ha ve so richly testifie~ to the crea tive genius of man, 
but sees that . this can be done only by man's creating not in 
his own name but in that of God. Phythian-Adams has found in 
this the gist of Berdyaev's message and his significance fo r 
our_ times : 
Berdyaev is a trumpet calling Christians, first to com-
urehend to the full the almost incredible riches of t he 
glory of their ·inheritanc e in the saints·, and then, in 
the power_,which is theirs always in Christ, , but of which 
t hey ha ve been unconscious or neglectful, to use their 
p ower_creatively as fellow-workers with God.l94 
Again I'Te note that Maritain's view is similar. Writ'!"' 
ing of the new age he describes it as 
an age not of theocracy or of humanism, but an ag~ mor e 
human than humanism a nd more divine than theocracy; an 
age in which the dignity and the nobility of cr.eation 
194. Art.(l938), 263. 
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will be more than ever recogniz ed but in the measure in 
whi ch creatures are of God and in which He lives in 
them: humanism, yes, but .. a humanism of the Inca rna ti on; 
theocracy, yes, but a theocracy of divine love in-
P.abiting the heart.l95 · 
Berdyaev's notion of the Church is a radical and 
challeng.ing one. Gone for him .is any distinction between 
the sacred and the profane, the supernatura l and the natural, 
the Church and the world, religion and life. We hav.e a re-
emphasis upon the ancient Greek ideal of naturalism in which 
all aspects of man's multiple nature were seen as good. 
For both Berdyaev and for the ancient Greeks evil lies not, 
as it has for much of the Christian .tradition, in .. something 
organic, but ~ is seen as a functional disorder. All of life 
is to be understood as under the aegis of religion~-reli~ion 
so conceived includes labor, art, science, philosophy, love, 
friendship, recreation--all the values of life. For . Berdyaev, 
then, neither religion nor the Chur ch is ~ relegated to a 
corner of life, but is rather "the whole plenitude of hei.ng" 
as that all is transfigured and related to the divine. The 
emphasis upon a dynamic, creative, conception of the Church 
which is to become actualized and incarnated in all of life 
and to lead to its total transfig).lration is an idea of. es-
sentially greater appeal than that of a static, finished in-
stitution which is a lready realized and which contains but a 
segment of life. 
195 • FMW ;· 159 • 
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Berdyaev's conception of the ethica l behavior of man 
c onfronted with the t a sk of transfig uring the world is, like 
hi s notion of the Church, darine a nd cha lleng ing . His criti-
cism of the ethics of the l aw as moving on the surfa ce and as 
fail ing to t a ke acc ount of the individua l and unique va lues 
of personal ity is we ll t a ken. This is essentially t he c r iti-
cism tha t has been made of lega lism f r om the judgment up on 
Pharisaism by Jesus to the modern considera tion of Kant. I n 
a ll s uch cases t here iE? a l a ck of interest in the h i st orica l 
a nd s cientific basis of mora lity, _ a failure to cons i der the 
new and the unique, and a tendency to subjugate the personal 
to the i rnpers ona l.l96 Berdyaev.- doe s not ., swing to an ant i-
nomi a n extreme but see s the mora lity of lega lism as a mini-
mum mora lity with abiding va lues wh ich cannot be d i sregarded 
by Chr i st i anity. 
Ber dyaev's criticism of trad iti onal Christian mora li ty 
i s tha t since it dea l s with man's redemption f rom mora l evil 
that man ' s ethica l deve lopment may he arr.ested at. the immature 
stage of persona l sa lvation • . Tha t this is a justifiab:l e 
criticism of t he ma ss of Chr i stian believers is obv ious both 
I 
froo h i st orica l study and from present emp irica l obser _vation. 
Berdyaev rightfully condemns the tendency for . entrance - i nto 
the Chri s tia n li f e to be s een as a g oa l rather t han a s a 
beginning . 
196. For expansions of t he se criticisms cf. Titus, 
ET, 2nd edit., l47ff. 
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In the ethi cs of creativeness Berdya ev has wrought a 
s ynt hesis of the pa rt i a l ins i ghts of the t wo preced i ng con-
ceptions of t he mora l task i n s e eing that man's redemption 
is incomplete until i t involves b oth the vertical thrust of 
the i nd ividual soul towards God a s i n the a c t of contem-
pl a tion it acquires the intuitive i nsight . of genius, a nd t he 
horiz ontal thrust towa rds ma n as in se l f-sacrificing lov.e 
it seeks to rea li ze by the out er crea tive a ct the inspirati on 
of genius. Berdyaev, like Pl a to, is confronted with t he task 
of reconc iling aristoc.racy and dem ocracy a nd, like the 
latter, solves it by stressing the need for those wh o hav.e 
behe l d t he light re turning to a id in effecting the salvation 
of their not so g ifted fe llows.l97 Berdyaev's awareness 
that creativeness sta nds in need of purification, wh ich can 
be accomplished only through t he medium of self-sacr ific ing 
love, i s aga ina sound insight whi ch is be ing increasing ly 
testified to as an objectiv . e f o.ct by psychologist[, s ociolo-
g ist and historian.l98 
Berdyaev, together with the other _exponents of the 
exi s tentia list philosophy, has rendered servtce in bringing 
to t he fore the rea lity of dea th which has tended to b~ 
pushed aside as something that wil l t ake pl ace sometime in 
the future, or else is mitigated by the combined efforts of 
the hushed hospital corr_idor and the undertaker's parlor. 
197. Cf. Plato, REP, 519C. _ 
11 198. Cf . Maritain, FJ:.lNv, "On the Purificati on of 111Iea ns. 
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Berdyaev's emphasis' on the p ositive significance of death is 
echoed by Quick: 
No final or perfect .good is atte.inable in . this world at _ 
all. For onlyby the sacrifice which deatb seals ca n 
the work of love be broug ht , to f -inality •• • • Christi-
anity, alone a mong the r e lig ions and ph.ilosophies of 
the world, succeeds in .eliciting from __ death, i.e., from 
th.e actuality_ of dying, , a unique _ va.lue, so that it is 
found to make a pos·itive and necessary · contribution_ to 
the perfection of created 1 ife. • • • To it dying is, an 
essential part~ or moment in that .. act . through which love 
accom_plishes the self-sacrifice which issues in eternal 
life.l99 
As an evil dea tb. is the .result of __ the soul's abandon-
' 
ment of God. Ma n is for .-Berdyaev 11 God's- child and creation 
a nd · a lso the child of freedom and •• ~ non-heing. 11200 The 
soul that renounces God and ohoos~s to identify itself with 
freedom a nd non-being will inevitably perish in the final 
passing away of that realm. This conception definitely seems 
to be in ha rmony with the New Testament teaching that God's 
purpose in .. human affairs is not to condemn but to save and 
deliver. As Paul describes it, 11 the wages: of sin. is death, 11201 
thus suggesting that the universe is' such a mora l and spiri-
tual order that sin results inevitably in. death • . Corruption 
and dissolution of personality follow from. the refusal of 
self-denial just as "the refusal to amputate a diseased limb 
may result in·_ the corruption of the whole body." 202 
199 • DC, 213 f • 
200. DM, 70. 
201. Romans 6:23. 
202. 'Quick, DC, 257n. Berdyaev would here seem to he 
amenable to the doctrine of annihilationism, but one that is 
self-caused r a ther than due to any act . of God. 
Berdyaev's rejection _of. the natural immortality of the 
soul a s derived from .its substantiality is sound • . As 
Knudson puts it: 
The assumption of the simplicity of the soul was based 
on a realistic metaphysics a nd on a mista ken inference 
from the conscious unity a nd identity of the self. The 
self is a spiritual and dynamic, . not a substantial 
unity. There is no simple a nd unitary soul substance. 203 
In rejecting all impersonal conceptions of immortality, 
and in stressing personal immorta lity, Berdyaev stands well 
within the main . line of Christia n tradition. He envisages 
personal immortality, not in the Hellenic sense as inv.olving 
only the soul, but in the broader Hebraic sense as involving 
a lso the body, a nd not only the body but the entire created 
world. 204 
Closely connected with this notion is Berdyaev!s 
view of conditional immortality. Man achieves immortality 
as he struggles for personality, i.e. as the eternal and im-
mortal element within him, his spirit or divine likeness,, 
gains possession and control of the psychical and physical 
elements. Personality with its wholeness and unity is an 
emergent .quality tha t is due to t he action on the psychica l 
and physical of the sp iritual element.205 
203. DR, 487. Cf. Brightman's rejection of the same 
notion in POR, 355ff. 
204. Cf. the appeal of this broader view to ~· . Norman 
Pitten~er in his essay, "The Christian Hope of a Transfigured 
World, cited supra, Chap. VII, l89n. 
205. Berdyaev's view ·of personality reflects the tri-
partite theory of the soul as found in Plato, but without the 
latter's intellectua lism and dua lism. Dean Inge has touched 
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The notion of the resurrection of t he body is a pe-
culiarly difficult one for many We stern minds to accept, 
imbued as they are with Greek notions of immortality. Yet 
as rationalistic a thinker as A.C. Knudson finds value in 
the conception as over against the pure immateria lism of the 
Greeks which he holds 
made no provision for concreteness and richness of life, 
for distinctness of individua lity, and for communi on 
with others •••• The idea of body does add something 
of posit ive value to that· of mere s pirit, and for t h is 
reason the traditional doctrine of the resurr_ect.ion of. 
the body has persisted· down to the present •. · In its 
orig inal crude form it is, of course, , obs_olete, but _.as 
a symbo l of the rea lity and the richness· of the life 
hereafter it is still of significance •••• Su.ch a 
body may h e th ought of as more resp onsive to the soul, , 
a more perfect mirror of i t , a nd a better·· mea ns of 
communication with others than the present. body.. In any 
case it symbolizes a richer and mvre definite 5gde of 
being than that suggest ed by a bodyleS~s soul.2 
Qu ick, likewise, finds in the spiritualized form of t he 
doctrine an es sential value, testifying tha t .the indiv.idual 
organism as well as this whole age or world-order 
must wholly die in its present earthly sta te in order 
to ~eceiv.e from God that full a nd heavenly gl or~ of 
whi ch its created na ture ha.s made it capa_ble •. The gate-
way to tne heavenly and eternal life is the self-
sacrifice which Christ first accomplished only through 
his dea th, and in which he enables Christians to follow 
him . And thus in Christ the univ,ersa l f a ct of physica l 
upon a critical point .in Berdyaev's psychology when _he aBks, 
"What is the relation between .the eternal a nd timeless s pirit 
and the living creature which came into the wor ld at .. birth?" 
Art.(l9 46), 200f •. We have a lready, sugge sted this weakness 
in dealing with the conception of pre-existence which for 
Berdyaev, sta nds or f a lls · together with that of immortality. 
206. DR, , 499f. 
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decay and death becomes fo r man, as it were, the sacra-
ment of the inward and spiritual truth that life must . 
be . wholly surrender_ed before it can be wholly won.207 
Following a comment in which he states tha :t Berdy_?ev' s meta--
physics come closest to doing ju s tice to the Easter-g ospel 
Quick concludes: 
So far. as it concerns the destiny of the individual . 
soul, the ess,ence of the Easter~gos·pel consis·ts in 
declaring in Christ the correlation between the com-
pleteness of the surrender of life to God and the com-
pleteness of its· restoration in glory, •••• All that 
lives in~ this w·orld must _really die. Bu.t this fact . of 
mortality may be made the opportunity for enter-ing into 
the · service a n d life-surrender: of the Son of God; a nd:, 
by so entering, . this morta l personality of ours, ; a nd 
not . supposedly any undyi ng part of it,. must at . the last 
through death put on immortality~ To be a · partaker_ of 
Christ 1 s life here and hereafter, as in, heav..en so on 
earth, is what the Christian means by life eternal. 2 08 
Berdyaev .! s conception of eternal life as a spiritua l 
life that may be entered here in time is a conceptton which 
we have noted is similar to the New Testament teaching. We 
have noted also Knudson's acceptance of a comparable idea. 
Quick's suggestions relative to this theme are quite in 
harmony with the notions of Berdyaev. 
We dare not say how far on the other side of physical 
death a soul may have bppor~unity for completing a self-
surrender which on this side it hardly seemed to ha v.e 
- . I begun-- just as we cannot say how far_ Christ s greatest 
saints had been received into the life of heaven_ ev.en 
before in the body they crossed. the narrow stream. But 
this much . surely we know, that whenever, . and. not until 
a man's surrender of himself to the God of love has been 
altogether . accomplished, he attains the en~ of his 
being; and that end is not death but life. 09 
207. DC, 268. 
208. DC, 270. 
209. DC, 270. 
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Berdyaev's treatment of hell is much more acceptable 
to the modern mind tha n ma ny of the traditional acc.ounts- of 
it. He rightly speaks the modern sentiment when he rejects 
the doctrine which sees hell from t~e divine point of view 
and as an objective reality. As Knudson says of such. a con~ 
ception: "In more recent times there has been a pronounced 
revolt against it •••• There is a growing feeling that 
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eternal puni~hment is inconsist ent with the divine goodness." 21° 
Quick points out that this point of view is in basic agree-
ment .with the New Testament: 
It is fundam~ntally in accordance with the t he ology of 
the New ·Testament to affirm that ~ , the purpose of God's 
intervention . in human affairs is always to save and de-
liver, although the salvation and, deliverance may in-
volve the condemnation and destruction of those who · 
resist God.211 
Berdyaev's positive account of hell as · seen frDm the 
human point of view and as a subj ective reality is ba sed on 
a definitely empirical and psycholog ical approach. Pitten-
ger's notion of hell as "willful a1ienation from God and 
pers ist~noe in that alienation," and Tillich's concept ion of 
it as "the decision against ultima te meaning, "212 are quite 
comparable in agreeing with Berdyaev . that there is a psy-
chology but not an ontology of hell. Quick sees many of the 
historic doctrines of hell as dramati zations for the purpose 
of impressing up on the sinner the seriousness of his fate. 
210. DR, 502f. 
211. DC, 255. 
212. Supra, Chap. VII, 20lf. 
It iS ' only ma n's failure to appreciate the terrible 
mea nihg and possibility of -s uch a fate, which exc uses 
the Church for painting it in the most lurid colours 
it co uld devise, even at the risk of marring its own 
g ospel.213 
Ber dyaev's description of heaven or pa r ad ise indy-
namic t e r ms is more appea ling to the modern mind than many 
of the trad itiona l sta tic conc epti ons. Knudson, likewise , 
g ives a n a ctivistic interpretation .when he registers his 
belief that "it will be a li fe continuous wit h the present 
••• a life of service a nd of pr ogress , a social life, a 
life of lov.e a nd yet a life of tran s cendent joy and peace . u 2 l~ 
Berdyaev's rejection of the notions of heav.en wh ich 
would make it either. compl e tely transcendent or compl etely 
imma.nent again is a testimony of his f i tness to serv.e as a 
media tor be tween the extremes of modern the ology which tend 
to be e ither completely other-worldly or completely this-
worldly. 
Berdyaev' s conception of sa lva tion as i nvolving not 
onl y the individual but a l so one's · fellows and the cosmos i s 
definite ly relat ed to th~ universali sm of Or i gen and h is 
spiritua l disciples. The work of salvation and transfigu-
ration must continue unt il a ll has been redeemed, ev.en t h ough 
the task will t ake other ae ons than this. Though Berdyaev 
states that theoretically hell may be escaped eiLher by 
annihila tion, a nd return to non-be i ng , or by salvation and 
213 . DC, 258 . 
2 1L~. DR, 5D4f. 
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return to true being , in a ctua l pr a ctice he str>esse s on l y 
t he l a tter possibility a nd. sees the task of man s s cre-
e.tively cooperating with God in the task of . conquering evil 
a nd he ll. 
' The question of universa lism is admitt ed ly a specu-
l at ive issue upon wh ich no f i na l de cision .can be ma de . 
rguments in favor of it have been ba sed upon 11 l 8g i ca l in~ 
ference from the sufficiency of the atonement," ho l d i ng that 
"universal salvation must be a rea l possibi l ity;,'' and if so 
then "ultimately a fact." To the desree that the f inal re-
s ult is not salvation but condem.nation God ' s purpose is 
frustra ted. 215 The -doctnine is a l s o strengthened by the 
purported a rguments for it by Pa ul which . in. essence sta te 
tha t "since God ' s fir s t word is pr omise , not law, his~ 
word must be salvation, not judgm(:mt."216 
Aga inst the doctrine may be put the opinion of BW 
Testa ment writers that men may a nd will reject the g ospel. 
Further, tha t 
it would contradict the vary esserice of the g ospel to 
suppose that God will ever compel a. soul to salvation; 
and therefore the presentation of his final offer of 
salvation in Christ must impose upon the soul an 
absolutely critical choice.217 
That God's wi ll and purpose is the universal salvation. 
of all may b:e agreed upon by everyone. That this pur.pose 
215. Qu ick, DC, 258f. 
216. Quick, DC, 259 
217. Qu ick, DC, 260. 
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depends for its fulfillment upon ~ a free responsa b~ each 
individual is likewise acceptable. That this purpose is 
meeting opposition and frustration· seems obvious from our. 
own observation .and experience. Whether we are Justified in 
setting limits. to what ~_ - God' s love may achieve, or whether 
we must admit that there is real possibilityand probability 
tha t his purpose will never be fully achieved is. a question 
that cannot be conclusively answered-. For Berdyaev,, at,_ 
least, the process of redemption will go on eternally, until 
everything is transfigured by, the joint effort;s of God and 
man into a Christianized cosmos. 
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7. -----------------Au seuil de la nouvelle e oque. 
Trans lated by Doria Olivier.) 
Neuch~tel-Paris: Delacb.aux et Niestle, 1947. 
8. -----------------Dialectioue existentielle du div in et de l'humain . 
Paris: J anin, 1947 • 
.Addi tiona.l German _ Titles 
1. -----------------Die menschliche-Pers~nlichkeit und die liberpers ~nlichen 
Yverte. 
Vienna : Bermann-Fischer, 1937. 
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2. -----------------
Sinn und Sch icksa l des russiscben Kommunismus. 
(Transla ted by J, S cho~.) 
Lucerne: Vita nova verlag, 1937. 
Additional: Spanisb Title 
1. -----------------
Las Fuentes el Sentido de l Communismo Ruso. 
Translated by Vincente Mendivil.) 
Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1939. 
Articles by Berdyaev 
( Tba following list of articles has been taken from. 
the files of Put' in the Los Ange les Public Librar.y. The 
translations are the work of the resident priest of the 
Russian orthodox: Church of the Holy Virgin Mary in Los 
.Angeles.) 
l. BERDYAE.'V, Ntc ola s. 
11 Tsarstvo bos ie i Tsarstv.o kesarya ·." 
(The Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of caesar.) 
Put .', 1(1925), 31-52. 
2. -----------------11 Evra z iyt sy. 11 
(Eurasians.) 
Put', 1(1925), 134-139· 
3. -----------------
"Neotom:l..zm." 
( Neothomism.) 
Pu~, 1(1925), 169-171. 
4. -----------------
11 Sla sen:l..e 1 tvorchestvo. 11 
(Salvation and Creativenessr.) 
Put', 2(1926), 26-46. 
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5. -----------------
"0 Dukhovnoi BurzhuaznostL'' 
(On the Spiritual Bourgeoisie.) 
Put', 3(1926), 3-13. 
6. -----------------
11 Otvet' na Pi semo Monarkh ista." 
(An Answer to the Letter of a Monarchist.) 
Put' , 3(1926), 140-144. 
7. -----------------
"0. D'erbinei o Religioznom' Obraze Ivioskvei v' Oktyabre 
1925 • II . 
(d' Herbigny and the Relig ious Aspect of Moscow in 
October, 1925.) 
Put', 3(1926), 145-147. 
8. -----------------
"Kosmar' zlog o dobra." 
( Nightmare of the Evil Good.) 
Put', 4(1926), 103-116. 
9. --------~--------
"Dnevnik' filosofa." 
(The Diary of a Phi losopher.) 
Put', 4(1926), 176-182. 
10. -----------------
"Zhozef' de Mestr' i Masoistvo. 11 
(Joseph de Maist re and I asonry .) 
Put', 4(1926), 183-187. 
11. -----------------
"Tserkovmaya smoota i svoboda sovyesti." 
(Church Perturbati ons and the Free dom of Conscience.) 
Put', 5(1926), 42-54. 
12 . -----------------
13. 
14. 
"Novaya kniga o Yakovye Berne." 
(New Book on J acob Boehme.) 
Put', 5(1926), 119-122. 
"Antichristianskaya mysl' (Tsel 's' )." . 
(Th e Antichri s tian Thought ( Ce lsus).) 
Put', 5(1926), 131-132. 
"Naooka o re lig ii i chri s tianskaya a.pologetika.n 
(Science of Religion and Chri stian Apologetics.) 
Put', 6(1927), 50-68. 
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15. -----------------
16 . 
11 K. Lo s skiy. Svoboda volu." 
(K. Lossky. Freed om of the Will.) 
Put', 6(1927), 130-131. 
-----------------
" Iz' r a zmy sh l enii o teoditseye. 11 
(Reflections on Theodicy. ) 
Put', 7(1927), 50-62. 
17. -----------------
18 . 
11 S 'ye zd ' v' Avstrii." 
(The Conference in Aust ria .) 
Put', 8 (1927), 131-133 . 
11 Utopicheskiy zt at i sm evoa ziztsev' .'' 
(The Utopian St at ism of the Euras i ans.) 
Put', 8 (1927), 141-144. 
19. -----------------
"Olvinenie zapada." 
(Accusation of the West .) 
Put ', 8(1927), 145-148. 
20. --- --------------
":Metafizicheskaya probl ema svobody ." 
(The Me t aphysica l Problems of Freedom.) 
Put ', 9 ( 1928 ), 41-53 · 
21. -----------------
"Kat olichestv.o i Action Frangaise." 
(Catholic ism.: and· Act ion Fran ga ise.) 
Put', 10(1928), 115-123 . 
22. -------~---------
23 . 
24 . 
" Je an Izoulet. Paris Capi t a le des Re lig ions ou l a 
Mission d 'Isra~:ll. 11 
Put', 10(1928), 130- 132 . 
"Tri Ubi ley a ( 1. Tolstoy, Gen . Ibsen 1 , N. Fe dor ov 1 ) • 
(Three Jubilees (L. Tolstoy, H. Ibsen, N. Federoff)!) 
Put', 11(1928), 76-94. 
11Augustin J akub i s i ak, Essai s ur l es limites de 
l'e s~a ce et du t emps . 
Put:, 11(1928), 127-129. 
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25 . 
26. 
-----------------
" fla rki onizm '~· 
( 'IIar cionism. .. ) 
Put ', 12 (1928), 116-121. 
"Obskuranti zm' • 11 
(Obscurantism. ) 
Put', 13(1928), 19-36 . 
27. -----------------
28. 
"Illuzii i rea l'nosti v' p sieh ologii emigrants koL 
molodezhi." 
(Illusions and Rea lities in the Psychology of t he 
Emi gr ant Youth.) 
Put', 14(1928), 3-30. 
uDnevnik' filosofa." 
(Phi losopher 's Diary.) 
Put', 16(1929), 82-94. 
29. -----------------
"O Sofiologii." 
(On the Sophiology.) 
Put', 16(1929 ), 95-99. 
30. -----------------
11 Jean Wahl . Le malheur _de la conscience dans la 
philosophie de Hegel. 
Put', 17(1929), , ·104-107. 
31. -----------------
32. 
33. 
34. 
"Gra f' J.P. Grabbe--Alexis s . Kh omiahoff. 11 
(Count J~P. GrabbB--Alexis s. Kh omiahoff.) 
Put', 17 ( 1929), 108- 111.~ 
"Drevo ztzni 1 drevo poznaniya •11 
(The Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge.) 
Put~, 18(1929), 88-106. 
" Novaya kniga o Ya. Be me." 
(New · Book on Jacob · Boehme.) 
Put', 18(1929), 116-122. 
"A. K. Gornostaev. Rai na zem1e." 
(A. K. Gornosta ev. Paradise on Earth .) 
Put', 19(1929), 114-116. 
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35. -----------------
"Iz' ztudov} o . Ya. Berne. I. Uchenie ob' Ungrund i 
svobode." 
(From the Sketches on J. Boehme. I. On Ungrund a nd 
Freedom.) 
Put', 20(1930), 47-19 • . 
36 
-----------------
. 
"Friedrich Karl Schumann. Der Gottesgedanke und der 
Zerfa11 der Moderne. '' 
Put', 20(1930), 113-116. 
37. -----------------
38. 
39· 
40. 
41. 
42. 
"Iz' ztudov' o Ya. Berne. II .. Uchenie o Sofin_ i 
androginye. Ya. Berne i roosskiya : sofio1ogicheskiya 
techeniya." 
(From the Sketches on J. Boehme. II. On Sophia and 
Androgyny. J. Boehme and Russian Sophio1ogica1 
Currents.) 
Put', 21(1930), 34-62. 
-----------------
"Pamyati Kn. G.N. Trubetskogo." 
(To the Memory of G.N. Trubetskoy.) 
Put', 21(1930), 94-96. 
-----------------71 Vostok' i zapad' ." 
(The East and the West.) 
Put', 23(1930), 97-109. 
-----------------
"E. Brunner. Gott und Mensch." 
Put', 24(1930), 122-124. 
-----------------
"Spor' ob' antroposofii. 11 
(The Controversy on Anthroposophy.) 
Put', 25(1930), 105-114. 
-----------------rrv' zashchitu A. B1oka." 
(In Defense of A .. B1oka;) 
Put', 26(1931), 109-113. 
-----------------
" .A smus. 
(.Asmus. 
the New 
Put' _, 
Ocherki istorii dialektiki 
Sketches on the History of 
Philosophy.) 
27(1931), 108-112. 
v novoy philosophii.'' 
Dialectics and of 
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44. 
-----------------
" Emmanuel Berl. Mort t.- de la moral bourgeoise.) 
Put', 28(1931), 104-106. 
45. -----------------
"Literaturnoe na.pravlenie i 'sotsial'nyi zakaz''. 11 
(The Literary Trends and the Social Requirements.) 
Put', 29(1931), 80-92. 
46. -----------------
11Pravda i los' kommunizma." 
(The Truth and Lie of Communism.) 
Put', 30(1931), 3-34. 
47. -----------------11 0 g ordosti smirennych'. 11 
(On the Pride of the Me ek.) 
Put', 31(1931), 70-75. 
48. -----------------
"Pages choisies du P • . Laberthonniere." 
Put', 32 ( 1932), 103-105. 
49. -----------------
so. 
51. 
52. 
"General'naya liniya sovyetskoy filosofin i 
voinstvoouscbchii a teizm'. 11 
(The General Line of the . Soviet .. Philosophy and the 
Militant A theism .• ) 
Put', 34(1932), 1-28 (supplement). 
" Duch ovnoe sostoyanie sovremennago mira." 
(The Spiritual State of the Modern World.) 
Put', 35(1932), 56-68. 
11 Garrigou-1agrange. 1a Providence.u 
Put', 35(1932), 97-99· 
"Dva ponima.niya Ohrist.ianstva ·." 
(Two Understand ing s of Christianity•) 
Put', 36(1932), 17-43. 
53. -----------------
11 Comte Hermann . de Keyserling. Meditations sud-
america ins." 
Put', 36(1932), 89-93. 
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54. -----------------
11 N .A. Setni tskiy. 0 konechnom' idea le. 11 
(N.A. Setnitsky. On the Ultimate Ideal.) 
Put', 36(1932), 93-95. 
55 . -----------------11 Cherovyek ' i mas ina. Problema sotsiologin i meta -
f iziki techniki.) 
(Ma n and Machine. Tne Problems of Sociology and of 
the Metaphysical Technique .) 
Put', _38(1933), 3-37. 
56. -----------------
"Martin Buber. 11 
Put', 38(1933), 87-91. 
57. -----------------
58. 
59 . 
60. 
61. 
62. 
11 Soorna 1 '.i!.spri t' i duchovno-s otsial 'nyya iska niya 
frantsuzskoy molodesi.~ 
(The Magazine 11 Espr1t" . and the Spi ritual-Social Search 
of the French Youth.) 
Put', 39(1933), 78-82. 
11 Schmidhauser, Der Kampf urn das geistige Reich ." 
Put', 40(1933), 66-70. 
- ------------~---
"Hearing, Dieu et Cesar." 
Put', 40TI933), 70- 72. 
-~---------------11 Mnogobosie i natsionalizm." 
(Polytheism a nd Nationa li sm .) 
Put ', 43(1934), 3-16. 
-----------------11 Poznanie i obschchenie. 11 
(Knowledge and Communication.) 
Put', 44(1934), 44-49. 
----~------------ h 11 11 Komediya pervorodnago gryec a. 
(The Comedy of the Original Sin.) 
Put', 44(1934), 68-72. 
--~~-Ch;;:~~;:;~~;~m' pessimizmye i optimizmye." 
(On Christia n Pessimism and Optimism.) 
Put', 46(1935), 31-36. 
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64. 
----------------
"Chto takoe chelovyek'?" 
(What is Man?) · . 
Put', 47(1935), 86-89 . 
65. ----------------
11 Persona lizm I i Iviarksizm r • 11 
(Personalism _a nd Marxism .) _ 
Put', 48(1935), 3-19. 
66. ---------------~ 
"Russkiv duchovnii r enes sans' na gala XX V.I. Soornal 
I Put r f • rr 
(Russian Spiritual Renaissance of t~e Beg inning of 
the 20th Century and the Magazine Put'.) 
Put', 49(1935), 3~22. ----
67. ------------- ---
"Duch' velikago inkvizitora." 
(The Spirit of the Great Inquisitor.) 
Put', 49(1935), 72-82. 
68. ----------------
70. 
71. 
72. 
73. 
"O relig ioznom' sotsia lizmye." 
(Religi ous socialism. ) 
Put', 49(1935), 86-91. 
"Problema chelovyeka." 
(The Problems of Man.) 
Put', 50(1936), 3~26. 
"Lev ' Shes t ov' • " 
Put ', 50(1936), 50-52. 
"Pamya t i Georgiya Ivanovicha Chelpanova." 
(To the Memory of Ge orge I. Chelpanoff.) 
Put ', 50(1936), 56-57. 
"I. N. Danzas, L'itineraire religieux de la conscience 
russe." 
Put', 51(1936), 74-76. 
"Ortodoksiya 1 chelovyechnost'." 
(Orthodoxy and Humanity.) 
Put', 53(1937), 53-65. 
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74. -----------------
11 Pamyat i Andreya Fedorovicl1a Karp ova." 
(To the Memory of Andrew F. Karpoff.) 
Put', 54(1937), 72-73e 
75. -----------------
"Kirche, Volk und Staat. Stimmen aus der Deutsc hen 
Evangelichen Kirche ·zur Oxforder Weltkirchenkonferenz ." 
Put 1 , . 54(1937), 74~76. 
76. -----------------
11 Christianstvo i anti semi tizm ' ." 
(Christianity :and Antisemit ism,.) 
Put' , 56(1938), 3-18. 
77- -----------------1'J,. Grenier, Essai sur l'esprit ,.d'orthodox·ie." 
Put', 57(1938), 8¥-86. . . 
78 . -----------------
11 Osnovnaya ideya filosofi n L. Shes·tova." 
(The Basic Idea of the Philosophy of L. Shestov. ) 
Put', 58(1938-1939), 44-48. 
79. -----------------11Pamyati pa py Piya XI." 
(To the Memory of Pope Pius XI.) 
Put', 59(1939), 55-56. 
Bo. -----------------
"Christianstvo i sotsia l'nii stroy." 
(Christianity and the Socia l Order." 
Put', 60(1939), 33- 36. 
81. -----------------
11 S . Frank' • Nepost is imoe." 
82. 
(S. Frank. The Unintelligible.) 
·Put', 60(1939), 65-67. 
-----------------
"Voyna 1 e scha tologiya ·. '' 
(War and Escha to1ogy .) 
Put', 61(1939-1940), 3~14 • 
. -
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Translated Artic le s by Berdyae~ 
1. BERDYAEV, Nicolas.--Art. (1926) 
"Die=; Krisis der Kultur.'_' 
Europ&ische Revue, 2(1926), 6-18. 
2 . --------------------Art. (1927) 
"Die Ill.uterung des l" Ussischen Nationa. lismus." 
(Translated by 0. von Taube.) 
Preussische Jahrb~cher, 210(1927 ), . 198-202. 
3. --------------------Art. (1928) 
"Der neue Typus der russischen Jugend." 
EuropMi sche Revue, 3(1928), 811-817. 
4. --------- ---- -------Art . (1931) 
"Utopia Come True." 
Living Age, 341(1931), 155-158. 
5 . - -------------------Art. (1932) 
"Psychologie der russisc hen Gottlosigke it." 
Hochl and , ; 29(1932), 193-206. 
6 . -- - -----------------Art. (1933)1 
"Christianity a.nd Communism. 11 
ComiiLonweal, 18( 1933), 440-442. 
7. --------------------Art. (1933 )2 
"The Bourgeois Spirit." (Also in Bivi .) 
(Trans l ated by Countess Bennigsen.) 
Dublin Revi ew , 193 (1933) , 169-180. 
8 . -------------------- Art . (1933)3 
11 General Line of Sov1 et .Philosophy." (Al so i n EOT . ) 
(Tra nslat i on of Put' artic le 49.) 
American Revi ew;· 1(1933), 536-559. 
9. -------------------- Art . (1934) 1 
"Metamorphosis of Marxism. '' 
American Review, 3(1934), 501-515. 
10. ---~----------------Art . (1934)2 
"Man, t he Ma chine, and the New Heroism ." (Also in m . ) 
(Translation of Put ' article 55 .) 
Hibbert J ourna l, 33 (1934), 76-89. 
11. ---------- - ------ - --Art. (1935)1 
. II 
"Young ,France a nd Socia l Justic.e . 
Dublin _Rev i ew, 196(1935 ), 37-46. 
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12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
-------------------Art. (1935 )2 
" Can Man Survive ? I. 'l'he Breakdown of the Humanistic 
Theory of Progr ess." 
(Translated by William H. Dunphy .. ) 
The Livins_Qhurch, 92(Jan. 26~ _ 1935), 97-99. 
-------------------Art. (1935J3 
" Can Ma n Survive? II. The Decadence of Liberty." 
(Trans l a t ed by William H. Dunphy.) 
The Living Church, 92(Feb . ·2, 1935), 133-135. 
-------------------Art. (1936) 1 
"Destin .de l' homme dans le monde actuel." 
Revue Politique et Lit t era ire~ 74(1936), 73-78. 
-------------------Art. (1936) 2 
" ~Var and the Christian Conscience." 
The Living Church, 94( Ma y 16, 1936.), 621-623~ 
-------------------Art. (i936)3 
"Christian Optimismand Pessimism." 
(Translat ed by Donald Lowrie .) 
(Translation of Put' article 63.) 
Christendom~ 1(1936), 417-427. 
---------------~---Art. ( 1937 )l-
11 Is Russia Going Fascist?'' 
· Christian Science Moni tor_, . Feb:. 17, 1937, 1-2. 
. 2 
-------------------Art. (1937) 
"The Crisis of Christianity." 
(Translated by Donald Lowrie.) 
Christendom, 2(1937), 228-240. 
-------------------Art. (1938) 1 
"Spiritual Dualism and Daily Bread." 
(Translat ed by Donald Lowrie.) 
Ameri can Scholar, 7(1938), 223-229 • . 
2 
-------------------Art . (1938) 
"Crime of Anti-Semitism. 11 
Commonweal, 29(1938), 706-709. 
-------------------Art. (1938~ 
11 Marx v s • Man. 11 
(Translation of Put' article 65,) 
Religion in Li:re;-7( 1938), 483-496·. 
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22 • . -------------------Art. (1939) 1 
11 Fa ta 1 i ty or Faith. 11 
(Translated .by Donald Lowrie.) 
Christian Century, 58(193§1), 603-604. 
23 . ----- - -------------Art . (1939) 2 
"The Paradox of Falsehood.'.' 
(Translated by Donald Lowrie • .) 
Christendom, 4( 1939), 494-501. 
24. -------------------Art~ (1946) 
"Deux etudes sur J .. Boehme . 11 
(Probably translations of Put ' articles 35_ and 37.) 
in Jacob . Boehme, MysteriU'iii':Uiagnum. 
Paris: Bib:liotheque philosoph~que , , 1946. 
25. --------------- ----Art. (1948) 1 
"The Crisis of European Consciousness." 
(Translated b:y Eugene Lampert· .• ) 
The Living Church, 116(Feb. 15:, 1948), 11-13_. 
26. -------------------Art. (1948) 2 
"The Spiritual State of the World Today." 
(Translated by Helene Iswolsky.•) 
Religion in . Life, 17(1948), 503-516. 
Secondary Sources and General Bibliography 
Anonymous. 
"Existentialism." 
Time, 47(Jan. 28, 1946), 28f. 
"Religion." 
Time, 49(Feb. 3, 1947), 65. 
"Berdyaev, Orthodox Religious Philosopher, Dies in. Paris . 11 
The Living Church, 116(April 4, 1948), 8. 
ARCHAMBAULT, Paul.--Art. 
"Le drame de la liberte dans : la philosophie de Berdiaeff ." 
Politique, XI, 2, 123-143. 
ARENDT, Hannah.--Art. (1946) 
"French Existentialism." 
Nation, 162(1946), 226-228 . 
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AUBR£Y , Edwin E.--Art. (1948) 
"The Philosophy of Nicolai Berdyaev." 
Theology Today, 4(1948), 522-533. 
AUGUSTI NE .--CG 
The City of God. 
(De Civitate Dei, translated by John Healy. ·) 
New · York: E.P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1945. 
B.AKE!lELL, Charles lVI . --SBAP 
Source Book in Ancient Philosophy. 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907~ 
BERGSON, Henr i.--ME 
Mind-Energy. 
(L'energ ie spirituelle, translated by H. Wildon Ca.rr.) 
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920. 
-----------------CE 
Creative Evolution. 
( L ''€voluti on .cr€a trice, 1907, tr.ansla ted by .Arthur Mitchell.) 
-----------------OM 
The Creative Mind. 
(Translated by I\Iab:e lle L. Andison.) 
New York: . The Philosophical Library, 1946. 
BIXLER, Julius Seelye. --Art. ( 1940) 
"The Contribution of Existenz Philosophie. " 
Harvard Theological Review, 33 ( 1940), 35-63. 
BLANDSHARD,. Brand et al.--PAE 
Philosophy in American Education. 
New York: Harper and Br others, 1945. 
BOURKE, V.J.--Art. (1936) 
"The Gnost icism of N. Ber.dyaev." 
Thought, 11(1936), 409-422. 
BOWNE , Borden Parker .--TTK 
Theory of Thought a nd Knowledge. 
Hew York: .American .Book Company, 1897. 
--- --------------------viET 
Metaphysics. (Revised edit ion.) 
New York: American Book Company, 1898. 
-----------------------KS 
Kant and Spencer. 
Best on: Rought on Mifflin Compa_ny, 1912. 
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BRI GH TMAN , E.S.--PG 
The Problem of God. 
New York: The Abingdon Press , 1930. 
- --- -------------FG 
The Finding of God. 
New York: The Abingdon Press , 1931. 
- ---------- -~ ----Art. (1932) 
" A 'remp ora li st Vi ew of God. " 
Journal of Re lig ion, 12(1932), 544-555. 
-----------------PR 
Per.s ona. li ty and Relig ion. 
New York: The Abingd on Press, 1934. 
----------- ---- - -POR 
A Philosophy of Relig ion. 
New York: Prentice-Ha ll, Inc., 1940. 
-----------------Art. (1944) 
11 Personalist Doctrine Imperiling Personal Unity • 11 
Christendom, 9 (1944), 520-522 . 
-----------------NV 
Nature and Values. 
New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1945. 
-----------------Art. (1947) 
"Bowne: Eternalist or Temporalist. 11 
The Personalist, 28(1947), 257-265. 
BROCK, Werner.--ICGP 
An Introduction to Contemporary German Philosoph~. 
Cambridge: Cambr idge University. Press, 1935. 
BROWN , John 1.--Art . (1946) 
11 Paris, 1946--and its Three Warring Literary Philosophies • 11 
New York Times Book Review, September 1, 1946, 9. 
----------------Art. (1947) 
"Chief PrOiJhet .of the Existentialists.~' 
New York- Times Magazine, February 2, 1947, 20. 
BRUNHER, E.'m i 1.--MR 
Man in Revolt. (Der Mensch im Widerspruch, 1937, translated by Olive Wyon.) 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939. 
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BURNS, Edward IvicNa.ll.--WC 
Western Civilizations. 
New York: W. W. Norton and Company , Inc., 1941. 
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The ~nglish Ph ilosophers from Bacon to Mill. 
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CASE , Shirley Jackson.--OPH 
The Christian Philosophy of History. 
Chicago: University of Chicag o Press, 1943. 
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"Spren Kierkegaard ." 
in Donald Attwater (edit.) , Modern Christian Revolution-
aries, 1-85 . 
New York: The Devin Adair Company, 1947. 
Ch4RKE , 0. Fielding.--Art . (19 48) 
" Nikolai Berdyaev 1874-1948." 
Current -Religious Thought, 8 (1948 ), 7-10. 
DAVIDOFF, Henry (edit.)--PBQ 
The Pocket _Book of Quotations. 
New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1942. 
DELESA LLEZo' Jacques. --Art. ( 1937) · 
"Cinq meditations sur l'existence .'' 
Revue de ph ilosophie, 7(1937), 56-68. 
DEMOS, Raphael.--POP 
The Philosophy of Plato. 
New York: Charles Scribner' s Sons, 1939. 
DENNERT, Eberhardr-Art. (1928 ) 
"Ber ja jews Gesch ichtsmetaphys i k . 11 
Ge isteskampf der Gegenwart, 64(1928), 408-419. 
ED1~N , Irwin (e dit.)--POS 
The Ph ilosophy of Schopenhauer. 
Hew York: Random House, 1928. 
Encyclo~e d ia Britannica.-- ~B 
The 1 t h ed., 23 vols. and index vol. 
London: The Ency cloped i a Britannica Company, 1937. 
EUB.i!.RWEG, Friedrich.--HP 
History of Ph ilo sophy. (2 vols.) 
(Grundr1ss der Gesch ichte de r Philosoph ie, 1862 to 1866, 
translated by George s . Mor ris.) 
New York: Sc ribner, Armstrong and Company, 1874. 
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FEDOTOV, G.P.--Art. (1948) 
" Nicholas Berdyaev as Thinker. 11 
The Living Church, ll7( Sept. 19, 1948), 15-24. 
FERM, Vergilius (edit.)--ER 
An ~ncyclopedia of Religion. 
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FL::EVVELLING, Ra lph Tyler.--Art. (1947) 
Reviews of Sa.rtre 's No Ex it and The Flies. 
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GARDN~R , Hel en.--ATA 
Art Through the Ag es. (Revis ed edition.) 
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"Plato's Philosophy of History • 11 
Christendom, 2 ( 1937), 436-447. 
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"The Abyss and The Given. 11 
Christendom, 3(1938), 508-520. 
HASKINS, Charles Homer.--RTC 
The Renaissance of t he Twelfth Centur~. 
Cambridge : Harvard University Pre ss, 1927. 
HEGEL, G.W.F.--PM 
The Phenomenology of Mind. 
( PhMnomenologie des Geistes, 1807, tnanslated by J'""B. 
Bai llie.) 
New York: The IVIa cmi llan Company, 1931 . 
---------------lOG 
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ABSTRACT OF TE:!: DI SSErtTATI ON 
The problem of this d i sserta tion i s to present. a 
crit ical expositi on of Nicole.s Berdyaev's phi losophy of 
h istory. 
An adequat e philos ophy of history will not be reached 
by attent i on to objective , abstrac t, and general concepti-ons 
wh ich but lead to intellectua l superstructures devnid of 
s ubstantia l exi.stence , but only by . concentr.E.tion .. upon. the 
s ub j§ctive , the c oncrete , and the par_t icular_ which are of. the 
very subs tance of history. This personalist ic, anthr_opologi~ 
cal , ex i stentia l appr oach sees history not as an. obj.ectiv . e 
pr ocess, b ut .. primarily as a spir i t _ual event which may he 
apprehended i nwa rdly through. t he 11 hist.orical memory" stimu-
la ted into activity by the acceptance of r e ligiou.s· myth, 
the greatest being tha t of the Fall . This myth is n ot to be 
acc epted conventionally, na tur a listi ca lly, nor .. literally but 
to b.e subJected to a spe culative process leading to the dis-
covery of deeper E)piri tual truths revelatory of inner r..eali ty •. 
The temporal, h.istnrical, phys ica l fact~ are not self-
expl anatory and self-sufficient but are to be compr_eherrded 
in _ terms of the eternal , metaphysical, spiri tue.l reality. 
This l~tter is not a static, monistic, immobile perfection. 
but contains a tragic potential _reveal13d in a dynamic dualism.. 
It is most adequately portrayed in the Christd.an" myth of. 
the divine Hypostases and further _illustrat.ed by the German_ 
mystical doctrine of the Gotthe i t or Ungrund from vrhich by 
a theog onic process the creator-God and freedom are mani-
f e s ted. God's creative taslc is conquering the free do!Jl of 
no"n-being . ~vil i s account ed for by God's powerlessne ss · 
over this recalcitrant factor. fJa n , t he image a nd likeness 
of God and possessing free d om, is called to crea ti v.e co-
operation .in ~od's work but rebels against Him· only to dis-
cover his freedom illusory as he be c.omes enslaved to h is 
lower natur e. Nan gains fr.eed om. a nd is restored to his 
orig i na l wholeness through the mediation .. of Christ the God-
/ 
Ma n whose grace enables man _ to make freely his resp onse to 
God a nd to help in the work of conquering non-being . I•ian 
a nd h is historica l ex i s t ence a r e t hus rooted in t he eternal 
a nd make a contribution to God in whom a l one their mea ning 
is r etained. 
The scientific study of ma n .beg inning with his i m-
mersion in nature pre s upp oses h is Fall. ncient non-Jewis 1 
cultures l a ck with primitive man an hi s to r ical s en se in 
bBing t horoughly at h ome in a nd formi ng a part of na tur e. 
Opposing t he r esulting static or. cyclical. notion of h is t ory 
the Jews develope d an h i s tor ica l dynamism ma r ked by extreme 
futuristic expe ctation s largely seen i n ter s of ter~est~ial 
fulfilment. Jesus did not fulfil these expectations a nd was 
rejected a s t he Messia h by most . of the Jews. Christianity 
ma de historical deve lopment p os sible by emphasl.zing t he 
freedom of the human spirit .as over agains t _ the pr e- c·_ristian 
concern with either na ture or God. Christia nity deliver.ed 
man from his b.ondage to nature but drov.e a wedge between 
natura l and s p i ritual man. Ma n retired from the natural 
to the spiritual world where after strugg le with the baser 
elements of his being he emerged a free human personality. 
The riliddle Ages forged and fortified human personality by 
its ascetic discipline and centralized spiritual authority. 
Its hope to realize the Kingdom of God failed since this: 
cannot be established without the free consent and uartici-
.. 
pation of man. 
Berdyaev. sees modern . history as the testing of human 
liberty. Humanism rebe'ls against medieval subjection in 
aff irming man's self-confidence, but. it ends in .. debasing him. 
through severing his celestial ties and in seeing him as but 
a part of nature. The Renaissance rediscovered natural man 
and antiquity, witnesse d the clash of pagan and Christian 
pr inciples, and saw their partial reconciliation in the 
great symbolic art of the age . The Reformation affirmed 
man's freedom from ecclesiastical compulsion, but it .. debased 
man by deny ing his primal .freedom before God. The En-
lightenment affirmed man's self-sufficient reason, but in . 
denying any mystery it debased man's ability to know. The 
French Revolution affirmed man's ability to change history 
but ended in denying all human rights. Romanticism af-
firmed man's spiritual resources but denied his ultimate 
destiny • . Industr.ialism affirmed man's liberation from nature 
but denied his integrity and dignity . Modern. history by a 
3 
fatal d ialectic sees humanism paradoxica lly be coming in-
humanism; the denial of God tending t o the denial of . man .• 
Berdyaev . sees the present as the beg i nning of a nevr 
barbarism the inhuma nity of whi ch is manifest in the total 
war. system where human 11 ves are regarded as mere means; · 
in capitalism under wh ich man is enslaved and oppressed by 
property; in collectivism where the orga nization . becomes 
the end and man , the instrument; i n a morality of besttalism 
wh ich permits th.e use of man _ in a ny way to attain inhuman. 
or ant i-human ends; in cultural manifestations in. literature,. 
science , philosophy, and theology which interpret integra l 
man ~ in terms , of a part; in . politics with . sham_ democracy 1 s 
concern .with only abstract, formal p olitica l free dom and 
the totalitarian!s rej~ction of a ll freedom; in the d ictat or -
led masses in which all individuality; is ruthlessly obliter-
ated; i n the intensification of rac i alism and nationalism 
which find the ex ist entia l _ center . in. entit ies other. than_ 
human personality; in_ the tyranny of . Caesar_s.: who rule by 
appeal to instinct .and emotion; and in~ a Chri.stianity that 
large ly conforms to the world •. This barbarism may lead on. 
to the new Middle Ages which Berdyaev sees marked by t be end 
of humanism, individualism, and formal liber a lism; a _ simpli-
fied material culture; political univer.salism.; - religious~ 
collectivism; ·and a · social or.der of the syndicalist_ type •. 
Berdyaev. rej ects the progressive and cyclical nDtions 
of history . Though Western civiliza tion . is at. a crisis , 
4 
he postulates the possibility of salvati on through reli&ious 
transfiguration. . Th i s wi ll take place only a s Chr.istiani ty 
and cr.eation .ar.e combined, i.e. as a dynamic ., cr.ea.tiv.e con-
ception of the Church .. becomes· actua lized and incarnated in _ 
a ll areas of life. 1\f.;.a. n's ethical task is one of cr.eativ.ity 
as i n contemplation . he acquire.s the i ntuitiv.e insight: of_ 
genius and in_ self-sacrificing love he actual.i.zes his inscpi.-
r ation • . Death signifies that ther.e is no eter.ni.ty in time 
and t hat an endless temporal series is meaningless--•. Ma n _' s 
role in . this situa tion is to forsake t he creat ion of t~mporary , 
transitory~ and corruptible goods and to devote hims-elf to 
the creation , of eternal, permanent, and immortal valu.es·. 
Hell , which results from man .' s separating h imself from God, _ 
can be escaped only through the God-man Christ.and those wh o 
are spiritually _his . Paradise comes not only at . the end of 
time but at . every moment as a God-huma nism by creative ac tivi-
ty redeems, transfigures, and Christianizes. t he ent i re cosmos. 
The following problems and obser.vations are s orne of 
the results of the investigation . ( 1) Berdyaev ' s- ph ilosophy 
of history, r eflecting his own unique spiritual exper.ience, 
is peculiarly personal . The b'est . approach to_ his writings~ 
is through his life, and the best insig ht .into his life is to 
be gained throug h his writings . 
(2) In his quest for. historical insight - Ber.dyaev 
stresses "knowledge by acquatntanc.e" as over against . 
"knowledge about • 11 Reason _ is seen_ primarily not~ as abs tra ct, 
5 
but as a personal experience. This leads to an appreciation 
of the ways of knowing by intuiti on , mys ticism, reve lation, 
and faith, but fails to ca rry full conviction because of 
hesitancy to criticize r ationally the claims of these ex-
periences or to sue; ge s t ways by wh ich their claims might he 
va lidated. 
(3) Berdyaev envisages the ultimate wor ld-ground in 
terms of Christian superna turalism but without making any 
effort .. to justify rationally this metaphysica l outlook. 
However, within this tradition he makes full use of reason 
i n a ttacking the inadequa cies of theistic absolutism a nd in 
establishing the·case for a theistic finitism. This suggests 
the problem as to just wha t is his attitude towa rd reason. 
(4) Berdyaev .'s recourse to the doctrine of t he Ungr und 
involves a number of contradicti ons : it is i n d irect oppo-
sit ion to his epistemolog ical p os ition in being a h i ghly 
rationalistic noti on; wh ile it is a nega tiv.e conception :to 
Hhich none of t he forms of t hought are applica ble, a number 
of rationa listic ca tegories are used in its elucidation; 
wh ile by means of it movement is i ntroduced into t he world-
ground, this is accompli s hed only by relegating the revea led 
Bibli ca l God to a secondary position; ·while movement . is made 
centra l, the means whereby the whole theog on ic process t a kes 
place in unc onvincing and inadequate. 
(5) Berdyaev's notion of man is da ring a nd forms the 
basis of the historica l proce ss . Since man is corre l ative 
with God, h i s creative histori ca l experience is meaningful 
6 
in making a contribution to the very nature of reality-. 
Yet Berdyaev seems to rob the terrestrial historical process 
of some of its meaning when he insists that it is the result .. 
of man!s sin and fall--events which took place in a pre -
existent state . 
(6) Berdyaev's view of modern history as the record 
of the testing of human freedom,. is a well-:-chosen category to 
link together_ the multifarious activities of Western man. 
s an interpretation of modern hi story it is not necessar-ily 
dependent upon Berdyaev 1 s particular epistemological and 
metaphysical views but would be equally valid linked w it ~ 
most other traditional and modern .expositions of the sig -
nificance of Christianity_. 
(7) Berdyaev 1 s analysis of the threat , to contemp ora ry 
man . is convincing in the light of recent .history. His 
diagnosi s of its cause as ly ing in the realm of the spir.itual 
receives corroboration from many other. cultural historians •. 
His pr ognosis of its dire future course has not yet been 
counteracted by the logic of events . His :- th.erapy is, _ however , 
marked by apoca lyptic vision, lacks a clear and wise grasp 
of' the issues and probabilities of the immediate .future, and 
thus is vag ue in~ its positive suggestions as to what . i s to 
be done • . 
( 8) Berdyaev 's phil osophy of history . is marked thr.ough:-
out by an effort to avoid th.e extremes of thought that ar.e 
currently manifested in the conflict between neo-orthodoxy 
I 
and naturalistic humanism . His is a constant effort . to 
mediate between man and God, fr.ee dom and grace , nature and 
supernature, time and eternity . 
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